Here Come the Black Helicopters!: UN Global Governance and the Loss of Freedom (15 page)

Transparency International defines corruption:

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. [The index] focuses on corruption in the public sector, or corruption which involves public officials, civil servants or politicians. The data sources used to compile the index include questions relating to the abuse of public power and focus on: bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and on questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in the public sector.
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Their methodology is impressive.

• They take a survey of more than seventy thousand households in ninety countries to measure “perceptions and experiences of corruption.”
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• They interview business executives who export goods and services to learn “the perceived likelihood of their firms [having to] bribe” officials in each nation to whom they sell.
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• They issue a Global Corruption Report, which explores corruption in particular sectors or spheres of government operations.
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• Finally, they conduct a “series of in-country studies providing an extensive assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the key institutions that enable good governance and integrity in a country (the executive, legislature, judicial, and anti-corruption agencies among others).”
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Based on this extensive research, Transparency International rates every nation on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning that it is highly corrupt and 10 meaning that it has quite high standards of honesty and integrity.

The results are dismal. Corruption is the order of the day in most countries of the world—the very nations that would rule any global government to which we assent!

About three-quarters of the countries of the world—132 of the 182 nations rated—received less than a 5 (on a 1–10 scale), indicating that they were badly corrupted. Ninety-two (half the countries) got a rating of 3 or less, indicating that corruption had penetrated to its very core. Only fifty of the 182 nations got better than a 5 on the corruption scale!

Here are the rankings for each country:
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Are these the nations to whom we are thinking of surrendering our sovereignty, giving them a one-nation, one-vote right to govern us and control our economies, the sea, the Internet, our industries, and many other key aspects of our lives?

But it is not just the member states of the UN that are hopelessly mired in corruption; it is the United Nations itself.

This institutional tolerance of corruption was much in evidence in the 1990s as the UN administered the Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. Established under UN auspices to channel revenues from Iraq’s carefully regulated sale of oil to provide food and medicine for its people, starving under the impact of international sanctions, the program became a poster child for corruption. The money mainly went into the pocket of the dictator, Saddam Hussein, and into those of the UN officials charged with administering the program.

The UN corruption demonstrated by the Oil-for-Food program is sickening. But worse—far worse—is the immunity and impunity of those who committed the larceny. They have not been punished or disciplined or even fired. They remain at their desks in the UN headquarters, anxious to see greater globalism enlarge their opportunities for personal enrichment and theft.

The oil-for-food program began in 1990 when the UN imposed economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein. To overturn the sanctions, Saddam worked to loosen the sanctions by pleading that they were starving his people and denying medical care to his children. So the UN decided to allow Saddam to sell limited amounts of oil to feed his people. As a result of his overt efforts to stir up sympathy for his starving people and his covert bribery of top UN officials, Saddam gradually expanded the amount of oil he could sell until the limits were ended entirely.

But the slush fund his oil profits generated found its way into the pockets of a plethora of international politicians often at the highest levels. The program included a 2.2 percent commission on each barrel of oil sold. Over the life of the oil-for-food program, the UN collected $1.9 billion in commissions on the sale of oil.
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The program was overseen by the Security Council of the UN, but subsequent investigations revealed that the leaders and UN delegates of three of the five permanent members—Russia, China, and France—were on the take, pocketing commissions as they rolled in.

• France received $4.4 billion in oil contracts.
  
• Russia received $19 billion in oil deals.
  
• Kojo Annan, the son of Kofi Annan (then UN secretary-general), received a $10 million contract.
  
• Alexander Yakovlev of Russia, senior UN procurement officer, pocketed $1 million.
  
• Benon Sevan, administrator of the oil-for-food program, received $150,000 in cash.
  
• France’s former UN ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée received $165,725 in oil allocations from Iraq.
  
• Rev. Jean-Marie Benjamin, assistant to the Vatican secretary of state, received oil allocations under the program.
  
• Charles Pasqua, former French interior minister and intimate friend of former French president Jacques Chirac, received oil allocations.
  
• The Communist Party in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church, and several Russian oil companies all received oil allocations.
  

In all, 270 separate people received oil vouchers permitting them to buy Iraqi oil at a discount and then sell it at the higher market price, pocketing the difference.

Former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, who investigated the program at the behest of the UN, said, “Corruption of the [oil-for-food] program by Saddam and many participants could not have been nearly so pervasive with more disciplined management by the United Nations.”
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Forty countries and 2,250 companies paid bribes to Saddam under oil-for-food to receive favorable treatment.

No UN official has been criminally prosecuted for bribes or any other crime stemming from the oil-for-food program.

This is the record of corruption at the United Nations. Who can doubt that if the Law of the Sea Treaty is ratified, the billions in oil royalties that flow through the UN will not open the door to the same kind of systematic and universal graft that characterized the oil-for-food program?

New opportunities for corruption-without-consequence are emerging from the initiatives for global governance. If the UN is to administer a vast fund to redistribute wealth to the third world, tax oil royalties from offshore drilling, regulate the Internet, and tax financial transactions and the like, the kleptocracies that make up much of the UN membership can only lick their chops in anticipation.

But won’t the UN enforce rules against corruption as it acquires more power? History indicates that it will do nothing at all to clean up its act.

Indeed, the tendency toward corruption—and the blind eye the UN leadership turned to it—that was evident in the 1990s only accelerated with the start of the new millennium.

In 2005, a huge scandal ripped the UN Procurement Department, which was responsible for all purchases made by the organization. Alexander Yakovlev, the head of the department, pled guilty to federal charges of wire fraud, racketeering, and money laundering. Working with his fellow Russian Vladimir Kuznetsov, the head of the UN Budget Oversight Committee, he tipped off bidders for contracts with inside information in return for bribes. Paul Volcker estimated that the Russians made off with $950,000 in bribes and helped contractors win more than $79 million in UN contracts.
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A year later, the FBI broke up a drug ring operating right out of the UN mailroom that had smuggled 25 tons of illegal drugs into the United States in 2005–2006.
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But what is exceptional about the Yakovlev case and the FBI investigation are not the crimes the UN officials committed, but the fact that they were punished. The case against Yakovlev was brought by the US attorney for the area in which the UN is physically located. The UN not only has never prosecuted one of its own for stealing or anything else, it totally lacks the ability even to try to do so. Such prosecutions of UN officials as the US attorney can bring are the only means of holding UN personnel legally accountable. But these cases are rare because the UN organization systematically hides evidence and permits its delegates to conceal their larceny behind diplomatic immunity.

Volcker complained about what he called “the culture of inaction” that surrounds the UN’s efforts at reform. Indeed, the anti-corruption agency at the international body, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OSIS), can only investigate UN agencies with their permission. Its funding for these inquiries must come from the budgets of the agencies it investigates. David M. Walker, comptroller-general of the United States, said that “UN funding arrangements constrain OIOS’s ability to operate independently. . . . OIOS depends on the resources of the funds, programs, and other entities it audits. The managers of these programs can deny OIOS permission to perform work or not pay OIOS for services.”
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