Hellcats (23 page)

The
Bonefish
pressed on, her crew tense—these were not friendly waters and the mines they were hunting weren't dummies. Edge, too, wiped sweaty palms on his khaki trouser legs. Then: “Mine contact!” The first strong, clear-toned contact of the morning. Range 250 yards. Then another, almost dead ahead. Other mines on the line began to show up at regularly spaced intervals and then all along the same line where the first two had been contacted. Hell's bells' clear, sharp ringing tone and the distinct, bright, and evenly spaced green pears on the PPI left no doubt that these contacts were Japanese mines, not fish. In his top secret report to Lockwood, Edge noted, “The tones were so clear and bell-like that all other contacts, of which there were many, could not compare and caused no confusion.”
⁷

Edge experimented with the FMS, varying the ship's speed to see if it had any effect on the contacts' range or tone. It didn't. For the remainder of the day Edge ran the
Bonefish
through gaps in the line and along the line itself, plotting the layout of the single and double rows.

Edge tried to determine the depths at which the mines had been planted, but couldn't establish anything definite. He upped the scope while submerged to get a glimpse of the mines, trying to determine their depth, but the murky water limited his visibility. Aside from that, the
Bonefish
was never closer than two hundred feet from the line. Varying the sub's depth changed the size of the blobs on the PPI, but not their tone, range, or clarity. Based on this experiment, Edge believed that most of the mines had been planted shallowly.

Confronted with data that seemed to confirm this belief, Edge casually commented in his report, “It is also interesting to note that Bonefish, in proceeding to assigned area . . . on 12 April, 1945, while on the surface, crossed this same mine line at about 19 miles from its NE end without incident and with beautiful bliss.”

Plotting resumed the next day. Edge concluded that the minefield was forty-seven miles long, with fifteen mines per mile, and that its double rows were 150 yards apart. The exercise revealed how accurate FMS plotting could be in the hands of expert operators and how its sensitivity and flawless performance could instill a feeling of confidence in a submarine's crew.

The data collected by Edge and the other skippers of FMS subs sent north by Lockwood, along with the intelligence developed by ICPOA, would provide the Operation Barney submarines with, if not a perfect picture of what lay hidden in the Tsushima Strait, a picture that would prove to be remarkably accurate.

 

 

Mine recon completed, Edge moved
north to patrol near Quelpart. Early in the morning, tracking what he thought were luggers, Edge almost stumbled into a trap set by two destroyer escorts. The DEs had the
Bonefish
boxed in between themselves and a pair of islands off the coast of Kyushu. Rather than tangle with these ships, Edge pulled away at flank speed to outrun them. The DEs were fast, faster than the
Bonefish
, and, closing in, they opened fire, forcing her down.

From early morning until early afternoon, Edge heard strong echo-ranging and counted

Two days later the
Bonefish
came close to another run-in with one of the depth-charge-dropping DEs. This time Edge kept his distance, remarking that their “treatment at his hands was too fresh for us to feel like playing with him again.”

Harry Greer's warning about near-saturation antisubmarine patrols had proven correct. In the closing days of the patrol Edge recorded fifty-five contacts with Japanese patrol boats, escorts, and planes in the lower Tsushima Strait area. Later, endorsing Edge's patrol report, Division Commander Louis Chappell said it all.

Edge at last found time
to work on the letter to Sarah he had started weeks earlier.

In San Diego, Lockwood had
received reports on the
Seahorse
's excellent mine recon and near-fatal run-in with Japanese patrol boats. Then from the
Bonefish
came Edge's radio message outlining the stunning success he'd had plotting mines off Danjo Gunto. Lockwood was flush with pride over the two skippers' work. He was proud, too, that he'd not wavered in his belief that FMS held the key to Operation Barney's success and that it was the best of the competing sonar systems he and his colleagues had come to the West Coast to evaluate. Even the
Seahorse
's plight—he was relieved that she'd made it back at all and impressed with the performance turned in by Greer and his crew (there'd be medals for everyone)—didn't slow his drive to get the operation under way on time. Another sub, the USS
Sea Dog
(SS-401), and her fine skipper, now on their way to Guam from a war patrol, would have to take the
Seahorse
's place.

Despite all the unfinished business awaiting his return to Guam, Lockwood relished the three days he'd spent at sea testing sonar systems aboard the
Flying Fish
with her skipper, Robert D. Risser of Chariton, Iowa, and aboard the
Redfin
with its CO, Commander Charles K. Miller. Lockwood had been joined by Harnwell and Henderson, as well as officers, scientists, and electronics specialists from other research facilities and Navy bureaus. Lockwood had also brought along George Pierce of the
Tunny
, who, with his firsthand experience running minefields, could explain the practical side of the business.

The tests conducted off the coast of California were exhaustive and exciting for naval officers and landsmen alike; it was an adventure in submarining and mine-detecting procedures some had never had before and might never have again. The tests proved conclusively that FMS worked better than the other competing systems, which had major drawbacks in their operation, display, maintenance, and especially sensitivity. In the end, Lockwood had his way: FMS was what he wanted and what he got. There was no turning back; he'd staked everything on FMS and it had come through for him when it had to.

In an interesting footnote to these tests, Frank Watkins in Washington sent a letter to Lockwood that must have pleased the admiral no end.

“SORG has submitted a study of British Mine-Detection results to Cominch,” wrote Watkins. “This study reputedly shows that British subs can do a fine job of mine detection. They conclude the study with a recommendation that British subs run interference for you thru Tsushima to chart the fields.

“Their study is based upon operational reports which show mine detection successes. Unfortunately, they do not have reports of the
unsuccessful
runs.”

 

 

Before returning to Pearl Harbor
and then Guam, Lockwood told Risser, CO of the
Flying Fish
, to unload the test gear and swap it for FMS, then get his sub out to Guam as soon as possible. It was already May and Risser's crew would need all the training they could handle; the other subs Lockwood had selected to take part in Barney were beginning to assemble in Guam.

Flying west from California, Lockwood consulted a list of his Barney skippers, looking for the man among them who could lead the operation. Every skipper on the list had the necessary experience. They had also proven that they wouldn't buckle under pressure. They were an aggressive and tenacious lot, each man equipped with a sub commander's most valuable asset: brass balls. Lockwood may have had in mind a man like Dudley Morton of
Wahoo
fame, but without his dash and his propensity for taking risks. The man he was looking for had to have something special: maturity. Running a finger over his list, Lockwood came to a name, stopped, and put a check mark next to it. He had his man.