God: The Failed Hypothesis (4 page)

The following three are examples of multiple-attribute disproofs:

A Perfect Creator Cannot Exist

1. If God exists, then he is perfect.

2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.

3. If a being is perfect, then whatever he creates must be perfect.

4. But the universe is not perfect.

5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe.

6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist
¹⁸
.

A Transcendent Being Cannot Be Omnipresent

1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).

2. If God exists, he is omnipresent.

3. To be transcendent, a being cannot exist anywhere in space.

4. To be omnipresent, a being must exist everywhere in space.

5. Hence it is impossible for a transcendent being to be omnipresent.

6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist
¹⁹
.

A Personal Being Cannot Be Nonphysical

1. If God exists, then he is nonphysical.

2. If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being).

3. A person (or personal being) needs to be physical.

4. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist
²⁰
.

Finally, here is an example of a single-attribute disproof:

The Paradox of Omnipotence

1. Either God can create a stone that he cannot lift, or he cannot create a stone that he cannot lift.

2. If God can create a stone that he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotent.

3. If God cannot create a stone that he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotent.

4. Therefore, God is not omnipotent
²¹
.

The reader will undoubtedly see much in these bare formal statements that needs clarification; again I address you to the original essays for details and additional disproofs of this kind. Like most philosophical discussions, it mainly comes down to the meanings of words and assembling them into coherent, consistent statements. The philosophers who formulated these disproofs have been careful about defining the terms used, while those who dispute them will generally disagree with those definitions or the way they have been interpreted. As a result, the debate continues.

Ways Out

Ways out of purely logical arguments can always be found, simply by relaxing one or more of the premises or, as noted, one of the definitions. For example, assume God is not omnibenevolent.

Indeed, the God of the more conservative elements of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam that take their scriptures literally can hardly be called omnibenevolent—or even very benevolent. No one reading the Bible or Qur’an literally can possibly regard the God described therein as all-good. We will see examples later, but for now the reader is invited to simply pick up an Old Testament or Qu’ran, open to a random page, and read for a while. It will not take you long to find an act or statement of God that you find inconsistent with your own concepts of what is good. And, as we will also see, much in the Gospel can hardly be called “good.”

In any event, the scientific case is not limited to an omnibenevolent, omniscient, or omnipotent god.

The scientific method incorporates a means to adjudicate disputes that otherwise might run in circles, never converging as dis-putants on all sides of an issue continually redefine and refine their language. In science we are able to break out of this vicious cycle by calling upon empirical observations as the final judge. Of course, ways out of the scientific arguments can also be achieved by redefining God or by disputing the empirical facts. The reader will simply have to judge for herself whether the examples present are convincing.

Models and Theories

Science is not just a matter of making observations but also developing models to describe those observations. In fact, philosophers have pointed out that any observation or measurement we make in science depends on some model or theory. They assert that all observations are “theory-laden.” For example, when we measure the time it takes for a particle to move from one point to another we must first assume a model in which particles are visualized as moving in space and time. The model must begin by defining space and time.

The use of models, which are simplified pictures of observations, is not limited to the professional practice of science. They are often used to deal with the ordinary problems of life. For example, we model the sun as an orb rising in the east and setting in the west. Travelers heading to the west can point themselves each day in the direction of the setting sun and, correcting for some northward or southward drift (depending on season), arrive safely at their destination. No additional elements to the model are needed—in particular, no metaphysics. The ancient Greeks viewed the sun as the gold-helmeted god Apollo, driving a golden chariot across the sky. The ancient Chinese thought it was a golden bird. Neither metaphysical model offers any additional aid to our travelers in their navigation. And, that lack of necessity in the absence of any other evidence testifies strongly for the nonexistence of such a god or golden bird.

While utilizing models is a normal process in everyday life, scientific models objectify and, whenever possible, quantify the procedure—thus providing a rational means for distinguishing between what works and what does not. Whenever possible, mathematics and logic are used as tools to enforce a consistency that is not always found in commonplace statements, which are formulated in the vernacular. For example, instead of saying that your blood pressure is probably high, a physician will measure it and give you two numbers, say, 130 over 100. Then he might prescribe some calculated amount of medication to bring the 100 down to 80.

Scientific instruments that enhance the power of our senses commonly yield quantifiable measurements, enabling scientists to deal with variables having numerical values upon which all observers can agree—within equally quantifiable measurement errors. While some sciences may deal with nonnumerical variables, physical models are almost always quantitative and the logical power of mathematics is put to great use in their utilization.

Most scientific models begin by defining their observables operationally, that is, by characterizing them in terms of a well-prescribed, repeatable measuring procedure. For example (as Einstein emphasized), time is defined as what you read on a clock.

Temperature is what you read on a thermometer. Specific instruments are chosen as standards. A mathematical framework is then formulated that defines other variables as functions of the observables and postulates connections between these quantities.

The term
model
usually applies to the preliminary stages of a scientific process when considerable testing and further work still need to be done. The “theories” that arise from this effort are not the unsupported speculations that they are often accused of being by those unfamiliar with the scientific method or by those wishing to demean it. To be accepted into the ranks of scientific knowledge, theories must demonstrate their value by passing numerous, risky empirical tests and by showing themselves to be useful. Theories that fail these tests, or do not prove useful, are discarded.

In this book we will make frequent reference to the
standard models
of fundamental physics and cosmology. By now these have sufficiently advanced to the level where they can be honestly recognized as standard
theories,
although their prior designations as models continue to be used in the literature, presumably to maintain familiarity. I find it amusing and ironic that opponents of evolution think they are undermining it by calling it “just a theory.”

The validity of the scientific method is justified by its immense success. However, we must recognize and acknowledge that scientific models and theories, no matter how well established, are still human contrivances and subject to change by future developments. This is in contrast to revelations from God, which should be true unconditionally and not subject to revi-sion. Furthermore, the elements of scientific models, especially at the deepest level of quantum phenomena, need not correspond precisely to the elements of whatever “true reality” is out there beyond the signals we receive with our senses and instruments.

We can never know when some new model will come along that surpasses the old one. We regard such a happening as the welcome progress of science rather than some disastrous revolution that tears down the whole prior edifice, rendering it worthless.

For example, despite a common misunderstanding, the models of Newtonian mechanics were hardly rendered useless by the twin twentieth-century developments of relativity and quantum mechanics. Newtonian physics continue to find major application in contemporary science and technology. It is still what most students learn in physics classes and what most engineers and others use when they apply physics in their professions.

Perhaps quarks and electrons are not real, although they are part of the highly successful standard model of particle physics. We cannot say. But we can say, with high likelihood, that some of the elements of older models, such as the ether, are not part of the real world. And, while we cannot prove that every variety of god or spirit does not exist in a world beyond the senses, we have no more rational basis for including them than we have for assuming that the sun is a god driving a chariot across the sky. Furthermore, we can proceed to put our models to practical use without ever settling any metaphysical questions. Metaphysics has surprisingly little use and would not even be worth discussing if we did not have this great desire to understand ultimate reality as best as we can.

The ingredients of scientific models are not limited to those supported by direct observation. For example, the standard model of elementary particles and forces contains objects such as
quarks,
the presumed constituents of atomic nuclei, which have never been seen as free particles. In fact, the theory in its current form requires that they
not
be free. The observation of a free quark would falsify that aspect of the standard model, although nicely confirm the quark idea itself.

Indeed, the development of models in physics is often motivated by considerations of logical and mathematical beauty, such as symmetry principles. But they still must be tested against observations.

Astronomical models include black holes, which can only be observed indirectly. Cosmological models include dark matter and dark energy, which remain unidentified at this writing but are inferred from the data. The models currently used in modern physics, astronomy, and cosmology are solidly grounded on direct observations and have survived the most intensive empirical testing. By virtue of this success, they can be used to make inferences that are surely superior to speculations simply pulled out of thin air.

Physicists generally speak as if the unobserved elements of their models, such as quarks, are “real” particles. However, this is a metaphysical assumption that they have no way of verifying and, indeed, have no real need (or desire) to do so. The models of physics and their unobserved elements are human inventions and represent the best we can do in describing objective reality.

When a model successfully describes a wide range of observations, we can be confident that the elements of those models have something to do with whatever reality is out there, but less confident that they constitute reality itself.

On the other hand, if a model does not work there is no basis to conclude that any unique element of that model is still part of reality. An example is the electromagnetic ether, which was discussed earlier.

Having read this, please do not assume that the doctrine of
postmodernism
is being promoted here. Science is decidedly not just another cultural narrative. The science referred to is called “Western science,” which was developed originally by Europeans utilizing mathematical insights from India (the concept of “zero”), the Arab world (numerals, algebra), and other cultures.

Peoples in all but the most primitive societies now utilize science.

While we might consider science another “cultural narrative,” it differs from other cultural narratives because of its superior power, utility, and universality.

Modeling God

Everyone involved in discourses on the existence of gods may be well advised to consider the approach outlined above. Like quarks, the gods are human inventions based on human concepts. Whether or not we can say if the gods people talk about have anything to do with whatever objective reality is out there depends on the empirical success of the models that are built around these hypothetical entities. Whatever a god’s true nature, if one exists, a god model remains the best we can do in talking about that god.

If we accept this procedure, then we can eliminate a whole class of objections that are made to types of logical and scientific arguments formulated in this book. In these arguments, God is assumed to have certain attributes. The theologian may ask: how can we mere mortals know about the true nature of a god who lies beyond our sensibilities? The answer is that we do not need to know—just as physicists do not need to know the ultimate reality behind quarks. Physicists are satisfied that they have a model, which currently includes quarks, that agrees beautifully with the data. The quark model is empirically grounded. It represents the best we humans have been able to do thus far in describing whatever objective reality underlies nuclear and subnuclear observations. Whether quarks are real or not does not change this. Whether any of the objects of scientific models are real or not does not change the fact that those models have immense utility. This includes Newtonian physics, despite the further developments of twentieth-century relativity and quantum mechanics.

Analogously, if a particular god model successfully predicts empirical results that cannot be accounted for by any other known means, then we would be rational in tentatively concluding that the model describes some aspect of an objective reality without being forced to prove that god really is as described in the details of the model.