France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (81 page)

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Authors: William I. Hitchcock

Tags: #History, #Europe, #France, #Western, #Modern, #20th Century, #Political Science, #Security (National & International), #test

BOOK: France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954
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Page 252
Poncet to Quai, May 7, 1953, same file; Maurice Schumann to François-Poncet, May 7, 1953, same file.
38. For a good sumary of the Saar negotiations see "The Saar Problem," November 18, 1953, State Department paper,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 84151.
39. Clesse,
Le projet de CED,
13743. On Bidault's defense of the EDC in the debate, see Dalloz,
Georges Bidault,
32026.
40. Minutes, Second Plenary Tripartite Meeting, December 5, 1953,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 177485. For Eisenhower's account, see his
The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 19531956,
24246. Churchill clearly had not heeded the "Steering Brief for Bermuda" prepared by the Foreign Office, which stated that "nothing should be done to hamper or embarrass the French Government in securing the ratification of the EDC early in the New Year. This means that there should be no appearance of further pressure on the French Government" (November 17, 1953, PRO, PREM 11/418).
41. Third Plenary Tripartite Meeting, December 6, 1953,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 1794806. For French documentation, see MAE, Europe 194955, Généralités, vol. 148*, esp. the telegram of December 8, 1953, from Bidault to the Quai summarizing the EDC debate at Bermuda. Dulles made hints about this "agonizing reappraisal" line when speaking privately to Laniel just before leaving Bermuda (Memorandum of Conversation, December 8, 1953,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 184344). On the notion that Dulles's comments to the NAC of December 14 were largely bluff, see Duchin, "The 'Agonizing Reappraisal.'"
42. Massigli reported Eden's lack of optimism on January 8, 1954; and Bonnet on January 9 wrote that Dulles had no faith that Molotov would be willing to give up East Germany. Bérard reported on January 19 that Adenauer too believed the conference would fail due to Soviet intransigence. Meanwhile, a January 20 memorandum from the Office of Eastern European Affairs in the Quai stated plainly that "nothing indicates the Soviets are willing to negotiate seriously on Germany" (all in MAE, Europe 194955, Généralités, vol. 150*).
43. For C.D. Jackson's comment, see letter to Marie McCrum, February 1, 1954, in Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson Papers, box 27. Molotov "practically wooed Bidault in public," Jackson wrote. For Dulles's report on Berlin to Eisenhower, see National Security Council minutes, February 26, 1954, Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC series, box 5; Dulles here praised Bidault, saying he "had done a much better job than Eden," and "behaved courageously, as one who had burned his bridges behind him." Also Dulles in Berlin to Eisenhower, February 1, 1954, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter series, box 2. French minutes of the Berlin Conference are in MAE, Europe 194955, Généralités, vols. 151*, 152* and 153*. Jean Chauvel, a frequent correspondent with Bidault, thought the failure of Berlin good for France, as it would solidify the Western Alliance and reinforce French standing in NATO (Chauvel to Bidault, February 24, 1954, Bidault papers, AN, 457 AP, box 44). For Eden's account, see
Full Circle,
5376.
44. Dulles to Bidault, February 24, 1954, and Bidault to Dulles, March 7, 1954, in Bidault papers, AN, 457 AP, box 36; also in
FRUS, 195254,
5: 87980 and 89496, respectively.
 
Page 253
45. On the developments in the Saar negotiations and U.S. pressure on Adenauer, see Dulles to Embassy in Britain, January 13, 1954,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 87273; Dulles to Embassy in Britain, February 27, 1954, ibid., 88082; Bruce to State, March 21, 1954, ibid., 9014; Dillon to State, March 22, 1954, ibid., 9069; Dillon to State, March 24, 1954, ibid., 91112.
46. Dillon to State, March 23, 1954,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 91011; Dillon to State, March 24, 1954, ibid., 91315; Conant to State, March 24, 1954, ibid., 91517; Dulles to Bidault, March 24, 1954, ibid., 91718; Bérard,
Un ambassadeur se souvient,
52326.
47. National Security Council minutes, March 4, 1954, Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, NSC series, box 5; and Acting Secretary Smith to Dillon, March 6, 1954,
FRUS, 195254,
5: 89294. British assurances to the French on the EDC were somewhat more precise: the British minister would attend EDC Council meetings; Britain would keep its forces on the continent as long as the security of Europe was threatened; and Britain would keep an armored division on the continent closely integrated with the EDC (March 10, 1954, PRO, PREM/618).
48. Report of the U.S. Joint Military Mission to Indochina, July 15, 1953 (O'Daniel Report), NARA, Decimal File 711. 5851G, box 3214.
49. U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Saigon to Commander in Chief, Pacific, NARA, Decimal File 751G. 5/10-3153, October 31, 1953; "Progress Report on military situation in Indochina as of Nov. 19, 1953," Papers of the Policy Planning Staff, NARA, RG 59, Lot 64 D 563, box 18. On the strategy behind the choice of Dien Bien Phu, see Lloyd Gardner,
Approaching Vietnam,
15156. On the evolution of the Navarre plan, see Devillers and Lacouture,
End of a War,
3459.
50. Devillers and Lacouture,
End of a War,
6070.
51. For a thorough review of the issue of Franco-American discussions over possible U.S. air intervention, see Herring and Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles and Dien Bien Phu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited"; and on FrancoAmerican relations in Indochina since 1952, Wall,
The United States and the Making of Postwar France,
24662.
52. Devillers and Lacouture,
End of a War,
23237; Randle,
Geneva, 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War,
26785; Dalloz,
Bidault,
36778. Herring provides a valuable summary in
America's Longest War,
342. For an internal assessment of the Geneva negotiations up to the end of June, including discussion of the secret talks, see
Note au sujet de la Conférence de Genève sur l'Indochine,
MAE, Europe 194955, Généralités, vol. 154*.
53. For the debate, see
L'année politique,
1954, 38390. Mendès France's record against the war in Indochina was quite consistent, as Lacouture shows (
Pierre Mendès France,
17592). Also see Ruscio, "Le mendésisme et l'Indochine."
54. On Mendès France's tactics, see Lacouture,
Mendès France,
316; and for a colorful and insightful account of the events from the start of the Geneva conference until Laniel's fall, see Elgey,
La République des contradictions,
61938.
55. Two collections testify to Mendès France's growing historical legacy:

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