For Honour's Sake (15 page)

“If the Orders-in-Council were revoked,” Foster asked, “would peace be restored?”

Their revocation, Madison replied, and a “promise of negotiation given on the question of impressment … would suffice.” Great Britain, he added, “could not perhaps do more on the latter at present than offer to negotiate.” Foster pressed whether such a move by the British government would result in an immediate armistice, but Madison demurred that such a decision was the responsibility of Congress and could not be made until its next sitting. If the president unilaterally announced cessation of all military operations pending negotiations, Foster said he could guarantee that Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commanding the British fleet at Halifax, would reciprocate. Madison responded coldly that the war declaration granted the presidency a specific mandate that must be carried out without compromise or modification.

Frustrated by Madison's alternating passive and aggressive tactics, Foster observed that the orders-in-council had been rendered pointless by the fact that now that America was at war scarcely a neutral nation remained; every country was pretty much aligned either with Britain or
with France. Foster feared that the United States would now see fit to formally align with Bonaparte.

Madison countered this concern by asking whether Portugal and Spain were not bound by treaties to fight alongside Britain. “Not against the United States,” Foster replied, but did America plan to invade Florida? Foster wrote of Madison's reply: “The President observed the Executive could not well be justified in stopping any expeditions which might have been undertaken at a time when perhaps alone they could be successful. It seemed indeed evident that he was decided to take Florida if he could, and for purposes of defense that something else might be done, probably Fort Malden taken.” That the Americans intended to clear the British out of Fort Malden, near Detroit, was worrisome because that was the first natural step toward an invasion of Upper Canada.

The meeting ended coolly. Outside the president's office, Foster was taken aside by Monroe. The secretary of state promised he would meet informally with Baker and receive any communications from Foster through him. Thus, a thin line of formal communication was preserved, but with Atlantic crossing time averaging five to six weeks it was a tortuously slow path.
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Madison and his administration were classically caught on the horns of a dilemma of their own making. While seeking to avoid hostilities that might render peaceful settlement impossible, there was the at least equally pressing need to initiate operations intended to win victory. Yet, while rushing toward war, neither Congress nor the president had done much to enable the nation to wage one effectively.

The 35,603-man army Congress had approved existed only on paper. On June 6, War Secretary Dr. William Eustis had reported to Congress that the regular army numbered just 6,744 officers and men, with another 5,000 having been raised under the authorization to increase the army by 25,000 soldiers. Most of these troops were poorly trained and their officers either equally inexperienced or elderly veterans of the Revolutionary War.
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Theoretically the various state militias could supplement this total, but Congress had refused Madison the power to force militiamen to serve beyond American borders.
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Congress's gutting of the navy bill left that service in even more parlous straits. Five frigates were in service and another five listing in harbours awaiting repairs. Additionally the navy could boast a mere three sloops, seven brigs, and sixty-two coastal gunboats. The latter were useless for anything beyond limited harbour defence. The navy mustered 4,000 seamen and 1,800 marines.

Given the paucity of ships and sailors, Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton's inclination had been to preserve what he had by laying up all the ships in safe harbours. But Madison scotched that idea. He told Hamilton “not to despair of our navy; that though its numbers were small … it would do its duty.”
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That said, no naval strategy was agreed upon before war was declared.

When Madison donned his little military hat on June 18 and visited the Navy Office, he told Hamilton to grant Commodore John Rodgers and Capt. Stephen Decatur “every belligerent right.” These orders were rushed to New York City, where the thirty-nine-year-old Rodgers, who was the senior officer, “ten minutes after the receipt of … instructions … put to sea” intent on pursuing a British convoy out of Jamaica reportedly consisting of 100 merchantmen protected by a thin screen of warships. Rodgers had five ships: the frigates
President, United States,
and
Congress,
the sloop
Hornet,
and the brig
Argus.
Departing with such haste, the commodore was well out to sea when a more detailed set of orders arrived instructing him to sail northward with
President
and
Hornet
from the Virginia capes while Decatur headed southward from New York with the other three ships. Their joint purpose was to protect from Royal Navy seizure American merchantmen bound for U.S. ports.
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This revised order had emanated on Sunday, June 21, from Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, who knew that a great number of vessels bearing between one and one and a half million dollars of imports were to arrive over the next four weeks. The navy's primary mission, he argued, must be to protect these ships, orders that “ought to have been sent yesterday … at all events, not one day longer ought to be lost.”
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Madison listened, issuing orders early Monday morning to “afford to our returning commerce all possible protection—nationally and individually.”
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But
Rodgers and the fleet were long gone, so there was nothing Madison could do until he decided to return to port. Failure to agree on a naval strategy prior to hostilities had given Rodgers opportunity to do as he pleased, which perfectly suited the impetuous and daring sailor.

Planning for land operations had proceeded little better. Although congressmen like Henry Clay had boasted that Canada could be quickly and easily conquered, nobody had bothered to draft a real invasion strategy. No team of staff officers was assigned to the War Office to undertake such planning. Eustis, with only a dozen civilian staff, held a dizzying array of responsibilities that included being quartermaster general, commissary general, Indian commissioner, and commissioner of public lands.
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A civilian, Eustis's only military experience was as a surgeon during the Revolutionary War.

The senior military officer was sixty-one-year-old Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn, who had seen no action since the Revolution. Although his appointment to command of the Northern Department on January 27, 1812, was more due to political connections than past military record, responsibility for conducting land operations fell on his shoulders. With more verve than an eye for tactics, intelligence, or logistics, Dearborn envisioned a three-pronged invasion of Canada. In April, he submitted a formal plan to Madison and Eustis. A main column would advance on Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, while another struck along the Niagara River and the third swept out of Fort Detroit across Upper Canada. The latter force would be commanded by Brig. Gen. William Hull, governor of Michigan Territory, who had been persuaded by Madison to take a regular army commission for this purpose. No timetable coordinating the three offensives was developed, so it was assured that each would be launched independently of the others.

Hull had accepted his appointment on April 9 and received immediate instructions from Madison to “repair with as little delay as possible to Detroit.”
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He responded that the many American inhabitants of Upper Canada would welcome his army as liberators. All agreed that the conquest of Canada would more than offset any gains the British might win with their supremacy at sea.
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Former president Thomas Jefferson offered regular counsel to his friend and successor Madison.
“The acquisition of Canada this year as far as the neighbourhood of Quebec,” he said, “will be a mere matter of marching.”
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In truth, nobody knew what American forces would face once they crossed the border into Canada. The lack of intelligence was such that estimates of British troop strength were grossly understated while the naval presence on the North American station was equally inflated. Although Britain had almost 700 warships at sea, including 260 ships of the line and frigates, in North American waters there were only 3 ships of the line, 23 frigates, and 53 sloops, brigs, and schooners. These were spread out across the seas from the West Indies to Halifax to Newfoundland.
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For the defence of Canada, Lt. Gen. and Governor in Chief Sir George Prevost had roughly 5,600 regulars. Only about 1,200 of these were stationed in Upper Canada and they were scattered across a string of small garrisons. While on paper the militia in Lower Canada numbered an impressive 60,000, Prevost considered them “a mere posse, ill armed and without discipline.” In Upper Canada, there was potential to call up 10,000 militiamen, but Prevost believed only 4,000 trustworthy enough to consider arming. The rest might as likely desert to the Americans and turn their guns against the redcoats.
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The British could also depend on some support from native tribes, but to what extent was hard to predict. Before returning to Britain in October of 1811 to attend to urgent personal business, Upper Canada's lieutenant governor Francis Gore reported on the strengths and allegiances of the various tribes that might be brought to the battlefield. Gore's report illustrated that the British could expect limited support from the tribes remaining in Lower Canada, while the existence of Tecumseh's confederacy on the western frontier could provide a significant number of warriors.

In Lower Canada, the once great Iroquois presence had largely been expunged by wars and disease. Just three villages remained. Two of these were dependent on “Presents and Supplies from the Government Stores at Montreal.” Gore believed the warriors there, about half the total available, would stand by the Crown. The Iroquois at St. Regis were more dubious, as that village was “placed immediately on the frontier line, which divides Lower Canada, from the United States of America, and receiving
from the American Government, an Annual Pension for Lands conceded, which they probably would not wish to forfeit. Some of them are known to be disaffected; we might however rely on half of them. These three Villages can muster 500 Warriors brave and active. They are all Christians, and have a Church in each of their Villages.” Although several other tribes were scattered in small numbers elsewhere in Lower Canada, Gore discounted them as being Christians who had lost their warlike ways.

Things looked much better in Upper Canada. Clustered near York and Niagara were mostly Mohawk and Mississauga that he considered “at the Governor's devotion.” They had also fought well and hard against the Americans in the Revolutionary War and could provide about 350 warriors for this fight. On the frontier dwelt a great confederacy of peoples including Miami, Wyandot, Shawnee, Potomac, and Delaware that drew “their Annual Presents at the Garrison of Amherstburg despite living on the American side of the border. They have no attachment to the Americans.” This, Gore said, was because of Indiana governor William Harrison's attack on Tippecanoe. He estimated that the confederacy painstakingly built by Tecumseh could deliver about 3,000 warriors. Added to this were 700 Ottawa warriors—”a very warlike tribe”—living near Lake Huron and Lake Michigan and the Fox and Sac peoples living between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi River. The Fox and Sac could raise about 500 warriors. These three tribes all drew supplies and presents from the British at Fort St. Joseph and were judged loyal.

Gore estimated all the warriors in Lower Canada, Upper Canada, and out on the frontier at about 5,300. He also thought it possible to lure the Sioux, who controlled the lands lying between the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, into joining the British in a war against the United States. Their lands, after all, would be next up for occupation by the American pioneers once the Ohio was overrun. The Sioux were “well trained under their War Chiefs,” and could easily provide 3,000 warriors—a potent force indeed.
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Whether they would march so far to make war, however, was uncertain.

While Gore had found comfort in the idea of anywhere up to 8,300 warriors rallying to fight the Americans, Prevost showed no inclination to include them in his plans. The governor intended no offensive
operations against the Americans and saw no defensive role for these warriors. Prevost fervently desired to avoid a fight altogether. Having assumed responsibility for governing all British colonies and territories on the western side of the Atlantic on September 13, 1811, Prevost brought to the job a distinguished military record and a reputation as an able administrator. But he was one for conciliation wherever possible and could countenance nothing as rash as America invading Canada for such trivial reasons as Madison had cited in his war declaration. War promised calamity and cost for both belligerents and was to be averted until diplomatic negotiations resolved the current dispute.

Prevost's parents were Swiss Protestants who came by their British citizenship because of his father's service as one of the many Swiss officers enlisted for service in the Royal American Regiment of Foot. Born in New Jersey on May 19, 1767, Prevost was raised in a household where French was spoken more than English. Educated at schools in England and on the continent, the already worldly young man took a commission in 1783. War with France brought rapid advancement. Twice wounded in the campaign to repel French invaders from the West Indies island of St. Vincent, then Lieutenant Colonel Prevost was promoted to a colonelcy and granted a wartime appointment to brigadier general. Facility in French contributed to Prevost's assignment as governor of St. Lucia after its conquest. Adopting a conciliatory manner, Prevost proved a popular governor who ran the island ably until its return to the French with the 1802 Treaty of Amiens. With war's renewal in 1805, Prevost successfully defended Dominica from French invasion and was promoted to major general and granted a baronetcy. The
Chesapeake
affair brought his transfer to Nova Scotia in the spring of 1808 to assume command of the troops there and also to take over as the lieutenant governor. From there it was a natural step up the career ladder to his new responsibilities in 1811.
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