Find, Fix, Finish (39 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Beyond Pakistan, Yemen in recent years has become a growing concern for American policymakers. The Fort Hood shootings, the attempted Christmas Day 2009 bombing, and the October 2010 cargo plane attacks were all traced back to the unstable nation. However, these terror attempts, while potentially lethal, are not yet on the level and complexity of the plots emanating from Pakistan. Yemen is a failed state and a definite cause of concern. But Pakistan is a country of nearly 200 million people—almost ten times the size of Yemen—with a much greater global reach. If Pakistan implodes it would become a menace to the US of a wholly different order.
Deploying elite forces, however effective, is not a substitute for a reasonably articulated counterterrorism strategy.
During a decade of asymmetric conflicts, special military forces, backed with overwhelming air power, have fought in a multitude of different environments. Further, one of the great successes of the last decade has been the strengthening of the relationship between the military and intelligence services when combating threats.
During a decade of asymmetric conflicts, special military forces, backed with overwhelming air power, have fought in a multitude of different environments. Further, one of the great successes of the last decade has been the strengthening of the relationship between the military and intelligence services when combating threats.
However, these special units cannot address nation-building issues on their own without the rest of government providing a large measure of support. Ultimately, the use of special forces as a lethal counterterrorism force—mostly though the auspices of JSOC and its 5,000 personnel—and the preeminent national military resource carries its own set of challenges, both in the way the combat is conducted and in the manner in which policymakers utilize these forces in the conflicts of the future.
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America will likely shelve the model of full-scale ground invasion of ramshackle nations for a generation or longer, given the recent US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, the US military’s role has significantly expanded in the last decade to include not only fighting America’s wars but also maintaining America’s peacekeeping obligations, nation building, and other quasi-diplomatic missions. The niche roles that these special military forces occupy may draw away the best and brightest people at the expense of other critical missions. JSOC may be “the instrument of choice,” according to one Pentagon official in September 2010, but it is the regular military units that are doing much of the hard work of rebuilding Afghanistan.
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By placing the hunter-killers in a vaunted position, the US military as a whole may be weighting their efforts more heavily than the efforts of the rest of the armed forces. Even though elite troops are asked to perform a spectrum of issues beyond capturing and killing terrorists, the trigger pullers alone get the glory. This is some cause for concern, as retired Special Forces officer Mark Haselton commented: “If we spend the rest of our lives ‘capturing and killing’ terrorists at the expense of those SF missions that are more important—gaining access to the local population, training indigenous forces, providing expertise and expanding capacity—we’re doomed to failure.”
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Trends in military spending highlight the growth of Special Forces: Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) budget has been increased from $3.8 billion to almost $10 billion over the last decade.
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And the Special Forces community is expected to grow significantly larger in the next decade. By 2015, SOCOM will be putting another 10,000 people on its payroll.
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This may be the most significant threat to its current strength. The close-knit nature of these groups may be eroded if a humdrum, stultifying bureaucratic class of desk-bound warriors rises in their place. After all, SOF personnel cannot be mass-produced.
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And the Special Forces community is expected to grow significantly larger in the next decade. By 2015, SOCOM will be putting another 10,000 people on its payroll.
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This may be the most significant threat to its current strength. The close-knit nature of these groups may be eroded if a humdrum, stultifying bureaucratic class of desk-bound warriors rises in their place. After all, SOF personnel cannot be mass-produced.
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Finally, there will remain a strong bureaucratic temptation to search for other targets beyond those in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflict zones. The possible spillover of sending elite military forces into places that have some degree of al-Qaeda presence—such as Algeria or Mali—is a troubling issue for the future. Indeed, as JSOC is already participating in an expanding conflict in Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere, the potentially destabilizing effect of inserting these elite military forces into countries across the globe remains unclear.
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America’s legal system can handle the challenge posed by captured al-Qaeda operatives.
The battle against individual al-Qaeda leaders can be resolved on the battlefield or in a courtroom. When top leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or Mohammad Atef, die in combat, their ability to foment political violence ends, martyrdom notwithstanding. But the lives of other terror suspects like KSM do not end with a lethal last stand. Much ink has been spilled over whether these people should spend a lifetime in legal limbo or be prosecuted in civilian or military courts, but trying these individuals in a legitimate and legitimating court of law would be most beneficial to the fabric of American society. Individuals who have been successfully tried in American courts include KSM’s nephew Ramzi Yousef (convicted 1997), the twentieth hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui (convicted 2006), Najibullah Zazi (convicted 2010), and a host of lesser-known terrorists and terrorist wannabes.
The battle against individual al-Qaeda leaders can be resolved on the battlefield or in a courtroom. When top leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or Mohammad Atef, die in combat, their ability to foment political violence ends, martyrdom notwithstanding. But the lives of other terror suspects like KSM do not end with a lethal last stand. Much ink has been spilled over whether these people should spend a lifetime in legal limbo or be prosecuted in civilian or military courts, but trying these individuals in a legitimate and legitimating court of law would be most beneficial to the fabric of American society. Individuals who have been successfully tried in American courts include KSM’s nephew Ramzi Yousef (convicted 1997), the twentieth hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui (convicted 2006), Najibullah Zazi (convicted 2010), and a host of lesser-known terrorists and terrorist wannabes.
Some argue that the legal means of “finishing” al-Qaeda might not work. What if the suspect is not convicted? Detainees, in many cases, are truly awful terrorists, but the evidence against them may have been received through sensitive intelligence methods or coercion, neither being admissible evidence in open court. Respected conservative jurists Benjamin Wittes and Jack Goldsmith argued in March 2010 that, given the harshly partisan climate and the Gordian knot that America’s national security detentions provide, the US should sidestep the issue of the courts and detain these individuals indefinitely. “Don’t bother trying them at all,” they wrote, “the politically draining fight about civilian vs. military trials is not worth the costs. It also distracts from more important questions in the legal war against terrorism.”
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The KSM affair is perhaps the best example (but not the only one), as the information he provided was valuable, but it was extracted through means debatably outside the bounds of US legal code.
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The KSM affair is perhaps the best example (but not the only one), as the information he provided was valuable, but it was extracted through means debatably outside the bounds of US legal code.
But detaining people indefinitely—their presumed guilt or potential innocence notwithstanding—rubs most Americans the wrong way. Arriving at an appropriate conclusion through a legitimate court proceeding is the best way to finish this problem once and for all. But the manner in which the government handled individuals such as KSM has unfortunately allowed these people to use their incarceration to publicly highlight their slow-motion martyrdom, as well as reinforce the nagging feeling that the US engages in acts that it would roundly condemn if carried out by other nations.
As David Frakt of the Air Force Reserve JAG Corps and a professor of law at Western State University College of Law has stated, “Nearly everyone agrees that [9/11] was one of the most monstrous single crimes ever committed. Whether one views KSM and his alleged co-conspirators as war criminals or simply mass murderers, there needs to be a criminal trial in some forum.”
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The civilian court system is certainly no friend to terrorist suspects. According to the New York University School of Law’s terrorist trial report card, “The overall conviction rate for prosecutions involving terrorism charges rate now stands at 89%.”
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In large part due to post-9/11 reforms, civilian prosecutors now have a number of tools to use when trying suspected terrorists. Moreover, civilian judges generally hand down stiff sentences in terrorism cases.
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The civilian court system is certainly no friend to terrorist suspects. According to the New York University School of Law’s terrorist trial report card, “The overall conviction rate for prosecutions involving terrorism charges rate now stands at 89%.”
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In large part due to post-9/11 reforms, civilian prosecutors now have a number of tools to use when trying suspected terrorists. Moreover, civilian judges generally hand down stiff sentences in terrorism cases.
So, how can the US proceed? There may be a “least worst” option available. One way to pursue justice while calming political winds is to try KSM and others for different charges in
both
military commissions and federal court. Wittes advanced this idea several months after publishing his “do nothing” thesis, arguing this method would “provide a valuable fail-safe against the possibility of total system failure.... Military commissions remain something less than ready for prime time, and federal court trials can go bad, too.”
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His optimism notwithstanding, there are unfortunately no true fail-safes since evidence derived from coercion could poison all the trials. Given the legal mess that the government has created and the fear of a precedent that would undermine the sanctity of the US legal system, however, this might be the best, if not the most satisfying, way to finish the job.
both
military commissions and federal court. Wittes advanced this idea several months after publishing his “do nothing” thesis, arguing this method would “provide a valuable fail-safe against the possibility of total system failure.... Military commissions remain something less than ready for prime time, and federal court trials can go bad, too.”
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His optimism notwithstanding, there are unfortunately no true fail-safes since evidence derived from coercion could poison all the trials. Given the legal mess that the government has created and the fear of a precedent that would undermine the sanctity of the US legal system, however, this might be the best, if not the most satisfying, way to finish the job.
People whose hearts burn with the fires of jihad aren’t automatically blessed with the know-how to produce mass destruction.
As cases like 9/11, the Zazi affair, the 2005 London transit attack, and Operation Overt suggest, most complex attacks against Western targets are conceived, planned, and trained for by strategic-minded leaders and competent personnel. Meanwhile, untrained attackers tend to slip up because of ill-preparedness, general stupidity, and skittishness. For example, the 2010 Times Square bomber-wannabe left the keys to his getaway car in the car that he was going to detonate and, despite paying for the car in cash, used his actual name in the e-mail used to contact the car’s seller.
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In 2007, a British-Iraqi medical doctor, with the help of radicalized compatriots, tried to set off a series of vehicle-borne explosive devices in central London; they failed due to mechanical problems.
As cases like 9/11, the Zazi affair, the 2005 London transit attack, and Operation Overt suggest, most complex attacks against Western targets are conceived, planned, and trained for by strategic-minded leaders and competent personnel. Meanwhile, untrained attackers tend to slip up because of ill-preparedness, general stupidity, and skittishness. For example, the 2010 Times Square bomber-wannabe left the keys to his getaway car in the car that he was going to detonate and, despite paying for the car in cash, used his actual name in the e-mail used to contact the car’s seller.
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In 2007, a British-Iraqi medical doctor, with the help of radicalized compatriots, tried to set off a series of vehicle-borne explosive devices in central London; they failed due to mechanical problems.
Without competent operational leaders like KSM, Rashid Rauf, or even Hizbollah’s Imad Mughniyah, the planning and execution of complex attacks can be stopped by security services. In the future, the US will likely see more of these wild, relatively simple one-off attacks that are thwarted by poor planning and human error. They may still be lethal, but they will not be as catastrophic as a well-laid plan.
An invested, educated populace is essential to protect against attack.
In
The Death and Life of Great American Cities
, Jane Jacobs wrote “the first thing to understand is that the public peace—the sidewalks and street peace—of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.”
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This analysis is as true in fighting terrorism as it is in fighting street crime; if regular citizens are invested in the upkeep of their society, then they can help thwart terrorism. Within walking distance of Jacobs’s former home, a T-shirt vendor proved her theory; Lance Orton noticed a smoking SUV and alerted local cops, thereby blocking Faisal Shahzad’s effort to blow up Times Square.
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In
The Death and Life of Great American Cities
, Jane Jacobs wrote “the first thing to understand is that the public peace—the sidewalks and street peace—of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves.”
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This analysis is as true in fighting terrorism as it is in fighting street crime; if regular citizens are invested in the upkeep of their society, then they can help thwart terrorism. Within walking distance of Jacobs’s former home, a T-shirt vendor proved her theory; Lance Orton noticed a smoking SUV and alerted local cops, thereby blocking Faisal Shahzad’s effort to blow up Times Square.
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To this effect, America should avoid scapegoating Muslims in a misguided attempt to damage the terrorist impulse, since it merely feeds al-Qaeda’s narrative that the West is reflexively anti-Islam. If Islam does indeed drive violent behavior, or if none of the 1.5 billion Muslims in the world can be trusted, then the US is in an exceptionally dire security position. This is especially true, given that some of America’s critical counterterrorism relationships—from Turkey to Jordan to Saudi Arabia to Iraq to Afghanistan to Pakistan to Indonesia—are with Muslim-majority nations. The US relies on these nations among many others for assistance in the fight against al-Qaeda and its extremist allies, and dismissing the countries’ majorities because of their faith is reckless and ignorant.
Furthermore, Muslim Americans help identify individuals with a propensity for violent behavior cloaked in religious fervor. MI5 and Scotland Yard discovered this when British-Pakistani neighbors tipped off local cops to the Op Overt hideout. Closer to home, cops in Portland, Oregon, received a tip-off from within the Muslim community in November 2010 that thwarted a car bomb attack.
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It goes against smart national security precautions—not to mention a violation of American neighborliness—to marginalize citizens for their faith and cast them into the rhetorical and political darkness. To those who disagree with this sentiment, President George W. Bush responded, a week after the 9/11 attack:
America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads. And they need to be treated with respect. In our anger and emotion, our fellow Americans must treat each other with respect.... Those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don’t represent the best of America, they represent the worst of humankind, and they should be ashamed of that kind of behavior.
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Only Americans have the power to destroy American civilization.
America is a nation defined as much by its national mentality as by its borders. In this regard, decisions made by the American public and its elected leaders will advance or hinder the country. For all its technical prowess and good intentions, America can be its own worst enemy, as the largest threats to US security stem from overreaction to terrorist provocations. Terrorism—even WMD-enabled terrorism—will not cause the systemic destruction of American society. Extremists can blow up buildings, crash civilian airplanes, and kill scores of people, but they will not cause the downfall of a country of some 310 million citizens. It is, instead, the reactions to violent provocations that will undermine the American system of government, social structures, and way of life.
America is a nation defined as much by its national mentality as by its borders. In this regard, decisions made by the American public and its elected leaders will advance or hinder the country. For all its technical prowess and good intentions, America can be its own worst enemy, as the largest threats to US security stem from overreaction to terrorist provocations. Terrorism—even WMD-enabled terrorism—will not cause the systemic destruction of American society. Extremists can blow up buildings, crash civilian airplanes, and kill scores of people, but they will not cause the downfall of a country of some 310 million citizens. It is, instead, the reactions to violent provocations that will undermine the American system of government, social structures, and way of life.
More often than not, regular police officers, customs officials, security guards, transit workers, and concerned citizens play critical roles in thwarting terrorism. Local Manila cops who responded to an apartment fire in 1995 apprehended a key player in the Bojinka case. Similarly, in 1999 alert customs officials in bucolic Port Angeles, Washington, helped apprehend Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian al-Qaeda member en route to attack Los Angeles International Airport.
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In 2005 firefighters in Diyarbakir, Turkey, responding to an apartment fire found chemicals and explosives that eventually led to the capture of the Zarqawi-linked terrorist Luay Sakka, a ringleader in the lethal series of attacks in November in Istanbul that killed twenty-seven people, including the British consul general to Turkey.
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Passengers on both Richard Reid’s and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s flights tackled both men before they could destroy the aircraft.
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In 2005 firefighters in Diyarbakir, Turkey, responding to an apartment fire found chemicals and explosives that eventually led to the capture of the Zarqawi-linked terrorist Luay Sakka, a ringleader in the lethal series of attacks in November in Istanbul that killed twenty-seven people, including the British consul general to Turkey.
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Passengers on both Richard Reid’s and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s flights tackled both men before they could destroy the aircraft.
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