Find, Fix, Finish (25 page)
Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Law enforcement spread out all over England to break up the conspiracy. By midnight on August 9, twenty-five people in Birmingham, High Wycombe, and East London—including Ali and Sarwar—had been arrested.
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Outside the UK, Italian authorities arrested some forty people, while Pakistan wrapped up several individuals.
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Outside the UK, Italian authorities arrested some forty people, while Pakistan wrapped up several individuals.
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UK authorities then conducted nearly seventy independent searches, netting some four hundred computers, two hundred cell phones, eight thousand computer storage items, as well as several martyrdom videos and bomb-making materials.
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All told, officials retrieved over six thousand gigabytes of data pertaining to the investigation.
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For American officials, the arrests came none too soon. TSA quickly forbade all liquids from being carried on planes—a restriction that more or less continues to this day.
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All told, officials retrieved over six thousand gigabytes of data pertaining to the investigation.
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For American officials, the arrests came none too soon. TSA quickly forbade all liquids from being carried on planes—a restriction that more or less continues to this day.
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Following the arrests, over a thousand flights were canceled to and from the UK, affecting some 400,000 passengers; losses in revenue to various airline companies may have topped $400 million.
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Added to the cost of adding security measures in other countries, the failed airline plot easily caused cumulative worldwide costs to public and private groups of almost US$1 billion.
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Added to the cost of adding security measures in other countries, the failed airline plot easily caused cumulative worldwide costs to public and private groups of almost US$1 billion.
In retrospect, British intelligence officials were probably relieved that their long surveillance operation did not go on longer despite the false start. Reportedly, the plotters were barely “two days away” from performing a test run and were planning to carry out the final attack within a week.
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THE FIRST TRIAL72
In August, prosecutors charged the conspirators—Ali, Hussain, Sarwar, Muhammad Ghulzar, and six others—with various criminal offenses related to the failed airline plot. British prosecutors believed they had a good case against the defendants based on the assembled evidence even without the testimony of Rashid Rauf, who had escaped Pakistani police custody in December 2007 and disappeared. In addition to the chemicals and other bomb-making supplies that law enforcement had collected, the prosecution played the martyrdom videos as evidence of the plotters’ intent. Prosecutors also claimed that Assad Sarwar was simultaneously developing plans to cripple other sites in England as well as inflight airliners.
Although several of the bombers pled guilty to lesser charges such as conspiracy to commit public nuisance and conspiracy to cause explosions, they fought the more serious charges, including conspiracy to murder using explosives on aircraft and conspiracy to murder persons unknown. They claimed that they wanted to cause a spectacle to protest British and US foreign policy but did not want to kill anyone. Ali even claimed that the bombs were just meant to frighten people as part of a political statement.
On November 8, 2008, after deliberating fifty hours, a jury convicted Ali, Sarwar, and Hussein of conspiracy to murder, but—incredibly—acquitted them of the crime at the heart of the plot: conspiracy to murder using explosives on an aircraft.
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British authorities immediately declared that they would seek a retrial of seven suspects on all previous counts, as well as the conspiracy to detonate improvised explosive devices on transatlantic passenger aircraft. Unique among them, Mohammad Gulzar was cleared on all counts.
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British authorities immediately declared that they would seek a retrial of seven suspects on all previous counts, as well as the conspiracy to detonate improvised explosive devices on transatlantic passenger aircraft. Unique among them, Mohammad Gulzar was cleared on all counts.
Several procedural and evidentiary reasons account for why British authorities failed to fully convict the plotters during this trial. The main reason prosecutors could not make the case against the ringleaders for conspiracy to commit murder using explosives on aircraft was their inability to include electronic communication intercepts as evidence. They could not exploit critical GCHQ and NSA intercepts as evidence because the UK and US governments thought that Rauf—who was still at large in Pakistan—might once again access his mail.yahoo.com e-mail account and reveal his location.
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In the eyes of the British and US governments, intelligence gathering and protection of sources and methods trumped prosecutors’ needs to make a convincing case based on all the evidence in open court.
RAUF’S DEMISE AND THE SECOND TRIAL74
In the eyes of the British and US governments, intelligence gathering and protection of sources and methods trumped prosecutors’ needs to make a convincing case based on all the evidence in open court.
Rashid Rauf ’s life ended in mid-November 2008, soon after his British colleagues’ first trial. Rauf was meeting with Egyptian al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubair al-Masri and al-Qaeda planner Abd al-Rahman Hussein bin Hillal in North Waziristan when a US drone fired a Hellfire missile into the building, reducing the structure to rubble.
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His death paved the way for British prosecutors to produce his e-mails in the second trial. The judge in the second trial, Richard Henriques, later remarked that these e-mails were “a vital source of information as to the control, progress and scope of this conspiracy . . . they establish beyond question the ultimate control of this conspiracy lay in Pakistan.”
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His death paved the way for British prosecutors to produce his e-mails in the second trial. The judge in the second trial, Richard Henriques, later remarked that these e-mails were “a vital source of information as to the control, progress and scope of this conspiracy . . . they establish beyond question the ultimate control of this conspiracy lay in Pakistan.”
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On February 17, 2009, the second trial began only to have the jury discharged a day later. Two weeks later, the trial resumed with a new jury. This new trial lasted for four months, with the prosecution arguing again that the plotters had indeed wanted to blow up commercial aircraft midflight. After deliberating for over fifty-four hours, the jury in early September delivered a guilty verdict for three of the main plotters—Ahmed Abdulla Ali, Assad Sarwar, and Tanvir Hussain—for conspiracy to murder involving liquid bombs and conspiracy to target airline passengers.
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On September 14, Judge Henriques called the plot the “most grave and wicked conspiracy ever proven within this jurisdiction.”
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Ali, Sarwar, Hussain, and Islam all received life sentences. A third trial, concluded in July 2010, convicted a further three Op Overt plotters of conspiracy to murder; they are currently serving long prison sentences.
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Ali, Sarwar, Hussain, and Islam all received life sentences. A third trial, concluded in July 2010, convicted a further three Op Overt plotters of conspiracy to murder; they are currently serving long prison sentences.
Far from a clean sweep, however, some of the individuals implicated in the 2006 plot beat the rap. Mohammed al-Ghabrah, whose relationships in Pakistan gave authorities the initial leads to the plot, still walks the streets of East London. So does Mohammed Gulzar, a shadowy individual alleged to be a senior figure in the operation. He journeyed to UK from South Africa on a false passport to meet several times with Ali and Sarwar to discuss the plot.
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With multiple potential terror plots facing Great Britain in the summer of 2006, the embattled UK intelligence establishment enlisted the assistance of its well-financed American counterparts. By mid-August 2006, the US and UK intelligence communities worked and operated almost as a single entity with information-sharing reaching a new high. As CIA director Michael Hayden put it, “Nothing less than intensive cooperation with our overseas colleagues could have achieved such a complete success.”
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The cooperation occurred, not only at the highest levels, but also at multiple levels deep within the bureaucratic firmament of both countries. The US considered this plot to be the biggest operation since 9/11 and treated it as such.
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The cooperation occurred, not only at the highest levels, but also at multiple levels deep within the bureaucratic firmament of both countries. The US considered this plot to be the biggest operation since 9/11 and treated it as such.
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The fact that each nation used its strength—America’s SIGINT capabilities alongside Britain’s physical surveillance capability and combined ability to “flood the zone” with personnel—is remarkable. Operation Overt became the new gold standard in fighting international terrorism. On one hand, MI5 placed a still unknown undercover agent within the airline plot cell, while on the other, the CIA “provided critical help in identifying and tracking people involved in Pakistan”
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related to the case. When the undercover British agent provided a scrap of information such as a name or a telephone number, US intelligence services could then leverage vast databases, information gleaned from detainee interrogations and signals intelligence capabilities, and provide even more e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and names to the British in return. This exchange was made over and over again, including when the NSA intercepted e-mails between Abdulla Ahmed Ali and Rauf in Pakistan and then shared them almost in real time with British authorities.
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The US also served as the conduit for information between the Pakistan’s ISI and Britain’s MI6.
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related to the case. When the undercover British agent provided a scrap of information such as a name or a telephone number, US intelligence services could then leverage vast databases, information gleaned from detainee interrogations and signals intelligence capabilities, and provide even more e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and names to the British in return. This exchange was made over and over again, including when the NSA intercepted e-mails between Abdulla Ahmed Ali and Rauf in Pakistan and then shared them almost in real time with British authorities.
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The US also served as the conduit for information between the Pakistan’s ISI and Britain’s MI6.
Of course, with every relationship there are bumps and annoyances along the way. The most egregious one of these occurred when Rashid Rauf was originally detained in August 2006 without British knowledge—causing the whole arrest mechanism to begin prematurely in England. The intense media hubbub surrounding the arrests, as well as the media pronouncements by then-Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff and New York congressman Peter King, reportedly irked the British, who were hard at work laying the foundation for the upcoming court case and did not like crucial, potentially jury tampering information to emerge from the mouths of American policymakers. But in the end, these were small irritants in thwarting what could have been the worst terrorist attack in the post-9/11 era.
CHAPTER 8
AN INCREASING PREFERENCE FOR LETHAL ENDS
Hell is empty, and all the devils are here.
—THE TEMPEST
B
y the middle of the decade, the US had begun to shift strategically from capturing top al-Qaeda personnel to killing them. Technological dominance provided the US a critical advantage; mobile and satellite phone technology became increasingly fatal forms of communication and al-Qaeda personnel were forced to rely on human couriers and face-to-face meetings to transmit messages. Senior leaders were becoming so concerned about the risk of electronic interception that communication between remaining operational leaders became more and more restricted. US intelligence analysts were beginning to realize that al-Qaeda’s hierarchy, like many Silicon Valley start-ups, had determined that a flatter management structure worked best, allowing them to adapt to the death or capture of senior leaders. But while al-Qaeda had regenerated each time, it had been forced to rely on leaders with less and less hands-on operational experience. Furthermore, fearing electronic interception, communication between bin Laden and remaining operational leaders had been increasingly restricted; each message spent months in the hands of couriers. In December 2005, US ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker went as far as to claim that bin Laden no longer controlled operations and that al-Qaeda had “run into serious problems.”
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y the middle of the decade, the US had begun to shift strategically from capturing top al-Qaeda personnel to killing them. Technological dominance provided the US a critical advantage; mobile and satellite phone technology became increasingly fatal forms of communication and al-Qaeda personnel were forced to rely on human couriers and face-to-face meetings to transmit messages. Senior leaders were becoming so concerned about the risk of electronic interception that communication between remaining operational leaders became more and more restricted. US intelligence analysts were beginning to realize that al-Qaeda’s hierarchy, like many Silicon Valley start-ups, had determined that a flatter management structure worked best, allowing them to adapt to the death or capture of senior leaders. But while al-Qaeda had regenerated each time, it had been forced to rely on leaders with less and less hands-on operational experience. Furthermore, fearing electronic interception, communication between bin Laden and remaining operational leaders had been increasingly restricted; each message spent months in the hands of couriers. In December 2005, US ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker went as far as to claim that bin Laden no longer controlled operations and that al-Qaeda had “run into serious problems.”
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A more lethal effort was now seen as the way forward to dismantle al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
AMERICAN UAVS, PAKISTANI SKIES: ABU HAMZA RABIA (KILLED, DECEMBER 2005)Shortly after the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi, the Bush administration launched a high-level internal review of its strategy against al-Qaeda. Behind the words “strategic approach to defeat violent extremism” was a commitment to pursue further capture/kill missions.
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Since the bulk of the US military and intelligence efforts were tied up in the morass of Iraq, the US had few resources to dedicate to finding bin Laden and dismantling al-Qaeda in Pakistan. “There’s been a perception, a sense of drift in overall terrorism policy. People have not figured out what we do next, so we just continue to pick ’em off one at a time,” said Roger Cressey, a former NSC counterterrorism official.
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Since the bulk of the US military and intelligence efforts were tied up in the morass of Iraq, the US had few resources to dedicate to finding bin Laden and dismantling al-Qaeda in Pakistan. “There’s been a perception, a sense of drift in overall terrorism policy. People have not figured out what we do next, so we just continue to pick ’em off one at a time,” said Roger Cressey, a former NSC counterterrorism official.
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Al-Qaeda had some success cementing alliances with regional jihadist groups worldwide, granting them the al-Qaeda banner without much day-to-day input over their planning or operations. Zarqawi’s bloodthirsty jihad in Iraq generated the most news, and al-Qaeda’s leadership accepted him in light of the dramatic effectiveness of his campaigns. To the degree it still existed, however, the center of al-Qaeda’s global operations remained in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Abu Hamza Rabia (Muhammad Rabia Abdul Halim Shuayb) probably inherited the operational post by default when Pakistan captured Abu Faraj in May 2005. The thirty-something Rabia had been Abu Faraj’s deputy and led al-Qaeda in Pakistan, helping plan the two assassination attempts on Musharraf in 2003.
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He also had connections to fellow Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri; a Pakistani official said that Abu Faraj’s interrogation had confirmed that Abu Hamza was in touch with al-Qaeda’s deputy chief and “was an important connection between Zawahiri and various al-Qaeda cells.”
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He also had connections to fellow Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri; a Pakistani official said that Abu Faraj’s interrogation had confirmed that Abu Hamza was in touch with al-Qaeda’s deputy chief and “was an important connection between Zawahiri and various al-Qaeda cells.”
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Abu Hamza was responsible for recruiting, training, and plotting large-scale attacks against US and European targets.
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He possessed a wide network within the jihadist universe and was trying to reinvigorate al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations.
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An FBI official quipped to the
New Yorker
in 2004 that “if there is an attack on the US . . . [Abu] Hamza Rabia will be responsible.”
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Abu Hamza wanted to organize foreign fighters to fight and die in Iraq, but al-Qaeda’s central command deemed him too valuable to be sent to the charnel houses of Baghdad and Mosul.
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He possessed a wide network within the jihadist universe and was trying to reinvigorate al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations.
7
An FBI official quipped to the
New Yorker
in 2004 that “if there is an attack on the US . . . [Abu] Hamza Rabia will be responsible.”
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Abu Hamza wanted to organize foreign fighters to fight and die in Iraq, but al-Qaeda’s central command deemed him too valuable to be sent to the charnel houses of Baghdad and Mosul.
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As with Abu Faraj, US counterterrorism analysts could not determine with much degree of precision Abu Hamza’s actual position within the organization. It was extremely difficult for analysts to establish exactly how terrorist leaders were related and who actually ran the show. Many counterterrorism officials had begun deemphasizing the importance of ranking al-Qaeda’s leaders; the organization was increasingly hobbled in its ability to communicate globally and, to some degree, had reverted to operating under regional leaders. Neither Abu Hamza nor anyone else seemed to have any control over Zarqawi’s operations in Iraq. Zarqawi operated independently, routinely ignoring advice from his supposed superiors in Pakistan.
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