Authors: Aki Peritz,Eric Rosenbach
Find, Fix, Finish (17 page)
One Pentagon adviser who worked closely with the OSP said, “Special Plans was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to al-Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States.”
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The adviser further argued that the Pentagon believed the CIA misinterpreted the situation. “The [CIA] was out to disprove linkage between Iraq and terrorism. That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at CIA that color the way it sees data.”
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The adviser further argued that the Pentagon believed the CIA misinterpreted the situation. “The [CIA] was out to disprove linkage between Iraq and terrorism. That’s what drove them. If you’ve ever worked with intelligence data, you can see the ingrained views at CIA that color the way it sees data.”
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Many intelligence officials did not approve of OSP’s activities. “Feith and company would find little nuggets that supported their beliefs and seize upon them, never understanding that there might be a larger picture they were missing,” noted Tenet. “Isolated data points became so important to them that they would never look at the thousands of other data points that might convey the opposite story.” When he first heard the reports produced by Feith’s team, Tenet allegedly told DIA head Vice Admiral Jake Jacoby, “This is entirely inappropriate. You get this back in intelligence channels. I want analysts talking to analysts, not people with agendas.”
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On November 24, journalist Stephen Hayes of the conservative
Weekly Standard
published portions of the classified summary in his article “Case Closed: The US Government’s Secret Memo Detailing Cooperation Between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden.”
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That same day, the Pentagon issued a press release, stating that the “classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions.”
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The CIA also sent Feith a list of corrections and disputed the reliability of several of the reports he cited.
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AL-LIBI RECANTSWeekly Standard
published portions of the classified summary in his article “Case Closed: The US Government’s Secret Memo Detailing Cooperation Between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden.”
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That same day, the Pentagon issued a press release, stating that the “classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions.”
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The CIA also sent Feith a list of corrections and disputed the reliability of several of the reports he cited.
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Sometime in 2003, al-Libi was returned from Egyptian to US custody.
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The exact details of his detainment remain hidden from public view. According to some reports, al-Libi was transferred from Egypt to Afghanistan and then sent to the detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in the spring of 2004.
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The exact details of his detainment remain hidden from public view. According to some reports, al-Libi was transferred from Egypt to Afghanistan and then sent to the detention center in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in the spring of 2004.
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In January 2004, likely while in US custody in Afghanistan,
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al-Libi began to recant his previous testimony that Iraq had provided chemical and biological weapons training to al-Qaeda operatives.
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On February 4 and 5, soon after he was transferred to Guantanamo, interrogators sent a series of cables detailing al-Libi’s new claims to CIA headquarters.
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These cables reported that al-Libi asserted he was recanting because he “had a strong desire to tell his entire story and identify why and how he fabricated information since his capture.” He said that Iraq had never trained al-Qaeda in chemical or biological weapons—“to the best of his knowledge.”
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al-Libi began to recant his previous testimony that Iraq had provided chemical and biological weapons training to al-Qaeda operatives.
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On February 4 and 5, soon after he was transferred to Guantanamo, interrogators sent a series of cables detailing al-Libi’s new claims to CIA headquarters.
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These cables reported that al-Libi asserted he was recanting because he “had a strong desire to tell his entire story and identify why and how he fabricated information since his capture.” He said that Iraq had never trained al-Qaeda in chemical or biological weapons—“to the best of his knowledge.”
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Why did he go back on his testimony? Al-Libi claimed that in 2002, while in US custody in Afghanistan, his debriefers threatened to make him sleep on the floor of his cold cell and to transfer him to a third country for interrogation if he did not cooperate.
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After his debriefers made him remove his socks and gloves and placed him on the cold floor of his cell for fifteen minutes, al-Libi claimed he decided to fabricate information in order to obtain better treatment. “Once al-Libi started fabricating information, his treatment improved and he experienced no further physical pressures from the Americans.”
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After his debriefers made him remove his socks and gloves and placed him on the cold floor of his cell for fifteen minutes, al-Libi claimed he decided to fabricate information in order to obtain better treatment. “Once al-Libi started fabricating information, his treatment improved and he experienced no further physical pressures from the Americans.”
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Later, after he had been transferred to Egypt, al-Libi explained that his Egyptian interrogators pressed him repeatedly about an al-Qaeda–Iraq connection.
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Al-Libi claimed that “this was a subject about which he said he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.”
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Allegedly dissatisfied with his response, his Egyptian interrogators shoved him into a container twenty square inches tall and held him there for some seventeen hours.
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When he was released from the box, al-Libi continued, the Egyptians gave him a final opportunity to “tell the truth” and then knocked him to the floor where he was pummeled for fifteen minutes. Al-Libi stated that his interrogators then pressed him again for an al-Qaeda–Iraq connection. This time, he claimed, he concocted a story about three al-Qaeda operatives who went to Iraq to receive some manner of nuclear weapons training. Allegedly he used the names of actual al-Qaeda members so he could recall details of his tale and make it more believable to his Egyptian questioners.
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Al-Libi claimed that “this was a subject about which he said he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.”
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Allegedly dissatisfied with his response, his Egyptian interrogators shoved him into a container twenty square inches tall and held him there for some seventeen hours.
121
When he was released from the box, al-Libi continued, the Egyptians gave him a final opportunity to “tell the truth” and then knocked him to the floor where he was pummeled for fifteen minutes. Al-Libi stated that his interrogators then pressed him again for an al-Qaeda–Iraq connection. This time, he claimed, he concocted a story about three al-Qaeda operatives who went to Iraq to receive some manner of nuclear weapons training. Allegedly he used the names of actual al-Qaeda members so he could recall details of his tale and make it more believable to his Egyptian questioners.
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According to al-Libi, the Egyptians asked him about training in anthrax and biological weapons several days later. Again, al-Libi at first claimed he “knew nothing about a biological program and did not even understand the term biological.”
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But when he could not conjure up a story, al-Libi declared, he was “beaten in a way that left no marks.”
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But when he could not conjure up a story, al-Libi declared, he was “beaten in a way that left no marks.”
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Senior US officials learned about al-Libi’s recantation in a report issued on February 14.
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The CIA was sharply divided on al-Libi’s reversal and reviewed all reports related to him.
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The CIA was sharply divided on al-Libi’s reversal and reviewed all reports related to him.
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Despite the new information pouring forth from al-Libi, the White House still defended the analysis of a strong link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. On June 17, four months after receiving al-Libi’s recantations, Vice President Cheney told Gloria Borger of CNBC’s
Capitol Report
that the evidence supporting the connection was firm. “There clearly was a relationship,” said Cheney. “It’s been testified to. The evidence is overwhelming.... The notion that there is no relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda just simply is not true. I mean, there are reams of material here. Your show isn’t long enough for me to read all the pieces of it.”
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Capitol Report
that the evidence supporting the connection was firm. “There clearly was a relationship,” said Cheney. “It’s been testified to. The evidence is overwhelming.... The notion that there is no relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda just simply is not true. I mean, there are reams of material here. Your show isn’t long enough for me to read all the pieces of it.”
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The media did not learn of al-Libi’s reversal until July 2004, when Michael Isikoff first reported it in
Newsweek
.
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In contrast to the information al-Libi provided to debriefers in 2002 on Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda, he “subsequently recounted a different story,” a US official told Isikoff. The bottom line: “It’s not clear which version is correct. We are still sorting this out.”
Newsweek
.
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In contrast to the information al-Libi provided to debriefers in 2002 on Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda, he “subsequently recounted a different story,” a US official told Isikoff. The bottom line: “It’s not clear which version is correct. We are still sorting this out.”
In his memoirs, George Tenet wrote, “Al-Libi’s story will no doubt be that he decided to fabricate in order to get better treatment and avoid harsh punishment. He clearly lied. We just don’t know when.”
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Officials accordingly asked, Did al-Libi lie initially when he said Iraq trained al-Qaeda operatives in weapons of mass destruction? Or did he lie when he went back on his earlier statements in order to receive better treatment once he returned to US custody? “A recantation would restore his stature as someone who had successfully confounded the enemy,”
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said Tenet. In other words, did al-Libi lie? Or did he lie about lying? And what role did his alleged torture play in his claims that he lied? The CIA sought to determine what was true and what was false.
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Officials accordingly asked, Did al-Libi lie initially when he said Iraq trained al-Qaeda operatives in weapons of mass destruction? Or did he lie when he went back on his earlier statements in order to receive better treatment once he returned to US custody? “A recantation would restore his stature as someone who had successfully confounded the enemy,”
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said Tenet. In other words, did al-Libi lie? Or did he lie about lying? And what role did his alleged torture play in his claims that he lied? The CIA sought to determine what was true and what was false.
“Many of the HVDs (high-value detainees) recanted information,”
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said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, the former head of the WMD branch of the CIA Counterterrorism Center.
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“This is why all of this intelligence couldn’t be corroborated. This is also why we began from the assumption that al-Libi was lying, and we only considered his intelligence to be true if we could corroborate it amongst several sources. For example, by playing al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah in sequence, we were able to cross-check the two.”
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said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, the former head of the WMD branch of the CIA Counterterrorism Center.
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“This is why all of this intelligence couldn’t be corroborated. This is also why we began from the assumption that al-Libi was lying, and we only considered his intelligence to be true if we could corroborate it amongst several sources. For example, by playing al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah in sequence, we were able to cross-check the two.”
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“We know that torture affects the quality of intelligence, the strongest correlation of accurate intelligence comes from willing debriefees,” continued Mowatt-Larssen.
The CIA also strongly suspected that al-Qaeda was trying to acquire chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons. Iraq already had a well-established history of developing poisons and chemical weapons and had proven that it would use them—even against its own citizens.
The CIA also strongly suspected that al-Qaeda was trying to acquire chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons. Iraq already had a well-established history of developing poisons and chemical weapons and had proven that it would use them—even against its own citizens.After al-Libi recanted in early 2004, CIA’s internal review of intelligence failures in the lead-up to Iraq expanded to include his case. “We had several lessons learned from al-Libi’s case, which resulted in changes in our standard operating procedures,” said McLaughlin. “First, we must be very careful when relying on foreign intelligence services for information. Second, analysts need to have greater transparency behind reporting in order to better understand the sourcing of reports and assess their confidence in the information. And lastly, if the descriptor on a source includes language that suggests caution, this must be conveyed to the recipient of the analysis. We need to be clear about the provenance of information and let people know if we have direct access to the source or not.”
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The SSCI released its first report on the IC’s assessments leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The 511-page
Phase I
report, released on July 9, 2004, pointed to failures in the IC’s analysis—failures that led to serious errors of judgment in the October 2002 Iraq NIE. The report also contended that the IC’s assessments about Iraq’s biological and chemical WMD capability, as outlined in the 2002 NIE, were not supported by the underlying information.
Phase I
report, released on July 9, 2004, pointed to failures in the IC’s analysis—failures that led to serious errors of judgment in the October 2002 Iraq NIE. The report also contended that the IC’s assessments about Iraq’s biological and chemical WMD capability, as outlined in the 2002 NIE, were not supported by the underlying information.
The SSCI assessed that for the WMD portions of Powell’s speech to the UN, “much of the information provided or cleared by the CIA for inclusion in Secretary Powell’s speech was overstated, misleading, or incorrect.”
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Although the committee considered the IC’s assessment of the links between al-Qaeda and Iraq to be reasonable, the report found that in a post-9/11 environment, analysts “were under tremendous pressure to make correct assessments, to avoid missing a credible threat, and to avoid an intelligence failure on the scale of 9/11” and be “bold and assertive.”
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Although the committee considered the IC’s assessment of the links between al-Qaeda and Iraq to be reasonable, the report found that in a post-9/11 environment, analysts “were under tremendous pressure to make correct assessments, to avoid missing a credible threat, and to avoid an intelligence failure on the scale of 9/11” and be “bold and assertive.”
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In February 2004, the SSCI voted to include several key issues, including the IC’s prewar assessments about postwar Iraq, postwar findings about Iraq’s WMD and links to terrorism, and a review of statements by senior policymakers to determine if those statements had been substantiated by available intelligence in a follow-up report that came to be called
Phase II
.
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Accordingly, at the release of the report, Vice Chairman Jay Rockefeller recognized that “there is a real frustration over what is not in this report, and I don’t think it was mentioned in [SSCI] Chairman Roberts’ statement, and that is about the—after the analysts and the IC produced an intelligence product, how is it then shaped or used or misused by the policymakers?” Senator Rockefeller pointed out several other concerns left unaddressed and expressed his desire to see the second phase of the investigation begin quickly so that it might fill in these gaps.
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Phase II
.
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Accordingly, at the release of the report, Vice Chairman Jay Rockefeller recognized that “there is a real frustration over what is not in this report, and I don’t think it was mentioned in [SSCI] Chairman Roberts’ statement, and that is about the—after the analysts and the IC produced an intelligence product, how is it then shaped or used or misused by the policymakers?” Senator Rockefeller pointed out several other concerns left unaddressed and expressed his desire to see the second phase of the investigation begin quickly so that it might fill in these gaps.
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