Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (108 page)

The arguments of the Chinese were irrefutable, but Mutsu declared that “from the outset, however, our government had insisted that we would not feel secure until the evils lying at the root of the rebellion in Korea had been eradicated.” He informed the Chinese that the Japanese government found it impossible to order the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea. Japan could not stand by while Korea was in such a wretched condition, as this would be contrary to the friendship that should prevail between neighboring nations. It also ran counter to Japanese security needs. Yamagata Aritomo observed on June 23 that war between China and Japan was inevitable.

On June 26
Ō
tori Keisuke had an audience with King Kojong at which he insisted on the importance of internal reform. On the twenty-eighth he demanded that the Korean authorities disclose whether Korea was an independent country or only a vassal of China. The Korean court was thrown into a state of panic by the question, and the discussions did not reach any conclusion. At this stage,
Ō
tori received from the Japanese government instructions that reform in Korea could not be expected until Chinese influence had been destroyed. No doubt this made
Ō
tori intensify his demands for an answer. On June 30 the Korean court at last affirmed that it was an independent country.
⁴⁰

On July 3
Ō
tori, with the assurance that Korea was an independent country, had an audience with the king of Korea during which he proposed reforms in Korea’s administration, finances, laws, military, and education. The court was still dominated by the reactionary Sadaedang, which stood in awe of China and detested reforms, but
Ō
tori’s proposal was backed by the might of the Japanese armed forces, and they could not refuse. The king issued a rescript blaming himself for the crisis, expressing shame over the years of bad government and grief over the repeated internal revolts. He attributed all that had gone wrong to his own lack of virtue and the incompetence of his officials. He set up a committee for reform and ordered it to consult with the Japanese minister.
⁴¹

One after another of the principal Japanese figures came out in favor of war. Count Matsukata Masayoshi, learning that at its meeting the previous day the cabinet had not reached a decision to open hostilities against the Chinese, visited It
ō
Hirobumi on July 12 to express his concern over the government’s hesitation. He declared that the arrogance of the Chinese grew worse each day and accused them of committing outrages of every sort in Korea. He deplored the government’s failure to take advantage of the opportunity it had been given to carry out its mandate. It
ō
thought that there was still insufficient reason for declaring war, but Matsukata declared that the public, even enemies of the government, was united in support of war. He predicted that if action were not taken in the next couple of days, it would be impossible to control public unrest and that there would be no guaranteeing that some foreign power might not intervene. Withdrawing Japanese troops from Korea would lower Japan’s national prestige in the eyes of foreigners, and its national unity would be once again imperiled. Matsukata ended by threatening never again to see It
ō
if he disregarded his advice.

It
ō
agreed to consider Matsukata’s views, but unlike Matsukata, who was not in the government, he could not forget his responsibilities as prime minister. Moreover, he was close to the emperor and knew that he was extremely reluctant to open hostilities, fearing that war between Japan and China might give some third country an opportunity to intervene.
⁴²

Li Hung-chang asked the Russians to mediate, and they gladly agreed. Russia’s interest in Korea, particularly in obtaining an ice-free port there, would be an important factor in developments in the region for years to come. The Japanese thanked the Russians for the offer of mediation but said they would withdraw from the peninsula just as soon as conditions permitted.
⁴³

The British also expressed their desire for peace in East Asia. In April 1894 the British government agreed on a revised treaty. Although the British refusal to give up extraterritoriality had long been a sore point with the Japanese, England was about to become the first major country to grant Japan equality.
⁴⁴
Prime Minister William Gladstone, who had newly formed a cabinet, declared that he not only considered the continuation of consular courts in Japan to be inappropriate but also believed that the abolition of these courts was of urgent importance in strengthening the ties of friendship between the two nations. But when the British offered on July 17 to mediate, the Japanese, who by this time had decided on war and were uninterested in the British proposal, deliberately proposed conditions that they knew the Chinese could not accept. The Japanese declared that any reinforcement of Chinese troops in Korea would be considered a provocation. The British protested, saying that this stipulation was in contravention of the Treaty of Tientsin, but the Japanese replied that the matter was not one on which they were subject to questioning by the British. The latter gave up their efforts to mediate.
⁴⁵

On July 23 Japanese troops of the mixed brigade entered Seoul at dawn. As they approached the royal palace, Korean soldiers suddenly opened fire. The Japanese answered this fire and entered the palace precincts, driving out the Korean troops and taking their place in guarding the palace. The king called on his father, the
taewon’gun
, to assume charge of the government. Although the
taewon’gun
had been bitterly anti-Japanese, his experiences as a prisoner of the Chinese had changed his outlook, and he now welcomed
Ō
tori to the palace. He informed him that the king had delegated to himself full powers to reform the government. He promised that he would always consult with
Ō
tori before taking any steps. On July 25 the
taewon’gun
announced the abrogation of the Korean treaty with China.
⁴⁶

The first battle of the war (which had not yet been declared) took place on July 25 when elements of the Japanese fleet encountered two Chinese warships, a cruiser and a gunboat, heading toward Asan. Not only did the Chinese ships fail to salute the Japanese flag, but their battle stations were manned. When the two fleets had closed to about 10,000 feet, the cruiser
Chi-yüan
opened fire, and the three Japanese ships returned it. After a battle lasting for more than an hour, the
Chi-yüan
, badly damaged, fled, and the gunboat was beached and abandoned. Two other ships approached, the warship
Ts’ao-chiang
and the British merchant ship
Kao-hsing
, carrying a thousand Chinese troops to Asan. During the ensuing action, the
Ts’ao-chiang
raised the white flag of surrender. The
Naniwa
, commanded by Captain T
ō
g
ō
Heihachir
ō
, ordered the
Kao-hsing
to weigh anchor and follow behind. When this order was disregarded, he sank the ship. The captain and two other British officers were rescued, but the Chinese crew and the thousand soldiers were left to drown. The sinking at first aroused anger in England, but British experts defended the Japanese action as appropriate in wartime, and the matter was allowed to drop, since that was to the advantage of the British government.
⁴⁷

The first land engagement took place on July 29 when the mixed brigade commanded by General
Ō
shima encountered the Chinese at Song-hwan. As usual, Japanese accounts of the battle state that the Chinese opened fire first and that the Japanese did no more than answer their fire. The Japanese, in any case, were victorious, putting the Chinese to rout and capturing their base at Asan.

On August 1 the Japanese declared war on China. The emperor issued a rescript to the military, urging them to fight on land and on the sea until the nation’s objectives were attained. They were urged to use all means at their disposal to achieve victory, providing that they did not violate international law.
⁴⁸

There can be no doubting the intense enthusiasm engendered by the war among the Japanese. This was the first time since Hideyoshi’s abortive attempt in the sixteenth century to conquer Korea that Japanese troops were fighting foreigners abroad, and it seemed a confirmation of Japan’s new status among the nations of the world. China, by contrast, appeared to the Japanese like the embodiment of all that Japan had rejected—an “unenlightened” country that prided itself on past glories rather than on present achievements.

Fukuzawa Yukichi, the prime exponent of enlightenment, published an article in which he declared that a war with China was necessary in order that the Chinese might benefit by the enlightenment that had been denied them by their obstinate Manchu rulers. He considered China’s interference in Korea to be an intolerable attempt to prevent the spread of enlightenment, and the war itself not merely a struggle between two countries but a “battle for the sake of world culture.”
⁴⁹

Uchimura Kanz
ō
, who was later known for his pacifism, published in August 1894 an article in English entitled “Justification of the Corean War.” He was certain that the “Corean War now opened between Japan and China” was a righteous war.
⁵⁰
He wrote,

The Corean War is to decide whether Progress shall be the law in the East, as it has long been in the West, or whether Retrogression, fostered once by the Persian Empire; then by Carthage, and again by Spain, and now at last (last in the world’s history, we hope) by the Manchurian Empire of China, shall possess the Orient forever. Japan’s victory shall mean free government, free religion, free education, and free commerce for 600,000,000 souls that live on this side of the globe.
⁵¹

Uchimura concluded by declaring, “Japan is the champion of Progress in the East, and who, except her deadly foe, China—the incorrigible hater of Progress—wishes not victory for Japan!”

The initial victories of the Japanese military in Korea brought on a wave of patriotic fervor that was heightened by the
nishikie
drawn and published as fast as news reached Japan. The battle of Song-hwan produced two heroes whose deeds were commemorated pictorially by various artists and in poetry composed by both Japanese and foreigners. The first hero at Song-hwan was Captain Matsuzaki Naoomi. Struck by a bullet in the leg, he went on fighting until another bullet struck his head.
Yarareta
(I’m done for!) was his last utterance. Matsuzaki’s fame, however, was soon eclipsed by that of an ordinary private, Shirakami Genjir
ō
,
⁵²
who fell in action on the same day, July 29, 1894. Reports told how Shirakami, though struck by a bullet, continued to blow his bugle to his last breath. When his corpse was found, the bugle was still pressed to his lips. Before long, a flood of poetry and
nishikie
had been inspired by the heroic bugler. For example, Toyama Masakazu composed the lengthy poem “I Am a Bugler,” which opens in this manner:

Okayama kenjin Shirakami Genjir
ō
.

Kare wa mata ikko no rappashu narishi nari
.

Hito wa ieri. Kare was tadatada rappafuki nari to
.

Kare wa ieri. Ware was tadatada rappafuki nari to
.
⁵³

Shirakami Genjir
ō
, Okayama man,

He too was a bugler.

People said, “He is just a bugle-blower.”

He said, “I am just a bugle-blower.”

The unspoken point of these lines is that Shirakami did not belong to the samurai class but was a mere conscript who merely blew a bugle. Indeed, most of the heroes of the Sino-Japanese War were men of humble social origins. The fact that these soldiers performed acts of bravery of a kind that had hitherto been associated exclusively with the samurai class proved that the entire Japanese people possessed the virtues of bravery and loyalty.

On August 11 the emperor’s ancestors were officially informed of the proclamation of war. Ceremonies were held in the palace sanctuary, and high-ranking nobles were dispatched to the Ise Shrine and to the tomb of Emperor K
ō
mei to report the news. Some days earlier, shortly after the emperor’s declaration of war had been issued, Imperial Household Minister Hijikata Hisamoto visited the emperor to ask which envoys he wished sent to Ise and the tomb of Emperor K
ō
mei. The emperor answered, “Don’t send anybody. I have not been in favor of this war from the start. It was only because cabinet ministers informed me that war was inevitable that I permitted it. It is very painful for me to report what has happened to the Ise Shrine and the tomb of the previous emperor.” Hijikata, astonished by these remarks, admonished the emperor, “But Your Majesty has already issued a declaration of war. I wonder if Your Majesty might not be mistaken in giving me such a command.” The emperor flew into a rage and said, “Not another word out of you. I don’t wish to see you again.” Hijikata withdrew in fear and trepidation.
⁵⁴

After he returned to his home, Hijikata gave earnest thought to the situation. The proclamation of war had already been disseminated at home and abroad, and units of the army and navy were on their way to the front. He could not bear to think of the effect the emperor’s words might have on the future of the war, yet there was no doubting he meant his words. Hijikata considered consulting with It
ō
but feared that would only make things more complicated. He could not sleep that night for worry and anguish. The next morning, however, the chief chamberlain came with a message from the emperor commanding Hijikata to waste no time in choosing envoys to be sent to Ise and to Ky
ō
to. Hijikata hurried to the palace, where he found the emperor in good humor, quite changed from the previous night, Hijikata gave him the names of two men, then burst into tears of emotion.