Eagles of the Third Reich: Men of the Luftwaffe in WWII (Stackpole Military History Series) (46 page)

Seidemann was also well qualified for his post. Educated at the Royal Prussian cadet schools at Potsdam and Lichterfelde, he was seventeen years old when Imperial Germany collapsed. Set on a military career, young Seide-mann joined Freikorps Maerker (the best of these outfits) and spent most of 1919 suppressing Communist and Sparticus revolts inside Germany. Seide-mann joined the army when Freikorps Maerker was inducted into the Reichsheer
en masse
in 1920. He became a member of the elite Prussian 9th Infantry Regiment at Potsdam, earned his commission in 1922, and underwent General Staff training. Joining the Luftwaffe as a captain in 1935, he served in various General Staff capacities (and briefly commanded a bomber training group) before joining Baron von Richthofen as chief of staff of the Condor Legion. He remained with Richthofen until 1940, as operations officer and later as chief of staff of VIII Air Corps. From October, 1940, until August 1942, he was chief of staff of 2nd Air Fleet. He had seen action in Spain, Poland, France, and Russia and had learned close air support techniques from the master. Seidemann’s expertise paid great dividends in the Kasserine Pass offensive, when much of the U.S. II Corps was routed. Although eventually defeated by sheer weight of numbers, Air Command Tunis was still resisting when the German front collapsed. Then Seidemann flew away to Sicily, taking his pilots, airplanes, and ground crews with him. As soon as he arrived back on European soil and his command was dissolved (May 15, 1943), Seidemann was promoted to the command of his old unit—VIII Air Corps—now fighting on the Russian front. He ended the war as a general of flyers, still leading the VIII.
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For Martin Harlinghausen, however, there would be no more promotions or field commands until almost the end of the war.

The German front collapsed because Kesselring’s strategy was a miserable failure. Second Air Corps was unable to either sink the enemy’s convoys or to protect its own convoys—or even its air bases. Because of high losses in the bomber arm and a deteriorating level of training at home, the effectiveness of the bomber attacks dropped appreciably. Many inexperienced crews completely failed to locate their targets—a problem their opponents did not seem to have. By March, 41 percent of the supply ships sent to Tunisia were being sunk.
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At the end of March, the Allies mounted heavy air attacks against II Air Corps’ bases in Sardinia and inflicted heavy casualties on the gruppen. Unable to successfully defend his bases, Harlinghausen had to withdraw to the mainland, in effect conceding defeat. Sorties against Allied shipping in the Mediterranean dropped from eleven per day to two.
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American and British air wings were now able to pay even more attention to the convoys. From March to May, 1943, American and British air and naval units sank 108 German and Italian vessels—340,438 Gross Registered Tons of shipping. Allied aircraft sank sixty-three of these (forty-three by U.S. air units alone).
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Under these losses, the Axis supply lines collapsed completely. Near the end, Army Group Afrika was running its tanks on low-grade Tunisian wine. Out of food, fuel, and ammunition, it had no choice but to capitulate. Some 130,000 German soldiers surrendered. The German civilians referred to this battle as “Tunisgrad.”

Martin Harlinghausen, who had fallen out with Kesselring, was relieved of command of II Air Corps on June 10, 1943, and was replaced by Lt. Gen. (later General of Flyers) Alfred Buelowius, the former leader of Luftwaffe Command North and 1st Air Division on the eastern front. Harlinghausen was briefly attached to the staff of the Air Commander Atlantic before being placed in reserve on June 26, 1943. He returned to duty in October, 1943, on the staff of the general of bomber forces, and gradually worked his way back into favor. He was named commander of Luftgau XIV on August 21, 1944, and was finally promoted to lieutenant general on December 1, 1944. On April 27, 1945—three days before Adolf Hitler committed suicide—he was named CG of Luftwaffe Command West (formerly 3rd Air Fleet). After the war he joined the West German Air Force and was commander of Air Force North (headquartered at Muenster) from 1957 until he retired as a lieutenant general in 1961.
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Meanwhile, the Wehrmacht had rallied in Russia. As we have seen, Manstein and Richthofen made a most effective team. As commander-in-chief of Army Group South, Manstein had the task of halting the Soviet winter offensive on the eastern front. Richthofen was given the familiar job of supporting him. He conducted the operations of his air fleet from his command train at Chortiza, near Zaporozhye. Stalin’s forces had not halted after Stalingrad, but pressed their advantage in the direction of Kharkov and Belgorod. Richthofen, now controlling I, IV, and VIII Air Corps, concentrated his Ju-88 bombers and Ju-87 antitank units against Gen. Markian Popov’s armored corps and elements of the First Guards Army and smashed them. The Red Air Force tried to intervene and was given what Colonel Seaton described as “a sharp tactical defeat.”
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With the Luftwaffe smashing Red troop concentrations and supply lines and dominating the air, Gen. Eberhard von Mackensen’s First Panzer Army encircled and destroyed the Popov Armored Group.
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Three Soviet infantry divisions and the Soviet 25th Armored Corps were destroyed. The Reds lost 615 tanks in this battle.
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Although he could not hold Kharkov or Belgorod, Manstein conducted a skillful retreat, marshalling his resources while the Soviets exhausted theirs. After the annihilation of the Popov Group, he counterattacked toward Kharkov. Leaving the much-reduced VIII Air Corps and the recon -stituted 9th Flak Division to support Army Group A (now isolated in the Kuban), Richthofen concentrated I and IV Air Corps—commanded by generals Guenther Korten and Kurt Pflugbeil, respectively—in support of First Panzer and Fourth Panzer armies: Manstein’s main effort. The drive began on March 6. Stukas and fighters bombed and strafed Soviet troop concentrations and blasted ground targets, while simultaneously preventing the Red Air Force from interfering with Manstein’s operations. By March 10 the Russians were in a disorderly retreat, pounded by the Luftwaffe, which shot up a large number of motorized columns. Both Kharkov and Belgorod were retaken by the Germans before the spring thaw set in and paralyzed operations throughout the region.
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Even after its catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, the German Wehrmacht had managed to halt the Soviets and reimpose a stalemate on the eastern front.

Of Richthofen’s conduct of operations during the Kharkov battles, General Plocher later wrote:

Von Richthofen’s 4th Air Fleet was thrown into the battle for Kharkov as one integrated whole, with the participating commands supporting each other, thereby insuring the availability of maximum air power at the crucial point. The main factors behind Richthofen’s success were extreme flexibility, good coordination, and concentration, the latter being secured through the creation of ad hoc battle groups to give air support to spearhead units of the ground forces (SS Division “Das Reich”), which led the assault on the city. ‘Massive concentration, ‘drastic concentration,’ ‘concentration of all forces to the highest degree,’ were phrases which appeared again and again in Fourth Air Fleet battle orders.
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Kharkov was Baron von Richthofen’s last major battle on the eastern front. To the south, the remnants of Army Group Afrika surrendered in Tunisia on May 12. The entire German southern flank in the Mediterranean was thus exposed to Anglo-American invasion. Hitler named Field Marshal Kesselring to oppose it. He selected Richthofen to lead the German air forces in the endangered sector (over the objections of Manstein, who wanted to keep the baron in southern Russia). Richthofen was succeeded as C-in-C of the 4th Air Fleet by General Dessloch and, on June 12, assumed the post of commander-in-chief of the 2nd Air Fleet in Italy.
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It was to be his last command.

Albert Kesselring had commanded 2nd Air Fleet since January, 1940, and since December, 1941, had simultaneously been air fleet commander and commander-in-chief, South (OB South). Now, however, he was to direct a ground campaign for the first time, so he needed Richthofen to direct his air forces. The baron had served under Kesselring in France in 1940 and in Russia in 1941, and the two had worked well together.

Richthofen’s arrival in the Mediterranean was an indication of the growing importance that sector was taking on in June, 1943. Richthofen carried with him several squadrons from the East and received more from the 3d Air Fleet, which was operating against Great Britain. The number of German fighters in Richthofen’s zone of operations (Italy, Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily) increased from 190 in mid-May to 450 in early July, despite heavy fighting and heavy casualties.
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Field Marshal von Richthofen assembled a talented set of subordinates to defend his large area of responsibility. Gen. Alfred Buelowius commanded II Air Corps, the main subordinate unit under the air fleet. Lt. Gen. Alfred Mahnke, the former commander of Air Division Donets, was given tactical command in Sicily (as air commander Sicily), while Gen. Adolf Galland, the inspector general of the fighter arm, was attached to 2d Air Fleet to speed up the arrival of reinforcements and to improve fighter pilot efficiency. Lt. Gen. Dietrich Peltz, former commander of Attack Command England, assumed command of Richthofen’s bomber units. By July 3, 2nd Air Fleet had 380 single- engine and 100 twin-engine fighters. At least half of the single-engine fighters were of the newest variety (FW-190s). Overall combat aircraft strength in the fleet increased 56 percent, to 975 airplanes, before Richthofen had been in the area a month.

The main problem the Germans faced was that no one knew where the Anglo-Americans would strike. Unlike in Poland, France, the Balkans, and Russia, Richthofen faced a situation where the initiative in the air had been completely surrendered. He again tried to concentrate his strength at the decisive point, just as he had done in Russia, but he incorrectly picked Sardinia as the Allied target and concentrated there.
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He actually reduced Luftwaffe strength on Sicily, from 415 aircraft in mid-May to 175 eight weeks later, when the Allies landed on the island.
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In preparation for the invasion of Sicily, the United States and Royal air forces provoked a series of twenty-one air battles over the island prior to DDay. In these actions, 2nd Air Fleet units defending the islands were decisively defeated by an enemy whose pilots were as capable as they were and whose aircraft were better. The Luftwaffe lost 100 aircraft over Sicily in intense aerial combat shortly before the Allies struck.
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Goering, furious, wrote a special letter of reprimand to the fighter pilots of the 2nd Air Fleet:

Together with the fighter pilots in France, Norway, and Russia, I can only regard you with contempt. I want an immediate improvement and expect that all pilots will show an improvement in fighting spirit. If this improvement is not forthcoming, flying personnel from the commander down must expect to be remanded to the ranks and transferred to the Eastern Front to serve on the ground.
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The letter did no good; rather, it further weakened morale. In the Battle of Sicily, Richthofen’s men were not even able to protect their own airfields. In the first three days of fighting, 2nd Air Fleet flew an average of 275 to 300 sorties every twenty-four hours, against 1,500 for the Anglo-Americans. Half of the German sorties were flown at night, when there was less danger of Allied retaliation. After July 12, Richthofen’s pilots only averaged 150 sorties per day, and by the sixteenth the Germans’ strength had been reduced to only forty operational aircraft. They were unable to significantly interfere with the Allied landings and only sank twelve naval vessels. The Allied plan allowed for the loss of 300 vessels before the situation became critical.
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They therefore can be said to have won the air battle by a wide margin.

Richthofen reinforced Sicily after the landings, of course, but it was too late. By July 18 he had committed 635 aircraft to the island. Of these, 600 had been destroyed or damaged by the end of the battle, and only 35 aircraft remained operational. By the twenty-second Richthofen had admitted defeat and had withdrawn to the mainland. Here a few fighters continued to fly support for German ground forces on Sicily, but only at extreme range. Second Air Fleet could average only 60 sorties a day, against 1,500 for the Allied air forces. Meanwhile, his Sardinian concentration came under attack, and losses there were also serious. In the Mediterranean sector during the Battle of Sicily (July 10–August 17, 1943), the Luftwaffe lost 1,850 aircraft to fewer than 400 for its opponents.
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It was the worst defeat of Richthofen’s career.