Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (81 page)

In making his decisions in November 2009, the president had said his national security team would review progress of the new strategy in December 2010. As I said earlier, if we couldn’t see real progress, then we had to be willing to change our approach. By early June, Biden and others in the White House were already pushing us to rethink the strategy.

Because of mounting political pressure both in Washington and in Europe to show security progress in Afghanistan by the November NATO summit in Lisbon, I was worried that NATO ambassadors in Brussels and the NSS in Washington would conclude
they
should decide which parts of the country were ready to transition to Afghan control. So I was blunt at the June NATO meeting in Brussels in arguing that any announcement of which provinces to transition should depend solely on recommendations from McChrystal, senior NATO representative Ambassador Mark Sedwill, and the Afghan government, based on criteria and metrics they developed. I said the timing of transition must remain dependent on local security conditions and Afghan capacity to govern. I asked the ministers to remember that “transition is the beginning of a process without a predictable timeline; it is not a rush for the door.”

Five days later Mullen and I testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee, ostensibly about the FY2011 budget. Much of the hearing focused on Afghanistan. Mike and I took issue with the negative tone of reporting from Afghanistan and reminded the senators that the surge forces were still arriving. When asked whether the surge could work, I wearily replied, “I must tell you I have a certain sense of déjà vu because I was sitting here getting the same questions in June 2007 when we had just barely gotten the surge forces into Iraq.” We warned that this was going to be a long, hard fight, but that McChrystal “is convinced, confident that he will be able to show that we have the right strategy, and we are making progress, by the end of the year.” Mullen said all the indicators were moving in the right direction, “as tough as it is.” We highlighted Karzai’s formal approval of the Kandahar operation just days earlier. The same day Petraeus and Flournoy testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee along the same lines, then appeared for a second day, Petraeus having fainted at the hearing the day before. In both hearings, the July 2011 drawdown date was hotly debated, with all of us saying that drawdowns would begin on that date, the pace to be determined by “conditions on the ground.” Unrelievedly, the president’s strategy in Afghanistan—and the performance of the U.S. military commander
there—was under heavy pressure both from his staff and Biden in the White House and from the news media. We were barely holding our own. Then disaster struck.

Late in the afternoon of Monday, June 21, Mullen called to tell me the magazine
Rolling Stone
was publishing an article, “The Runaway General,” about McChrystal that was potentially very damaging. He sent the article to my office, and as I read it, I wondered what in the world Stan had been thinking to give this reporter such access. The article cited one aide as describing McChrystal’s first meeting with Obama as a “10-minute photo op.… Obama clearly didn’t know anything about him, who he was. Here’s the guy who’s going to run his fucking war, but he didn’t seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed.” Another staff aide is quoted as calling Jim Jones a “clown” who remains “stuck in 1985.” Most egregiously, the article portrayed the general mocking the vice president. “ ‘Are you asking about Vice President Biden?’ McChrystal says with a laugh. ‘Who’s that?’ ‘Biden?’ suggests a top adviser. ‘Did you say: Bite Me?’ ” The article by Michael Hastings was harshly critical of the entire Afghan strategy, and I knew the quotes about Biden, the president, and Jones would be dynamite at the White House.

About five p.m., Stan called me to apologize for the article. Deeply fearful of its impact on the war, for once I couldn’t contain my anger: “What the fuck were you thinking?” McChrystal offered no explanation, didn’t say he or his staff had been misquoted or that the article was distorted in any way. The four-star general replied essentially as he had been taught as a cadet at West Point—“No excuses, sir.”

My heart sank. I knew that McChrystal’s critics in the White House could put his command in jeopardy. Jim Jones called twice that evening to let me know the White House was getting very “spun up” about the article, a classic understatement.

The next afternoon I was scheduled to meet privately with the president about potential successors for me, Mullen, and Cartwright. Before the meeting, Biden called and, I thought rather defensively, said, “I didn’t rile him [Obama] up last night, I just asked him if he’d seen the article.” Biden told me that McChrystal had called him to apologize for the comments in the article.

I went in to see the president a little after three p.m. on the twenty-second. The first words out of his mouth were “I’m leaning toward relieving McChrystal.” He went on to say, “Joe [Biden] is over the top about
this.” (So much for Biden’s credibility.) I said I was going to see Stan the next morning and would tell him that if he were in any position but commander ISAF, I would fire him myself. But, I went on, “I believe if we lose McChrystal, we lose the war.” I said I feared that any successor would take three to four months to get confirmed, get to Afghanistan, and get up to speed. This loss of momentum, in light of the timelines the president had set, the fragility of the Kandahar campaign, and Stan’s special relationship with Karzai, I said, would be “irrecoverable.”

The president told me my concerns were valid, but he had to think about the institution of the presidency. He said, “Let’s talk substance.” He then reinforced my worst fears. He said, “I don’t have the sense it’s going well in Afghanistan. He [McChrystal] doesn’t seem to be making progress. Maybe his strategy is not really working.” Hearing the president express doubt about the strategy he had approved six months earlier, just as many of the surge troops were arriving in Afghanistan, and his lack of confidence in his commander and the strategy floored me. These feelings did not spring from a magazine article but had been there all along. I replied that the effort was proving harder and taking longer than anticipated, but McChrystal had just briefed forty-four NATO defense ministers in Brussels and all expressed confidence that we were on the right track. “They trust him. And I believe we are making progress and will be able to demonstrate that we are on the right path in December.”

Obama then asked, “What if Petraeus took command?” I told Obama that if Dave would do it, it would address my worst fears—Petraeus knew the campaign plan, knew Karzai, knew the U.S. military leaders in Afghanistan, knew the Europeans, and knew the Pakistanis. I said that under the circumstances, that would be the best possible outcome. Petraeus could hit the ground running, and his reputation would itself bring new energy to the campaign.

I still urged the president to hear out McChrystal. I said McChrystal would offer a letter of resignation and affirm his support for the president’s policy. I urged the president “to flay him” but then be generous and turn down the resignation, and tell Stan he had one last chance. As I left the Oval Office, I was pretty sure the president would not do as I had suggested.

The personal warmth, confidence, and trust that Obama consistently showed me—often at difficult moments between us—never ceased to surprise. Our meeting originally had been scheduled to talk about succession
planning at Defense, and when we finally turned to it, I told him I planned to leave early in 2011. I probably had been his most contentious, difficult, and stubborn cabinet member; and yet the president then told me, in the same meeting where he said he was about to fire a field commander I had recommended to him, that he wanted me to stay for at least the remainder of his first term. “I know that’s not possible,” he said. “How about January 2012?” I reminded him that when we had talked the previous December, I’d said that this timing wouldn’t work because it would be hard to get a quality person to serve for potentially only one year. I also said he didn’t want a defense secretary nomination before the Senate early in the presidential primary season, thus providing Republicans an opportunity to use the hearings to attack his national security policies. Obama agreed, then suggested I remain until the end of June 2011, a logical time to leave as we began the transition in Afghanistan. I said okay. As I reflected on the meeting, I was moved by the president’s generous treatment of me. I probably owed
him
a bottle of vodka.

After that meeting, I went downstairs to the Situation Room for a principals’ meeting. When it was over, I told Hillary I thought the president was going to relieve McChrystal and was thinking about Petraeus as a replacement. She thought Petraeus was a great idea.

When I returned to the Pentagon, I took a call from Karzai, who earlier had had a videoconference with the president. He urged leniency for McChrystal: “I like him. He serves your objectives clearly and purposefully in Afghanistan. I have never had such a clear understanding and productive relationship with any other officer as I have with him.” Karzai said he knew about our system of civilian control but expressed the hope that “this very fine gentleman” could stay in Afghanistan. I told him I would pass along his comments to the president, and that I shared his high regard for McChrystal, but that he had “committed a very serious breach of discipline.” I said I hoped the matter would be resolved quickly to avoid prolonged uncertainty.

At eight-thirty the next morning, Mullen and I met with McChrystal. I again told him, “If you were in any other job than commander in Afghanistan, I’d fire you myself. How could you put the entire war effort at risk with such a stupid decision?” I told him the president was leaning toward relieving him and that the proper thing to do was to offer to resign. Stan said only, “I’ll do what’s best for the mission.” He then left to see Obama.

Just after ten a.m., the president called to tell me he had relieved McChrystal and told me to “come over right away to discuss the way forward.” Mullen and I raced to the White House and joined Obama, Biden, Emanuel, Jones, and Donilon in the Oval Office. We reviewed a list of other possibilities for commander—Marine General Jim Mattis, then commander of Joint Forces Command; Army Lieutenant General Dave Rodriguez, McChrystal’s second-in-command; Marine Lieutenant General John Allen, deputy commander at Central Command; and General Odierno. All present agreed that only Petraeus would work. I said Petraeus was in the White House for a meeting, and the president said, “Get him up here.”

While those two met, the rest of us went to the Situation Room to wait for a scheduled meeting with the president on Afghanistan. Thirty minutes passed. Mullen, Donilon, and I began to look nervously at one another, wondering if something had gone wrong in the Obama-Petraeus meeting. At 10:50, the president came in and told the assembled senior team that Petraeus was the new commander, and he would have full freedom to make military recommendations. Obama expected frankness. He said Dave supported the strategy but could make recommendations for changes, which the president would consider. He then delivered a very stern lecture about divisions within the team, sniping, and leaks. He demanded that everyone get on board. The president wanted to announce the change immediately in the Rose Garden. It all happened so fast that Petraeus had to leave a phone message for his wife that he was headed back overseas.

Because we had another principals’ meeting in the early afternoon, Mullen, Clinton, Petraeus, and I remained in the Situation Room after the Afghanistan meeting to discuss the civilian side of the equation. It was a somber gathering given the drama that had just taken place. We were still trying to fathom the consequences for the war in Afghanistan. Hillary suggested Ryan Crocker as our new ambassador, replacing Eikenberry. (Crocker had been ambassador in Iraq and a close partner of Petraeus’s during the surge.) We all agreed he’d be terrific if he was willing to do it. Hillary said she would raise the idea with the president that afternoon. She later told me that Obama did not want to move on the ambassador’s job until the dust had settled with the military changes, but he had authorized her to reach out very quietly to Crocker. At Clinton’s suggestion, Petraeus called Crocker that evening and reported back
to us that Ryan had not said no, but there were some conditions, including that Holbrooke had to go. But the protective umbrella over Eikenberry at the White House was still up, and Crocker would not become ambassador for more than a year.

McChrystal, whose civilian media adviser had thought the general should reach outside the mainstream media to discuss his mission in Afghanistan, had handed Biden and his other adversaries at the White House and the NSS the opportunity to drive him from command. Giving access to the reporter writing for
Rolling Stone
—a reporter who subsequently would also write very critical articles on both Petraeus and Lieutenant General William Caldwell, in charge of training Afghan security forces—was a terrible blunder. An Army inspector general investigation later concluded that the Army officers on McChrystal’s staff had not made the derogatory comments; nor had the general heard directly the statements in question. (I would hear subsequently that some of the comments in the article were attributable to non-Army members of his staff.) The Department of Defense inspector general reviewed the Army report and, while finding shortcomings in that investigation, concluded that “not all of the events at issue occurred as reported in the article.” The magazine stuck by its reporter.

Whatever actually happened or was said, McChrystal’s refusal to defend himself—to give me any ammunition to use on his behalf—made it impossible for me to save his job. But to this day, I believe he was given the bum’s rush by Biden, White House staff, and NSS who harbored deep resentment toward his unyielding advocacy the previous fall of counterinsurgency and a huge troop surge in Afghanistan; who interpreted his public comments back then as “boxing in” the president; and who continued to oppose the strategy approved by the president and the way McChrystal was implementing it. I am convinced the
Rolling Stone
article gave the president, egged on by those around him in the White House, and himself distrustful of the senior military, an opportunity he welcomed to demonstrate vividly—to the public and to the Pentagon—that he was commander in chief and fully in control of the military. Absent any effort by McChrystal to explain or to offer mitigating circumstances, I believe the president had no choice but to relieve him. The article simply was the last of several public missteps by the general in the political minefield, a risky battlespace where he had little combat experience. At his retirement ceremony in late July, I told the audience, “As he
now completes a journey that began on a West Point parade field nearly four decades ago, Stan McChrystal … does so with the gratitude of the nation he did so much to protect, with the reverence of the troops he led at every level, with his place secure as one of America’s greatest warriors.”