Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (63 page)

Rahm called after the meeting to apologize for the “campaign” comment but said again that the president was feeling boxed in by all the press articles, including one that same day about a Defense war game that purportedly showed the vice president’s option wouldn’t work. I told Rahm that until that story, the military had been quiet since my public warning to advise only in private, but that had not been true of people at the White House. He admitted, “I know, I know.”

Jones came to see me that same day to share his concerns over McChrystal’s plans. He had been very quiet during the meetings in the Situation Room. He said, “The idea of 100,000 American troops in RC [regional command] South and RC East blows my mind. There
is something missing, the glue that holds it all together. Where is the Afghanistan-wide plan, including the NATO role?” He was also concerned about the inflexibility of the military—either 40,000 troops or none. Jim said that Mullen was seen as responsible for the contentiousness and “has real problems among some at the White House,” though not necessarily the president. I went through my familiar commentary again. I said that the notion of some kind of organized campaign was ridiculous, that McChrystal’s statement in London was an unscripted answer to a question, and that Mike had admitted that his statement in his confirmation hearing had been a mistake. I said I thought the atmosphere at the White House was getting poisonous, especially on the part of Donilon, who had characterized Mullen and the military as “insubordinate” and “in revolt.” It steamed me that someone who had never been in the military and had never even been to Afghanistan was second-guessing commanders in the field on things like why there were helicopters in certain places. Jones acknowledged he had “to get Tom back in the box.”

The next day the shit hit a new part of the fan. Roughly three weeks earlier the president had told me that he wanted to talk privately with Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Cartwright to get his personal views on the path forward in Afghanistan. I told him that if it became known, Mullen would feel undercut. I advised Obama to tell no one else, and I suggested he meet Cartwright on a Saturday in the residence. The meeting took place on Tuesday, October 20, while I was in Japan. Several people at the White House were aware of it. Mullen wasn’t. A week after the fact, Jones told Mike about the meeting.

Mike came to see me that afternoon, feeling betrayed by Jones, Cartwright, and possibly me. He felt the meeting showed a lack of confidence in him on the part of the president. He asked why the president wouldn’t just tell him about wanting to meet with Cartwright (who had been sworn to secrecy). Mike said Cartwright now felt like damaged goods and was wondering how he could stay long-term. I thought Mike might resign. I described the origins of the meeting and my concerns. I admitted I had probably made a mistake in my advice to the president and should have told him to be up-front with Mike. Mullen then asked how he stood with me, and I told him I would not want to remain as secretary without him as my partner, that I had total confidence in him and felt terrible about the whole episode. I added that the president had put all
three of us—Mullen, Cartwright, and me—in an awful spot. Mullen and I agreed we each had to talk privately with the president.

Mike wanted clarity on the perceived “campaign” by the military, the president’s confidence in him, and the overall White House view of the military. A few weeks earlier the president “had chewed our asses,” as Mullen put it, for public military statements. Obama had said, “On Afghanistan, my poll numbers will be stronger if I take issue with the military over Afghanistan policy.” That clearly had bothered Mike (as it did me) because it suggested we were on different teams. After our meeting, I called Rahm and asked for fifteen minutes privately with the president the next day. I said it was about a personnel matter but not mine. Rahm asked, “Mike?” I said yes.

I told Obama about my conversation with Mullen and his worry that the president had lost confidence in him. I reported also that Cartwright felt it would be difficult for him to stay on now. I acknowledged to the president that I had given him bad advice. “I should have told you to go ahead and see Cartwright but call Mike first.” The president said he could have handled it better, too, and maybe he was not sensitive enough to military protocol because he had never served. But “I feel like I should be able to talk to anyone in uniform as commander in chief,” he said. I told him I did exactly that at every post and base without the chain of command present. I told him Mike wanted to stay behind for a private talk with him after our regular meeting that afternoon. Obama said he would give Mike a full vote of confidence but would also repeat his belief that military comments had boxed him in on Afghanistan. Mike later told me they had a good conversation and cleared the air.

This episode serves as a reminder that those at the highest levels of government, tough and experienced people accustomed to the hard knocks of political life at the top in Washington, are still human beings. All of us, in varying degrees, have vulnerabilities, insecurities, and sensitivities. All hate critical press stories that question our motives, integrity, or competence. All, including hardened senior military officers and secretaries of defense, need the occasional pat on the back or gesture of support. And however independent and powerful, we need to know we have the confidence of our boss, especially when he is the president of the United States.

By early November, we were focused on three options: 20,000 additional troops (half for counterterrorism, half for training Afghan forces),
the vice president’s recommendation; Option 2, McChrystal’s proposal for 40,000 more troops; and “Option 2A,” my alternative of 30,000 with a push on the allies for 5,000 to 7,000 more. Much would be written later about resentment in the Pentagon over Cartwright helping Biden and his staff craft an alternative plan from McChrystal’s. For Mullen, Petraeus, McChrystal, and others, that was probably true. I had no problem with it. My only concern was that, as was his style, Cartwright didn’t share much about what he was doing with either the senior civilians (including, at times, me) or the military in the Pentagon, which didn’t help things.

Late in our deliberations, we dealt with the important question of how fast additional troops could get into Afghanistan. The original military plan had the deployments spaced out over more than a year. The president correctly pointed out that that could hardly be characterized as a “surge” to recapture momentum. He asked Petraeus how fast the surge had arrived in Iraq. About six months, Petraeus said. Obama decided the arrival of the troops in Afghanistan had to be significantly accelerated. The military leadership ultimately agreed to get most of the troops there by the end of August 2010—a logistical nightmare, but they managed it.

How long would the surge troops stay? The military had been saying that areas cleared of the Taliban would be ready to transition to Afghan government security responsibility within two years. Because the first Marines had arrived in Helmand in the summer of 2009 to take on the Taliban, the president wanted to begin bringing out the surge troops in July 2011. I had opposed any kind of deadlines in Iraq but was supportive of the president’s timeline in Afghanistan because I felt some kind of dramatic action was required to get Karzai and the Afghan government to accept ownership of their country’s security. I also accepted the military’s two-year forecast. I knew well we were not talking about a countrywide transition in July 2011 but, rather, the beginning of a process that would go district by district or province by province. A “conditions-based” date to begin drawing down the surge forces therefore was acceptable to me. To those who said we were inviting the Taliban to just lie low until we left, I said that would only give us more opportunity to accomplish our goals.

In practical terms, a set date to begin drawing down the surge gave Obama something to work with in terms of reassuring both the public and Congress that he was not committing to an open-ended war in Afghanistan. Most Democrats and a growing number of Republicans in
Congress had become increasingly skeptical about the war and its cost, both in lives and in treasure. The politics of the troop increase would be a heavy lift indeed—just as in Iraq in early 2007.

The endgame began on November 6 with a thunderbolt cable to Clinton and the White House from Ambassador Eikenberry in Kabul, which leaked almost immediately. He was dead set against a counterinsurgency strategy and a large infusion of U.S. troops. He said that adding troops was counter to “Afghanization” and “civilianization” of the mission. In his view, Karzai was not an adequate strategic partner, we overestimated the ability of the Afghan forces to take over security, and more troops would only deepen the dependency on us by the Afghan forces. He complained about the lack of a civilian counterpart to the commander of ISAF (McChrystal) and said that he ought to fill that role, not the UN or NATO senior representatives. Eikenberry recommended that we study the situation for several more months while proceeding with development projects.

I thought his recommendations were ridiculous. Analyze for four more months? How do you do development projects without security? The cable ruptured the relationship between McChrystal (and the senior military) and Eikenberry once and for all, both because of the substance but also because Eikenberry had never mentioned either his views or his cable to McChrystal.

On Veterans Day, November 11, we went around and around again on the options. The next day the president called me from Air Force One on his way to Singapore. He said he was focusing on sending two brigade combat teams and not considering a third until the summer of 2010, when we could see what Karzai had done and how we were doing. I urged him to approve all three brigades to demonstrate resolve and to ease military planning. He could then “off-ramp” the third depending on Karzai’s actions. He said he’d think about it. He then asked: Were any of the 17,000 in the first tranche of surge troops being deployed because they were needed to support a force of 40,000 more troops? Could some of the third brigade be brought forward to strengthen the second? What were the benchmarks of progress? Could we accelerate both the buildup and the drawdown? How should we treat the civilian and military components together? He said he had posed those questions to the NSS.

As he prepared to end the conversation, he asked me how to adjust
his body clock for the Asia trip. I said, “The old-fashioned way—alcohol and Ambien.” He laughed and said he’d break out the Johnnie Walker.

On November 13, I invited Emanuel and Denis McDonough to my office to review the president’s questions and to make sure Defense and the NSS understood the questions in the same way. They brought Lute with them, and I was joined by Mullen. Rahm told me that my comments on sending three brigade combat teams had gotten the president’s attention. I said that sending two brigades would look like the president simply split the difference between zero and four and that, after two months of deliberation, that would be characterized as a “gutless” decision. I was sure that when senior military leaders were asked by Congress to give their personal, professional opinion, they would say two brigades were not enough.

I do not leave big issues to chance. On the fourteenth, I called Hillary in Singapore, told her of my telephone conversation with the president, explained what I’d said about three brigade combat teams, and asked whether she still supported that. She affirmed her strong support and then asked, “Where’s Jones?” I said I didn’t know, that he had been slippery on this whole matter. She agreed. I told her I’d called because the president might make a decision on his trip and she would be the only strong voice present. She laughed and said she’d do her best.

Our last meeting was on November 23, from eight to ten in the evening. The stage had been set by two opposing papers. The NSS paper recommended that the president approve two brigade combat teams (about 20,000 troops, Biden’s proposal) and reserve a decision on the third until July 2010. Mullen, in opposition, wrote a memo to the president, which he sent to Jim Jones, reasserting in the first sentence the need for 40,000 troops; McChrystal was equally adamant. Their unyielding views angered Biden, Jones, and the NSS and portended a break between the president and the military. Mullen was traveling in Europe. When I caught up with him, I said I thought that he, Petraeus, and McChrystal had agreed that my alternative of 30,000 troops plus more allied troops was workable. Mike decided to tear up his memo and redraft it. Fortunately, I had told Jones not to give the original Mullen memo to the president.

The meeting that night was straightforward and lacking in drama. Mullen, Petraeus, and McChrystal were candid in what they said but flexible, affirming their support for whatever the president decided. Hillary
strongly supported McChrystal’s approach, with UN ambassador Susan Rice, Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg, Mullen, Cartwright, McChrystal, Petraeus, and me supportive of the “maximum leverage” option (my alternative). Biden, Donilon, and Brennan were all opposed. Eikenberry supported more troops but was skeptical that counterinsurgency would work because of the deficiencies of the Afghan government. Emanuel spoke mainly about the political challenge of getting the money to pay for a surge, and the impact on public opinion, health care, the deficit, and other programs. He said getting congressional approval would be difficult.

On November 27, the day after Thanksgiving, the president called me at home in the Northwest for a long talk. He was fine with the 30,000 troops with flexibility “in the range of 10 percent” for additional enablers, but he would not agree to the requests for 4,500 enablers unrelated to the new deployments that had been stacking up on my desk for over two months. He said that pushed the total number to 37,000, which would be hard to sell on the Hill, and it was too close to McChrystal’s number for the general to understand he was being given a different number and a different mission. “I’m tired of negotiating with the military,” he said. When I expressed my dismay, saying that I’d held off on this need for months pending his decision and now I would have to provide those needed enablers “out of hide,” he responded that McChrystal ought to be able to find the necessary troops: “Doug Lute tells me there’s a lot of tail to tooth [troops in support roles as opposed to fighters] in Afghanistan.” He asked me to return to Washington early for a meeting with him, Mullen, Cartwright, and Petraeus to make sure they were on board: “If they aren’t, I will revert to McChrystal’s option of 10,000 mostly trainers.” We agreed to meet at five on Sunday.