Dönitz: The Last Führer (31 page)

However, once again he seems to have convinced Raeder, who, despite British and French guarantees to Poland, suggested in a staff memorandum that spring that the Polish conflict would be isolated. In his memoirs, written as a broken old man, he confessed that some officers did not share his view, and named Dönitz as one. This seems to be borne out by the fact that after he inspected Dönitz’s U-flotillas on July 22nd that year he made a speech to the officers in which he told them he had the Führer’s personal assurance that there would be no war with Great Britain in the near future.

‘Do not believe that the Führer would bring us into such a desperate position, for a war with England would mean
Finis Germania
!’
⁴⁶

Nonetheless, Dönitz’s apprehensions do not show in a paper he wrote
at the beginning of July. This contained an ambitious proposal for building one or two U-boat repair ships and stationing them abroad. The rationale was that since the task of the U-boats in war would lie in the Atlantic and other distant areas it was necessary to train in these areas; this was not possible without repair and supply facilities which, in lieu of bases, could only be undertaken by specially equipped ships on station.

His conclusion leaves no room to doubt that he anticipated war with Great Britain within a few years, not within two months!

There is evidence that by this time he had convinced at least the U-boat department at High Command of the soundness of his views on the coming war; on August 3rd, the first staff officer (1 U),
Kapitänleutnant
Fresdorf, wrote a paper on U-boat types for the war against commerce whose conclusions might have been dictated by Dönitz.
⁴⁸
Fresdorf was obviously not expecting war with England within a few weeks either! His analysis took into account German surface raider groups yet to be provided by the Z-Plan. He thought that these groups, which could only be beaten off by battleships, would force Great Britain to contract her supply lines—for shortage of capital ship escorts—into a single route across the North Atlantic. He believed the United States would act as a neutral ‘middleman’; all supplies for England would be gathered in US ports then sent in convoys across a broad highway on which all British naval resources, above all aircraft carriers, would be concentrated. In this section he appears closer to Fürbringer than to Dönitz, pointing to the continuing uncertainty over how effective the British Asdic was, and to the probability that single U-boats would be forced under water by aircraft from carriers; hence they would be unable to use their surface speed to intercept convoys.

From these doubts he passed in one bound to the optimism of Dönitz’s view that against a concentration of ships in a convoy it was neccessary to bring a concentration of U-boats! Further, that to overcome the difficulties of finding the convoys in the spaces of the Atlantic they must be located by special long-range, 25-knot boats stationed off the US
assembly ports; these boats would then shadow the convoys when they sailed, continually reporting position and course so that attack groups could be positioned to intercept them over the last third of their journey. Fresdorf did not explain why these fast boats should be immune to the carrier aircraft threat he had spelled out in the earlier part of the paper; it might have been expected that their radio transmissions alone would have alerted the British, who would presumably do all in their power to shake them off. This possibility was not discussed; Fresdorf simply considered the number of boats required; he accepted Dönitz’s figure of 300 torpedo boats Types VII and IX for the attack groups to operate in the eastern third of the Atlantic without any discussion, and accepted the need for Führer U-boats from which the area chiefs could exercise local tactical control; here he went far above Dönitz’s figure, suggesting 20 Type XII boats simultaneously operational, thus a need for 60 of these boats in total. And for the ‘cruiser’ U-boats for reconnaissance off US harbours and for artillery and mining operations in distant sea areas, he suggested fifteen, thus a total of 45.

Since he also suggested smaller boats for North Sea and Baltic operations, and replenishment and ‘tanker’ U-boats to extend the Atlantic boats’ endurance, the total fleet he envisaged was approaching 500 boats, a considerable increase on the Z-Plan and, as he pointed out, one that could not be met without increasing the number of building yards, nor indeed without personnel problems. He drew the logical conclusion that what the proposal amounted to was a renunciation of part of the surface element of the Z-Plan in favour of the U-boat arm. This ties in with Dönitz’s advocacy of a U-boat alternative to the Z-Plan.

Hitler, meanwhile, had been working up his usual excuse for assault; this time it concerned the rights of the predominantly German inhabitants of Danzig, the port at the end of the ‘Polish corridor’ created by the allied powers at Versailles; events were following the same, sad course as at the end of July 1914 with the western governments trying desperately to douse the fuse of a European conflagration sparked in Berlin. Once again the vital decision was taken in Moscow. At the end of July the German Foreign Ministry had dangled a tempting proposition before Stalin: German policy was aimed at Great Britain, not Russia; Germany could offer Russia neutrality and a settlement of all questions between them from the Baltic to the Black Sea. At some time before August 12th the Soviet leader swallowed the bait, and his government declared themselves ready for a ‘systematic discussion of all outstanding issues,
including the Polish question’.
⁴⁹
Hitler was jubilant: he had pulled off yet another master-stroke against his western enemies. After learning the outcome of a meeting on August 15th between his Ambassador in Moscow and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, he felt quite sure of it.

On the same day Dönitz, on six weeks’ leave in Bad Gastein, was recalled by telephone. He arrived at Kiel on the 16th, and that afternoon took over from his chief of staff, Eberhardt Godt. Godt had been his adjutant in the
Emden
, had since taken a U-boat course and had joined his staff the previous year. The two made an excellent combination, Dönitz providing the fire and drive and inspiration, Godt the calm efficiency of the ideal staff officer who never pushed himself forward; they remained together until the very end. All that was missing from the team was a strong critical, analytical brain.

Dispositions for ‘Case White’ had been prepared long since; they provided for all boats not required in the Baltic against Poland and Russia to sail to waiting stations around the British Isles ready to attack British trade, should Great Britain honour her obligations to Poland. The next few days were taken up in getting the 35 immediately ready boats away and attending to unforeseen difficulties such as a shortage of operational torpedoes; Dönitz personally took his leave of all the Commanders before he sailed, commenting afterwards in his war diary, ‘The very confident attitude of the crews deserves special mention. In my opinion it is a sign that the broad masses of the people have great faith in the government.’
⁵⁰

His own view of the chances of a World War at this time are difficult to guess; by the 21st he knew of the likelihood of a treaty with Russia, and this probably caused him to believe the Führer would pull off another miracle, as indeed the great majority of Germans believed. In any case on that date he transferred his command ship to Swinemünde, which seems to imply that he expected to be controlling eastern, not western operations; it had been agreed earlier that ‘if Case White should develop into a major war the FdU will go to Wilhelmshaven with the
Erwin Wassner
’.
⁵¹

On the other hand frustration at the lack of numbers of U-boats burns through the pages of the war diary he had started, and it is difficult to account for this solely in terms of a limited Polish operation.

By the 24th, after the announcement of the non-aggression treaty with Russia, and news that both England and Poland were mobilizing he must
have anticipated war with the West; he asked the naval war staff in Berlin not to reduce the area now occupied by his boats when danger zones were declared for shipping, and he told them that zones extending only 200 miles west of England were not sufficient. He was informed that the zones had not yet been fixed! He then dictated a message to his Atlantic boats to give them the latest political developments; it was held up in Berlin; he wrote in his war diary: ‘I do not agree with this. FdU must be able to give his boats general information as well as just the dry bones of orders if touch is to be maintained between leader and subordinates.’
⁵²

By this time fifteen boats, including U 37 with a flotilla chief aboard to take local tactical control, were on their way to Atlantic waiting positions Northabout around the Faroe Islands, an unnecessarily extended route in Dönitz’s opinion but forced on him by the naval staff; the increased fuel expenditure meant that they would only be able to stay on patrol until mid-September. A further three boats were preparing to sail the same route, a flotilla of the small Type II boats were either on station in the North Sea or preparing to sail and fourteen others were in the Baltic. This comprised practically the entire U-boat force of 56 boats; it left nothing in reserve to take over the positions when the boats had to come in. This was a decision from Berlin. Also by this date, the 24th, the ‘pocket battleships’
Graf Spee
and
Deutschland
, with their supply ships, were on their way to Atlantic waiting positions. It was a pitifully small force with which to take on the Royal Navy. ‘
Y-Tag
’ for the attack on Poland was 48 hours away.

Hitler, however, had lost his nerve: the British government was evidently determined to support Poland despite the shock of the Russian treaty, and his ally, Mussolini, was not prepared to support him! He ordered a postponement of the attack and, calling the British Ambassador to the Chancellery, made a desperate effort to get back to the original first principles of his policy; he personally would guarantee the continued existence of the British Empire, even to the extent of placing the power of the
Reich
at the disposal of the British government.
⁵³

Besides re-opening the official dialogue, Hitler, at Göring’s insistence, sent an unofficial go-between to London; this was a Swedish engineer named Dahlerus, an enthusiast for Anglo-German co-operation, who had made earlier forays in this field. Dahlerus saw the British Foreign Secretary, returned to Berlin the next day, the 26th, and at 12.30 the same night reported to Hitler in Göring’s presence that Britain was going
to stand by her obligations to Poland. By this time Hitler had worked out detailed proposals for how the British should help him gain Danzig peacefully! However, he went on, raising his voice, should there be war, ‘
Dann werde ich U-Boote bauen
—
U-boote
—
U-boote!
’ and working himself into a paroxysm through which his words were scarcely distinguishable, he drew himself up and shrieked as if addressing a Nuremberg rally, ‘
Ich werde Flugzeuge bauen—Flugzeuge—Flugzeuge—und ich werde meine Feinde vernichten!
’
⁵⁴
(I will build aircraft—aircraft—aircraft—and I will destroy my enemies!’)

Dahlerus, stunned, turned to see Göring’s reaction, but found him unmoved. Hitler grew calmer after the outburst and begged the Swede to tell him, since he knew England so well, why he (Hitler) had been unable to reach agreement with the British government. Dahlerus hesitated, then told him he believed it was due to lack of confidence in him and his government.

In the next few days the official replies from Great Britain, while absolutely firm on the guarantee to Poland, gave rise to hopes that there were areas for negotiation; a feeling that the political genius of the Führer had manifested itself once more seems to have passed down the line to Dönitz. The evidence is in his war diary. His frustrations at the lack of boats had culminated on August 28th in a determination to put the case for a rapid build-up of the U-boat arm personally to Raeder. He composed a long memorandum
⁵⁵
reiterating all the points made in his previous reports about the unique suitability of the U-boat for the Navy’s principal task—the destruction of British Atlantic communications—and the necessity for a force of at least 300 boats to carry this task to a successful conclusion—the magic number again, not analysed, flatly stated. There can be no doubt that he really believed that with 300 boats he could force Great Britain to her knees by himself; the single foundation for this was his development of group tactics, since that was the only real change in the U-boat’s favour since the First World War. His paper ended with a plea to Raeder to build the arm up to this strength at the expense of other fleet units in the shortest possible time so that it could ‘carry out its main task, that is to defeat England in war’. It was typed out and sent to Berlin on September 1st; he wrote in his war diary:

The extraordinary thing is that while he wrote these words he knew the German assault on Poland was under way. It had been ordered by Hitler the previous day. Afterwards the former Commander of the Baltic Station, Admiral Albrecht, had told the Führer of his fear that England must be drawn in, to which the reply had been, ‘
Ich höre den Frieden-sengel rauschen
’
⁵⁷
(‘I hear the wings of the angel of peace’). Perhaps this delphic utterance had reached Dönitz, who had moved in the meantime with his staff to U-boat command headquarters West, a plain timber barracks on the outskirts of Wilhelmshaven. At 6.30 pm, one and a half hours after his arrival a message had gone out from the High Command to Atlantic U-boats in the sense of Hitler’s directive that responsibility for opening hostilities in the west should rest unequivocally with England and France: ‘No attacks against English forces except in self-defence or by special order.’
⁵⁸
The boats were informed that hostilities with Poland would start at 04.45 the following morning: ‘Attitude of western powers still uncertain.’