Discourses and Selected Writings (3 page)

Over long stretches Descartes’
Discourse on Method
, the first classic of modern philosophy, reads like nothing so much as a
paraphrase of Epictetus. One programmatic passage will have to do by way of illustration:

Clearly Epictetus remained one of the ancient sages whom an educated person could be expected to know well, as it was assumed there was still much of truth in him.

We conclude by jumping ahead to the present, noting his surprising importance in the history of psychotherapy. Psychologist Albert Ellis has acknowledged Epictetus as one of the chief inspirations behind the development of Rational-Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), arguably the foremost modality in counselling today. As a college freshman in an informal study group devoted to reading and commenting on major philosophers, Ellis was struck by Epictetus’ insistence that ‘It is not events that disturb people, it is their judgements concerning them’
(Enchiridion
5). Ellis openly credits Epictetus for supplying his guiding principle that our emotional responses to upsetting actions – not the actions themselves – are what create anxiety and depression; and that (a point basic to Stoic psychology in general) our emotional responses are products of our judgements – are in fact (irrational) judgements
tout court:
‘Much of what we call emotion is nothing more nor less than a certain kind – a biased, prejudiced, or strongly evaluative kind – of thought. What we call feelings almost always have a pronounced evaluating or appraisal element.’
⁶
Ellis points out that irrational beliefs often appear in the way people talk to themselves. Compare Epictetus at IV 4, 26-27:

The more one reads in the literature of self-help, therapy, recovery and so forth, the more apparent it becomes how much is owed to this regularly rediscovered author, whose ideas have proven useful in disciplines such as applied psychology that in his own day had hardly made a start.

1. Tacitus,
Annals
VI 22.

2. Al-Kindi, ‘Encyclopaedic Scholar of the Baghdad “House of Wisdom”’.
http://www.muslimheritage.com/day_life/default.cfm?ArticleID=691&Oldpage=1
. Accessed 4 September 2007.

3. Blaise Pascal, ‘Discussion with Monsieur de Sacy’, in
Pensees and Other Writings,
trans. H. Levi (Oxford, 1995), pp. 182-92, at p. 187.

4. René Descartes, ‘Rules for the Direction of the Mind’, in
The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
2 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 3 including Anthony Kenny (Cambridge, 1988), vol. 1, p. 10.

5. René Descartes, ‘Discourse on Method’, in
The Philosophical Works of Descartes,
ed. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1931), pp. 80-130, at pp. 96-7.

6. Albert Ellis, ‘Early Theories and Practices of Rational-Emotive Behavior Theory and How They Have Been Augmented and Revised During the Last Three Decades’,
Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy,
vol. 21, nos. 3-4 (December 2003), pp. 219-43, at p. 232.

Interest in Epictetus is currently experiencing one of its periodic upsurges, and some works of secondary literature deserve notice in this connection. Pride of place belongs to the comprehensive study by A. A. Long, a leading scholar of later ancient philosophy:
Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life
(Oxford, 2002). Long is also co-editor, with D. Sedley, of the standard sourcebook for Stoicism and the other philosophical schools that post-date Aristotle:
The Hellenistic Philosophers
(Cambridge, 1987).

Readers of the present translation may derive some benefit from my commentary on Book I (Oxford, 1998), though it is intended mainly for academic use. The part logic plays in Epictetus is the subject of an acute study by J. Barnes,
Logic and the Imperial Stoa
(Leiden, 1997).

A personal account of how Epictetus helped a prisoner of war endure extremes of hardship and degradation can be found in J. Stockdale’s
Courage under Fire: Testing Epictetus’ Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior
(Stanford, 1993). Stockdale is remembered mainly for being third-party candidate Ross Perot’s running mate in the US presidential election of 1992, but during the Vietnam War he spent seven years as a POW, four of them in solitary confinement – solitary, it seems, except for a copy of the
Discourses
. Two lectures, collectively entitled ‘Stockdale on Stoicism’, are available online:
http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/Publications/stoicism1.pdf
;
http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/Publications/stoicism2.pdf
. As testimonials to Epictetus’ enduring value they are probably unsurpassed; but by any measure they make very compelling reading.

The ethics of Epictetus feature prominently in the 1998 bestselling novel by Tom Wolfe,
A Man in Full
(New York, 1998), based largely on Wolfe’s conversations with Stockdale. Stockdale’s essays promoting the wisdom of Epictetus and the values of Stoicism have in recent years been studied by officer candidates in all branches of the American armed forces. Nancy Sherman, a teacher at the US Naval Academy, has published
Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military Mind
(New York and Oxford, 2nd edn 2007).

In two of his final books the French philosopher Michel Foucault singled out Epictetus for his contribution to what he called ‘technologies of the self’: refined procedures whereby a person learns to control his feelings, thoughts and desires. Epictetus’ advice to monitor our thoughts and appearances (or ‘representations’), Foucault argues, anticipates Freud:
Technologies of the Self
(Amherst, 1988);
The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self
(Harmondsworth, 1990).

Epictetus is accorded two chapters in a philosophically rich and wide-ranging study by R. Sorabji:
Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death
(Chicago, 2006).

Finally, a new translation of the
Manual
with detailed commentary can be recommended:
Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living
(London, 2005) by K. Seddon.

My translation is based on the most recent edition of Epictetus’ complete works in Greek, that prepared by J. Souilhé (Paris, 1948-65) in the Bude series of classical texts. The footnotes list instances where for various reasons I have chosen not to use Souilhé’s text as the basis for my translation.

Epictetus has been called a ‘rhetorical wizard’, but certain features of his style are less congenial to print than they would have been to oral delivery. An example is his recourse to repetition. This is no sign of a poverty of ideas but, along with his aggressive style, frequent use of metaphor, dialogue, personal example, etc., part of an effort to make his message memorable. Obviously the rationale for returning to the same themes is largely absent when his lectures are available in print, since we can reproduce the same effect for ourselves by reading and rereading them
ad libitum.
Consequently I have omitted from my translation of Books III and IV a number of discourses that I judge to be little more than restatements of ideas developed to better effect elsewhere.

The innumerable editions of the
Enchiridion
attest to the fact that in this form students’ acquaintance with Epictetus has for centuries begun and ended. The
Enchiridion
purports to distill his philosophy to essentials, without such stylistic superfluities as the snatches of imaginary dialogue that regularly enliven the exposition of ideas in the
Discourses.
Unfortunately in the process Epictetus is flattened to the point of sententiousness; argument is omitted in favour of bald assertion; and to readers with some background in contemporary (especially analytic) philosophy the book makes a disappointing impression.
Epictetus comes across more as a ‘moralizer’ than an authentic philosopher. Nonetheless the
Manual
no doubt still has its uses; readers may find it helpful in orienting themselves to Epictetus’ thought before exploring the
Discourses
themselves.

The complete set of thirty-odd fragments has been translated from the text of W. A. Oldfather in the Loeb series (London and Cambridge, 1925–8) which is based in turn on H. Schenkl’s edition in the Teubner series of classical texts (Leipzig, 1916).

Arrian to Lucius Gellius, greeting:

I have not composed these words of Epictetus as one might be said to ‘compose’ books of this kind, nor have I of my own volition published them to the world; indeed, I acknowledge that I have not ‘composed’ them at all. But whatever I used to hear him say I wrote down, word for word, as best I could, as a record for later use of his thought and frank expression. So they are what you would expect one person to say to another
ex tempore
, not compositions originally intended to be read by posterity. Such being their character, they have somehow, without my knowledge or intention, fallen into the public’s hands. Yet I little care whether I shall be judged incompetent in the art of composition; and for his part Epictetus does not care at all if anyone should despise his Discourses, since in uttering them he was clearly aiming at nothing except moving the minds of his audience towards what is best. So if these Discourses achieve that much, they will have exactly the effect that a philosopher’s words, in my opinion, ought to have. But if not, the reader should realize that, when Epictetus spoke them, his audience could not help but experience just what he intended them to feel. If the Discourses on their own do not achieve this, then perhaps I am to blame or it simply cannot be helped.

Farewell.

[1] In general, you will find no art or faculty that can analyse itself, therefore none that can approve or disapprove of itself. [2] The art of grammar is restricted to analysing and commenting on literature. Music is confined to the analysis of harmony. [3] Consequently neither of them analyses itself. Now, if you are writing to a friend, the art of grammar will help you decide what words to use; but it will not tell you whether it is a good idea to write to your friend in the first place. Music is no different; whether this is a good time to sing and play, or a bad one, the art of music by itself cannot decide.

[4] So what can? The faculty that analyses itself as well as the others, namely, the faculty of reason. Reason is unique among the faculties assigned to us in being able to evaluate itself – what it is, what it is capable of, how valuable it is – in addition to passing judgement on others.

[5] What decides whether a sum of money is good? The money is not going to tell you; it must be the faculty that makes use of such impressions – reason. [6] Reason, in addition, takes the measure of music, grammar and the other arts, judging their benefit and deciding when it’s best to use them.

[7] So it’s only appropriate that the gods have given us the best and most efficacious gift: the ability to make good use of impressions. Other capacities they did not put in our power. [8] Was it because they did not want to? Personally, I believe that they would have endowed us with those others too, had they been able. But they were not. [9] Since we are on earth,
you see, bound to a material body and material things, we can hardly avoid being limited by these extraneous factors.

[10] Well, what does Zeus say? ‘Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made your little body and possessions both free and unrestricted. [11] As it is, though, make no mistake: this body does not belong to you, it is only cunningly constructed clay. [12] And since I could not make the body yours, I have given you a portion of myself instead, the power of positive and negative impulse, of desire and aversion – the power, in other words, of making good use of impressions. If you take care of it and identify with it, you will never be blocked or frustrated; you won’t have to complain, and never will need to blame or flatter anyone. [13] Is that enough to satisfy you?’

‘It’s more than enough. Thank you.’

[14] And yet, while there is only the one thing we can care for and devote ourselves to, we choose instead to care about and attach ourselves to a score of others: to our bodies, to our property, to our family, friends and slaves. [15] And, being attached to many things, we are weighed down and dragged along with them. [16] If the weather keeps us from travelling, we sit down, fret, and keep asking, ‘Which way is the wind blowing?’ ‘From the north.’ ‘That’s no good. When will it blow from the west?’ ‘When it wants to, or rather when Aeolus wants it to; because God put Aeolus in charge of the winds, not you.’ [17] What should we do then? Make the best use of what is in our power, and treat the rest in accordance with its nature. And what is its nature? However God decides.