Discourses and Selected Writings (20 page)

[31] If you lose the struggle once, but insist that next time it will be different, then repeat the same routine – be sure that in the end you will be in so sad and weakened a condition that
you won’t even realize your mistakes, you’ll begin to rationalize your misbehaviour. [32] You will be living testimony to Hesiod’s verse:

‘
Make a bad beginning and you’ll contend with troubles ever after
.’
⁶¹

[1] The Master Argument
⁶²
is evidently based on the mutual incompatibility of the following three principles: 1) everything past that is true is necessary; 2) an impossibility cannot follow a possibility; 3) something which is neither true nor ever will be true is possible.

Diodorus saw the inconsistency; his solution was to concede the truth of the first pair of propositions, but maintain (in defiance of the third) that nothing is possible which neither is nor ever will be true. [2] He was followed by someone who maintained the truth of the other two: 3) that something is possible which neither is true now nor ever will be, and 2) that an impossibility does not follow a possibility – but not 1) that everything past that is true is necessary. Cleanthes’ school, in fact, seems to have upheld the latter view, and Antipater
⁶³
mainly agreed with him. [3] And some defend the other set of principles: 3) that something is possible which neither is true nor ever will be, and 1) everything past that is true is necessary – but, in opposition to 2), assert that an impossibility can follow a possibility. [4] To retain all three, though, is impossible because they are mutually incompatible.

[5] Then, if someone asks me which of these propositions I approve myself, I will answer him, ‘I don’t know, but I
can
report that Diodorus held this opinion about them, the followers of Panthoides, I believe, and those of Cleanthes, held that one, and the school of Chrysippus advocated the third.’

[6] ‘Yes, but what about
you
?’

‘Look, I wasn’t born for this – to test my impressions, compare what people say and form my
own
opinion on the subject.’
⁶⁴

Which is to say, I’m no different from a student of literature.

[7] ‘Who was Hector’s father?’

‘Priam.’

‘Who were his brothers?’

‘Alexander and Deiphobus.’

‘And who was their mother?’

‘Hecuba. Or so I’ve read.’

‘Where?’

‘In Homer. But I believe Hellanicus,
⁶⁵
too, has written on these very same questions, and there may be one or two others…’

[8] It’s the same with me and the Master Argument; what can I add to what’s already been said? If I am vain, however, and want to impress people, especially at a party, I can catalogue exactly who said what: [9] ‘… And Chrysippus has written splendidly on the subject in the first chapter of his book
On Possibles.
Cleanthes devoted a whole treatise to the topic, Archedemus too. And then there are Antipater’s contributions, not only in his book
On Possibles,
but in his special monograph on the Master Argument. [10] Haven’t you read it?’

‘No, I have not.’

‘Oh, read it by all means!’

And what will he gain by reading it? He’ll just be harder to shut up than he is already. I mean, what did
you
gain by reading it? What opinion did you formulate on the subject? Of course, you will tell us all about Helen and Priam and the island of Calypso – things which neither exist nor ever will.
⁶⁶

[11] In literature, too, it is no great achievement to memorize what you have read while not formulating an opinion of your own. In ethics, we do the same thing, only it’s much worse.

[12] ‘Tell me what’s good and bad.’

‘Listen: “The wind carrying me from Troy brought me to the Ciconians.”
⁶⁷
[13] Everything can be classified as good, bad or indifferent. The virtues, and the things that share in them, are
good. The vices and what shares in them are bad. Everything in between is indifferent, like wealth, health, life, death and poverty.’

[14] ‘What’s your source for that?’

‘Hellanicus says it in his book on Egypt.’

I mean, how is this any different from saying, ‘Diogenes
⁶⁸
– or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes – says so in their
Ethics’?
Have you evaluated what they have said, or made up your own mind about it? [15] Let’s see how you handle a storm while on board ship. Do you still maintain these distinctions when the sails are flapping madly and you’re crying out to heaven? Suppose some joker sidles up and says, ‘Please be so kind as to remind me of what you were saying the other day: A shipwreck is nothing bad – that was it, wasn’t it? – and doesn’t have anything bad about it?’ [16] Aren’t you inclined to grab an oar and brain the man with it? ‘Why are you tormenting me, pal? We’re about to die and you come along offering nothing but jokes and ridicule?’

[17] If the emperor summons you to answer a charge, do you remember these same distinctions when you show up pale and shaking? Suppose someone comes up to you and says, ‘What are you afraid of, friend? What significance does this accusation have for
you?
After all, it isn’t virtue or vice that Caesar hands out in his chamber.’ [18] ‘Why do you have to add to my troubles with your sarcasm?’ ‘Tell me, anyway, philosopher, what are you scared of? You’re only in danger of death, prison, torture, exile or disgrace – that’s all. Are any of these a vice, or is there anything vicious about them? What did you personally used to call such things?’ [19] ‘Why are you pestering me, pal? My own evils are enough for me.’

‘Evils’ is right: you have enough evils in the way of hypocrisy, cowardice and the moral pretension you affected while sitting in the classroom, dressed up in borrowed colours. Why did you used to call yourself a Stoic?

[20] Just pay attention to the way you behave and you will discover the school of philosophy you really belong to. You’ll discover that the majority of you are Epicureans, a few Peripatetics
⁶⁹
– but these grown soft. [21] After all, where should we look to prove that, in actual fact, you regard virtue as equal to,
or even more important than, everything else? Show me a Stoic, if you know of one.

[22] Where or how? Of course, you can produce thousands who talk the Stoic talk; they are the same ones who are no less conversant in Epicurean principles, and can give you an expert account of Peripatetic doctrine too. [23] Well, who is a Stoic, then? We call a statue Phidian if it is characterized by Phidias’ style. So show me someone characterized by the beliefs that he espouses. [24] Show me someone untroubled with disturbing thoughts about illness, danger, death, exile or loss of reputation. By all the gods, I want to see a Stoic!

[25] OK, you may not know of one perfectly formed; at least show me someone in the way of becoming one – somebody pointed in the right direction. Do me this one favour; don’t grudge an old man the sight of something he has yet to see. [26] Do you plan to show us the Zeus of Phidias, or his Athena -objects made of ivory and gold? It’s a living soul I want one of you to show me, the soul of a person willing to work with, and never criticize, either God or a fellow human being. One who will never fail, or have experiences he does not want; who will never give in to anger, jealousy or the desire to dominate others.

But rather than try to describe him in detail [27] I will define him simply as someone set on becoming a god rather than a man. Even in this body of death his mind is focused on communion with God. Show me this person. [28] But you can’t. So stop kidding yourselves and deceiving others about what’s most important.
^∗
And stop assuming an identity that’s not your own; you’re all thieves and robbers at large of deeds and titles that don’t in the least pertain to you.

[29] Well, I am your teacher now, and you have come to me to be educated. This is my ambition: I aspire to make you proof against force, obstruction and disappointment; free, content and happy, with your attention fixed on God in every matter great and small. Learning and putting these goals into practice, in the meantime, is the reason
you
are here. [30] So why can’t you do it, if you have the right ambition, and I, in turn, have
the proper training? What’s missing? [31] Whenever I see that a worker has the right material, I expect the work to be done. Well, now, we have a workman here, and we have the material. What are we missing? [32] Cannot the thing be taught? It can. Well, then, isn’t it within our power? On the contrary, it’s the
only
thing within our power. Wealth is not, nor is health or fame – nothing, in a word, is within our power except using impressions correctly; by nature this alone cannot be interfered with or impeded.

[33] So tell me the reason why you don’t succeed. Look, either it’s my fault, or it’s yours, or the fault lies in the nature of the thing. But since the thing itself is manageable and alone is within our power, it follows that either I’m at fault or you are – or, more likely, that we both must share the blame.

[34] So what do you say? Are you prepared at last to get down to business? Let’s make a fresh start. Just begin, believe me, and you will see the truth of what I’ve been saying.

[1] Even people who deny that statements can be valid or impressions clear are obliged to make use of both. You might almost say that nothing proves the validity of a statement more than finding someone forced to use it while at the same time denying that it is sound. [2] If, for instance, somebody were to deny that there is anything universally true, obviously he would have to make a statement to that effect: ‘Nothing is universally true.’ You don’t see the contradiction? [3] It’s the same as if they were to say, ‘If any truth is universal, it is false.’ [4] Or if someone were to say to you, ‘Know this, nothing is knowable, everything is in doubt.’ Or, ‘Trust me on this one, you’ll be glad you did: Nobody but nobody can be trusted.’ Or, ‘You learned it here first, my friend: There is nothing capable of being learned. [5] I not only tell you this, I’ll prove it to you if you like.’ So how – to get to the point – are these so-called Academics any different? They say, ‘Believe me, everyone, nothing
can be believed with any certainty. Be certain of this: you cannot be certain of anything.’
^70
∗

[6] Epicurus is the same way. In his effort to expunge the natural good will that men have for each other, he demonstrates the principle that he aims to destroy. [7] This is what he says: ‘Don’t be idiots, everyone, refuse to be fooled or misled: rational beings have no natural good will toward one another, believe me. Anyone who says different is trying to trick you and lead you astray.’ [8] Well, why do you care? Let us be tricked. After all,
you
won’t be any the worse if all the rest of us are convinced that good will towards one another
does
exist by nature, and that saving, not destroying, it is a primary obligation. Actually, you’d be much better off and more secure.

[9] So why, my friend, do you concern yourself with us, burning the midnight oil and rising at dawn, to write those interminable books? Is it because you’re worried that one of us might be misled into thinking that the gods actually care for mankind, or mistake the essence of the good for something besides pleasure? [10] Because if that’s the case, drop everything and go to bed; make like the animal you’ve judged yourself worthy to be: eat, drink, copulate, defecate and snore. [11] The views of others on the important questions, whether right or wrong, should hold no interest for you. What are we to you anyway? Now, sheep, of course, you have an interest in, inasmuch as they allow themselves to be shorn and milked and ultimately led to slaughter. [12] Wouldn’t it be nice if human beings, tranquillized and sedated by Stoic doctrine, could likewise submit to you and your kind to be shorn and milked? [13] You should have reserved your teachings for your fellow Epicureans and kept them out of the hands of us Stoics; instead you should try and convince us that nature intends us for fellowship, and that virtue is a good thing, so that you can keep everything for yourself. [14] Perhaps this sociability should be extended to some, but not others. Well, who deserves it – people who reciprocate it, or people who hold it in contempt? And no
one holds it in more contempt than you who make such a distinction.
⁷¹

[15] What urged him to get out of bed and write the things he wrote was, of course, the strongest element in a human being – nature – which subjected him to her will despite his loud resistance. [16] ‘Since you hold these asocial opinions,’ she told him, ‘write them down for others to read, lose sleep in the process and by your own behaviour belie your doctrines.’ [17] We hear of Orestes being hounded by the Furies, who wouldn’t let him sleep; but for Epicurus the Furies and Avengers were much harsher. They woke him when he slept and wouldn’t allow him a moment’s peace, forcing him to make public his horrid views the way drunken madness goads the priests of Cybele – [18] human nature is just that irresistible.
⁷²
A vine cannot behave olively, nor an olive tree vinely – it is impossible, inconceivable. [19] No more can a human being wholly efface his native disposition; a eunuch may castrate himself but cannot completely excise the urges that, as a man, he continues to experience. [20] And so Epicurus removed everything that characterizes a man, the head of a family, a citizen and a friend, but he did not remove our human instincts, and could not -any more than lazy Academics can dispose of or negate their own senses, although most of their energy has gone into trying to do just that. [21] It’s too bad, really. Nature gives a person rules and guidelines to discover the truth, and instead of trying to complement and improve on them, they devote themselves to impugning and rejecting the least little thing that could assist them in the effort. [22] Tell us, philosopher, what you think of piety and devotion to the gods.