Discourses and Selected Writings (12 page)

[15] Let the Pyrrhonist and Academic philosophers step forward to face us.

‘For my part, I have no leisure for these controversies, nor can I simply side with convention.’
⁴⁶

[16] Now, if I had a dispute about property I would have called in a lawyer to help with my case. What will meet my needs in this instance? [17] The process of perception – whether it involves the entire body or only a part – this I may not be able to explain, because either alternative seems problematic to me. But that you and I are not the same person – of that I’m quite certain. [18] I mean, when I want to swallow something, I never carry it to
your
mouth, but my own. And when I want bread, I don’t grab a broom, I head straight for the bread like an arrow to its target.
^∗
[19] And you Sceptics, who dismiss the evidence of the senses – do you act any differently? Which one of you ever went to the mill when you were in need of a bath?

[20] ‘Well, shouldn’t we be diligent defenders of convention, then, and watchful for any attack on it?’ [21] Certainly – provided we have the leisure for controversies of this kind. The person who is trembling, upset and inwardly broken in spirit needs to spend his time differently, though.

[1] The cause of our assenting to the truth of something is that it appears to be fact. [2] And it is impossible to assent to anything that does
not
appear to be fact. Why? It is the mind’s nature: it will assent to the truth, reject what is false and suspend judgement in doubtful cases.

[3] Here, I will prove it to you: feel, if you can, that it is night now. ‘Impossible.’
Don’t
feel that it is now day. ‘Impossible.’ Feel, or don’t feel, that the number of stars is even. ‘Impossible.’ [4] So when someone assents to a false proposition, be sure that they did not want to give their assent, since, as Plato says, ‘Every soul is deprived of the truth against its will.’
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[5] They simply mistook for true something false.

Now, with respect to our actions, the case is analogous, only instead of true and false we react to impressions of right and wrong, good and bad, honest and dishonest. [6] And it is impossible to think that an action will do us good and not choose to do it.

[7] What about Medea, though – she who says:

I know that the acts I intend are wrong

But anger is the master of my intentions.

That only amounts to saying that she thinks gratifying her anger by exacting revenge on her husband is preferable to keeping her children safe.
⁴⁸
[8] ‘Yes, but she is in error.’ Well, demonstrate to her clearly that she is in error and she will not act on her idea. As long as you don’t lay it out for her, though, she has nothing besides her own idea of right and wrong to guide her. [9] So don’t get angry at the poor woman for being confused about what’s most important, and accordingly mutating from human being to snake. Pity her instead. We take pity on the blind and lame, why don’t we pity people who are blind and lame in respect of what matters most? [10] Whoever keeps in mind that our actions are all determined by our impressions, which can either be right or wrong – now, if the impression is correct, we are innocent, but if it is incorrect we pay for it
ourselves, since it is impossible that someone else should be penalized for our error – whoever keeps this in mind will not be angry or upset with anyone, won’t curse, blame, resent or malign anyone either.

[11] ‘So in your view great tragedies are merely the result of this – somebody’s “impression”?’

The result of that and that alone. [12] You take the
Iliad:
it’s nothing but people’s impressions and how they dealt with them. An impression made Paris rob Menelaus of his wife, and an impression got Helen to run away with him. [13] Now, if an impression had come to Menelaus that perhaps he was better off losing such a wife – well, that would have meant the loss to us not just of the
Iliad
but of the
Odyssey
as well.

[14] ‘So you’re saying that matters so great owe their origin to something so trivial?’

But what do you mean by ‘matters so great’? Wars, factions, the loss of many men, the razing of cities – tell me what’s so ‘great’ about all that? [15] What’s so great about slaughtering many sheep or cattle, or burning a lot of storks’ or swallows’ nests? [16]

‘Can you really compare the two?’ Why not? In the one case human bodies are lost, in the other case the dead happen to be farm animals. People’s houses burn, so do storks’ nests. [17] What’s so earth-shaking or awful in that? Show me how a house, considered merely as shelter, is better than a stork’s nest. [18] ‘How can a stork be compared with a human being?’ Where the body is concerned, there is lots of similarity, only in man’s case his body inhabits houses composed of bricks and timber, while storks’ nests are made of sticks and mud.

[19] ‘So is there no distinction between a person and a stork?’

Of course there is, but not in regard to these externals. [20] Reflect and you’ll realize that man excels in other respects: in taking cognisance of his own behaviour; in being sociable, trustworthy and honourable; in learning from his own mistakes; in brains. [21] What counts as good and bad for man can be found precisely in those respects in which he differs from the beasts. If his special qualities are kept safe behind stout walls, and he does not lose his honour, trustworthiness or
intelligence, then the man is saved. But lose or take away any of these qualities and the man himself is lost.

[22] Everything significant depends on this. Did Paris’ tragedy lie in the Greeks’ attack on Troy, when his brothers began to be slaughtered? [23] No; no one is undone by the actions of others. That was the destruction of storks’ nests. His tragedy lay in the loss of the man who was honest, trustworthy, decent and respectful of the laws of hospitality. [24] Wherein did Achilles’ tragedy lie? The death of Patroclus? Not at all. It was that he gave in to anger, that he whined about losing a mere woman and lost sight of the fact that he was there not for romance but for war. [25] Those are the genuine human tragedies, the city’s siege and capture – when right judgements are subverted; when
thoughts
are undermined.

[26] ‘Women are driven into captivity, children are enslaved, and men are put to the sword. Is none of this bad?’

[27] What’s the basis for adding that description? Let me in on it too.

‘Why don’t you explain instead how they are
not
evils?’

[28] Let’s turn to our standards, produce our preconceptions. I mean, this is what flabbergasts me. If there’s a question about weight, we don’t formulate a judgement at random; if it’s a matter of judging straight and crooked, we don’t make our decision based on whim. [29] If the truth of the case makes any difference to us at all, then none of us operates in the dark. [30] Yet when it comes to the first and foremost cause of good and bad conduct; when it’s a matter of doing well or ill, of failure or success – only then do we proceed blindly and erratically, only then are we found to lack anything like a scale or measure. A sense impression appears and right away I react. [31] Am I better than Agamemnon and Achilles, insofar as they do and suffer such wrongs by following their impressions, while the impression does not satisfy me? [32] Is there any tragedy with a different source? What is the
Atreus
of Euripides? An impression. The
Oedipus
of Sophocles? An impression. The
Phoenix?
An impression.
Hippolytus?
⁴⁹
An impression. [33] What kind of person, then, pays no attention to the matter of impressions,
do you think? Well, what do we call people who accept every one indiscriminately?

‘Madmen.’

And do we act any differently?

[1] The essence of good and evil consists in the condition of our character. [2] And externals are the means by which our character finds its particular good and evil. [3] It finds its good by not attaching value to the means. Correct judgements about externals make our character good, as perverse or distorted ones make it bad.

[4] God has fixed this law, and says, ‘If you want something good, get it from yourself.’ But you say, ‘No, I’ll get it from another.’ I say, ‘No – get it from yourself.’ [5] If a tyrant threatens me at court, I say, ‘What is he threatening?’ If he says, ‘I will put you in chains,’ I say, ‘He is threatening my hands and feet.’ [6] If he says, ‘I will behead you,’ I say, ‘He is threatening my neck.’ If he says, ‘I will throw you into prison,’ I say, ‘He is threatening my entire body’; if he threatens exile, I say the same. [7] ‘Well, then, aren’t
you
threatened, even a little?’ If I feel that these things are nothing to me, then no. [8] But if I fear for any of them, then, yes, it is I who am threatened.

Who is there left for me to fear, and over what has he control? Not what is in my power, because no one controls that except myself. As for what is not in my power, in that I take no interest.

[9] ‘So do you philosophers teach contempt for rulers?’

Not at all. You don’t find any of us preaching defiance of them within their range of competence. [10] My body, my property, my standing in society, my friends – they can have them all. And I challenge anyone to say that I encourage others to lay claim to those things.

[11] ‘Yes,’ the king says, ‘but I want control over your judgements too.’ Who gave you that power? You cannot add the
judgements of others to your conquests. [12] ‘I will win by way of fear.’ You do not seem to realize that the mind is subject only to itself. It alone can control it, [13] which shows the force and justice of God’s edict: the strong shall always prevail over the weak. [14] ‘Ten are stronger than one.’ Yes, for what, though? For taking people captive, for killing or dragging them off, for taking away their property. For main force, yes, ten are better than one. [15] But one person with right judgements is superior to ten without. Numbers here are irrelevant. Put them in the balance, the person with correct ideas will outweigh all the others.

[16] ‘To think of the indignities Socrates suffered at the hands of the Athenians!’ Not ‘Socrates,’ stupid, express yourself more carefully: ‘To think that Socrates’ poor body should have been seized and hauled off to prison by men stronger than it, that somebody gave his poor body hemlock, that it grew progressively colder until it was dead.’ [17] What seems unjust, or outrageous, in this, or worth blaming the gods for? Didn’t Socrates have resources to compensate? [18] Where was the essence of the good for him – and who is more to be heeded in that regard, him or you? ‘Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot harm me,’
⁵⁰
he says, and: ‘If it pleases the gods, so be it.’

[19] Produce a person who can get the better of someone whose judgements are superior. You can’t, though, try as you might. This is God’s law and nature’s: ‘Let the best man win.’ But ‘best’ in his area of expertise. [20] One body is stronger than another body, many bodies are stronger than one; a thief has the advantage here over one who is not a thief. [21] This is how I came to lose my lamp:
⁵¹
the thief was better than I am in staying awake. But he acquired the lamp at a price: he became a thief for its sake, for its sake, he lost his ability to be trusted, for a lamp he became a brute. And he imagined he came out ahead!

[22] Fine words, you may say – but now I have been seized by the cloak and am being dragged downtown. Bystanders shout, ‘Hey, philosopher, what good did your views do you after all? Look, you’re being hauled off to prison and soon will
be beheaded.’ [23] Tell me, what
Introduction to Philosophy
could I have read that would have saved me from being dragged away if a stronger man grabs me by the cloak; or could have kept me out of prison if I am assaulted by a gang of ten? [24] What philosophy has taught me, though, is to be indifferent to events beyond the will’s control. [25] Haven’t you profited in this respect too? So don’t look for help from philosophy except in areas where you have learned that help from it can be found. [26] As I sit in prison I can say, ‘Whoever laughs at me is deaf to the real meaning of words, can’t understand what they hear, and doesn’t even care to know what it is philosophers say or do. Let them be.’

[27] But the answer comes: ‘Come out of prison.’ If you have no further need of me in prison, I’ll come out; if you need me, I’ll go back in again. [28] ‘How long will you keep this up?’ For as long as the mind chooses to be with the body. But when the mind no longer consents, then you can take my body, and farewell to it. [29] Only, we must not part with it rashly or irrationally, or on trivial pretext. Because, again, God does not wish it. He needs us, he needs the world that we help populate. If he sounds the signal for retreat, though, as he did for Socrates, we must obey the signal as if it came from our commander-in-chief.

[30] Well, should we try telling this to the ignorant mob? [31] What would be the point? It’s enough if we are convinced of it ourselves. When children come up to us clapping their hands and shouting, ‘Today is good Saturnalia,’ do we say, ‘The Saturnalia is not “good”?’ Of course not, we clap our hands right along with them. [32] As for you, if you can’t change a person’s mind, realize that he is no more than a child – and clap hands with him. And if you can’t bring yourself to do that, then just keep quiet.

[33] It is essential that we remember this, so that, when troubles arise, we will know that it’s time to exhibit what we’ve learned. [34] A student fresh out of school who gets into difficulty is like someone practised in the solving of syllogisms; if anyone gives him an easy one, he says, ‘Give me a knotty one instead, I want a bit of practice.’ In the same way, athletes don’t
like to be paired with pushovers. [35] ‘
He
can’t lift me,’ one says, ‘this other guy is better built.’ No, when the crisis comes, we groan and say, ‘I wanted to keep on learning.’ Keep learning what? If you didn’t learn these things in order to demonstrate them in practice, what
did
you learn them for?