Disaster at Stalingrad: An Alternate History (25 page)

The advance elements of Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army reached the Stalingrad-Morozovsk Railway Line in the evening. A great opportunity now presented itself. A good part of both 62nd and 64th Armies could be cut off in Stalingrad’s inner defence belt by an encirclement of the panzer corps of the two German armies. Army Group B headquarters quickly endorsed the plan as did Tresckow.

At this point Paulus took counsel of his fears. It would be far too risky to have his XIV Panzer Corps make such a manoeuvre while it was already heavily engaged with the defenders of Stalingrad’s suburbs, threatened by heavy Soviet forces from the north, and cut off from 6th Army’s main body and supplies. Paulus declined to make the attempt. The two Soviet armies had time to escape into the city. The last chance to destroy the enemy in the field was lost. The 6th Army was now committed to grinding urban combat. Paulus, who had been so apprehensive of his infantry losses, had thrown his army into the very situation that devoured men.

Disaster in the Western Desert had brought Rommel to the gates of Egypt just as the British were trying to come to grips with the impending Turkish entry into the war. That would threaten the vast oil resources at Baku but also those at Mosul in northern Iraq and at Abadan on the Persian Gulf, both sources vital to the British war effort. If successful, the Turks and Germans would not only have stripped the Soviets and Western Allies of crucial sources of oil but also have cut the Persian Corridor through which most aid now reached the Russians. The British scraped together six divisions for their 10th Army based in Baghdad; there would have been more, but two had already been rushed off to help stop Rommel. They also set up a largely paper 9th Army in Syria and used deception to inflate its very weak forces into divisions. The Americans had been persuaded to redirect several air squadrons to bolster 10th Army. The British had offered to deploy a corps of three divisions for the defence of Baku, but Stalin had categorically refused to allow even friendly foreign troops on Soviet soil.
¹

Stalin nonetheless was particularly worried about keeping the Persian Corridor open now that the Arctic route was temporarily stopped. The main route ran by rail and road from northern Iran to the rail centre at Dzhulfa in Soviet Azerbaijan, and then north through Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and Tiflis (modern Tbilisi), capital of Georgia, where it picked up the Georgian Military Highway that took it over the high passes to Ordzhonikidze (former Vladikavkaz) in North Ossetia. Ordzhonikidze was the main sorting and transshipment station for all the supplies and equipment coming through Iran. From Ordzhonikidze it was sent by rail straight up to Astrakhan where much of it was then fed directly into the defence of Stalingrad as well as equipping the growing Stavka reserve accumulating east of the Volga and north of the Don.

The Dzhulfa rail centre was also the main junction with Baku and the shipments of aid coming by sea from the Persian port of Noushahr. From that port aid was also sent to the Caspian port of Makhachkala just north of the Caucasus range. From there it was transported to Ordzhonikidze. Two alternative routes ran from Tehran through Soviet Turkmenistan to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian and from there by sea to Baku. Dzhulfa, though, was the critical junction. If it failed, the only way British and American aid could get through was to reroute it across the Caspian from Noushahr directly to the ports of Makhachkala and Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga. Given the lack of shipping, that would amount to only a trickle. If the terminus of Ordzhonikidze fell, only the unused sea route to Astrakhan would remain.

Stalin and the Stavka had also long been aware of Turkey’s imminent entry into the war, even the codename, Operation Dessau. A casual observer could have seen what was coming as the Turkish Army massed on the border to be joined by a German expeditionary corps. If that were not enough, their agent within the Wehrmacht’s general staff fed them the organization and date of the invasion. That had given Stavka time to alert the Transcaucasian Front’s five armies to dig in and prepare. Stalin also ordered two more armies from Stavka reserve to reinforce them. Their commitment soon proved prescient.

On 2 September the Turkish ambassador handed Foreign Minister Molotov a declaration, just as Turkish armies were crossing the border into the Soviet Socialist Republics of Georgia and Armenia. The twenty-one divisions of the Turkish 2nd and 3rd Armies led the invasion. Eight divisions of former Soviet Muslim POWs were attached in separate corps to each army. Another fifteen Turkish divisions were assembling along the country’s eastern and southern borders to threaten the British in Persia, Iraq and Syria. The Turkish chief of staff, however, was reluctant to engage the British fully. Turkey needed a way out of the war if something were to go wrong. He issued confidential instructions to those armies to restrain their aggressiveness.

The German Jäger troops were under no such restraint and flowed like water seeking its own level through the difficult terrain of the border area in 3rd Army’s sector. They had to admit that the Turks might not be the brightest warriors ever to tread the earth, but they were always up for a fight, especially against a traditional enemy like the Russians. Third Army’s objective was the Georgian capital of Tiflis, 130 miles from the border, with a secondary mission to threaten Batumi on the Black Sea Coast just beyond the border. After taking Tiflis 3rd Army would then cooperate with 1st Panzer Army’s drive through Chechnya to Baku and the oilfields.

The mission of the 2nd Army was to strike through Soviet Armenia and into Azerbaijan. Its primary immediate mission was to seize the rail centre at Dzhulfa. The 2nd Army’s attack also put the Armenians at the mercy of the Turks, who were determined to finish their genocide of 1915-22. It was almost as if they were responding to Hitler’s question of 1922, ‘Who remembers the Armenians?’ They were going to ensure that no one did. The Final Solution of the Armenians was at hand.
²

Stalin was impatient for an attack from north of Stalingrad on the encircling German troops north of the city. Zhukov had flown to the front to see to it. He found the armies available unready for such an offensive operation and informed Stalin over the scrambler phone. Stalin then called Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, the Chief of the General Staff, whom he had also sent to the area to observe what was going on. He admitted the Germans had reached the northern suburbs. Stalin exploded over the phone:

Vasilevsky replied as calmly as he could, ‘We are putting everything that can fight into the places under threat. I think there’s still a chance that we won’t lose the city.’ Stalin rang him back shortly and ordered an immediate attack, regardless of the condition of the troops. The attack on the 5th failed for exactly the reasons that Zhukov had anticipated - the inexperience of the divisions and their lack of ammunition. It did one thing of great value, however.
³
When Zhukov explained that the attack had failed but that it had diverted 6th Army reserves outside Stalingrad to contain it. Stalin replied, ‘That’s very good. It is of great help to the city.’ Zhukov tried to tell him that the attack had served no purpose, but the
Vozhd
said, ‘Just continue the attack. Your job is to divert as many of the enemy forces as possible from Stalingrad.’
⁴

The build-up for the attack had been clear to the Germans, and Paulus’s concentration of effort to stop it gave 62nd and 64th Armies a breathing space. At the same time, Chuikov alerted Yeremenko of the threat from 4th Panzer Army coming from the south, threatening to get behind the two Soviet armies. He drew the proper conclusions. On the night of 2–3 September the two armies withdrew into the inner Stalingrad defence ring. On the 3rd, Seydlitz’s LI Corps linked up with Hoth’s panzer spearheads to find only an empty pocket.

Seydlitz continued his two-division attack and tore through the repositioned elements of 62nd Army. Unit after unit was driven back with heavy losses or simply collapsed as the Germans approached the western outskirts of Stalingrad. Two rifle divisions completely disappeared from 62nd Army’s order of battle in this fighting. The German attack was concentric with LI Corps driving from the west, XIV Panzer Corps from the north, and XLVIII Panzer Corps (4th Panzer Army) from the southwest. Zhukov’s continued attacks from the north, however, drew most of the combat power out of XIV Panzer Corps’ attack against 62nd Army. More importantly, Paulus diverted his air support from the attack on Stalingrad to contain Zhukov’s attacks. Renewed Soviet attacks on 5 September caused Paulus to order Seydlitz to suspend his attack in order to commit all German air support in that direction. Hoth’s panzers also found stiffening resistance slowing their progress against 64th Army. Crushing Soviet artillery and rocket-launcher fire and infantry counterattacks eventually brought them to a halt.

Chief of the Army General Staff Halder was presenting a major appraisal of the deteriorating condition of the fighting forces on the Eastern Front when Hitler savagely interrupted him. ‘Who are you to say this, Herr Halder, you who in the First World War occupied the same revolving stool, and now lecture me on the fighting man, you who have never been awarded the black Wounds Badge?’
⁵
There was a stunned silence among all the officers in the briefing room. Hitler had flung at the Army’s Chief of Staff the ultimate insult.

One too many times Halder had argued with Hitler’s wishful thinking. He may have been sitting on the same revolving staff stool, but that had not prevented him from gaining a clear understanding of the exhaustion of the German forces on the Eastern Front as well as the inadequacy of resources deployed along two divergent directions across vast distances.

Three days later the tension came to a head. Jodl had enraged Hitler with his reports of his visits to the front. He had reported that List had stated he did not have the resources to complete his mission. Jodl had not spent his career on the revolving staff stool and had seen as much combat as Hitler had in the First War and was twice wounded. Hitler screamed at him. ‘Your orders were to drive the commanders and troops forward, not to tell me that this is impossible.‘
⁶
Jodl in turn lost his temper and screamed right back that List had followed Hitler’s orders. Again Hitler screamed. ‘You’re lying. I never issued such orders - never!’ He stormed out into the black of the Ukrainian night. ‘It was an hour before he came back - pale, shrunken, with feverish eyes.’
⁷

That night he ordered stenographers from the Reichstag to report to headquarters in order to take verbatim notes of his deliberations. From then on, the rift between him and his Wehrmacht generals widened. Hitler sulked, even refused to shake hands with his generals and thereafter took all his meals alone. On the 9th, he relieved List and announced that he would now personally command Army Group A. The commanders of 17th and 1st Panzer Armies would report directly to him. In reality, because Hitler took no direct interest in the details of command, the army group’s chief of staff functioned as its commander.

One general, who had just returned after a week away, ‘was so shocked by Hitler’s “long stare of burning hate” that he thought: “This man has lost face; he has realized that his fatal gamble is over, that Soviet Russia is not going to be beaten in this second attempt.”’
⁸

Now confident that the threat to his northern flank had been stabilized, Paulus order Seydlitz back into the attack in what he hoped would be the final push that would take the city. Supported by assault guns and groups of 40-50 Stukas, the lethal German combined-arms machine ground steadily towards the bank of the Volga.

However, Stalin’s instinct that continuous attacks by Stalingrad Front from the north would give the defenders of the city vital breathing room was again proved correct. Seydlitz and his chief of staff visited Paulus at 6th Army headquarters that night and found him on the horns of a dilemma. He was still worried about his northern flank, and Zhukov’s attacks gave him every reason for it. Should he continue to attack due east into the city or north to contain Zhukov? In the end, he ordered Seydlitz to wheel the flank of his corps north to support XIV Panzer Corps on the 9th. At the same time, he ordered Hoth’s XLVIII Panzer Corps (resubordinated to 6th Army) to attack southeast to break through to the Volga and split the 62nd and 64th Armies.

With the fall of the main passes, the Vikings and Slovaks fell like an avalanche on the rear areas of the Soviet 46th Army. Most of its main units had been scattered in regiments and battalions fighting in the mountains and passes. As the Germans burst through from the Klukhor Pass, overwhelming the final reserves of the 394th Rifle Division, all these detachments in the mountains were suddenly isolated and out of the fight. The Soviets had not one tank to contest the advance.

The only force standing in the Germans’ way was the 7th NKVD Division which was just then experiencing a visit from Beria himself at its headquarters at Zakharovka a few miles north of Sukhumi. Despite Beria’s interference, they held out for two days, displaying a determination to fight to the death. On the third day, they collapsed under the weight of the enemy’s combined arms attack. Rudel’s Stukas first destroyed the division headquarters. Then, one by one, they took out each of the antitank guns into the depth of the enemy defences. The panzers and their grenadiers burst through the broken lines and shot anyone in blue trousers. They would take no NKVD prisoners.
⁹

Beria himself waited too long to escape the chaos. His staff car was intercepted by a German tank lurching onto the road to cut off the NKVD. The collision did the car no good as the tank crunched right over it turning the second most feared man in the Soviet Union into bloody jam.
¹⁰

Following the tanks, the mountain corps marched. To the east the Alpini were also heading to Sukhumi. They had only half the distance to go. Ahead of them were only elements of the shrunken 351st Rifle Division.

MAP №6 THE FALL OF SUKHUMI AND THE TURKISH INVASION

The 46th Army’s headquarters had just transferred to Sukhumi when the Vikings and Slovaks blew into the city. Besides its naval personnel, there was only one rifle regiment in the city. Since there were no prepared defences, the Soviets fell back into the ruins of the 14th-century Genoese fort and the 18th-century Ottoman fortress. The Soviet sailors either defended their own facilities or powered up what ships they had to escape. The German corps commander directed his men from the Kaman Cathedral where tradition said that the bones of St John Crysostom were buried. All this time Rudel’s Stukas played the vital role of heavy artillery, blasting away the enemy holed up in the ruins. The Alpini streamed into the city before their German counterparts late that day and were thrown into the final assault on the ruins.

By the next day, this beautiful Georgian city with its palm trees, spas and botanical garden was fully under German control and largely intact except for the port facilities which the Soviet naval personnel had destroyed. The last of the defenders were dead or prisoners. Of the latter, there were over 8,000. By this one victory, the entire coast north to the Taman Peninsula was cut off including 12th, 18th, 47th and 56th Armies and the surviving elements of the Black Sea Fleet. The North Caucasus Front simply ceased to exist. The German mountain corps commander commented that the victory had come none too soon for the first snow was falling in the high mountain passes.
¹¹

One flinty sailor had no intention of surrendering. He commanded the Azov Sea Flotilla which had initially found refuge in Novorossiysk after the fall of its own bases earlier. Vice-Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov took the last of his ships to sea, crammed with refugees, to Batumi over a hundred miles down the coast on the Turkish border.
¹²

Hitler received the news with a righteous tirade. ‘All along I knew,’ he told the staff, ‘that my will would triumph,’ he pointed to them, ‘when all of you doubted. When I convinced the Turks to come in on our side, you doubted still. Now we are crushing the Russians between us.’ He pounded the table in a triumphal rage that approached a wolfs howl.
¹³