Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (67 page)

Ye made it clear that Mao had been at the helm when the country committed the errors of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—the first public, though somewhat indirect, acknowledgment by a Chinese official
that Mao himself bore some responsibility for errors. Ye also acknowledged that many party leaders were also responsible in part for these mistakes because of their “impatience”: “We had become impatient in 1957. . . . In 1958 we departed from the principles of carrying out thoroughgoing investigation and study and of testing all innovations before popularizing them.” With respect to the Cultural Revolution, he said, “We were not always able to stick to the correct principles established during our first seventeen years . . . as a result, we had to pay a very bitter price and instead of avoiding errors . . . we committed even more serious ones.”
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Marshal Ye then offered guidance on how to draw the proper lessons from Mao's errors. After 1927, Mao had found the correct road for the Chinese revolution “by proceeding from the realities of China. . . . We Chinese Communists and the Chinese people call this development of Marxist-Leninism in the Chinese revolution ‘Mao Zedong Thought.’”
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Ye also praised the 8th Party Congress in 1956, chaired by Chairman Mao, when Mao had stated that “the large-scale turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have come to an end,” and had declared that it was vitally important to “unite the entire people for economic and cultural development.”
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The reaction to Marshal Ye's speech was very favorable. The educated public was pleased to hear that party leaders were finally facing up to their problems and moving in a realistic direction they could support. For those who had been attacked over the years, no speech could truly make up for their suffering, but the admission of party errors was a welcome if belated message, a major breakthrough in ending the empty, boastful slogans and for dealing frankly with the issues facing the country.
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Beginning the Evaluation of Party History

Before Marshal Ye's speech was delivered, Deng believed the speech would resolve the party's historical problems and that further discussion of Mao's role could be postponed for some years. He feared that additional discussion of Mao and his place in China's history would only extend the contentiousness that he wanted to bring to an end. It would be better simply to get on with the work. But Mao's role was so deeply embedded in a host of policy issues that many party leaders supported a further review of party history. Some feared that if Mao's ideas were not specifically criticized, political movements like the Cultural Revolution might recur. After the positive reaction
to Ye's speech, Deng relented, sensing that at least some controversial issues could be discussed without splitting the country apart. He began to consult with others about how to proceed with a more detailed analysis of party history.
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At the 7th Party Congress, convened in 1945 as World War II was ending and the party was entering a new phase, party officials had summed up the first twenty-four years of party history in light of the new era. In 1979, as the party was coming out of the Cultural Revolution and entering another new phase, it seemed appropriate to again sum up its historical experiences. As leaders began to prepare this document, called the “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party,” discussions inevitably focused on how to evaluate Mao's role.

To prepare for this historical evaluation, Deng organized a small group with the committed reformer Hu Yaobang in charge, and two conservative defenders of party orthodoxy, Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, as head and administrator, respectively, of the drafting committee.
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As usual, Deng first met the drafters to lay out the major topics he wanted to be covered. He would meet with them fifteen more times and go over each draft, giving specific directions each time. As Hua began to lose power in mid-1979, it was easier for Deng and his allies to reach a consensus that included negative criticism of Mao, so the full evaluation would not be completed for over a year. By 1980, however, after Deng had more firmly consolidated his control and weakened Hua's base of power, Mao's errors could be addressed more directly.

Final Preparations for the New Administration, Late 1979

Hua Guofeng had been basically sidelined by the middle of 1979. In areas where Deng and Hua Guofeng had overlapping responsibility, Deng had simply moved in to take charge. Indeed, by the time U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Beijing in January 1980, Chairman Hua was so powerless that when he was speaking during the meetings, the other Chinese officials in attendance carried on side conversations and paid little attention, a gross violation of the respect ordinarily accorded Chinese leaders.
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In the latter part of October 1979, Deng met with Hu Yaobang, Yao Yilin, and Deng Liqun. They had many important issues on the table as they prepared for the Fifth Plenum, scheduled for February 1980, which may be regarded as the beginning of the Deng administration. At that plenum, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were put in place and Hua's four key supporters
(Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen Xilian, and Ji Dengkui) would be removed from the Politburo. Deng also planned at the plenum to formally clear Liu Shaoqi's name.
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In addition, the leaders needed to discuss plans for reestablishing the party Secretariat.

When these critical meetings were taking place there was no confrontation with Hua Guofeng, for at the time, following the suggestion of Deng and Li Xiannian, Hua was traveling in France, Germany, Italy, and England. He left on October 12. While Hua was away, meetings of the State Council and Politburo were chaired by Deng, and by the time Hua returned on November 10, the basic plans for the Fifth Plenum, including the planned removal of the four Hua loyalists, were in place.
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Once Hua's supporters were removed and Zhao and Hu were in place, it would be easier to proceed with Deng's agenda on the historical resolution.

By the Fifth Plenum in February 1980, scarcely a year after the Third Plenum, Deng had consolidated his power sufficiently that he was able to set out his agenda for the 1980s, revise the structure for coordinating high-level party work, and name his team of senior officials. In American terms, the Deng administration took office in early 1980.

Deng's State of the Union Address for the 1980s

On January 16, 1980, Deng presented a major address on “The Present Situation and the Tasks before Us.” It laid out his goals for the entire decade of the 1980s. It was, in effect, his state of the union address. Hua Guofeng, in his political report to the 11th Party Congress in 1977, had focused on the recent political struggles, and in his ten-year economic vision in 1978 had focused on economic issues. By contrast, Deng's brief address at the Third Plenum in 1978 was a rallying call for reform and opening. His speech in January 1980 was the first major address after Mao's death to define the overall goals for the coming decade.

Deng's logic was simple and straightforward: adopt policies that would contribute to the realization of the four modernizations:

Modernization is at the core of all . . . major tasks, because it is the essential condition for solving both our domestic and our external problems. Everything depends on our doing the work in our own country well. The role we play in international affairs is determined by the extent of our economic growth . . . the goal of our foreign policy is a
peaceful environment for achieving the four modernizations. . . . This is a vital matter which conforms to the interests not only of the Chinese people but also of the people in the rest of the world.
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In his address, Deng acknowledged that “some people, especially young people, are skeptical about the socialist system, alleging that socialism is not as good as capitalism.” So how should China demonstrate the superiority of socialism? “First and foremost, it must be revealed in the rate of economic growth and in economic efficiency.”
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At the time, few foreigners would have predicted that the growth rate of a country led by the Communist Party would in fact surpass the growth rate of Western countries for a whole decade, let alone three decades.

Deng was still setting down the criteria for promotions. He told his officials that if they wanted to hold important positions they needed to acquire professional qualifications. He also stated that with a strong economy, China would be in a better position to resist the hegemons and to achieve reunification with the island of Taiwan. “We must work for the return of Taiwan to the motherland, for China's reunification. We will endeavor to attain this goal in the 1980s.”
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He said that “we must surpass Taiwan, at least to a certain extent, in economic development. . . . Nothing less will do. With the success of the four modernizations and more economic growth, we will be in a better position to accomplish reunification.”
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Deng's goal of surpassing Taiwan economically and of reuniting with Taiwan within the decade was to prove overly optimistic, but within three decades, the success of Taiwan's economy was thoroughly dependent on its economic relationship with the mainland, something few could have imagined in 1980.

What was needed for China to achieve economic modernization? Deng listed four requirements: (1) a firm and consistent political message, (2) political stability and unity, (3) hard work with a pioneering spirit, and (4) a contingent of officials with both an “unswerving socialist orientation” and “professional knowledge and competence.”
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The essence of Deng's message—the need for a firm political line and a stable social order—was consistent with the four cardinal principles he had announced nine months earlier, and with the stance he would take throughout his time as preeminent leader. In his talk on January 16, 1980, he said, “There are hooligans, criminals, and counter-revolutionaries who carry on underground activities in collusion with foreign forces and the Guomindang secret service. Nor can we take too lightly the so-called democrats and other people with ulterior motives who
flagrantly oppose the socialist system and Communist Party leadership. . . . It is absolutely impermissible to propagate freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association in ways implying that counter-revolutionaries may also enjoy them.”
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Yet he also announced that the party would continue the policy of a hundred flowers blooming and would drop the slogan that “literature and art are subordinate to politics” because it could too easily be used as a theoretical pretext for arbitrary intervention. He warned, however, that “every progressive and revolutionary writer or artist has to take into account the social effects of his work.”
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In an effort to lower the overly high expectations that had sprung up since December 1978, Deng talked about the hard struggle ahead and the need to preserve a pioneering spirit. Having suffered for two decades, many people had begun setting goals based more on hope than on reality. Deng remained impressed with Prime Minister Ikeda's plan to double incomes within a decade, which had stimulated Japanese growth during the 1970s. But having learned from the bitter disappointments of the Great Leap Forward when goals could not be met, Deng took care to consult not only Chinese specialists but also foreign experts from the World Bank before setting out what he considered to be a realistic goal.
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Deng became convinced that between 1980 and 2000 China could double its income twice and therefore he popularized the slogan, “quadrupling income by 2000.” When it later seemed as if that goal would be difficult to reach, he quietly began speaking of a quadrupling of GNP rather than a quadrupling of income—a goal that would be easier to achieve. He cautioned the public, however, that in the decade ahead, China would not have the resources to become a welfare state.

After the 1978 Third Plenum, Deng became acutely aware that many leading officials in the provinces, impatient to start investing and growing, were unhappy with Chen Yun's “readjustment policy” that restrained growth (see
Chapter 15
), but in 1980 Deng still defended that policy. Deng reminded “some comrades” who were not satisfied with the current pace of modernization how much more progress they had made in 1978–1980 compared to previous years.

In truth, when defining the ideal role for a ruling party, Deng sounded more like a Western business executive than a Maoist, when he explained that the Chinese should strive to “raise labor productivity, reduce the proportion of goods unwanted by society and the number of factory rejects, lower production costs, and increase the utilization rate of our funds.”
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In weighing the importance of whether it was more important for officials to be “red” or
“expert,” Deng repeated his convictions that he had already made clear: “We should make sure that the leadership of professional organizations at different levels, including the leadership of the party committees, is gradually taken over by people with professional skills.” He cautioned that “some new members who joined the party during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ are not qualified.” Deng closed his state of the union address with a ringing endorsement of the party: “Without party leadership it would be impossible to achieve anything in contemporary China.”
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