Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (29 page)

It was at this point that Mao took up the quotation in the fifth draft of the ten-year vision for the development of science under the CAS that he had objected to. It had quoted Mao as saying that “science and technology constitute a force of production.” After Mao looked it over, he said that he had not said that. To say that, he argued, would make science and technology as important as class struggle, an idea he could not accept. In Mao's view, “class struggle is the key link.” After being called to task by Mao, Deng told Hu Qiaomu, who had been responsible for the draft document, to go back to the sources. When Hu Qiaomu checked, he found that Mao was correct—he had never uttered that expression. Hu Qiaomu had simply come across a similar idea in Mao's works, and, as an editor, made slight alterations in the wording.
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Mao had allowed Deng to undo much of the damage done by the Cultural Revolution while clinging to the fig leaf of a belief that the Cultural Revolution was good. Now Deng was attacking the fig leaf. If while Mao was alive, Deng was already altering what Mao said and attacking Mao's favorites at Tsinghua University, what might Deng do after Mao died?

Mao's New Messenger, Mao Yuanxin, October 1975–April 1976

As Mao's suspicions about Deng's disregard for his own views deepened, his suspicions about his two go-betweens, the two ladies (Nancy Tang and his distant relative Wang Hairong), also intensified. They were becoming too close to Deng.
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They had been behaving, Mao said, like “rats on a sinking ship.”
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Mao was fading, Deng was rising, and the two ladies could no longer be counted on to be loyal to the sinking ship. Indeed, Deng continued to meet with them occasionally even after he fell into disfavor with Mao.
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Because of Nancy Tang's central role in the 1972 visit by President Richard Nixon, Mao allowed her to interpret during the visit of Julie Nixon and David Eisenhower a few weeks later, on January 1 and 2, 1976.
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But that was the last time she interpreted for Mao. Weeks before, Mao had already begun to rely on another messenger, his nephew Mao Yuanxin (see Key People in the Deng Era, p. 733).

When he became Mao's messenger, Mao Yuanxin was a mature, experienced official, eager to carry out Mao's instructions. He stopped at Mao's residence in Beijing on September 27, 1975, en route to Xinjiang (where his father had been a Communist martyr) to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region on September 30. As he had done before, he gave his uncle a detailed account of events in the Northeast. He said that opinion there was divided between those who thought the Cultural Revolution had been 70 percent successful and those who thought it had been 70 percent a failure. The negative critics, he said, were even more vocal than the critics of ultra-leftism who had emerged in 1972 after Lin Biao's death.

After taking part in the celebrations in Xinjiang, Yuanxin returned for a week to the Northeast to wrap up his affairs, then moved to Beijing to serve as his uncle's full-time liaison. Mao Yuanxin was still in awe of his uncle and he shared his radical perspective. As an experienced official and Mao's nephew, Yuanxin carried far more authority in his role as go-between than
the two ladies had. He also played a far more active role than they ever did as his uncle began to orchestrate an almost daily campaign to criticize Deng.

Some of Deng's supporters later claimed that Mao Yuanxin made Mao suspicious of Deng; he may have increased Mao's suspicions by, for example, calling attention to how Deng made some changes in the documents Mao had approved before they were distributed. But in fact Mao was already suspicious of Deng when Yuanxin arrived.
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Other officials were convinced that Yuanxin sometimes inserted his own views when reporting Mao's instructions.

Whether or not he heightened the problems between Mao and Deng, as Deng's supporters complain, Yuanxin did have a radical perspective and he had worked with Chi Qun in Liaoning in late 1974. The two had teamed together to promote the “Chaoyang model,” which was designed to promote political education by providing colleges with course material adapted to the needs of rural officials.
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Yuanxin thus personally agreed with Chi Qun about the importance of political education at Tsinghua University and, like Chi Qun, opposed the new emphasis on academic quality by Liu Bing, Deng, and Zhou Rongxin.

Mao Launches Criticism of Deng, November 1975

On October 31, Deng, aware of Mao's growing dissatisfaction with his work, requested a meeting with Mao. Mao saw him the next day and criticized him for supporting Liu Bing.
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But he also provided some reassurance: responding to Deng's request for an appraisal of the work of the Central Committee during the previous few months, Mao said that the policies were “correct,” and he went on to acknowledge the achievements of consolidation.
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In the several confrontations with Jiang Qing that had flared over the previous few months, Mao had invariably supported Deng, and Deng, while realizing he was taking some risks, hoped Mao would continue to do so. As it turned out, Deng had overestimated how much support he would receive from Mao in the weeks ahead.

When Mao Yuanxin met with Mao the next day, he reported to his uncle that Deng rarely talked about the achievements of the Cultural Revolution, seldom criticized Liu Shaoqi's revisionist line, and hardly ever praised the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius that had also targeted Zhou Enlai. Mao Yuanxin added that Deng rarely mentioned class struggle and
concentrated solely on improving production. And finally, speaking to Mao's deepest fears, he told his uncle there was a danger that Deng would restore the pre–Cultural Revolution structure.
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After that meeting between Mao and his nephew, tensions between Deng and Mao escalated rapidly.

Deng tried on several occasions to see Mao privately “to receive instructions,” but after his meeting with Mao on November 1, Mao always refused to see him. If Deng were to tell him in private that he approved of the Cultural Revolution, then after Mao's death he could deny what he said. Party historians who have seen the relevant documents are convinced that Mao wanted Deng's approval of the Cultural Revolution to be on the record, heard by other people, or committed in writing so that Deng could never publicly deny it. When Mao met his nephew on November 2, for instance, he told Mao Yuanxin to meet Deng that same day, in the presence of two other officials, to tell him Mao's views.

Although Deng's daughter Deng Rong does not record the date, she relates a meeting at their house between her father and Mao Yuanxin that quite likely occurred that evening.
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She writes that one evening Yuanxin, at his uncle's behest, came to their house to talk with Deng. Deng's daughter did not know what went on during their private conversation behind closed doors, but she could tell that Mao Yuanxin had come “to fuss” and that her father “didn't waver.” She concludes, “The talk between Papa and Mao Yuanxin went badly.” When Mao Yuanxin left, she writes, “Papa did not see him out.”
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Mao Yuanxin is reported to have begun his job as Mao's messenger with some diffidence toward the senior party officials, including Deng. But when he spoke with the full support of Mao Zedong behind him, he acquired some authority. It is easy to imagine that Deng, proud of his many personal accomplishments, convinced of his rectitude, and reluctant to affirm the Cultural Revolution, would have been less than enthusiastic about being criticized by someone half his age.

The two people selected by Mao to join Mao Yuanxin and Deng Xiaoping at the meeting on the next day were Wang Dongxing and Chen Xilian, both of whom shared Mao's commitment to the Cultural Revolution. Deng knew Mao Yuanxin would report back to Mao, but he did not waver. He presented his views forthrightly: “You [Mao Yuanxin] said that the party center consolidation has followed the revisionist line and that in all areas we have not carried out the Chairman's line. That's not right. As for what line I have been carrying out in the three months since I have been leading the work of the Central Committee, as for whether conditions throughout the country are a
bit better or a bit worse, one can evaluate by the actual results.” Deng, aware that he was in deep trouble with Mao, added that he was willing to undergo a self-criticism.
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After the meeting, on the same day that Yuanxin reported to his uncle that Deng had not tamely accepted criticism, Mao told his nephew that they should immediately convene a meeting of eight people: the same four (Deng, Mao Yuanxin, Wang Dongxing, and Chen Xilian), along with Zhang Chunqiao (one of the Gang of Four) and three key vice premiers—Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng—who had guided economic and government work during the Cultural Revolution. Mao said, “It doesn't matter if there is some quarreling. The next stage will be for the Politburo to meet.” Earlier, Mao had said the Cultural Revolution was 90 percent good, but in preparation for this meeting Mao settled for a lower hurdle: Deng and the other officials must acknowledge that the Cultural Revolution was 70 percent good, and “if one Politburo meeting doesn't resolve the issue, it can meet a second time and a third time.”
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The group of eight met the next day, November 4, and that same evening Yuanxin again reported to Mao the results of their meeting. Mao Yuanxin had urged Deng to accept the Cultural Revolution as basically good and to agree that class struggle was still the “key link.” Instead, Deng avoided giving Mao's nephew a direct answer. Mao was clearly displeased with Deng's response, but he said to his nephew that they were undertaking criticism of Deng not to remove him but to help him correct his errors. Mao then directed his nephew to warn Zhang Chunqiao, a member of the Gang of Four, not to mention a word about these proceedings to Jiang Qing, who always was ready to criticize Deng publicly.
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After Mao Yuanxin reported to his uncle, Mao directed that the group of eight should meet again, and they did so. Later that day, November 7, Yuanxin reported to his uncle that there had been no progress in getting Deng to budge.

The strategy that Mao followed next was to gradually enlarge the number of participants and ratchet up the pressure until Deng would give a clear commitment of support for the Cultural Revolution. Accordingly, Mao directed Yuanxin to assemble all seventeen people on the Politburo, including Jiang Qing. The Politburo members were to criticize by name those who had supported Deng in the fields of culture and science and technology: Hu Qiaomu, Hu Yaobang, Li Chang, and Zhou Rongxin. Deng's daughter Deng Rong writes that launching attacks on these people whom Deng had supported was a way of putting greater pressure on Deng, who knew that his refusal
to yield would create serious problems for his associates. As explained earlier, Minister of Education Zhou Rongxin, once president of Zhejiang University and a long-time staff assistant to Zhou Enlai and to Chen Yun, had been speaking out boldly about raising the educational levels to assist modernization and even about reducing the role of political education.
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On November 8, in a further blow to Deng, Zhang Chunqiao, who was responsible for supervising the field of education, told Zhou Rongxin to engage in a self-criticism for encouraging students to study while ignoring China's political struggles.

Parallel to the Politburo meetings criticizing Deng and his colleagues were large public denunciations of Deng's allies for their elitist views on education. At the time, Deng's name was not yet mentioned publicly. But on November 13, Mao, unhappy about Deng's failure to respond at the initial meetings, wrote out specific instructions for the Politburo meetings to “help” Deng.

Two days later, Deng, acutely aware of the seriousness of Mao's criticism and quite likely thoroughly aware of Mao's disillusionment with Wang Hongwen, wrote to Mao suggesting that Wang Hongwen, who had completed his assignment in Zhejiang, replace him in leading the daily work of the Central Committee. Mao replied the same evening that for the time being Deng Xiaoping should continue to chair the meetings. Mao did not invite Wang Hongwen to resume his former responsibilities, and two months later he named Hua Guofeng as acting vice chairman.

On November 16 and 17, the Politburo again met to criticize Deng and his key supporters in the fields of education and science. Like Zhou Enlai, Deng had the stamina to chair, at Mao's insistence, a meeting at which he was the target of criticism. Mao Yuanxin made the key presentation criticizing Deng for his failure to follow Mao's directives affirming the Cultural Revolution, class struggle, and Mao's educational policies. Jiang Qing, who was by then allowed to attend the criticism sessions, and her radical allies added their voices to the criticism. During the meeting, Deng made no comments beyond the minimum necessary to serve as chair. After allowing his attackers to present their case, from the chair Deng called on those being criticized—Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, Zhou Rongxin, Li Chang, and Liu Bing—to explain their positions. But when asked at the end of the meeting to summarize the discussion, Deng declined, saying that he was hard of hearing.
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The proceedings against Deng escalated rapidly during the first half of November and reached a climax on November 20, when the discussion turned into an overall evaluation of the Cultural Revolution. Again at Mao's direction,
Deng chaired the meeting. Deng rarely asked others for advice, but in the days before this meeting, under continued pressure, Deng consulted with Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying, and Chen Yun. He struggled to find a way to sidestep an affirmation of the Cultural Revolution in a way that Mao would find the least objectionable. When pressed by the Politburo members to agree on a formula affirming the Cultural Revolution, Deng, following a suggestion by Ji Dengkui, said: “During the Cultural Revolution.... I was in the Peach Blossom Grove. I didn't even know what happened in the Han dynasty, to say nothing of what followed later during the Wei and Jin dynasties.” This clever allusion, one that Mao himself had used only a week earlier, referred to a well-known story, “The Peach Blossom Grove” by Tao Yuanming, in which the people in the grove admit that because they were closed off, they were in no position to know what was happening in the wider world.
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Deng's effort to dodge the issue did not satisfy Mao, who wanted a clear affirmation of the Cultural Revolution. Mao and Deng had reached an impasse.