Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (17 page)

To Mao, hearing reports of Kissinger's discussion with Zhou, the proposal had overtones of the Soviet Union's proposal in the late 1950s to provide a collective defense for China, which had led Mao to break off relations with the Soviet Union for fear of granting powers to the Soviet Union that would have compromised Chinese sovereignty. Now, in Mao's view, Zhou was ready to grant the United States power over intelligence-gathering that would compromise China's independence.

Jiang Qing, sensitive to Mao's moods and always seeking opportunities to criticize Zhou Enlai, saw her moment and launched an attack on Zhou for being too eager to yield to the United States. She called him a capitulationist.
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Mao, who wanted a firmer backbone in China's foreign policy, was ready to allow a vigorous attack on Zhou Enlai.

From November 25 to December 5, 1973, immediately after Kissinger's visit, Mao organized a series of Politburo struggle sessions against Zhou Enlai in the Great Hall of the People. After Lin Biao's death, Mao had taken little interest in the details of daily work, but he micromanaged the criticism of Zhou by selecting who would attend, outlining what they would say, and setting the overall tone of the meetings. In his view Zhou was close to being a rightist capitulationist.
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All of the Politburo members were required to publicly criticize him. Zhou wrote a detailed self-criticism, but Mao judged it inadequate, demanding that Zhou compose another one that condemned his own actions even more strongly. After the November 1973 meetings, Kissinger was able to visit Zhou, but never again, as Zhou made clear to Kissinger, was he allowed to negotiate with him.

Mao Passes Responsibilities to Deng, December 1973

After Kissinger's November visit, for dealing with the United States Mao turned to the person who had proved absolutely firm in standing up to the Soviet Union: Deng Xiaoping. In December 1973 Deng was directed to attend the Politburo meetings to criticize Zhou. Zhou had been like an elder brother to Deng in France, in the underground in Shanghai, and in their
work in Beijing in the early 1950s. Yet Mao had reason to hope that Deng would choose to side with him rather than with Zhou. During the rectification campaign of the 1940s, Deng had been on Mao's side while Zhou had not. Deng had bonded with Mao since being accused of leading the Mao clique in 1931, and he had been promoted in the 1950s by Mao. After 1956, when Deng had become general secretary of the party, his relations with Zhou were sometimes awkward regarding party matters: Zhou, who remained senior in rank, had to report to and receive instructions from Deng, who managed daily party affairs.
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And during the Cultural Revolution, Zhou did not defend Deng.
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Deng knew very well that what he said at the meetings to criticize Zhou would be reported to Mao by the two ladies. Near the end of the meetings, Deng said to Zhou, “You are only one step away from the Chairman. Others could hope for such a position, but it would be unattainable; for you it is attainable. I hope you will take this as an adequate warning.”
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On the surface Deng's words may not have seemed vicious, but in the context they were damning. In effect, Deng had implied that there was a danger Zhou might try to upstage Mao and usurp his role. When the two ladies reported Deng's comments to Mao, Mao was thrilled, and immediately invited Deng in for a talk.

Several days later, Mao called a meeting of the Politburo, asking the members to make Deng a full member as well as a member of the CMC. This was the first time in history that Mao had rushed through such an appointment without having it cleared by a plenary session of the Central Committee.
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Zhou officially remained on as premier, but Deng began attending his meetings with foreign officials. Indeed, although he was still physically able seven months later to take the plane flight and possibly represent China in May 1974 at the United Nations, Mao chose Deng to attend in his stead. And after Zhou entered the hospital on June 1, 1974 for surgery, Deng began hosting the visits with foreign dignitaries.
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Firming up the Military, 1971–1974

After Lin Biao's death in the plane crash en route to the Soviet Union, Mao needed to ensure that his military leadership was loyal and united. Before the plane crash, Mao had already taken precautions to firm up support against Lin Biao. In August 1971, for instance, Mao took a personal tour of military bases in central and south China and talked openly of differences with
Lin Biao. He also replaced a number of military leaders, which weakened Lin's base of support.
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Immediately after the crash, the four military officers on the Politburo—Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo—were given ten days to declare their distance from Lin. Those who failed to do so were arrested within a matter of days and released in the late 1980s.

Just as Mao turned to Lin Biao in 1959 to unify the military after he had removed Peng Dehuai, so too did he need someone after Lin's death to strengthen the military's central command. Mao turned first to Marshal Ye Jianying, who was widely respected in the military, had no enemies, and, being a decade older than Lin Biao, had no leadership ambitions (see Key People in the Deng Era, p. 740). At the end of 1973, however, when Mao began to rely on Deng Xiaoping to manage U.S. relations with a firmer hand, he turned to Deng to help strengthen control over the military as well.

Not long after the 10th Party Congress, Mao reportedly tested Wang Hongwen and Deng by asking what might happen after his death. Wang replied that the Chairman's revolutionary line would continue. Deng, acutely aware of the power of the commanders in the military regions, said that warlords might emerge and the country might sink into crisis. Mao thought Deng gave the better answer, and by the end of the year the military commanders had been rotated yet again.
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Also shortly after the 10th Party Congress, Mao learned that when Lin Biao was still alive, Li Desheng, a military leader who had recently risen to be a party vice chairman, had signed a letter of loyalty to Lin that in Mao's view went further than necessary. It was a great shock to Mao. Fearing that other regional commanders might have been too close to Lin Biao, Mao decided to rotate them; to reduce the risk that they might organize people in their new posts, they were transferred without their staff.

After discovering other letters of loyalty by military leaders to Lin Biao, Mao also became more suspicious of the political leadership in Beijing that had worked with Lin and decided to bring to Beijing new regional officials who had not worked closely with the former “comrade in arms” who proved unfaithful. Because Deng had spent his time in Jiangxi while Lin Biao was at the helm, Mao knew that Deng could not possibly have had close relations with Lin. He also knew that two of the key military leaders—Li Desheng, who was being sent to the Shenyang Military Region, and Chen Xilian, who was brought in to take the most sensitive position, head of the Beijing Military
Region—had both served in Deng's Second Field Army. Mao could be confident that Deng would keep them in check.

Soon after the rotation of the regional military commanders, then, Mao announced that a military officer, Deng Xiaoping, would be a member of the Politburo and of the CMC. As Mao put it, “I am thinking of making him secretary general of the Politburo. If you don't like that title, we'll call him chief-of-counsels.”
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Deng, always more concerned about actual authority than titles, politely refused those titles. Mao knew that the senior military officers would be relieved by Deng's appointment, not only because he had military credentials, but also because they knew he would not take part in any vindictive purges. So although Deng had to show his loyalty to Mao by severely criticizing the eight military commanders who had been influenced by Lin, the experienced senior officials knew Deng did this because he was required to do so. After his appointment, it was not entirely clear whether Marshal Ye outranked Deng or Deng outranked Marshal Ye, but each was deferential to the other and they cooperated effectively in working with the regional commanders.

While curbing Lin Biao's influence in the military, Mao also launched a political campaign among the general public to criticize those who had been close to Lin. It was discovered that Lin Biao had written notes in the margins of things he had read, showing he had great respect for Confucius; the campaign against him and someone else accused of being too Confucian, Zhou Enlai, was therefore called “Criticize Lin, criticize Confucius”
(pi-Lin, pi-Kong)
. The campaign began with editorials on January 1, 1974, and continued throughout the first half of 1974. It initially targeted Li Desheng and others in the military who appeared to be too close to Lin Biao. By late January, however, Jiang Qing was using the campaign to criticize Zhou Enlai. In addition to criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, it took aim at “the duke of Zhou.” Zhou was damaged, but he weathered the storm. He continued on as premier and even chaired meetings during which he was being criticized, though he was removed from sensitive negotiations with the United States.

At the end of the campaign in August 1974, Mao the instigator became Mao the magnanimous. He blamed the two ladies for acting like little generals when criticizing Zhou Enlai, and he criticized Jiang Qing for overdoing the criticisms in the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius. He went as far as to tell Jiang Qing that she should stop attacking people and that she
did not represent his views. She was wrong, Mao asserted, to declare that Zhou's problems were so serious as to be called an eleventh-line struggle, and she was wrong to have accused Zhou of being impatient to seize authority.
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At a July 17, 1974, Politburo meeting, Mao warned Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan that they should not be a “Gang of Four.” It was the first time the term was used to describe these four radical members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Although these four had not operated as a tightly organized and well-planned clique, they had played a central role in attacking Zhou.

The name “Gang of Four” would catch on—as would the idea that they were dangerous. As Jiang Qing continued to attack Zhou and senior officials, she and the other three in turn became the target of intellectuals and senior officials who attacked this Gang of Four. It was not yet possible, however, to push back against the one who made it possible for the Gang of Four to launch their attacks, Chairman Mao. Indeed it was only in private conversations that some brave people, with friends they thoroughly trusted, would hold up four fingers and wiggle their thumbs, indicating that it was not just a Gang of Four but there was a fifth as well: Mao Zedong.

While under criticism, Zhou Enlai's cancer continued to advance. On June 1, 1974, he entered the No. 301 Hospital for an operation and remained living there in an attractive suite of rooms for much of the time until his death in January 1976. Zhou was seasoned enough to know that Deng's criticism in late 1973 had been made under pressure from Mao. By early 1974 Zhou and Deng were working together closely on foreign policy issues, with Deng in effect serving as acting premier under the personal guidance of the hospitalized Zhou, who officially kept his post.
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Deng may have been returned to office by Mao, not by Zhou, but in 1974 and 1975 Zhou and Deng were once again collaborating as closely as they had in France, in the Shanghai underground, and in Beijing before the Cultural Revolution.

Deng knew that Mao wanted him also to work with Jiang Qing, and he tried to do so. But as Zhou became weaker, Jiang Qing began to worry about Mao's willingness to give more responsibilities to Deng and began redirecting her criticisms toward him.
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Jiang Qing was right that Deng was rising in prominence within the party. The most striking sign of Mao's growing trust in Deng was Deng's selection as the first Chinese leader to make a major presentation at the U.N. General Assembly.

Deng's Historic U.N. Address

In the spring of 1974, Deng was elevated to international prominence when Mao designated him to make the presentation for China at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Since 1971, when mainland China had replaced Taiwan in the China seat at the United Nations, no Chinese leader had addressed the General Assembly.

Months earlier it was expected that the maiden speech by a Chinese representative would focus on economic issues. The Ministry of Foreign Trade, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was assigned to prepare the speech for a Chinese leader and Li Qiang, in charge of trade policy, was to make the presentation. Shortly before the event, when it become apparent that the United Nations would focus on China's international relations, responsibility for preparing the speech was handed over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In making the decision to send Deng to New York, Mao took into consideration that Zhou was too soft to be a reliable representative. Wang Hongwen, with his lack of seasoning, would have been an embarrassment. Above all, Mao wanted a senior leader who would stand up to the United States.

To put his plan into action, Mao, the wire puller, had Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang approach their ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to ask that Deng be made head of the delegation to the United Nations. The ministry quickly obliged. Jiang Qing, unaware that Mao had been behind the decision to send Deng to the United Nations, bitterly opposed the selection. She knew that the visit would strengthen Deng's influence at home and abroad and that Deng, whose firm resolve had inspired the nickname the “steel factory,” might well place limits on her activities.
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On March 27, 1974, Mao, who by this time was living apart from Jiang Qing, warned her by letter not to attack Deng's selection because he himself had made it. Except for Jiang Qing, the Politburo unanimously supported the selection of Deng as head of the Chinese delegation.
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