Cochrane (44 page)

On
27
February, Cochrane returned to Valparaiso. The Ministry of Marine had assumed that the attack on Valdivia would be defeated and, as a matter of face saving, they had carefully prepared charges of insubordination against him for having sailed there without proper au
thority. As news of the victory
and of a passing attack on the Spanish fort at Chiloe, spread through Valparaiso and Santiago, the government hastily withdrew its charges and publicly congratulated Cochrane on his "admirably arranged plan" and its "most daring and valorous execution".
¹²

But the matter of prize money was no less productive of ill-feeling in Chile than it had been in England. Cochrane and his men received "nothing but promises". But in this case there was a remedy, which he exploited by retaining everything he had seized at Valdivia despite threats of prosecution for illegal detention of national property. Cochrane answered this, on
14
May, by offering O'Higgins his resignation as commander of the Chilean navy. This produced consternation and further promises of payment for the squadron. Cochrane himself was awarded
67,000
dollars and an estate at Rio Clara in the south of the country. He refused the estate, bought a hacienda of his own at Herradura, about eight miles from Valparaiso, and withdrew his resignation. When he offered to pay for the construction of a naval base for the Chilean navy at this place, he was warned not to start on the project in any way. The authorities were not prepared to pay anything towards it and, as he discovered, they showed their displeasure by holding back much of the prize money.

On
16
July, Cochrane offered his resignation again, supported two days later by twenty-three of the Chilean navy's European and American officers. By now, Cochrane's two English rivals, the captains Guise and Spry, were in open rebellion against him. Indeed, he had put Guise under arrest for direct disobedience to orders and was awaiting the arrangements for a court-martial which he hoped would secure the offender's removal from the service.

The Minister of Marine, Jose" Zentano, wrote to Cochrane and begged him not to resign at this point. Cochrane's resignation would "involve the future operations of the arms of liberty in the New World in certain ruin;
and ultimately replace in Chile
, your adopted home, that tyranny which your Lordship abhors, and to the annihilation of which your heroism has so greatly contributed."

Cochrane cared little for Zentano, but he also received private letters from San Martin and O'Higgins, "begging me to continue in command of the naval forces and assuring me that there should be no further cause for complaint".
¹³

From Cochrane's own point of view, there were strong enough reasons for remaining in his command. Setting aside his indignation over the question of prize money, he believed strongly in the Chilean cause. Personally, he had a great admiration for O'Higgins, whom he exempted from any part in the niggardly treatment of the naval squadron. Most important of all, there was nowhere else in the world, at the time, where he could exercise his supreme gifts as a naval commander. The purchase of the hacienda had been a gesture of commitment to the Chilean cause and to his continuing part in it. As Sir James Mackintosh informed the House of Commons, Cochrane now stood before the eyes of the world.

Lord Cochrane is such a miracle of nautical skill and courage; his cause of banishment from his country is so lamentable - his adventures have been so romantic - and his achievements so splendid, that no Englishman can read them without pride, that such things have been done by his countryman; and without solemn concern that such talents and genius should be lost to the land that gave them birth.
¹⁴

For Cochrane, there was a final and immediate reason which made his departure from Chile unlikely. The capture of Valdivia had removed the greatest threat to the young republic so far as the south was concerned. To the north, however, the Spanish still held the long coastal strip of Peru, by virtue of the garrison at Lima and the access to it by means of the neighbouring port of Callao. It was at Callao that the most powerful ships of the Spanish squadron were concentrated and Zentano was right when he warned Cochrane that this base was enough for the Spanish to reverse the whole course of the revolution in Chile itself.

In Santiago and in Valparaiso, preparations went ahead for the decisive battle of the war. It was proposed that the entire weight of the Chilean army and navy should be thrown against Lima and Callao under the joint command of General San Martin ashore and Cochrane at sea. The army would be carried as far as possible by sea, and then the double attack would commence. To placate the foreign seamen and their officers, San Martin signed a public promise that all arrears of pay would be made good on "my entry into Lima", a pledge also signed by Cochrane as witness.
¹⁵

On
21
August
1820,
the squadron with
4200
troops on board put to sea from Valparaiso, among the cheers of the inhabitants fining the shore. There had already been a less obtrusive departure. Believing the climax of the war was at hand, Cochrane had despatched a confidential messenger, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles, to a very different destination. Charles had served under Sir Robert Wilson in Egypt, and had made the acquaintance of several participants in that campaign. At Cochrane's instigation, he was about to renew one of those acquaintanceships by setting out on a long and momentous voyage to St Helena. But the dream of a great Napoleonic Empire in South America was never to be realised. By the time that Colonel Charles reached St Helena, the health of the exiled Emperor had begun its long and irreversible decline. His deterioration had already gone so far that there was nothing for Colonel Charles to do but to return to Valparaiso.
¹⁶

The problems of Cochrane's attack on Lima began early. San Martin, as commander-in-chief of the army, informed him that the troops would go ashore at Truxillo, a considerable distance from their objective. Cochrane was disconcerted by this, believing that the landing should have been swift and close to the targets, enabling rapid and simultaneous attacks to be made on Lima by land and Callao by sea. He saw no point in invading an area where, as he put it, "the army could have gained no advantage, nor, indeed, have found anything to do, except to remain there safe from any attack by the Spaniards".
¹⁷

It was the beginning of a long, final quarrel between the two commanders. San Martin might be an experienced leader in the struggle against Spain, but by Cochrane's standards he exhibited caution to a degree which approached cowardice.

In the event, San Martin revised his plan and went ashore with his army at Pisco, which was closer to the objectives, although still some one hundred and fifty miles short. He remained there for seven week
s, to Cochrane's fury, even decli
ning to attack Pisco itself, which was defended by no more than three hundred Spanish troops. Then at length on
28
October, San Martin re-embarked his army on the transports for the last stage of the voyage to Callao. He was prompted by news that the province of Guayaquil, hearing that an army of liberation was on the way, had declared itself independent without further ado. However, when the squadron reached Callao, San Martin thought better of putting his army ashore there, and insisted on being taken back to Ancon, thirty miles to the north.

Irritated beyond endurance by San Martin's conduct of the attack, Cochrane returned with the
O'Higgins,
the
Independencia,
and the
Lautaro
to the waters off Callao. For San Martin's benefit, he announced that he was going to blockade the port so that Lima would not be reinforced by sea. What he had in mind was something more dramatic, a plan which he had no intention of confiding to San Martin. The latter was settling down peacefully at Ancon, a port which the Spanish hardly bothered to defend, since, as Major Miller observed, it consisted only of "a few fishermen's huts, half buried in the drifted sand".
¹⁸

On
3
November, Cochrane began his close reconnaissance of the harbour of Callao, using the
O'Higgins
for the purpose. In one sortie, he outmanoeuvred the defences by sailing between the island of San Lorenzo and the mainland, through the Boqueron passage. The citizens of Callao crowded the shore to watch, knowing that the channel was suitable only for vessels of less than fifty tons. The Spanish gunboats waited to close on the wreck of the
50
-gun warship. Cochrane's secretary, W. B. Stevenson noted the "utter astonishment" of the spectators as Cochrane brought his flagship through the narrow rocky channel with as little concern as if he had been handling a rowing boat. It was a show of seamanship designed to undermine the morale of the enemy. But it was more than that. He was now certain that neither the
Venganza
nor the
Prueba
were anywhere near. Callao was defended by shore-batteries, a floating boom, and most important of all, by the
Esmeralda.
The
44
-gun frigate was the fastest and most powerful Spanish warship on the Pacific coast. Her destruction would be a decisive factor in loosening the grip of the enemy on the garrison towns. But if she could be captured intact, and incorporated into the Chilean navy, the advantage would swing so far in favour of Cochrane and his men that Spanish power in Chile and Peru might never be re-established.
¹⁹

Like the attack on Valdivia, the only positive advantage which the Chileans enjoyed was that no one would believe them foolish enough to attempt to "cut out" the
Esmeralda.
So far as the Spanish possessed a "pocket battleship", she was one, well able to give a good account of herself in an exchange with any of Cochrane's ships. Apart from this, she lay securely at anchor in Callao harbour, protected by three hundred pieces of artillery in the shore-batteries, by a strong harbour-boom with chain moorings, by twenty-seven gunboats and several armed block-ships.

On
5
November, during the afternoon, Cochrane announced to the crews of his ships that he was about to strike "a mortal blow" at Spanish sea power in the Pacific. There was a surfeit of volunteers, perhaps impelled by his promise that, "The value of all the vessels captured in Callao will be yours." He chose
160
seamen and
80
marines, preparing to make the attack that night.

The men embarked in fourteen small boats which had been lowered and assembled alongside the
O'Higgins.
Cochrane himself went in the leading boat. All his other ships were out of sight and even the flagship had been anchored far enough out to sea to put the Spanish defenders off their guard. When the action should begin, he judged that it might be very confused and close-fought. Each man was therefore issued with a pistol and a cutlass, most suitable for hand-to-hand fighting, while the entire attacking force was dressed in white with blue bands on their left arms to identify friend and foe.

Like so many actions of its kind, the cutting out of the
Esmeralda
was over almost before the defenders realised that it was in earnest. Cochrane, timing it, noted that it lasted no more than quarter of an hour from start to finish. But before the action began, there was a long preliminary from about
10
p.m. to midnight, during which the loaded boats pulled silently across the dark water to a small gap in the harbour boom. The little craft were grouped into two divisions, under Cochrane's overall command, the first under his flag-captain, Captain Crosbie, the second under his most vehement critic, Captain Guise of the
Lautaro.

As the flotilla glided past the boom, Cochrane in the bows of the first boat, a sharp challenge rang across the dark surface of the anchorage and the unwelcome silhouette of a Spanish gun-boat appeared ahead of them. Instead of answering, Cochrane ordered his oarsmen to bring him alongside the boat, a course which evidently impressed the Spanish commander as being that of submission. As they came alongside, Cochrane rose to his feet and addressed the commander.

"Silence or death!" he sa
id softly. "Another word and I’ll
put you every one to the sword!"

By the time that the commander could think of a response, he found his launch surrounded by fourteen boatloads of armed men and the initiative had passed from him. Cochrane with the leading boats was already making for the
Esmeralda.

There were two neutral warships anchored off Callao, both destined to play an innocent part in Cochrane's plan. The first was the United States frigate
Macedonian,
the second was the Royal Navy frigate
Hyperion.
The sentry at the gangway of the
Macedonian
hailed Cochrane's boats as they passed but, as W. B. Stevenson saw, the man was "immediately hushed" by the American officer of the watch. As Stevenson's boat passed the
Macedonian,
"many of her officers hung over the bulwarks, cheered us in whispers, wishing us success, and wishing also that they themselves could join us". There were no cheers and no good wishes from H.M.S.
Hyperion.
Indeed, her sentries continued to hail Cochrane's boats with all the power of their lungs, as though determined to alert the Spanish defenders.

Despite this, Cochrane's boat reached the side of the
Esmeralda,
still undetected by the watch. While he led the boarding party on one side of the ship, his rival Captain Guise led a second attack on the opposite side. But though the guards on the
Esmeralda
had noticed nothing as yet, they were fully alerted by the sound of Cochrane and his men boarding the ship by the main-chains. Cochrane raised himself to the level of the deck only to be met by a blow from the sentry's musket-butt. Losing his hold, he fell heavily into the boat below, driving the thole-pin, on which the oar rested, into his back near the spine. It was an injury which was to cause him considerable pain for years to come.