Closing the Ring (57 page)

*  *  * *  *

The supreme question of the treatment to be accorded to Germany by the victors could at this milestone only be the subject of “a preliminary survey of a vast political problem,” and, as Stalin described it, “certainly very preliminary.” It must be remembered that we were in the midst of a fearful struggle with the mighty Nazi Power. All the hazards of war lay around us, and all its passions of comradeship among Allies, of retribution upon the common foe, dominated our minds. The President’s tentative projects for the partition of Germany into five self-governing states and two territories of vital consequence under the United Nations were of course far more acceptable to Marshal Stalin than the proposal which I made for the isolation of Prussia and the constitution of a Danubian Confederation, or of a South Germany and also a Danubian Confederation. This was only my personal view. But I do not at all repent having put it forward in the circumstances which lay about us at Teheran.

We all deeply feared the might of a united Germany. Prussia had a great history of her own. It would be possible, I thought, to make a stern but honourable peace with her, and at the same time to re-create in modern forms what had been in general outline the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which Bismarck is supposed to have said, “If it did not exist, it would have to be invented.” Here would be a great area in which not only peace but friendship might reign at a far earlier date than in any other solution. Thus a United Europe might be formed in which all the victors and vanquished might find a sure foundation for the life and freedom of all their tormented millions.

I do not feel any break in the continuity of my thought in this immense sphere. But vast and disastrous changes have fallen upon us in the realm of fact. The Polish frontiers exist only in name, and Poland lies quivering in the Russian-Communist grip. Germany has indeed been partitioned, but only by a hideous division into zones of military occupation About this tragedy, it can only be said, “I
T CANNOT LAST
.”

¹
No question as to whether it should be the Eastern or Western Neisse had vet arisen.

6
Cairo Again: The High Command

Anglo-American Discussions in Cairo
___
Andaman Islands Plan
___
No Agreement at Our First Plenary Meeting, December
4___
The President Agrees to Abandon the Andamans Plan, December
5___
Our Joint Telegram to Premier Stalin, December
6___
Question About the Number of Troops Required by Admiral Mountbatten___Staff Discussion of the Strategy Against Japan___Our Conference with the Turks at Cairo___Outline Plan for Aiding Turkey___The Turks Will Not Commit Themselves___President Roosevelt Decides to Appoint General Eisenhower to Command “Overlord”___The President and I Visit the Sphinx.

O
N
D
ECEMBER
2, I got back to Cairo from Teheran, and was once more installed in the villa near the Pyramids. The President arrived the same evening, and we resumed our intimate discussions on the whole scene of the war and on the results of our talks with Stalin. Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who had refreshed themselves by a visit to Jerusalem on their way back from Teheran, were to carry forward their discussions on all their great business the next day. Admiral Mountbatten had returned to India, whence he had submitted the revised plan he had been instructed to make for an amphibious attack on the Andaman Islands (Operation “Buccaneer”). This would absorb the vitally needed landing-craft already sent from the Mediterranean. I wished to make a final attempt to win the Americans to the alternative enterprise against Rhodes.

The next evening I dined again with the President. Eden
was with me. We remained at the table until after midnight, still discussing our points of difference. I shared the views of our Chiefs of Staff, who were much worried by the promise which the President had made to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek before Teheran to launch an early attack across the Bay of Bengal. This would have swept away my hopes and plans for taking Rhodes, on which I believed the entry of Turkey into the war largely depended. But Mr. Roosevelt’s heart was set upon it. When our Chiefs of Staff raised it in the military conferences, the United States Staffs simply declined to discuss the matter. The President, they said, had taken his decision and they had no choice but to obey.

On the afternoon of December 4, we held our first plenary meeting since Teheran, but made little headway. The President began by saying that he must leave on December 6, and that all reports should be ready for the final agreement of both parties by the evening of Sunday, December 5. Apart from the question of the entry of Turkey into the war, the only outstanding point seemed to be the comparatively small one of the use to be made of a score of landing-craft and their equipment. It was unthinkable that one could be beaten by a petty item like that, and he felt bound to say that the detail
must
be disposed of.

I said that I did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British delegation viewed our early dispersal with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would declare war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated. This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making “Overlord” a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

The second event of first-class importance was the decision to cross the Channel during May. I myself would have preferred
a July date, but I was determined nevertheless to do all in my power to make a May date complete success. It was a task transcending all others. A million Americans were to be thrown in eventually, and five or six hundred thousand British. Terrific battles were to be expected, on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give “Overlord” the greatest chance of success, it was thought necessary that the descent on the Riviera (“Anvil”) should be as strong as possible. It seemed to me that the crisis for the invading armies would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our beachheads. As soon as the “Overlord” and “Anvil” forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same commander.

The President, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points: (
a
) Nothing should be done to hinder “Overlord.” (
b
) Nothing should be done to hinder “Anvil.” (
c
) By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing-craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war. (
d
) Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best [in the Bay of Bengal] with what had already been allocated to him.

On this last point I suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from Mountbatten in order to strengthen “Overlord” and “Anvil.” The President said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China, and he would not be prepared to forgo the amphibious operation except for some very good and readily apparent reason. I replied that this “very good reason” might be provided by our supreme adventure in France. At present the “Overlord” assault was only on a three-division basis, whereas we had put nine divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The main operation was at present on a very narrow margin.

Reverting to the Riviera attack, I expressed the view that it
should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing-craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy, and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. I then pointed out that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of “Overlord.” I said that I was surprised at the demands for taking the Andamans which had reached me from Admiral Mountbatten. In the face of Marshal Stalin’s promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value, while, on the other hand, their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.

The discussion continued on whether or not to persist in the Andamans project. The President resisted the British wish to drop it. No conclusion was reached, except that the Chiefs of Staff were to go into details.

*  *  * *  *

On December 5, we met again, and the report of the Combined Staffs on operations in the European theatre was read out by the President and agreed. Everything was now narrowed down to the Far Eastern operation. Rhodes had receded in the picture, and I concentrated on getting the landing-craft for “Anvil” and the Mediterranean. A new factor had presented itself. The estimates of the Southeast Asia Command of the force needed to storm the Andamans had been startling. The President said that fourteen thousand should be sufficient. Anyhow, the fifty thousand men proposed certainly broke the back of the Andamans expedition so far as this meeting was concerned. It was agreed for the moment that Mountbatten should be asked what amphibious operations he could undertake on a smaller scale, on the assumption that most of the landing-craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks. Thus we parted, leaving Mr. Roosevelt much distressed.

Before anything further could be done, the deadlock in Cairo was broken. In the afternoon the President, in consultation
with his advisers, decided to abandon the Andaman Islands plan. He sent me a laconic private message: “ ‘Buccaneer’ is off.” General Ismay reminds me that when I told him the welcome news cryptically on the telephone that the President had changed his mind and was so informing Chiang Kai-shek, I said, “He is a better man that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city.” We all met together at 7.30 the next evening at the Kirk Villa to go over the final report of the Conference. The Southern France assault operation was formally approved, and the President read out his telegram to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, informing him of the decision to abandon the Andamans plan.

*  *  * *  *

I now worked out with the President a joint summary of our decisions to be sent to Stalin.

Prime Minister and President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin

6 Dec. 43

In the Cairo Conference just concluded, we have arrived at the following decisions as to the conduct of war in 1944 against Germany additional to the agreement reached by the three of us at Teheran.

The bomber offensive against Germany, with the objective of destroying German air combat strength, the German military, industrial, and economic system, and preparing the way for a cross-Channel operation, will be given the highest strategical priority.

We have reduced the scale of operations scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal to permit the reinforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.

We have ordered the utmost endeavours to increase the production of landing-craft in U.K. and the U.S.A. for the reinforcement of “Overlord,” and further orders have been issued to divert certain landing-craft from the Pacific for the same purpose.

*  *  * *  *

In informing the Southeast Asia Command of our decisions, I did not conceal from Mountbatten the shock which the estimates of his advisers which he had endorsed had been to me.

Prime Minister to Admiral Mountbatten (Delhi)

9 Dec. 43

You will have seen the President’s telegram to the Generalissimo about the abandonment of “Buccaneer” with which as you know I am in entire agreement. This arises from the decision at Teheran to concentrate everything on “Overlord” and a simultaneous operation against the South of France.

Everyone here has been unpleasantly affected by your request to use 50,000 British and Imperial troops of which 33,700 are combatant against 5000 Japanese. I was astounded to hear of such a requirement and I cannot feel sure you are getting competent military advice. The Americans have been taking their islands on the basis of two and a half to one and that your Generals should ask for six and a half to one has produced a very bad impression. Even the detailed figures with which I have been furnished do not remove it.

I hope that preparations will now go forward for Sumatra after the monsoon. However, while such standards as those you have accepted for the Andamans prevail, there is not much hope of making any form of amphibious war.

  Mountbatten replied that the United States in their recent landings had deployed a superiority of troops varying from between three to one to over six to one. The larger figure applied when cover from shore-based aircraft was not possible. For taking the Andamans he would have carrier-borne and not shore-based aircraft, and their effort was likely to be expended after four days. It was therefore essential to capture the Andamans airfield within that time. The resources already allotted to him would enable him to carry the fifty thousand men proposed. Of these however only nine thousand could be landed by the first two waves. He did not therefore feel he was asking for an undue superiority in order to ensure quick success. He cited the American landing at Munda, where, with an even higher ratio of superiority, only very slow progress had been made.

I remained unconvinced. But the following post-war comment from the War Office should be printed in order that the point at issue may be fairly presented:

Operation “Buccaneer,” an assault on the Andaman islands, involved transporting our forces one thousand miles from the nearest base, and the force included all troops required for the development of facilities, the building of airfield and strips, and for work in the docks. It was estimated that sixteen thousand would be non-fighting troops, and included in the balance of “fighting” troops were all headquarters, engineers, and anti-aircraft units. The enemy was considered to have air superiority in the area. Admittedly the “teeth” part of the force outnumbered the estimated Japanese garrison by about four to one, but this was not much greater than what was at that time accepted as a desirable preponderance for an assault landing. It cannot be overlooked that we had been uniformly unsuccessful against the Japanese for the previous twelve months. Lord Mountbatten undoubtedly wished to make his first assault a success, if only for the sake of theatre morale.