Citizen Emperor (60 page)

The insurrection in Madrid served Napoleon’s purposes: the rebellion was integrated into a narrative surrounding the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy. The pretext used by Napoleon to justify the overthrow was that the nation was in ruins, and that this had been in part brought about by Godoy and the internal intrigues wrought by Fernando. It was a theme Napoleon played to over the coming months and years.
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Spain, which had once ruled the world, which had once had great kings, no longer did so because its ‘government had been passed into the hands of the weak’.
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As with France and the overthrow of the Directory at Brumaire, as with the overthrow of the Bourbons in Naples, so too had Napoleon rescued Spain from the abyss. He had no other interest in intervening in Spanish affairs than ‘those of all kings and all fathers’. The argument was hardly likely to convince. Later, because of the reaction of the courts of Europe to these machinations, not to mention the reaction of the people of France – just about everyone was aghast
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– those involved in the fall of the Spanish House of Bourbon later attempted to distance themselves from it. Talleyrand, for one, whose role was not insignificant even if he was not there in person, later blamed Napoleon and referred to Bayonne as a ‘pitiful intrigue’ (
intrigue pitoyable
).
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The overthrow of the Spanish monarchy not only shocked the vast majority of European royal houses, because it went against the core of their political philosophy – the principle of legitimate monarchy – but also appalled many who had remained steadfastly loyal to Napoleon till then. It tarnished Napoleon’s reputation; there was a general feeling that he had done something ‘unworthy’, ‘odious’, ‘atrocious’, all words that one can find in commentaries of the time.
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Much was made of this by contemporaries who opposed Napoleon. From the start the early histories of the reign described his intervention as unjust and accused him of having deliberately provoked a crisis so that he could then step in.
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The statesmen of Europe did not understand why Napoleon should go to the trouble of overthrowing a ruling house that was already completely subservient to him.
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‘A Barbarous and Inhospitable Land’

And nor did the French, who universally condemned the war in the Peninsula. Public opinion in France, already tired of the incessant warring, did not take kindly to the way in which France had become embroiled in Spain. Secret police bulletins through the summer of 1808 and from various towns and regions in France underline the degree to which public opinion was hostile to French intervention in Spain.
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This was even more the case for the military called on to fight in the Peninsula. General Hulot, who accompanied Junot into Portugal, complained that he had to fight ‘for the ambition and the pride of one family, with no benefit for France, with no glory for us!’
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Colonel Noël wrote of the ‘indignation’ aroused by the events at Bayonne and believed that Napoleon was imposing a war on France out of pride and ambition.
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There is enough material in the letters and diaries of the day to indicate a general malaise or discontent with the French involvement in Spain.
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This appeared to be a war started for the Emperor’s personal gain and was thus fought with reluctance by the officers and troops.
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The French entered Spain in the belief that it was already ‘a barbarous and inhospitable land’.
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Their experiences were only going to reinforce that prejudice. They had been brought up on this idea since well before the Revolution. It was the remarkable brutality of the French, the wanton destruction, the ruthless butchery that turned many Spaniards, even those who had at first sympathized with the invader, against them. It was the viciousness of the Spanish, the excessive zeal and the seeming delight with which they slaughtered the invader that marked Spain as the worst field of operations a Frenchman could be posted to. Francisco Goya’s etchings and paintings of the disasters of war are damning indictments of human cruelty, even though we are not sure whether he was actually witness to any of these events. General Saint-Laurent, who commanded at Vitoria, wrote to a friend: ‘We have the whole country against us. As the Army has been without pay for a very long time, and the phrase “distribution of food” has disappeared from the dictionary, one would think we were among Vandals. Nothing is respected; the war, which has continued for too long, kills morale; it is a question of who plunders the best . . . It is enough to make one blow one’s brains out.’
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All Spaniards, according to Sergeant-Major Rattier of the Imperial Guard, hated the French.
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Maurice de Tascher, a twenty-one-year-old officer and cousin to Jospehine, wrote of the fanaticism of the Spanish, including their women. While in the town of Écija, between Seville and Granada, young girls of twelve to fifteen years of age would pass him in the street making a stabbing gesture to the throat. Another young girl told him that his head would make a nice ornament in front of her door.
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This is not the place to go into the war in Spain and in particular the guerrilla war, treated in some recent works, nor to explore the extreme violence that underlined the struggle between the Spanish and the French, except to say that, while popular resistance to the French invasion was widespread and deep, lasting from 1808 till the French were ousted in 1814, support for the war among the Spanish was anything but enthusiastic. The impact of the guerrilla war is now thought to have been much less impressive than has traditionally been made out.
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One also has to point out that Spain was, in comparison to the rest of Europe, already a very violent country. In the 1830s for example, its crime rate was one of the highest in Europe.
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But there were other difficulties facing the French, not the least of which was the absence of Napoleon from the field. Despite his rank, General Savary was placed in overall control of military operations, something that the marshals subordinated to him could not tolerate. This was indeed one of the reasons why the French were never able to gain complete control over the country – competing interests, petty rivalries and a good deal of pride impeded the French efforts to repress what quickly became a generalized revolt. Savary, moreover, did not go about things with a light hand. He behaved like any other French general – he ordered those under his command to crush the revolt with unflinching brutality. The slightest provocation, the least bit of resistance, was met with the harshest repression. To cite but two among a never-ending list of atrocities, when some of the inhabitants of the town of Torquemada, halfway between Burgos and Valladolid, burnt an effigy of Napoleon on 6 June 1808, Marshal Bessières had the town razed. When the town of Córdoba was stormed by the French that same month, it was sacked without mercy.
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The French ambassasor to Madrid, the Comte Laforest, was embarrassed to ‘repeat all the excesses’ committed by French generals.
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Napoleon had an inkling of what was going on – he later referred to Spain as the ‘devil’s business’ that was costing him dearly
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– but he never really appreciated either the difficulties or the complexities of the Spanish theatre. He simply ordered the revolt to be put down, and was not averse to instructing some of his generals to make examples of recalcitrant populations. He returned to Paris on 14 August, suffering from what one historian has described as a kind of ‘personal euphoria’.
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One can cite the victories at Austerlitz and Jena as turning points, moments when Napoleon became even more imbued with a sense of destiny than he already was, when he believed himself invincible. Bayonne too seems to have contributed to that feeling of self-grandiosity.

Bailén

It is easy to look on the Spanish uprising with the benefit of hindsight, but nothing in contemporary European experience could have anticipated its depth and extent. There was every reason to believe that the generals on the ground would eventually be able to get the upper hand and suppress any resistance to French authority. Napoleon was certainly more optimistic, oblivious of the loyalty the people of Spain felt towards their royal family. He wrote to Cambacérès that ‘opinion in Spain is taking the direction I wish. Law and order is everywhere restored, and it is nowhere troubled.’
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He was quickly disillusioned. The first efforts to suppress the revolt by sending in five flying columns ended in failure, so that by the end of June Napoleon had to rethink his initial strategy. There were some initial successes when the road to Madrid was opened, which allowed Joseph to travel to the capital to assume the throne.

Joseph set out for Madrid at the beginning of July, accompanied by a few collaborators who had served him well in Naples. Based on his experiences there, he had every intention of using Spanish notables to help him run his kingdom. He brought with him a constitution, the first in Spanish history, which was a mixture of French and Spanish traditions. Even before he arrived, though, a vibrant and abundant pamphlet literature was being directed against both him and the French: Joseph was portrayed as a drunkard and nicknamed
Pepe Botella
(Joseph the Bottle); the French were depicted as ‘Jews, heretics and sorcerers’.
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Pamphlets called for liberty and independence, and portrayed Napoleon as a new Attila the Hun.
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The
afrancesados
countered with their own propaganda, but it was of little use.
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When Joseph entered the capital on 20 July 1809, he was greeted with indifference. The bells may have rung out, the streets and some of the windows along the way may have been decorated, commemorative medallions may even have been struck, but the people remained silent.
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The new king organized a
corrida
to celebrate his arrival; almost no one turned out.
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He wrote to his brother in an attempt to open his eyes to what lay before them. Napoleon curtly replied, ‘I will find the columns of Hercules in Spain, but not the limits to my power.’
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Then came news of the disastrous military defeat at Bailén. It was not of itself a significant battle. About 21,000 French troops engaged about 27,000 Spanish regulars commanded by General Castaños on a plain covered with olive groves. The fighting took place all day in temperatures of 40 degrees Celsius, resulting in a number of men dying of heat exhaustion. General Pierre Dupont, who led the French forces badly, surrendered, in part because another general, Dominique Vedel, refused to come to his aid. Dupont was able to negotiate the repatriation of the officers, as well as their baggage, which included art works and treasures looted from Andalusia, but not of their men. When news of the surrender reached Napoleon in Bordeaux on 2 August, he was furious. Anger turned to despair and, in the middle of the night, ‘plaintive cries involuntarily came from his breast’.
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He considered Dupont’s surrender an act of cowardice – it was the first time since 1801 that a Napoleonic army had laid down its arms
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– and decided that the responsible officers should be tried for treason. When Dupont was repatriated along with five other officers, they were arrested.