Churchill's White Rabbit (10 page)

Instead he approached as calmly as he could. The police were working in pairs: a German and a French collaborator. Bitterly, Forest pulled out his forged identity cards and handed them over, trying not to glare at his countryman so ably helping the enemy. The checking of his papers seemed to take forever, and Forest knew now that he was entirely at the mercy of the skill of the SOE forgers. One slip – an incorrect stamp, an out-of-date signature – could lead him straight to the Gestapo. Trembling inside, he didn’t realise that even those with genuine papers felt the same way when faced with the German spot checks. After what seemed like an eternity the German policeman handed back his papers and waved him on. Forest walked through the line resisting the temptation to run as fast as he could and feeling a surge of elation that his SOE papers had proved their worth.

His delight quickly died when he saw that he was approaching a second police line. It was obvious now that this was not a routine spot check. The Gestapo were after someone and the fact that a Black Maria
⁵
was parked nearby and three or four men were being pushed into it only confirmed his fears. Despite this he kept his cool and passed through the second line as easily as the first. He left as rapidly as he dared trying not to think of the poor souls being forced into the car and into the eager hands of the Gestapo.

Notes

1
.  General William Lendrum ‘Billy’ Mitchell (1879–1936) was considered a founding father of the US Air Force and was the only individual to have a type of American military aircraft named after them: the B-25 Mitchell.

2
.  As quoted in Seaman,
Op cit
.

3
.  French militia created by the Vichy government to hunt down the French resistance, often more feared than the Gestapo due to their more intimate knowledge of the country and its people.

4
.  Marshal,
Op cit
.

5
.  A slang term for a police car or van, usually painted a distinctive black. It was the standard euphemism for Gestapo vehicles during the Second World War.

– 7 –

Good Agents Always Arrive Punctually

THIN, TALL BROSSOLETTE STOOD at the Port Maillot with Passy as the clock struck eleven and Forest arrived with precision timing. Neither man noticed that Forest seemed a little flustered by his run-ins with the police; both had their minds on other matters.

With little talk Brossolette escorted his two comrades to the apartment of his cousin Hélène Peyronnet
¹
at 102 avenue des Ternes. Hélène was already an active member within the resistance and quickly organised separate safe houses for Passy and Forest. Passy’s flat was on the ground floor of a complex at Neuilly near the busy rue Demours and with a courtyard leading to another building, therefore offering good escape routes should the worst happen. Hélène had arranged for Forest to stay in a luxury apartment owned by the French film star Jeanne Helbling, which also overlooked a courtyard and offered easy escape, despite being on the first floor. Brossolette was to remain in the rue de la Faisanderie. After assigning these quarters the group also organised several secondary locations that they could retreat to if their cover was blown.

Finally they could begin the daunting task of assessing the resistance effort in France and what the British could do to unite it and assist it. Passy set to work on collating intelligence from various sources, while Forest and Brossolette started sending out feelers to existing agents in France, especially those involved in organising weapons stores and parachute landings. Some of these men, such as Michel Pichard, Jean Aryal, and Jean-Pierre Deshayes, Forest had already met in England, while others were new to him. Brossolette worked keenly to establish contacts with the various resistance networks, but this was easier said than done. Away from the action in London, many of the networks and smaller groups were unknown to him, while other names that he had believed were clandestine organisations were something else entirely. It had been assumed that Voix du Nord, Le Cerle, and La Ligue were all names of resistance groups. These had filtered into the SOE offices through various sources and, at a distance, seemed likely candidates. On location Brossolette and Forest discovered that Voix du Nord was actually the title of a clandestine publication produced by rather under-active resisters as a platform for their opinions. The other two were groups either purely political (and therefore not interested in the form of resistance SOE would propose) or associated with the Freemasons, a group that was regularly attacked by the Vichy forces and the Nazis, but that did not throw up active resisters.

After a few false starts Brossolette and Forest were able to start assessing the various resistance movements they came across. Some were too embryonic to be worth their time or could be absorbed into bigger groups, while others did not have the manpower or the leaders to maintain them. Eventually five important resistance groups presented themselves:

Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM)

Ceux de la Libération

Ceux de la Resistance

Liberation

Front National (FN)

By 2 March a meeting had been arranged with the representative of OCM, Colonel Alfred Touny.
²
Tall and imposing, Touny was now in his fifties and a strong figure in the resistance, and was accompanied by Roland Farjon, Forest’s former host; both would eventually be shot by the Germans, just two of the 4,000 members of OCM who perished fighting for their cause.

OCM would become one of the greatest resistance networks of the war, and even at the meeting with Touny it was clear that it was one of the most secure and complete organisations operating in France. In 1941 the organisation could only boast a few hundred members but by 1943 it was stated that they had around 45,000 members, many of whom were keen for military-style action.

At the meeting in March 1943 it was clear that the OCM was going to be a significant asset to the British plans for the re-invasion of France. SOE’s priority was to rally national resistance in France in order to harass the Germans and seriously hamper their forces when Britain landed its troops on D-Day. The resistance would never be able to retake France alone, they simply did not have the military might or political support, but by eating away at the Germans, pecking at their morale and their feelings of safety within Paris, delaying them and preventing troops from moving efficiently they were a vital tool to the Allies who knew the landings in France would be bloody and costly. Resistance helped pave the way for the advance of the British and Americans, as well as for the return of the exiled French troops, and also kept the country alive in those dark days and prevented it from slipping into a morass of despair and apathy.

Not all encounters were as successful as the one with Touny. Forest and Brossolette met with Colonel Henri Manhes, who while undoubtedly brave and keen for action, had come up with several completely unfeasible ideas for resistance work and seemed very reluctant to coordinate plans with London. His choice of assistant was also deemed questionable. Pierre Meunier failed to inspire confidence despite later becoming a significant figure in the resistance. The situation resolved itself quite quickly when Manhes was arrested.

Uniting the resistance movements was going to be a difficult task. Brossolette struggled to keep his temper and sarcasm under control in meetings and offended leaders and representatives. Among the resistance there was a feeling that the new arrivals were undermining the work of ex-prefect Jean Moulin, who was pursuing similar lines to coordinate the resistance. Moulin was a dashing, charismatic figure with a film-star presence and innocent charm, but he was a formidable personality who very rapidly crossed swords with Brossolette. Forest could only watch as the two passionate Frenchmen argued continuously in Madame Claire Davinroy’s apartment and wondered how long it would be before the lady’s Gestapo neighbours came to investigate. Despite their opposing politics the men managed to maintain a united front when in public, but it was a tense arrangement. Brossolette felt that Moulin was completely unequipped to deal with the resistance problem in occupied France when his previous experience had been with organisations in the unoccupied zone.
³
His dominating personality and attempts to unite the military power of the resistance single-handedly under his own control also created tensions.

Forest, though not deeply political, had his own strong opinions and views on life and none of these gave much room to the concept of communism. So the meeting with the clever and youthful Georges Beaufils, codename Joseph, was something he dreaded, knowing that the courageous young man was a representative of the intelligence branch (FANA) of the Front National, a communist resistance cell.

There was an uneasy relationship between the other resisters and the communists, largely because their politics were linked more with the fortunes and whims of Russia and the Soviet principles that they treasured rather than with patriotism towards their own country. When the Soviets had agreed to a pact of neutrality with Germany, this left ardent communists with a difficult choice. On the one hand their country was under threat, but on the other they were supposed to place their loyalty to the Soviets over loyalty to their own nation. The internal politics of the Communist party at that period were so complicated that even at the time few knew exactly where they stood. Some communists saw it their duty to collaborate, others distrusted the Germans and chose a quiet path of passive resistance. It wasn’t until Hitler attacked Russia that minds were made up and the communists came wholeheartedly into the fray.

Still, there was always the worry that should Russia’s politics change, so too might the views of the communist resistance, and they were powerful adversaries. Then there was always the niggling concern that they actually might be planning to let Russia take Paris.

With all these doubts in mind Forest met with Joseph. He found the young communist eager but sensible and the security precautions already imposed within the communist cells impressed him: communists were such a hated faction that even before the war they had learned the invaluable nature of secrecy.

All was not well, however. Forest suggested the arranging of wireless telegraphy between FANA and London to speed cooperation. Joseph declined, arguing that the groups’ communication lines were already overwhelmed with transmissions. As there was no communication between London and FANA, this could only mean that they were in close communication with Russia, a situation that came uncomfortably close to their fear that the Soviets still had their eyes on France. Joseph was not against getting what he could from the British however, and he complained that his people were not receiving weapons from London. Forest agreed that this should be resolved, but first Joseph should send some key men to Britain to be trained in the use of these weapons, a reasonable enough request to which Joseph quickly agreed. But the men he promised never appeared.

Forest was even more convinced that the communists still had their loyalties firmly tied to Russia and that their Soviet masters did not want them linking too closely with another nation whose ideas and political outlook was so opposed to their own. Despite this, he also recognised that Joseph’s organisation would be vital to the resistance work: they understood the need for security, were prepared to take risks and, bluntly, did not flinch at the thought that their actions would impact on innocent civilians who would suffer in German reprisals.

If Joseph was a complicated and disputed contact, Lecompte-Boynet of the Ceux de la Resistance could only be deemed an asset. Lecompte-Boynet was the chief of the party and had amassed around 1,000 supporters for the group, which was largely paramilitary. Unlike many resisters the party maintained quite neutral politics, looking only to restore France to liberty. MI6 had already made contact with the group and used them for gathering intelligence and Lecompte-Boynet proved a willing co-operator. His party members were ready for action and he estimated that by D-Day he would have between 25,000 and 30,000 troops at his disposal to fight the Nazis.

Forest found an even more significant contact in the Ceux de la Libération (CDLL) leader Roger Coquoin.
⁴
Coquoin was the same age as Forest and Brossolette when they met in early 1943; the son of a chemist and the former head of the chemistry laboratory at the Academy of Medicine, he had only been leader of the group for a short time having taken over from Maurice Ripoche after his arrest. Coquoin was keen to work with the British and his group was well established and neutral in its politics – always an asset. They also boasted links with Transports Routiers, the French organisation that controlled all road transport through the country. The managing director of the company was a member of CDLL and was quite willing to disrupt German traffic whenever he was needed to. He also regularly fed the group intelligence on the movement of German troops. Most exciting to Forest, the director knew the locations where the Germans had begun stockpiling vehicles in case of invasion and the CDLL was ready to sabotage these sites when the time came.