Chanakya's New Manifesto: To Resolve the Crisis Within India (27 page)

In order to achieve these objectives,
Chanakya’s New Manifesto
states:

4.1    It is essential that India develops a new security mentality. Only when we have this change of outlook can a strong security culture be nurtured.

4.2    Security cannot be a part-time pursuit.

4.3    Even if an integrated structure is created, it will count for little unless there is focused political leadership to guide it. A distracted political leadership, or one without the requisite authority, or lacking resolve or will, can render any organization ineffectual.

4.4    Security requires toughness of approach and ruthlessness in achieving nationally-desired goals. Secrecy, where necessary, is a must. Goals have to adhere to timelines. There can be no dilution in implementation schedules. Security is an unsentimental business; the only principle that must shape it is the safety and well-being of the State and its citizens.

4.5    India must forge a foreign policy where security becomes a core concern. Diplomacy without this focus is a ceremonial charade. Security-oriented diplomacy requires fixity of purpose and flexibility of means. It also requires clarity in identifying, unhesitatingly, from where threats to the country’s security emanate.

4.6    The bedrock of India’s foreign policy must be the understanding that until they prove, without a shadow of doubt, their good intentions towards India, Pakistan and China must be classified as hostile or potentially hostile states. This does not mean that attempts to improve bilateral relations with them should be jettisoned; nor does it preclude negotiations and dialogue where required, or the furtherance of people-to-people contacts where desirable; clarity of vision enables the use of a variety of approaches without losing sight of the truth. Any nation that enhances our security must be cultivated; any nation that is allied or close to nations that threaten us, must be contained, by co-option, seduction, engagement or other means.

4.7    A real threat to our security is the collusion between China and Pakistan. We must, therefore, be prepared for a war against both, in a worst-case situation. A principal tenet of our foreign policy must be to break, weaken or dilute the nexus between the two countries. If this requires us to sow discord or to create mistrust or encourage suspicion between them, we must do so. If we can weaken the nexus by providing to any one of the two greater dividends through engagement with India, this too should be pursued, but as conscious policy, not through policy drift. The detailed study of those countries which pose a direct security threat to India must become an overarching goal of foreign policy. Only then can we anticipate what the enemy will do, preempt hostile behaviour, see through deceitful moves, understand the dynamics of hostile decision-making and hope to short-circuit it.

4.8    Security diplomacy must be embedded in a first-rate Policy Planning Division (PPD). A PPD is essential to analyze information on countries that threaten us and prepare constantly updated options for those tasked with the country’s security. A PPD is useful only if it has a clear-cut brief; the PPD must be tasked only with security-related issues; within that focused brief, the Division must produce daily updates on security-related developments, including internal developments in hostile countries, as well as likely future scenarios.

4.9    The PPD must be adequately staffed, including where necessary, by consultants with specific areas of expertise.

4.10  In an ideal situation, the external affairs minister should see a memo prepared by the PPD the first thing in office, and only then go about his official routine.

4.11  The MEA must stop being a post office between embassies abroad and the PMO. It must resuscitate its original mandate of providing considered advice on foreign policy issues. For this, the institutional ethos of the MEA must change. It must be headed by a young, dynamic minister who can motivate the institution to carry out this responsibility. Equally, the time has come for a foreign secretary to assert the MEA’s independent policy-making credentials.

4.12  A security-oriented foreign policy must be insulated from the pulls and pressures of coalition or regional politics. Any country which is prepared to sacrifice its overall and long-term security concerns for short-term political gains does not deserve to be in power. Equally, political parties which refuse to see the larger good of the nation deserve to be debarred from political life. The ability of weak governments at the Centre to resist such myopic pressures will be strengthened by the generic reform proposed earlier which will give coalition governments, on the basis of an agreed governance agenda, a lock-in period of stability for three years.

4.13  Our defence sector needs a better command-and-decision-making structure. It is axiomatic that our defence forces must remain under civilian control. But this does not mean that the leadership of our armed forces is systemically marginalized in vital strategic decisions.

4.14  Just as the foreign office needs a dynamic and young minister, so too does the defence ministry. The country needs an individual who can inspire the armed forces and be capable of decisive leadership. The RM cannot be randomly chosen on the basis of coalition compromises or the need to accommodate political ‘heavyweights’ who are past their prime.

4.15  Under such an RM, there must be set up a Defence Committee which, apart from key figures in the civilian bureaucracy such as the defence secretary, includes the three service chiefs. This committee must meet regularly and at least compulsorily once a week, to review and decide on matters of importance to the defence sector.

4.16  The Defence Committee will report to the Cabinet Committee on defence chaired by the PM. The three service chiefs will also be part of this committee, which shall mandatorily meet at least once a fortnight.

4.17  In such a system it may not be necessary to create a chief of defence staff from among the three service chiefs as proposed by the Kargil Committee Report; nor is there need for the potentially divisive proposal to create a fourth chief at the apex, over the current three chiefs. Each of the three service chiefs look after defined sectors whose needs, within an integrated defence policy, are different. Moreover, although equal in rank, there is an inherent asymmetry in their relative strength, with the army chief overseeing a much larger infrastructure, both in terms of budget and personnel. It would, therefore, be better to include all three chiefs in the decision-making process, rather than to have the interests of the army, the navy or the air force be represented by only one chief of staff. The important thing is to give the armed forces an institutional presence when it comes to making decisions that involve national security.

4.18  The DRDO needs a major overhaul. The CAG should produce a comprehensive report on the organization so that projects past their sell-by date are weeded out and a realistic review is made of everything that the organization intends to produce in the future. This report must be prepared within three months.

4.19  Indigenous defence production should simultaneously be opened to public-private partnership (PPP). It makes no sense to buy extensively from private foreign arms manufacturers while keeping armaments out of the purview of our own private sector. A targeted indigenization policy should be prepared wherein certain sectors of defence production are outsourced to, or earmarked for partnership with, private agencies. The policy must be a stable and long-term one so the private sector can make the necessary investment and build infrastructure without worrying that the policy will be rescinded. A transparent policy for the selection process of arms manufacturers is essential, as also an accountability regime to ensure costs and time schedules are kept under control. The latest union budget has established ‘guidelines’ for establishing joint venture companies by defence PSUs in PPP mode. It is imperative to go beyond merely the establishment of ‘guidelines’ and move to actual partnerships.

4.20  The Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security is reported to have recommended the creation of a National Technology Council chaired by the defence minister in which private companies engaged in the production of arms and security equipment will have representation. However, the mere creation of one more committee cannot be a substitute for a qualitative shift in policy where, on an institutional and planned basis, the private sector is made a partner in the national goal of boosting indigenous defence production.

4.21  The current cap on FDI in defence production at 26 per cent should be raised to at least 49 percent, and where necessary, to 74 per cent. In a situation where our own private sector is not allowed to set up armaments industries and we are the world’s largest importer of arms, there can be no harm, at least in the mid-term, of allowing the world’s leading arms manufacturers to set up arms manufacturing subsidiaries within the country to supply the country’s defence needs, especially as we are already importing arms from them. Such a policy, where Indian companies can in the initial stages be junior partners with foreign investors, will also allow our own corporate sector to develop the required expertise, and in future reduce our excessive dependence on foreign defence suppliers.

4.22  It is important in the short-term and mid-term to substantively increase the efficiency of our defence procurement. India will remain, for a considerable number of years, a major importer of arms and defence-related equipment. We will therefore need to vastly improve the existing procurement policy if we are to pay more than lip service to national security. The creation of defence procurement bodies without a carefully considered and implemented policy framework means very little. The defence ministry has a Defence Acquisition Council chaired by the RM, with two subordinate wings, the Defence Procurement Board and the Defence Technology Board. However, these wings can only function effectively when there is clarity on long-term procurement. All existing bodies in this sector should be replaced by an integrated Defence Procurement Directorate (DPD) in the ministry of defence, chaired by the RM. Apart from relevant officials and experts, both from the civil and the armed forces, the DPD should include a representative from the office of the CAG and (when set up) from the Lokpal.

4.23  The presence of the CAG and the Lokpal to vet procurement processes will ensure that vital decisions on defence supplies and defence-preparedness are not held hostage by allegations of wrongdoing and corruption. The paralysis which has currently gripped the defence ministry must end. The enemy is corruption, not our own defence preparedness. With this in mind, an immediate review should take place on the ban imposed on major foreign defence suppliers. The allegations of corruption against them should continue to be investigated, and any Indians or foreigners who are found guilty should be punished, but a blanket ban at the cost of our defence needs can only be described as downright foolish.

4.24  The DPD will work to stringent timelines. All major defence procurement decisions will be taken within two years from the floating of tenders. This time frame will include the period taken for field trials. Any slippage of deadlines must be brought to the notice of the Defence Committee chaired by the RM and the Cabinet Committee on Defence chaired by the PM. These two Committees will also be obliged to do a three-monthly suo motu review of major defence procurement deals.

4.25  The new policy will require responsibility to be fixed for delays, and administrative action will be taken against those found guilty.

4.26  Any instance of corruption in defence procurement deals will be treated as treason and dealt with as such.

4.27  Fresh thought should be given to the reflexive banning of all so-called ‘middlemen’ in defence deals. The Chanakyan approach is directed towards the good of the country and buttressed by an inherent pragmatism. If India needs to buy defence equipment worth thousands of crores of rupees, and several foreign firms are competing for the orders, it is only to be expected that they will have agents who work to further their bids. After all, authorized agents to broker deals work in almost every area of economic engagement, not only in India but also abroad. If authorized agents are banned, given the huge sums involved, unauthorized operators are bound to take their place, regardless of the risks involved. To be pragmatic, we should open up the process, make it transparent and allow authorized agents to make informed presentations to the newly set up DPD (as proposed earlier). It is time that the nation emerges out of the outdated shadow of the Bofors arms deal and deals with such matters in a mature manner.

4.28  A new Border Infrastructure Cell (BIC) chaired by the PM and consisting of the ministers of the defence, external affairs, finance and home ministries needs to be created immediately. The three service chiefs should be invited to attend its deliberations. Our defence-related infrastructure along our vast and disputed borders with China and Pakistan is poorly developed. Similarly, our coast guard, which has the onerous responsibility of protecting our 7,500 kilometre-long coastline, needs major upgradation. We need to dramatically improve our efficiency and delivery at the ground level in this crucial area. Hence, the recommendation to create a separate cell, directly under the PM, with key ministers as members, to ensure the regular monitoring and expeditious implementation of practically every aspect of border infrastructure. The BIC must meet at least once a month on a mandatory basis.

4.29  An affiliated area of crucial importance is the need to tackle illegal immigration from Bangladesh, especially into the ethnically-sensitive border state of Assam. In as many as eleven of twenty-seven districts of Assam, Muslims have become a majority which is certainly not a reflection of its original demography. It is regrettable that the problem has grown because of short-sighted vote bank politics practiced by some political parties. A scrupulously fair census must be carried out to identify illegal immigrants, and all those who have entered the country after a certain cutoff date should be deported to Bangladesh. The border with Bangladesh should be fully fenced-in and put under much higher surveillance.