Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (23 page)

What seems evident is that all the good will and political legitimacy that the military has sought through its public Buddhist works and its continuous emphasis on Buddhism was destroyed in this crackdown.

Cyclone Nargis was the single most devastating disaster to strike Burma/Myanmar in recorded history. It is common for cyclones in the annual monsoon season (May through September or so) to sweep up the Bay of Bengal from the south and inundate the Bengal area of India and Bangladesh. Such torrential rains frequently affect Burma/Myanmar, and along the Rakhine coast the annual rainfall can approach 200–300 inches per year, about three times that of Rangoon and almost ten times that of the dry zone of central part of the state, as the Arakan Yoma mountains stop most of the precipitation.

Nargis was unprecedented, however. Stories circulate that the government issued warnings, but these were said to be less than adequate in two respects: they did not emphasize the severity of the storm, and many of the affected areas are so remote that no warning reached them. Although the figures
are imprecise, some 138,000 people were killed. The mangrove swamps that offer some protection against cyclones had been severely diminished to make way for shrimp and other aquatic farming, so villages were exposed to the full force of the storm, in much the same way that New Orleans suffered more in Hurricane Katrina because it had lost its wetlands protection. The absurdity of the government’s response was apparent when it officially indicated the exact number of ducks, chickens, and water buffalo that had been killed but could not count the number of people. It is estimated that damage has amounted to US$2.4 billion at the free market exchange rate, and was 27 percent of GDP in 2007.

Regardless of the accuracy of the rumor that the junta in Naypyidaw, out of the path of the storm, delayed responding because they do not like to hear bad news, or the additional rumor that the informants did not want to interrupt Maung Aye’s golf game, these are indicative of the cynicism with which the actions of members of the junta are treated. However, these are but subsidiary elements in the junta’s reaction to the events.

We should remember that the cyclone of May 2 preceded the planned referendum on the constitution on May 10. The government had explicitly denied foreign requests for referendum observers, even turning down suggestions that the United Nations play that role. They did not want any foreigners watching the referendum. It is highly probable that the date of May 10 was chosen by the government because astrologers considered it was auspicious for their cause; thus, canceling that date was exceedingly difficult. To solve this dilemma, the date was allowed to stand for most of the country, except in the delta where the cyclone hit. That new date there was May 24. Aside from whether this was a credible delay, it is significant that the government denied visas for foreigners to go into the affected areas until May 24, thus effectively preventing them from observing the referendum.

As worldwide offers to provide assistance poured in, the United States had its ships off the coast and was prepared to
fly in helicopters with relief supplies to the most remote areas. The junta adamantly refused the offer, although supplies (estimated at some US$75 million) eventually were allowed to land in Rangoon. The United States was extremely upset by this apparent lack of concern by the military for its own people, and American newspapers complained about the callousness of the government. The most important issue from the junta’s vantage point was likely to have been something completely different. For two decades the United States has advocated regime change and the overthrow of military rule in Myanmar, and there is no question that the junta believed that this would be the best excuse for an invasion—an invasion that some dissidents inside and externally have called for (although the NLD has never done so). The absurdity of the United States starting another war was not apparent to the Burmese, who have been ever fearful of a U.S. invasion since 1988.

The Burmese government’s response was in sharp contrast to that of the unaffected Burmese people, who organized their own relief teams and response. They carried out assistance and equated themselves with great worldwide appreciation. The Burmese government response was also in sharp contrast to the reaction of the Chinese leadership to the massive earthquake in Sechuan Province at about the same time. The Chinese leadership showed up at devastated sites and comforted the affected, while two weeks after the cyclone Than Shwe was shown inspecting a carefully constructed tent village in what was a photo opportunity, not a realistic appraisal of the situation. (Officials later privately admitted this was a mistake.) Autonomous social workers and helpers were often detained because they were operating free from government control.

Important as well was the inherent nationalism of the junta’s response that the Burmese do not need the outside world. Even at such a dire time, it would have been most unlikely for the junta to allow unrestricted access to its territory. When it later tried (unsuccessfully) to raise some US$11 billion for relief, it stipulated that relief was to be managed by the
Burmese themselves. They certainly would resist and deplore the suggestion by the French foreign minister that the United Nations should invoke the R2P, which would authorize foreign intervention without the approval of the state concerned (a provision that was passed in 1995 in cases of conflict). The junta would have been perceived it as evidence of invasion by foreign powers, to which the Burmese might well have responded with military force, thus escalating tensions into confrontation.

Cyclone Nargis exhibited the systemic problems of the military’s administration: its fear of foreign intervention and civilian leadership; nationalism; the propaganda elements of administration; and the low priority it placed on the welfare of its people. The coordinated response was eventually led by ASEAN with assistance from the United Nations. But the Burmese clearly did not want to be seen as beggars in the international community.

The constitution has been in preparation since 1993. The junta carefully chose a special group, the participants in the National Convention, to draft the major provisions of that document. It began meeting January 9, 1993. The discussions at all stages were strictly controlled and heavily scripted. Very few of those who won in the 1990 elections were included in the Convention, and indeed the purpose of the Convention was not only to begin the process of writing a constitution but to erase the results of the May 1990 election that the military disastrously lost and the NLD had so dramatically won. The military’s primary provision from the inception of the process was that the military would play the primary role in the society. This was never in doubt. Early, the military published the 104 principles on which the constitution was to be written. Most important was the planned primary role of the military under any new government (reflected in the constitution in Chapter I,6 (f)):
“enabling the Defense services to be able to participate in the National political leadership of the State.”

At one point in 1995, the NLD delegates walked out of the conference, claiming it was too restrictive, and they were never allowed back, although at a later stage some wanted to return. Over time, the National Convention was convened and recessed on several occasions. Some claimed that the longer the military delayed this first step on the road to “discipline-flourishing democracy,” the longer it would take to hold new national elections.

The Saffron Revolution may have speeded up the process. Some speculate that the military became concerned about the repression of the Buddhist
sangha
and the danger to its rule and brought the process to a quick end after interminable delays. The reasons may include the provision in the constitution that no one can be held legally responsible under a penal law for any excesses prior to its approval (
Chapter I
, Section 43; Chapter XIV, Paragraph 445). Thus, the regime’s leaders get a free pass, at least as long as they stay in the country.

The date chosen for the referendum was May 10, 2008, and it seems more than likely that this was considered astrologically auspicious by the leadership. Events of this magnitude in Myanmar are often so timed. When the cyclone hit on May 2, the military had a dilemma. To postpone the referendum would be to court inauspiciousness, so to speak, but the devastation was so extensive that something had to be done. Thus, the referendum was to take place as planned in central and upper Myanmar, while it was postponed until May 24 in the stricken areas in the delta. Even that date was improbable, yet it was almost impossible to carry out any voting in that region. But the date loomed as important because until the referendum was completed, foreigners were not given visas to provide relief supplies there. The government has adamantly refused to have foreigners, even those from the United Nations, observe the referendum.

If the National Convention was heavily scripted, the referendum was even more so. Reminiscent of Stalinist election
figures, the military claimed that 98.12 percent of those eligible voted and that 92.48 percent of the people approved of it, although there were widespread charges that many had their votes submitted in advance and without their approval. The provisions of the constitution were not widely circulated in advance of the referendum. Elections are scheduled for sometime in 2010, following which the new constitution will come into effect.

The preamble of the constitution begins:

Myanmar is a Nation with magnificent historical traditions. We, the National people, having been living in unity and oneness, setting up an independent sovereign State and standing tall with pride. Due to colonial intrusion, the Nation lost her sovereign power in 1885. The National people launched anti-colonialist struggles and National liberation struggles, with unity in strength, sacrificing lives and hence the Nation became an independent sovereign State again on 4th January 1948.

The provisions of the constitution ensure military control at all levels. There will be one bicameral National Assembly, and other legislative bodies at the state/region and township levels. The People’s Assembly (
Pyithu Hluttaw
) will have 440 seats, of which 110 will go to active-duty military nominated by the minister of defense. The Upper House (
Amyotha Hluttaw
), for nationalities, will have 224 seats, of which 56 will be held by the military. Thus, active-duty military personnel (nominated by the minister of defense) will have a quarter of the seats at the national level, at the state/regional level (Paragraph 161 (d)), and at the self-administered ethnic zones and division level (Paragraph 276 (i)).

The head of state, the president, indirectly elected by the assembly for not more than two terms of five years each, must have military knowledge and be resident in the country for twenty consecutive years (except when abroad with official
approval). Such a person and his or her family can owe no allegiance to any foreign power. There will be three vice presidents also chosen by the assembly (one of whom will be from the military group), and from among whom the president would be elected. Military budgets and promotions cannot be subject to civilian control. “The Defense services has the right independently and to adjudicate all affairs of the armed forces” (
Chapter 1
, 20 (b)). A state of emergency can be declared by the National Defense Security Council, composed of the president, vice presidents, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and his deputy, the minister and deputy minister of defense, the two speakers of the houses, and the ministers of home affairs and border regions (all chosen by the minister of defense). The commander-in-chief of the armed forces thus will have exceptional powers, and while appointed by the president, can effectively overrule a president when, under an emergency decree, power is transferred by the president to the commander, who at that time “exercises state sovereignty” (
Chapter 1
, Section 40).

Provisions exist for the protection of various rights (religion, assembly, press, etc.) including those of the minorities, but as is common in many societies, these are not absolute but subject to public order, morality, and the like. Women are to have equal rights and salaries (
Chapter VIII
, 35a). Freedom of religious practice is stipulated, but religious groups cannot engage in any economic, financial, or political activities. No foreign support to any such group is allowed. Buddhism, although not the state religion, is given special status.

No area of the state will ever have the right of secession (
Chapter I
, Section 10), as did the Shan and Kayah States under the 1947 constitution. There will be six small ethnic enclaves (self-administered zones for the Kokang, Palaung, Naga, Danu, PaO, and a self-administered division for the Wa) that will have local government. The constitution can be amended, but only by a 75 percent vote, which precludes any amendments not approved by the military. There is a stipulation that there will be no demonetizations, a reflection of the disastrous results of
that in 1987, and no nationalization of enterprises (
Chapter I
, Section 36). There are provisions for environmental protection, and a Constitutional Tribunal to determine the legality of legislation. The judicial system is supposed to be independent; the civil service should be free of politics. No foreign troops will be deployed on national soil, and there will be no aggression (
Chapter I
, Section 42).

The constitution provides, in effect, a clean slate for any offenses by government personnel that might have been previously committed: “No proceeding shall be instituted against the said Councils [SLORC, SPDC] or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in respect of any act done in the execution of their respective duties” (Chapter XIV, Paragraph 445). The president is not “answerable” to any court or the Hluttaw “for the exercise of the powers and functions of his office” or acts associated thereof, except impeachment (
Chapter V
, 215).