Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (35 page)

Debate thus opens among citizens of the target society. Many, perhaps even all, will be simultaneously rights-bearers and individuals liable to be affected by cross-border action. On both counts, however, significant gradations may exist, and may need to be reflected in permissible contributions. In particular, abusive state officials may bear considerably fewer rights than ordinary citizens, and thereby gain less of a say. Once such matters have been decided, the literature on deliberative democracy stands as an obvious reference point in determining how discussion might unfold. Since about 1990, when what John S. Dryzek terms the “deliberative turn in democratic theory” took place, analysts have proposed a variety of mechanisms for generating authentic debate.
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Against theorists who insist on an austere conception of public reason, Dryzek himself favors a more tolerant position allowing for “argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and gossip.”
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He also proposes that discussion focus on specific needs rather than abstract values and ideals, holding that this will boost the probability of agreement. Ian O’Flynn examines possibilities for deliberative democracy in divided communities, focusing on two key procedural requirements of reciprocity and publicity. He argues that building a strong civil society is essential.
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James S. Fishkin floats the possibility of deliberative polling, whereby people are brought together and asked for their views before and after open discussion.
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Deliberative ideals have also been explored in non-democratic contexts such as China.
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In addition, they have been raised to the global level through Dryzek’s project of “transnational discursive democracy.”
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In the realm of intervention, the proposal that debate be moved outside elite forums and opened to the people evidently takes on a utopian tinge. On the one hand, potential targets are frequently societies in which the voice of the people is forcibly muzzled. On the other, the need for external action often arises most pointedly in situations of extreme emergency such as war or natural disaster. Nevertheless, it remains important to aspire to broad-based discourse in which citizens are given a fair chance to express their views. Moreover, Dryzek’s focus on informal modes, O’Flynn’s insistence that civil society be strengthened, and Fishkin’s deliberative polling are all consistent with the argument made here for either a quasi-Rawlsian approach of identifying trustees to speak on behalf of the broader population or, more practically, a less formal attempt to make use of listening projects.

In difficult but familiar settings where the government is chauvinistic, prickly and utterly resistant to dialogue of any kind, it is quite possible that the first stage of debate will generate rapid cessation of official involvement. Citing the sovereignty invested even in Jackson’s quasi-states, autocrats like Myanmar’s military leaders are likely to treat with disdain a proposed forum on intervention. Clearly this should not be allowed to derail proceedings, for that would be to grant a damaging veto to dictators. Equally, participants should not conclude that only assertive modes of cross-border action are viable, for that too would be to invest in the target regime a key negating power. Instead, attempts should continue to be made to develop a broad domestic consensus on discursive engagement. Only if failure is registered here should discussion switch to assertive modes.

Nevertheless, the practical consequence of official hostility will need to be evaluated, for ordinary people will very likely then be prevented from speaking out either by formal restrictions or by a culture of intimidation and fear. Creative ways of tapping into local sentiment will thus have to be found. While it may not be possible to secure either representative or scientific input, there is almost always the option of operating through outsiders working on the ground. Only very rarely are the UN and major aid agencies totally excluded, which opens up the possibility of making use of UN missions, INGO field offices, and the networks of local contacts they must develop to undertake their core functions. In this way, gathering a sense of indigenous opinion should be possible without either engaging in illegal activities or endangering lives. While the quality of the resultant data will inform the seriousness with which it is taken, there should not normally be grounds for dispensing with this step.

Once a measure of internal deliberation or consultation has been undertaken, debate switches to an external forum where it is picked up by outsiders assembled under two key headings. In one category, the central criteria are moral and backward-looking. Here are the bearers of imperfect duties of justice, both state and non-state, seeking to find acceptable ways to deliver on demands accruing either specially through harmful past action, or generally through common membership of the human race. In the other category, the decisive criteria are political and forward-looking. Here are above all neighboring states, more distant states with a significant regional presence or interest, and major INGOs and corporations with a firm commitment to engagement with the target society. Many participants, perhaps even most, will feature in both categories, being simultaneously significant duty-bearers and important foreign stakeholders.

In the external forum, considerations relating to the likely impact of any actual intervention mandate that close neighbors be allowed more of a voice than individuals living far away. This issue was at the heart of a rare discussion of Myanmar in the UN Security Council in January 2007, when a resolution was tabled by the US and UK. Against the contention that the junta might pose a danger to nearby states, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya asserted that “None of Myanmar’s immediate neighbours, ASEAN members or most Asia-Pacific countries believed that the current situation in Myanmar posed a threat to regional peace and security.” Following on, South African Ambassador Dumisani S. Kumalo noted that ASEAN “had said that Myanmar was not a threat to its neighbours.” Concluding, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, speaking from the chair but in a national capacity, maintained that “a large number of States, including, most importantly, Myanmar’s neighbours” shared the opinion that the situation in the country did not pose a threat to the peace.
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All three countries thus voted against the resolution, with China and Russia applying vetoes. Intuitively, the argument about listening to neighbors makes sense. They are likely to have a good feel for conditions inside the target jurisdiction. In addition, any impacts of engagement, whether positive or negative, will almost certainly be felt more strongly in the region than many time zones away.

Outsiders’ first task is to table and examine information gathered inside the target jurisdiction. Phased contributions are then heard. In one sequence, neighboring states present their views and distant stakeholders follow up. In another, major duty-bearers indicate how they can contribute to a collaborative interventionist effort. Ultimately a free flow of debate ensues. Throughout, the judgments and assessments of insiders are accorded primacy, and distinct forms of external contribution are mapped on to them. At the close of deliberations, conclusions can be drawn and an itemized action plan endorsed. As a final task, the broad balance of opinion can be made known, and every actor intending to intervene in the target jurisdiction advised to respect it. Ideally, a division of responsibilities and agreed coordination mechanisms will also be established. While some may commit to direct engagement on the ground, others may limit themselves to indirect involvement, for instance through allocation of funding.

In contexts of large-scale and potentially controversial cross-border action, a necessary component in establishing broad commitment to these procedural requirements will almost certainly be UN backing. This could be sought in three main ways. First, the General Assembly could be asked to endorse the approach in principle. Second, a body such as the General Assembly Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) or a reformed version of the Human Rights Council could consider proposals for low-level, discursive engagement. Third, the Security Council could rule on proposals for high-level, assertive engagement. Additional parts of the UN system, such as the UNDP, UNICEF and the UN Global Compact, could be allocated key supporting functions both in supervising the deliberative process and in coordinating any follow-up action. For all of these agencies, such responsibilities would be no more than an incremental extension of existing activities.

Throughout, the focus of debate will be injustice inside the target jurisdiction, and means by which duties of global justice, both historically determined and universally entailed, might best be performed. The key requirements are initially to hear what rights-bearers in the target jurisdiction have to say about the injustice that has accumulated in their society, then to table for analysis and debate means by which concomitant duties might be performed, and ultimately to work out practical engagement strategies. In this way, imperfect duties of global justice can be stripped of the abstract and intangible character they readily assume, and given meaningful real-world content.

Clearly in any actual case deliberation will necessarily be rough and ready, and the process is highly unlikely to turn out precisely as outlined here. Engaging local opinion could be difficult. The role and activities of the target regime may be contentious. Determining which neighbors should join a regional forum will be open to negotiation. Detailed issues of agency participation could be hard to resolve. Securing input from key duty-bearers could be impossible. Coordination may have to be abandoned in favor of simply calling on all parties to take note of conclusions reached, and inviting them to operate in broad conformity with their main thrust. Moreover, none of this undeniably cumbersome procedure should ever be allowed to stand in the way of urgent global response to the kind of humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis. Equally, however, it should be animated to the largest degree possible when any proposal for cross-border political action is made. In principle, a process of interactive intervention premised on the demands of global justice should aspire to this broad shape.

Interactive intervention

Two elements are central to the procedures of interactive intervention presented here: a leading role for insiders, and a following role for outsiders. To insiders is allotted the initial task of exposing injustice, sketching the main parameters of desirable intervention, and tabling it for external consideration and debate. To outsiders falls the consequential task of acknowledging imperfect duties of global justice, committing to cross-border political action, and deciding how to engage in ways that are consistent with insider views. While outsiders’ role is thereby indispensable, it is also essentially recessive. The core process can be used to structure analysis of any form of cross-border political action, proposed or actual. It covers both the state and non-state sectors, embraces the central issues generated by intervention, and indicates how many clamorous voices are to be heard. Though not specific to the Myanmar case, it can be employed to evaluate proposals for foreigners to reach inside the country and perform duties of justice. This final section looks at how that might be done, focusing not on substantive matters, which are addressed later, but rather on the issue of procedure that is the concern of this chapter.

In an examination of imperfect duties of global justice, rights-bearers are the totality of the Myanmar people. Instances of historical injustice have been experienced by the nation as a whole. Issues now triggering universal concern equally pervade the entire society. Broadly, however, a far more weighty set of rights is borne by the oppressed citizenry, and a considerably less weighty set is held by forces of oppression focused on the military machine, for they are themselves responsible for much contemporary injustice. This distinction has significant implications for a process of interactive intervention, generating a large voice for civic actors and only a small say for officials. Duty-bearers are also multiple. Under the rubric of historical injustice, duties borne by former imperial masters Britain and Japan, and even by isolating western powers and engaging Asian powers, need to be considered. Under the rubric of universal justice, the global community represented in the UN is the key player. The major external stakeholders likely to be affected by any actual engagement are Myanmar’s immediate neighbors and regional associates.

In this case, several practical ways of launching a process of interactive intervention are conceivable. Requests for external assistance in tackling injustice made above all by opposition forces and grassroots leaders could be heard by states. Conceivably, an
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contact group could lead the response, set the ensuing agenda for engagement and oversee the entire process. Indeed, a subset of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, formed in December 2007, is well placed to do that with UN secretariat support.
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Equally, however, non-state actors could take the lead, with the “globalization from below” currently developing in networks of cross-border citizen activism building a platform for action.
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While major INGOs are likely to be most prominent, it would also be possible for a core group of large companies to take charge and work through bodies such as the UN Global Compact and peak international associations to devise new modes of corporate and other involvement.
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In any of these scenarios, the core tasks for external actors remain the same: to solicit the views of local people, convene an external forum, and promote implementation of any conclusions reached.