Brothers in Arms (92 page)

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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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verge of becoming a rightist the distance, the chairman said, was "only 50 meters."

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Facing Mao's repeated criticism, Zhou Enlai acknowledged at the Nanning conference that "as far as the mistake of 'opposing adventurism' is concerned, I should take the main responsibility."
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On January 31 Mao Zedong summarized the discussions at the two conferences in an important document entitled "Sixty Articles on Work Methods"; in it he attempted to be as explicit as the political situation allowed in defining the mission of his continuous revolution:
Continuing revolution. Our revolutions come one after another. The seizure of political power in the whole county in 1949 was soon followed by the antifeudal land reform. As soon as the land reform was completed, the agricultural cooperativization followed. Then the socialist transformation of private-owned industry and commerce and handicraft occurred. The three socialist transformations, that is, the socialist revolution in the field of the ownership of means of production, will be completed by 1958, and will be followed by the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts. . . . [We are] now preparing to make a revolution in the technological field, so that [we may] overtake Britain in fifteen or more years.
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In this text Mao set up the overall purpose of the Great Leap Forward, the campaign that was to sweep across China's cities and countryside a few months later.
From March 8 to 26 Mao chaired another Central Committee working conference, in Chengdu, and further escalated his criticism of "opposing adventurism." The chairman claimed that "adventurism is a Marxist way and 'opposing adventurism' is an anti-Marxist way." He announced that "we shall continue to commit to adventurism in the future." On March 25 Zhou Enlai, on the verge of political defeat, made a more comprehensive self-criticism.
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In addition to dealing with his own domestic mistakes, Zhou devoted a large portion of the self-criticism to his ''conservative and rightist tendency" in handling the foreign relations of the People's Republic in previous years. He admitted that the Foreign Ministry's work under his direction had neglected the necessary struggle in dealing with nationalist countries, had maintained a kind of wishful thinking concerning imperialism (especially toward Japan and the United States), and had failed to conduct necessary criticism of the revisionist policies of other socialist countries. He particularly mentioned that while it was plausible to learn from the experience of the Soviet Union, it was a mistake to copy it completely.
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Zhou's self-criticism clearly showed that profound interconnections existed between the domestic and international aspects of Chinese politics in the late 1950s. Following Mao's ideas, the CCP leadership at the Chengdu conference decided to revise radically China's economic development plans, so that "it would catch the right opportunity to surpass Britain in a period even shorter than fifteen years."

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The Great Leap Forward followed as a consequence of the party's implementation of these aims.

It was at this crucial juncture of Mao's continuous revolution that the potential tensions between China and the Soviet Union became an inner Chinese political problem. First there was Moscow' s suggestion of establishing communication systems for the Soviet navy in China. In November 1957, during the visit of China's defense minister, Peng Dehuai, to the Soviet Union, the two sides reached an agreement that they would cooperate closely on developing naval and air forces in the East Asia.
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In a letter dated April 18, 1958, Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii proposed to Peng that in order to communicate with the Soviet Union's submarines in the Pacific area, the Soviet high command and the Chinese Ministry of Defense cooperate over a four-year period in constructing a long-wave radio transmission center and a long-wave radio receiving station specially designed for long-distance communication. The Soviet Union would cover 70 percent of the construction costs.
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Mao came to consider these plans as a threat to China's sovereignty and integrity. He decided to accept building the stations but to pay all the expenses and to have exclusive ownership. Following Mao's instructions, Peng responded to Malinovskii on June 12, informing him that the Chinese government "agrees to the construction of high-power long-wave radio stations, and welcomes the technological assistance from the Soviet Union." However, Peng emphasized that "China will cover all expenses, and the stations will be jointly used by China and the Soviet Union after the completion of their construction." Peng proposed that the two governments sign a formal agreement along these lines.
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On July 11 the Soviet Union provided a draft agreement for the construction of the radio stations. Probably without understanding the nature of Beijing's request for exclusive ownership, the Soviets still insisted that the stations should be jointly constructed and managed by China and the Soviet Union. The Chinese responded with several suggestions for revision: China would take the responsibility for constructing the stations and they would belong to China; China would purchase the equipment it was unable to produce from the Soviet Union and would invite Soviet experts to help construct the station; and after the station's completion, it would be used jointly by China and the Soviet Union.
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Before the radio station issue was settled, a second dispute in the military field emerged, this one concerning the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese sub-

 

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marine flotilla. Already in late 1957, Soviet military and naval advisers in China had indicated to the Chinese that they could purchase new naval equipment from the Soviet Union. On June 28, 1958, Zhou Enlai wrote to Khrushchev, requesting that the Soviet Union provide technological assistance for China's naval buildup, especially the designs for new-type submarines.

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On July 21 Iudin called on Mao Zedong. Speaking on behalf of Khrushchev, Iudin said that the geography of the Soviet Union made it difficult for the Soviet navy to take full advantage of the new submarines. Because China had long coastlines and good natural harbors, the Soviets proposed that China and the Soviet Union establish a joint submarine flotilla. Mao Zedong told the ambassador that "first, we should make clear the guiding principle. [Do you mean that] we should create [the fleet] with your assistance? Or [do you mean] that we should jointly create [the fleet], otherwise you will not offer any assistance?" Mao emphasized that he was not interested in creating a Sino-Soviet "military cooperative."
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The next day Mao summoned Iudin to his quarters for a lengthy and very emotional conversation. Mao surveyed the history of the relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union, criticizing the fact that the Soviets had always treated their Chinese comrades from a stand of "big power chauvinism." He then repeatedly emphasized that the essence of the Soviet proposals of establishing long-wave radio stations and a joint submarine flotilla lay in Moscow's attempt to control China. The chairman angrily claimed that "you may accuse me of being a nationalist or another Tito, but my counter argument is that you have extended Russian nationalism to China's coast." Throughout the talk, Iudin seemed like the head of a foreign (or "barbarian") tribute mission who was receiving the teachings of the Chinese "son of heaven.'' As with many of Mao's meetings with Iudin, the chairman presented a near monologue, and the Soviet ambassador had few opportunities to respond. When the conversation was approaching its end, Mao told Iudin to "report all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev," emphasizing that "you must tell him exactly what I have said without any polishing."
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Alarmed by Iudin's report, Khrushchev traveled to Beijing from July 31 to August 3, meeting four times with Mao and other Chinese leaders. At the first meeting Khrushchev endeavored to explain to Mao that the Soviets had no intention of controlling China. On the radio station issue, he emphasized that it was the "personal opinion" of Malinovskii, rather than the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), to construct "jointly" the long-wave station. He agreed that the Soviet Union would provide financial and technical support for establishing the station but would let the Chinese own it. On the joint fleet issue, Khrushchev explained that Iudin

 

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might not have accurately conveyed the message from Moscow, emphasizing that the Soviets were more than willing to treat their Chinese comrades as equals. Mao Zedong, however, would not easily buy Khrushchev's explanations, claiming that "big-power chauvinism" did exist in the Soviet attitude toward China.

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is After four days' intensive meetings, on August 3 Malinovskii and Peng, representing the Soviet and Chinese governments, signed an agreement on the construction of long-wave stations and the dispatch of Soviet experts to China.
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Yet the psychological gap between the Chinese and Soviet leaders, especially between Mao and Khrushchev, persisted.
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Mao would later recall that "the overturning of [our relations with] the Soviet Union occurred in 1958, that was because they wanted to control China militarily."
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Mao's harsh reaction to these two issues reflected his increasing sensitivity toward questions concerning China's sovereignty and equal status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Underlying this sensitivity, though, was a strong "victim mentality" that characterized Chinese revolutionary nationalism during modern times. This mentality had been informed by the conviction that the political incursion, economic exploitation, and military aggression of foreign imperialist countries had undermined the historical glory of Chinese civilization and humiliated the country. Consequently, it became natural for the Chinese Communists, in their efforts to end China's humiliating modern experiences, to suspect the behavior of
any
foreign country as being driven by ulterior, or even evil, intentions. Although the Soviet Union was a Communist country, when Mao claimed that Khrushchev and his Kremlin colleagues intended to control China, he apparently had equated them with the leaders of Western imperialism.
That the explosion of Mao's suspicion and distrust of Soviet "chauvinist intentions" toward China came in the summer of 1958, rather than earlier, should be understood in the context of the chairman's criticism of "opposing adventurism" within the CCP leadership. Indeed, reading the transcripts of Mao's talks with Iudin and Khrushchev, one gets an impression that was quite similar to many of the chairman's inner-party speeches throughout late 1957 and early 1958. In both circumstances, Mao believed that he had absolute command of the truth; and, in these monologues, the chairman became accustomed to teaching others in critical, often passionate, terms. Indeed, when Mao was turning his own revolutionary emotion into the dynamics for the Great Leap Forward, it is not surprising that he had the same offensive-oriented mood in dealing with his Soviet comrades.
When Khrushchev arrived in China at the end of July 1958, the leaders in Beijing already had decided to begin large-scale shelling of the GMD-controlled Jinmen (Quemoy) island off the coast of Fujian Province.
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In determining the timing of the shelling, the chairman hoped that it would not only confront inter-

 

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