Bonnie Prince Charlie: Charles Edward Stuart (Pimlico) (34 page)

This can be seen most clearly in the attitudes of the clan leaders to the invasion of England, undertaken at Charles Edward’s insistence to enable him to gain the English throne. To Charles the invasion of England was to be different in kind from anything undertaken from Scotland before. The clan leaders, though, could never entirely rid themselves of the instinct that any incursion south of the border had to be a raid, albeit in this case a large-scale one. Thus it had ever been in relations between England and Scotland. This attitude had a further implication. The Highland chieftains considered that their interests would be served quite well by a Stuart king in Scotland; Charles Edward’s dynastic ambitions in England did not interest them. For this reason they entered on the adventure south of the border with reluctance and misgivings. Significantly, the only clan leader to advocate advancing on London from Derby was
young
Clanranald, whose position as his father’s proxy absolved him from deeper consideration of his clan’s interest.
⁶⁷
Indeed, it can be argued that the entire rebellion of 1745 failed precisely because the Highlanders were motivated byunderstandable clan interests and not commitment to the aspirations of the Stuarts.
⁶⁸

It is clear that the differential attitude to Charles Edward of the territorial potentates in Scotland was not fortuitous. The pattern of conflict may not be a simple one of feudalists versus patriarchs, still less a direct one of capitalists versus traditional clansmen, but closer inspection does reveal a clear antagonism between big and lesser battalions.
⁶⁹

The only two clan leaders, who appeared openly at the head of their warriors and who did not have obvious
prima facie
economic motives, fit into this pattern of small clans versus big ones. Mackinnon of Mackinnon was struggling to hold his own against his two great neighbours in Skye.
⁷⁰
And MacDonald of Glencoe was thought of so little significance in the political struggle in Scotland that after Culloden not even Cumberland thought him worth hounding. His abject letter of surrender and pitiful pleas for clemency were accepted by an administration not noticeably prone to leniency at this time.
⁷¹

There was also a strong urban and proletarian element in the composition of Charles Edward’s army. Artisans, shopkeepers, farmers and labourers made up a large part of the non-clan element of the army, many of them holding commissions of company rank.
⁷²
Almost the whole of John Roy Stewart’s regiment was recruited from the slums of Edinburgh.
⁷³
The Manchester regiment was to contain a strong component of weavers, drapers and apothecaries. In all some 1,400 individuals from the working class (including agricultural workers) and the lower middle class (semi-skilled workers and tradesmen) served in the Jacobite army.
⁷⁴

The army that crossed into England in November 1745 was not a revolutionary force in terms of ideology or consciousness.
⁷⁵
But in its unconscious representation of socio-economic conflict and the incompatibility of the interests of many of its members with the Hanoverian status quo, it stood for something much more than purely dynastic struggle.

(November–December 1745)

ON 31 OCTOBER THE
prince left Edinburgh, scene of his greatest triumph, for Pinkie House, where he spent the night.
¹
He was never to see Holyrood or the Scottish capital again. One good omen attended his departure. This was the arrival of a supply of money and arms from Spain.
²
All the indications were that it was the first of many such supplies. Assistance from Spain as well as France now seemed probable.

Rendezvous was at Dalkeith. From there the Jacobite army was to set off for the English border.
³
The plan was to advance in two columns. The main body under Lord George Murray (the Atholl brigade, Perth’s, Ogilvy’s, Glenbucket’s and John Roy Stewart’s) would proceed with the baggage and artillery via Peebles and Moffat before entering England at Longtown. The second division under the prince (Elcho’s Lifeguards and the clan regiments) would make a feinting movement to Lauder and Kelso, as if making for Newcastle, and then sheer off via Jedburgh to meet up with Lord George’s column near Carlisle.
⁴

Even before the prince left Dalkeith, Lord George’s words about the necessity of pacifying Scotland first came back to haunt him. At news of the departure of the Jacobite army for England, the town of Perth became ‘fractious and insolent’. The prince had to tarry to write detailed instructions to Strathallan, Oliphant of Gask and Lord Lewis Gordon about the need to keep Scotland in an iron grip while he was away.
⁵

There could be no turning back now. The prince marched down the Rule valley and Liddlesdale, forded the Esk and spent his first night in England on 8 November 1745 (OS).
⁶
Next day he linked up with Lord George’s main column. The smoothness of this operation
was
, however, somewhat marred by two pieces of intelligence Murray gave the prince. One was that there had been considerable desertion during the passage through the Lowlands. No more than 5,000 infantry and 500 cavalry in the end crossed with the prince into England. The other was that tents, stores and ammunition had been ‘lost’ at Moffat.
⁷
It would be necessary now to billet the army in towns.

Nothing daunted, the prince ordered the siege of Carlisle to commence. Breastworks were opened on the 9th, but on the 11th the investment was broken off. The Jacobite army retired to Brampton to prepare for a battle with Wade, reported to be crossing the Pennines from Newcastle. It soon became obvious that Wade would not arrive quickly; in fact he was forced back to Newcastle by heavy snowdrifts in the mountain passes.
⁸
The Jacobites returned to Carlisle to commence the siege in earnest.
⁹

Demoralised by Wade’s failure to come to their aid, and with only a tiny garrison in the castle, the citizens of Carlisle decided to surrender. This time the prince was determined not to make the mistake he had made at Edinburgh: both town
and
castle had to capitulate before he would give terms; it was all or nothing.
¹⁰
Despite the pleadings of the castle commander, Carlisle accepted the inevitable. Both town and castle were given up. On Monday 18 November, riding a white horse, the prince entered Carlisle in triumph.
¹¹

The easy capture of the first obstacle on English soil augured well for the prince’s future success, but a shadow was cast over his victory by another row involving Lord George. Murray peremptorily resigned his commission as lieutenant-general when the prince allowed the other commander, Perth, to negotiate Carlisle’s surrender.
¹²
Lord George was on solid ground in pointing out the propaganda advantage the Whig government would extract from the surrender to a Catholic lord of the first town in England the Jacobites reached. It needed no special gifts of imagination to rehearse the likely parrot-cries of ‘popery and arbitrary government’. But in regarding the task laid on Perth as a personal snub to himself, Murray ignored the fact that he had only himself to blame. He had declined to take command of the siege operations outside Carlisle, commenced when the citizens still had hopes from Wade. Perth, on the other hand, had thrown himself into the opening of trenches with gusto. In heavy snow and frost he worked in his shirt-sleeves alongside his men. The commission from the prince to accept the surrender may have been unwise on Charles Edward’s part, but it was very understandable.

The resignation threw the clan regiments into consternation. Their leaders had faith in Lord George as a military captain, not in anyone else. The effect of the resignation on the clansmen’s morale was so devastating that the prince, against his will, was forced to ask Murray to withdraw it. Perth magnanimously offered to accept what was in effect a demotion, in charge of the rearguard and baggage.
¹³
Thereafter Lord George was sole and undisputed field commander.
¹⁴

The ease with which Carlisle had fallen might have made the Jacobites over-confident, but Lord George and his party on the council responded to it instead by arguing for a return to Scotland. The prince spiked their guns by bringing on d’Eguilles (who accompanied the Jacobites into England) and asking him to reveal his instructions from Louis XV.
¹⁵
When read out these made clear that the French king wanted to gauge the strength of the English Jacobites as well as the Scots. This could be done only by advancing into England. Reluctantly Lord George and the Highland leaders acquiesced. Snow and ice notwithstanding, they would have to penetrate farther into England.

Because of the loss of tents, the army had to spend every night of the march in towns. To solve billeting problems, the Jacobites advanced in two columns.
¹⁶
Lord George Murray led the first column, with Elcho’s Lifeguards in the van. With Lord George were his Athollmen, plus Glenbucket’s and Stewart’s Edinburgh regiment. A day behind him came the prince with the main army. It was not planned to make a junction of the two segments of the army until the first sizeable town, Preston, was reached. Undoubtedly both Charles Edward and Lord George relished the days out of each other’s sight.

The prince was in Penrith on 21 November, rested on the 22nd, and made the long trek to Kendal on the 23rd.
¹⁷
Despite the sleet, snow, bad roads and fatigue, he marched on foot at the head of his army. Only with difficulty was he persuaded to get up on horseback when crossing rivers.
¹⁸
On the twenty-seven-mile haul from Penrith to Kendal, he was so tired by the gruelling slog that he took hold of the shoulder belt of one of Ogilvy’s men to prevent himself falling down in a faint.
¹⁹

Resting on the 24th, the prince reached Lancaster on the 25th, hoping to confer with Lord George, but the lieutenant-general had already moved on to Preston. The speed of his advance irked the elderly Moidart Men (especially Sheridan, Tullibardine and Sir John MacDonald), who tried to influence the prince by saying that Lord George was stealing all the glory by being permanently in the van.
But
, as Murray rightly pointed out to O’Sullivan it was not practicable to switch the order of march for the two columns before Preston.
²⁰

On the 26th the prince moved down to Preston. Cumberland and Westmoreland were well known to be hostile pro-Hanoverian country, but Lancashire had now been reached and this was where large-scale enlistment in the Jacobite army was expected. The response was disappointing: a mere dribble. One of the Lancashire volunteers, John Daniel, did, however, leave a famous description of the prince at this time:

The first time I saw this loyal army was betwixt Lancaster and Garstang: the Brave Prince marching on foot at their head like a Cyrus or Trojan hero, drawing admiration and love from all those who beheld him, raising their long-dejected hearts and solacing their minds with the happy prospect of another Golden Age. Struck with this charming sight, and seeming invitation
leave your nets and follow me
, I felt a paternal ardour pervade my veins.
²¹

Yet the underlying trend was worrying. There was no opposition to the Jacobites, but no enthusiasm for them either. When the two columns reunited in Preston, Lord George Murray insisted on another council meeting. Preston was psychologically important for the Highlanders, for it was the farthest south reached by any raiding Scottish army hitherto. It was also the scene of the Scots’ rout by Cromwell in 1648 and of the Jacobites’ second defeat (on the same day as Sheriffmuir) during the 1715 rising. Knowing well how the superstitious clansmen’s minds worked, Murray worked hard to exorcise this ghost. He marched the vanguard through Preston and to the other side of Ribble Bridge so that the town would not be ‘their
ne plus ultra
for a third time’.

There was further tension at the Preston council. Lord George’s north-western strategy, based on his much-vaunted Stanley family connection which made him ‘certain’ they would find support in Lancashire, was already proving a failure. Murray would have liked nothing better than to cut his losses and retreat to Scotland. Again the prince produced d’Eguilles as his trump, again the Scots subsided, but there was a general feeling that the real issues had merely been shelved.
²²

The council turned to the question of itinerary. Since Warrington Bridge had now been broken down by the defending militia, the route the Jacobites had intended to take anyway (via Manchester) seemed
all
the more desirable, since the Whigs would still not be certain that the Jacobite target was London.
²³

The pressure on the prince was building up. He decided to write to Sir Watkin Williams Wynn: ‘The particular character I have heard of you makes me hope to see you among the first.’ He asked Wynn to join him with all speed and not to worry too much about numbers: ‘it will be looked upon as a battalion if it come to the number of 4 or 500 men or upwards. But whatever numbers you bring will be acceptable, though they were below that and even though they were very small.’
²⁴

Napoleon used to ask of a general: ‘Has he luck?’ If we accept that this is a key attribute for a military leader, we can immediately infer something about Charles Edward from the fate of the letters he sent to the English Jacobite leaders. His first letter, sent to Lord Barrymore from Brampton on 11 November, was handed to his son, Lord Buttevant, by the prince’s messenger, since Barrymore was at London in the House of Commons. Buttevant, who was violently opposed to his father’s Jacobite sentiments, promptly burned it.
²⁵
The prince’s second letter, to Watkin Williams Wynn, was intercepted by one of Cumberland’s agents.