Bonnie Prince Charlie: Charles Edward Stuart (Pimlico) (26 page)

At Kinlochmoidart things were also going well. Food shortages had been solved by Clanranald’s capture of three barges loaded with corn and oatmeal.
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At this Murray of Broughton finally decided to commit himself. He arrived at Kinlochmoidart on Sunday the 18th.
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So far was the prince from holding his two-faced behaviour against him that, a week later, he appointed Murray to be his secretary. A shrewder man might have been alerted by Murray’s foot-dragging, but Charles Edward was always of an excessively forgiving nature until the point where he toppled over into suspicion and hatred, when he became impervious to reason. Always in the prince’s personality there was the lack of a middle path or a golden mean. He was too trusting and lacked normal shrewdness and suspicion when dealing with flatterers. When his suspicions were aroused, they quickly toppled into paranoia.

Yet all in all the omens were good when the prince set out for Glenfinnan. The only sombre note had been struck by the London government’s putting a price of £30,000 on the prince’s head. At this stage Charles was inclined to laugh this off.
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Leaving Kinlochmoidart, the prince marched to Loch Shiel and went by boat to Glenaladale, where he spent the night. There the first of the north-eastern lairds (distinct from the clan leaders) joined him: John Gordon of Glenbucket, a stooped man of fifty-eight who brought along Colonel Swithenham as a prize exhibit.
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Swithenham thus enjoyed the dubious privilege (for him) of witnessing the raising of the royal standard at Glenfinnan next day.
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In the morning the prince, guarded by fifty of Clanranald’s men, was taken by boat to Glenfinnan at the northern end of Loch Shiel. There he was met by Morar and the rest of the Clanranald clan.
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The narrow fresh-water loch was beset by beetling hills and saw-toothed ridges. Rocky screes dotted with heather added to the sombre effect. It was a desolate location for a scene of high pageantry. No
rebellious
legion commander in Germany could ever have raised the standard of revolt against Rome in more remote surroundings.

This time it was the Spes Britanniae, come from Rome, that unfurled the banner. At the head of Loch Shiel on Monday 19 August 1745 the prince enjoyed one of his few days of unsullied happiness. The raising of the Stuart colours at the age of twenty-four was the culmination of all his childhood dreams and adolescent aspirations. At the side of the dark loch the prince waited with his three hundred Clanranalds for the gathering of the clans.

The rendezvous had been set for 1 p.m. but for two hours Keppoch and Lochiel did not appear.
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One can only speculate at the anxious state of mind of a prince so plagued by fantasies of betrayal. Suddenly at 3 p.m. the distant skirl of the pipes was heard. Large numbers of Camerons began to descend to Glenfinnan out of the surrounding mountains, forming an ‘agreeably bizarre’ zigzag pattern as they did so.
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Three hundred Keppochs and seven hundred Camerons, virtually that clan’s full fighting strength, made the rendezvous.
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Doubtless Lochiel refrained from telling the prince that raising them had not been easy, that he had had to threaten to burn bothies over their heads before they rallied to him.
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The prince made a short but inspiring speech, playing down his divine right, stressing instead that he had come to Scotland to make his beloved subjects happy.
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At 5 p.m. he ordered the standard carried to the other side of the river Finnan and called his first war council for that very evening.
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At the council two things had to be decided: future strategy and a choice of military leader. The loss of heavy ordnance when the
Elisabeth
turned back meant the previous idea of first besieging Scotland’s forts and castles would have to be abandoned; indeed, they would have to give Fort William a wide berth to avoid its cannon.
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That being the case, the prince advocated a swift advance on Cope’s forces as soon as the clan army was properly equipped and victualled. He was aware that Cope had no more men than he did, as a result of heavy troop withdrawals to Flanders, both before and after Fontenoy.
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Lochiel and the other clan leaders also favoured another approach to the Skye chiefs, this time in their own names without mentioning the prince.
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Then they turned to the issue of the command. Lochiel spoke with due modesty, saying he knew nothing of formal military matters but would take advice from those who did. Sir John MacDonald then proposed O’Sullivan as major-general.
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Strangely enough, considering his partiality at this time for the forty-five-year-old
Irishman
, the prince deferred a decision. Perhaps at some level he knew O’Sullivan was a military dud. Only constant nagging by Sir John MacDonald over the next few days secured the appointment.

The prince passed that night in a little barn at the head of the loch. Next day he departed to spend some days with Lochiel at his estate at Achnacarry, between Loch Lochy and Loch Arkaig.
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Then the small army began its march. They pressed on through mountain trails to the Glengarry country. From Kinlocheil, where Charles Edward jokingly offered £30 for George II’s capture in response to the price on his own head,
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he forged ahead to Moy, staying one night at Fassifern’s house.
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On the 24th the army made a detour to avoid being seen by a warship lying off Fort William in Loch Linnhe.
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Not far from Fort Augustus the prince was met by five hundred Glengarry men and about three hundred Stewarts of Appin under Charles Stewart of Ardshiel.
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Already the prince’s mania for physical fitness was paying off. The clansmen actually complained that he set too fast a pace!
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Monday 26 August was a critical day for the prince. He was now aware that Cope was marching by Dalwhinny towards Fort Augustus. He therefore sent part of his army by forced march to seize the head of Corriearrack pass before Cope could reach it.
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Only one week after Glenfinnan the prince faced the prospect of a battle. He did not shirk it, even though sufficient excuse presented itself, in the surprising form of a communication from Lord Lovat.

On reaching Inverary Castle after a hard day’s march by way of Letterfinlay, the prince was met by Fraser of Gortleg with a verbal message (naturally!) from Lovat.
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Assuring him of his loyal services, Lovat asked the prince to direct his steps towards Fraser country. If he passed through Stratherrick to Inverness, clan Fraser would rise to a man; almost certainly such a march would also draw in the Grants, Mackenzies, Mackintoshes and Macleans, all of whom were Jacobite clans with unpopular Hanoverian or absentee leaders. In that case Macleod and Sir Alexander MacDonald would be cut off from their protectors; they would no longer be able to maintain their pro-Whig stance against the hostility of their own tacksmen.

This was a very tempting strategy. Even while Charles Edward pondered it, Tullibardine suggested another. This was to push south with all speed through Atholl country and swoop on Edinburgh. But not, the prince insisted, before he had dealt with Cope. Here, as usual, the prince’s intuition was sound. His instinct was always for an early battle, and it was a good one in the early stages of the rising, when the best hope was a series of knock-out blows. Evasion of a
battle
in 1745 (as opposed to 1746) always brought misfortune to the Jacobites. The prince’s conclusion was that he would take Tullibardine’s advice once he had vanquished Cope.

On Tuesday the Jacobite army pressed on to Aberchalder, where the MacDonalds of Glencoe joined them, plus some of the Grants of Glenmoriston.
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Ominously, though, there came the first signs of a problem that was to dog the prince throughout the campaign: desertion. This time it was a group of Keppoch’s MacDonalds that absconded.
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Yet, all in all, the prince felt his army to be in good shape for the coming clash with Cope.

The battle of the Corriearrack pass was, like the battle of Stone on 1 December, a case of a battle that never was which yet had momentous consequences. To understand the situation we must return to follow Cope’s movements. The obvious government strategy was to keep the Jacobites penned behind the Highland line, waiting for lack of money and resources to dissolve the tiny rebel army. Cope decided otherwise. He quit Edinburgh on the day of Glenfinnan and was in Stirling on 20 August. His orders were to seek out and destroy the enemy before they could leave the Highlands – a rerun in effect of the strategy so successfully pursued by General Wightman in 1719. But it was a risky strategy, given the paucity of government troops in Scotland, for if it misfired the Jacobites could descend into the Lowlands and seize the great cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. For success, Cope needed enemy leadership to be as supine as it had been in 1715 and 1719. Instead, this time he faced the driving, dynamic energy of Charles Edward Stuart.

Cope laid his plans carefully. Before leaving Edinburgh he strengthened the garrison there (and at Glasgow and Stirling) and left Colonel Gardiner’s dragoons to defend the Forth at Stirling. Another company of dragoons was detailed to defend Edinburgh.
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So far everything had been done professionally. But things began to go wrong for Cope when he was just one day out from his base at Stirling. At Crieff he found not a single pro-Hanoverian clan waiting to join him. His inclination was to proceed no further. But he had his orders.
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Advancing, he reached Dalnacardoch on 25 August, where he learned of the speed of the Highlanders’ progress. The prospect of a battle in the Corriearrack loomed. Cope took his army to the closest possible base, at Dalwhinny.
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What he saw there did not reassure him. Corriearrack was an obvious spot for an ambush. A high pass through the mountains, separating Loch Laggan and the Spey valley from the Great Glen,
Corriearrack
was in those days traversed by one of Wade’s roads. A spectacular engineering feat, the road zigzagged up from the south side to a height of 2,500 feet. Then it descended more steadily to Fort Augustus on the northern side, passing through several glens and valleys with ample cover provided by dense heather.
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The negotiation of this pass would have been difficult enough for redcoats in full pack even with no enemy present. Convinced from his intelligence (though wrongly) that the Highlanders already controlled the north side of Corriearrack and had laid an elaborate ambuscade, Cope decided that any further advance would carry him into a death-trap. Cope concluded that the odds were against him. He ordered his men to make for Inverness by forced marches.
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The Jacobite army began its ascent of the pass before daybreak on 27 August, expecting, when they reached the summit, to see Cope’s men strung out snake-like on the southern approaches.
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The Highlanders gained the summit. There was not a single redcoat to be seen. On 28 August the prince advanced cautiously to Garvemore, in battle order, suspecting a ruse by Cope. From dispirited camp-followers of Cope’s army they soon learned the truth. In jubilation they marched down the zigzags to Garvemore.
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Here for the first time since Glenfinnan the army tasted bread, having eaten only roast meat on the road – a curious reversal of dietary fortune for most clansmen.

When the full army assembled. in high morale at the thought that Cope had fled rather then risk a battle with them, the prince called a hastily improvised council to consider pursuing the Commander in Chief, Scotland. A forced march through Strathclear might enable them to intercept him at Slochd Mor between Carrbridge and Tomatin. But it was decided that Cope had too long a start on them, and that the Highlanders were too fatigued to make success certain.
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The prince now wished to press south through the unoccupied pass of Killiekrankie to the Atholl country. Against his wishes, he was drawn into a diversionary raid. Hearing that Cope had fled pell-mell through Ruthven, doubtless demoralising the troops there, O’Sullivan saw a chance to set the seal on his oral appointment as major-general. The barracks at Ruthven looked an easy target. The prince, however, argued that with no cannon or scaling ladders, taking the barracks would not be worth the loss of life involved. Once again he was right.
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Eventually O’Sullivan and Archie Cameron wore him down and persuaded him to let them have a small party of raiders for the attempt. O’Sullivan quickly revealed his military ineptitude. So far
from
being demoralised, the defenders at Ruthven beat off the Highlanders with losses.
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More successful was the side trip to seize Cluny MacPherson at his house. Murray of Broughton had summoned the nominally Jacobite Cluny to the colours a second time on 26 August but there had been no reply.
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The ambivalent chief was carried prisoner to the prince next day.
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After Charles Edward gave him the same terms as Lochiel, i.e. security for his estate, he agreed to come out and raise his clan.
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Disguising the hard-headed bargain he had struck, Cluny pretended it was loyalty to the Stuarts that had brought him out: ‘an angel could not resist the soothing, close application of the rebels.’
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On 29 August the prince pressed on to Dalwhinny and on the 30th to Dalnacardoch. Here he had word from Robertson of Struan that the Robertson clan would be joining the army at Blair.
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On the 31st the army proceeded to Blair Castle in Atholl. Here they received another important recruit in the form of John Roy Stewart.
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The army was short of experienced officers, and John Roy had held a commission in the Scots Greys. The prince gave Stewart a commission to raise a new regiment in the north and if possible to bring in the Grants.
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At about this time, too, good news was received from the MacGregors, who had surprised and captured eighty-nine soldiers at the barracks of Inversnaid.
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