Bomber Command (67 page)

Boeing B-17 FORTRESS III
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. Type: four-engined heavy bomber; crew: 6; length: 73 feet; height: 15.6 feet; wingspan: 104 feet; maximum weight: 64,000 lb; ceiling: 31,500; cruising speed: 230 mph; maximum speed: 280 mph; bombload: 12,800 lb (with fuel for 1,140 miles); armament: nine .50-in machine-guns in turrets and free-mounted: engines: 4 Cyclone GR1820-97.

Appendix C: Letter to Sir Norman Bottomley, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, from Sir Arthur Harris

AIR 20/3218

Headquarters, Bomber Command

High Wycombe, Bucks

29th March 1945

ATH/DO/4B

PERSONAL & TOP SECRET

Dear Norman

It is difficult to answer indictments of which the terms are not fully revealed and for this reason I cannot deal as thoroughly as I should like with the points raised in your CAS.608/DSAS of March 28th. I take it, however, that it is unnecessary for me to make any comment on the passages which you quote and which, without the context, are abusive in effect, though doubtless not in intention.

To suggest that we have bombed German cities ‘simply for the sake of increasing the terror though under other pretexts’ and to speak of our offensive as including ‘mere acts of terror and wanton destruction’ is an insult both to the bombing policy of the Air Ministry and to the manner in which that policy has been executed by Bomber Command. This sort of thing if it deserves an answer will certainly receive none from me, after three years of implementing official policy.

As regards the specific points raised in your letter, namely the adverse economic effects on ourselves by increasing yet further the material havoc in Germany and the destruction of Dresden
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in particular the answer is surely very simple. It is already demonstrated in the liberated countries that what really makes any sort of recovery almost impossible is less the destruction of buildings than the complete dislocation of transportation. If, therefore, this objection is to be taken seriously I suggest that the transportation plan rather than the strategic bombing of cities is what needs to be considered, as I understand it has been, and for precisely that reason. You will remember that Dresden was recommended by the Targets Committee as a transportation target as well as on other grounds.

I do not, however, stress this point since I assume that what is really at issue is (a) whether our strategic bombing policy up to date has been justified (b) whether the time has now come to discontinue this policy. I will therefore confine myself to these questions.

As regards (a) I have on previous occasions discussed this matter very carefully in official correspondence with the Air Ministry and to avoid repetition I refer you to the following correspondence:

(i) Bomber Command letter BC/S.23801/Press/C.-in-C. of October 25th 1943.

(ii) Air Ministry letter CS.21079/43 of December 15th 1943.

(iii) Bomber Command letter BC/S.23801/Press/C.-in-C. of December 23rd 1943.

(iv) Air Ministry letter CS.21079 of March 2nd 1944.

(v) Bomber Command letter BC/S.31152/Air/C.-in-C. of March 7th 1944.

I have always held and still maintain that my Directive, which you quote, ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems’ could be carried out only by the elimination of German industrial cities and not merely by attacks on individual factories however important these might be in themselves. This view was also officially confirmed by the Air Ministry. The overwhelming evidence which is now available to support it makes it quite superfluous for me to argue at length that the destruction of those cities has fatally weakened the German effort and is now enabling Allied soldiers to advance into the heart of Germany with negligible casualties. Hence the only question which I have to answer is this: would ‘confining ourselves to more precise concentrations upon military objectives such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle zone’ tend to shorten the war more than persistence in attacks on cities? The answer appears to me to be obvious; but, even if it is not, I must point out as I have frequently done before that we have by no means always a free choice in this matter. Weather conditions frequently constrain me to decide between attacking cities and not attacking at all. When this happens it is surely evident that it is expedient to attack the cities. I can only find, pinpoint and hit small targets with a small part of my force at a time, and I have not enough fighter escort to do more than two such small attacks daily.

I have thus disposed of point (a). We have never gone in for terror bombing and the attacks which we have made in accordance with my Directive have in fact produced the strategic consequences for which they were designed and from which the Armies now profit.

Point (b) is rather difficult to follow. It can hardly mean that attacks on cities no longer produce dislocation in the German war effort. Quite the contrary is the case. The nearer Germany is to collapse the less capable she is of reorganizing to meet disasters of this kind and we ought logically to make a special effort to eliminate the few cities which still remain more or less serviceable.

I therefore assume that the view under consideration is something like this: ‘no doubt in the past we were justified in attacking German cities. But to do so was always repugnant and now that the Germans are beaten anyway we can properly abstain from proceeding with these attacks’. This is a doctrine to which I could never subscribe. Attacks on cities like any other act of war are intolerable unless they are strategically justified. But they are strategically justified in so far as they tend to shorten the war and so preserve the lives of Allied soldiers. To my mind we have absolutely no right to give them up unless it is certain that they will not have this effect. I do not personally regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier.

It therefore seems to me that there is one and only one valid argument on which a case for giving up strategic bombing could be based, namely that it has already completed its task and that nothing now remains for the Armies to do except to occupy Germany against unorganized resistance. If this is what is meant I shall no doubt be informed of it. It does not however appear to be the view of the Supreme Commander. Until it is, I submit that the strategic bombing of German cities must go on.

Some final points. As you know Transportation targets are now largely off. Oil has had, and is getting, all we can practically give it in consideration of weather and escort factors. We answer every army support call and, as Monty tells us, in a ‘decisive manner’. We have asked for more but there aren’t any. H.E. is seriously limited in supply. Incendiaries are not. All these factors must therefore also be considered, and the inevitable answer is that either we continue as in the past or we very largely stand down altogether. The last alternative would certainly be welcome. I take little delight in the work and none whatever in risking my crews avoidably.

Japan remains. Are we going to bomb their cities flat – as in Germany – and give the Armies a walk over – as in France and Germany – or going to bomb only their outlying factories
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and subsequently invade at the cost of 3 to 6 million casualties? We should be careful of precedents. Yours Ever,

Bert

Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, KCB, CIE, DSO, AFC,

Air Ministry, Whitehall, SW1

Appendix D: British and German production of selected armaments, 1940–44

Appendix E: Schedule of German cities subjected to area attack by Bomber Command, 1942–45