Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (37 page)

High
above, the intercept operators in the EC-121 ferret continued to eavesdrop on
voices from the war below, but they heard no more mentions of the American
flag. "Finally," said Chief Nowicki, "it was time to return to
Athens. We recorded voice activity en route home until the intercepts finally
faded. On the way home, the evaluator and I got together to try to figure out
what we copied. Despite replaying portions of the tapes, we still did not have
a complete understanding of what transpired except for the likelihood that a
ship flying the American flag was being attacked by Israeli air and surface
forces."

After
landing on the Greek air force side of the Athens airport, Nowicki and the
intercept crew were brought directly to the processing center. "By the
time we arrived at the USA-512J compound," he said, "collateral
reports were coming in to the station about the attack on the USS
Liberty.
The
first question we were asked was, did we get any of the activity? Yes, we dared
to say we did. The NSA civilians took our tapes and began transcribing. It was
pretty clear that Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats attacked a ship in
the east Med. Although the attackers never gave a name or a hull number, the
ship was identified as flying an American flag. We logically concluded that the
ship was the USS
Liberty,
although we had no idea she was even in the
area and could become the object of such an attack." At the time, based on
the fractured conversations he heard on the intercepts, Nowicki just assumed
that the attack was a mistake.

The
question then was whether to send a CRITIC to NSA, CRITIC being the highest
priority for intercept intelligence. "After much deliberation," Nowicki
said, "we decided against the CRITIC because our information was already
hours old. To meet CRITIC criteria, information should be within fifteen
minutes of the event. ... It had been quite a day and other days remained
before us. We returned to the Hotel Seville for rest and relaxation, feeling a
sense of exhilaration but not comprehending the chaos and calamity taking place
on the
Liberty
at that very moment as she struggled to leave the attack
area."

The message sent by the
Liberty
shortly after the attack
requesting immediate help was eventually received by the Sixth Fleet, which was
then south of Crete, 450 miles to the west. Suddenly high-level communications
channels came alive. At 2:50 P.M.
(Liberty
time), fifty minutes after
the first shells tore into the ship and as the attack was still going on, the launch
decision was made. The aircraft carrier USS
America,
cruising near
Crete, was ordered to launch four armed A-4 Skyhawks. At the same time, the
carrier USS
Saratoga
was also told to send four armed A-1 attack planes
to defend the ship. "Sending aircraft to cover you," the Sixth Fleet
told the
Liberty
at 3:05 P.M. (9:05 A.M. in Washington). "Surface
units on the way."

At 9:00
a.m.
(3:00 P.M.
Liberty)
bells
sounded and the first CRITIC message, sent by either the
America
or the
Saratoga,
stuttered across a role of white Teletype paper in NSA's Sigint Command
Center. The senior operations officer then passed it on to Director Marshall
Carter. With Carter in his ninth-floor office was Deputy Director Tordella. At
9:28 A.M. (3:28 P.M.
Liberty)
Carter sent out a CRITIC alert to all
listening posts. "USS
Liberty
has been reportedly torpedoed by
unknown source in Med near 32N 33E," said the message: "Request
examine all communications for possible reaction/reflections and report
accordingly."

Eleven
minutes after the CRITIC arrived at NSA, the phone rang in the Pentagon's War
Room and European Command Headquarters told the duty officer that the
Liberty
had been attacked by unknown jet fighters.

At that
moment in Washington, President Johnson was at his desk, on the phone,
alternately shouting at congressional leaders and coaxing them to support his
position on several pieces of pending legislation. But four minutes later he
was suddenly interrupted by Walt Rostow on the other line. "The
Liberty
has been torpedoed in the Mediterranean," Rostow told Johnson
excitedly. A minute later, the adviser rushed into the Oval Office with a brief
memorandum. "The ship is located 60 to 100 miles north of Egypt.
Reconnaissance aircraft are out from the 6th fleet," it said. "No
knowledge of the submarine or surface vessel which committed this act. Shall
keep you informed."

In the
Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara called Carter at NSA for
precise information on the ship, its personnel, and other details. Carter told
him what he knew but said that the Naval Security Group, which manned and
operated the ship, would have the most up-to-date facts. Carter told McNamara
that he would have Captain Ralph E. Cook, the Security Group's director, call
him immediately. Carter then called Cook's office, only to discover that he was
at the dentist's. Cook's deputy, a Captain Thomas, got on the phone, and Carter
told him to call McNamara at once. About ten minutes later McNamara again
called Carter and said he still hadn't heard from anyone. After a few more
minutes of crossed wires, McNamara and Thomas finally talked.

NSA's
worst fears had come true. "After considerations of personnel
safety," said Tordella, "one of General Carter's and my immediate
concerns, considering the depth of the water and the distance of the ship off
shore, had to do with the classified materials which she had on board." Tordella
got on the phone to the Joint Reconnaissance Center and spoke to the deputy
director, a Navy captain named Vineyard. "I expressed my concern that the
written material be burned if at all possible and that the electronic equipment
be salvaged if that were possible," he said.

But
Tordella was not prepared for what he heard. According to NSA documents
classified top secret/umbra and obtained for
Body of Secrets,
Tordella was told that some senior officials in Washington
wanted above all to protect Israel from embarrassment. "Captain Vineyard
had mentioned during this conversation," wrote Tordella, "that
consideration was then being given by some unnamed Washington authorities to
sink[ing] the
Liberty
in order that newspaper men would be unable to photograph
her and thus inflame public opinion against the Israelis. I made an impolite
comment about the idea." Almost immediately Tordella wrote a memorandum
for the record, describing the conversation, and then locked it away.

Concern
over the secrets on the ship grew and Carter said he was prepared to order the
ship scuttled to prevent their loss. He only reconsidered when informed that
the shallowness of the water made compromise of materials and equipment "a
distinct possibility." Then he began worrying about the security of the
material if the ship ended up sinking. "If it appeared the ship was going
to sink," Carter told Vineyard, "it was essential that the security
of the sinking site be maintained. ... It would be necessary to get down and
remove the sensitive material from the ship."

Also,
there was discussion of sending in a replacement ship, the USS
Belmont.
A
cover story for the
Liberty
was then quickly devised. "She was a
communications research ship that was diverted from her research assignment,"
it said, "to provide improved communication-relay links with the several
U.S. embassies around the entire Mediterranean during the current
troubles."

On the
America
and
Saratoga,
the pilots were instructed to "destroy or drive
off any attackers who are clearly making attacks on the
Liberty."
They
then catapulted into the air toward the
Liberty
at 3:45 P.M.
Liberty
time
(9:45 A.M. Washington).

At 4:00
P.M. on the
Liberty
(10:00 A.M. Washington), the crew was still
screaming for help. "Flash, flash, flash," Radioman Joe Ward shouted
into his microphone. "I pass in the blind. [That is, he didn't know who
was picking up the transmission.] We are under attack by air-craft and
high-speed surface craft. I say again, flash, flash, flash." By then,
unencrypted voice messages had been filling the open airwaves for two hours. If
the Israelis were monitoring the communications, as they did continuously
during the war, they would now have begun to worry how soon the American
fighters would arrive.

From the
White House Situation Room, Rostow phoned Johnson at 10:14 A.M. (4:14 P.M.
Liberty)
to tell him that the ship was "listing badly to starboard. The
Saratoga
has launched 4-A4's and 4-A1's." Johnson feared that the attack had
been conducted by Soviet planes and submarines and that the United States was
on the verge of war with Russia. Later he called all his advisers for an
emergency meeting in the Situation Room.

About the
same moment that Joe Ward was again pleading for help, Commander Ernest C.
Castle, the U.S. naval attach
é
in Tel
Aviv, was summoned urgently to Israeli Defense Force Headquarters. There, he
was told that Israeli air and sea forces had attacked the
Liberty
"in
error." Castle raced back to the embassy and at 4:14 P.M.
Liberty
time
(10:14 P.M. Washington), he dashed off a Flash message to Washington concerning
this development. Strangely, NSA claims that it first learned of Israel's
involvement fifteen minutes before Castle was called by the Israeli Defense
Forces and half an hour before Castle's Flash message. It has never been
explained how NSA discovered this.

At the
White House, Johnson was relieved to learn that the attackers were not Soviet
or Egyptian. There would be no war today. But he became very worried that the
Russians, through Sigint, radar, or observation, would become aware that a
squadron of American fighters was streaking toward the war zone, and that if
the USSR suspected that America had suddenly decided to become involved, it
would launch an attack. So at 11:17 AM. (5:17 P.M.
Liberty)
he sent a
hot-line message to Kosygin in Moscow.

The small
office next to the War Room had lately become a busy place. Supervisor Harry O.
Rakfeldt, a Russian-speaking Navy cryptologic chief, was already pounding out a
hot-line message to Moscow, one of a number he had sent during the crisis, when
the White House phone rang. Army Major Pawlowski, the presidential translator,
picked it up, listened for a moment, then told Rakfeldt to notify Moscow to
stand by for an emergency message. Immediately Rakfeldt stopped typing, dropped
down several lines, and sent "Stand by for an emergency message."
Then, as Major Pawlowski dictated, Rakfeldt typed the following alert:

We have
just learned that USS Liberty, an auxiliary ship, has apparently been torpedoed
by Israel Forces in error off Port Said. We have instructed our carrier
Saratoga, now in the Mediterranean, to dispatch aircraft to the scene to
investigate. We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose of this
flight of aircraft and hope that you will take appropriate steps to see that
proper parties are informed. We have passed the message to Chernyakov but feel
that you should know of this development urgently.

The
message arrived in the Kremlin at 11:24 A.M. Washington time; Kosygin replied
about forty-five minutes later that he had passed the message on to Nasser.

Black
smoke was still escaping through the more than 800 holes in the
Liberty's
hull,
and the effort to hush up the incident had already begun. Within hours of the
attack, Israel asked President Johnson to quietly bury the incident.
"Embassy Tel Aviv," said a highly secret, very-limited-distribution
message to the State Department, "urged deemphasis on publicity since
proximity of vessel to scene of conflict was fuel for Arab suspicions that U.S.
was aiding Israel." Shortly thereafter, a total news ban was ordered by
the Pentagon. No one in the field was allowed to say anything about the attack.
All information was to come only from a few senior Washington officials.

At 11:29
a.m.
(5:29 P.M.
Liberty),
Johnson
took the unusual step of ordering the JCS to recall the fighters while the
Liberty
still lay smoldering, sinking, fearful of another attack, without aid, and
with its decks covered with the dead, the dying, and the wounded. Onboard the
flagship of the Sixth Fleet, Rear Admiral Lawrence R. Geis, who commanded the
carrier force in the Mediterranean, was angry and puzzled at the recall and
protested it to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Admiral
Geis was shocked by what he heard next. According to
information
obtained for
Body of Secrets,
"President Lyndon Johnson came on
with a comment that he didn't care if the ship sunk, he would not embarrass his
allies." Admiral Geis told Lieutenant Commander David Lewis, the head of
the NSA group on the
Liberty,
about the comment but asked him to keep it
secret until after Geis died. It was a promise that Lewis kept.

The hole
in the
Liberty's
twenty-three-year-old skin was nearly wide enough to
drive a bus through; the ship had a heavy list to starboard, most of its
equipment was destroyed, thirty-two of its crew were dead (two others would
later die) and two-thirds of the rest wounded; its executive officer was dead,
and its commanding officer was badly hurt. Despite all this, the
Liberty
was
heroically brought back to life and slowly made her way toward safer waters. To
keep the ship from sinking, the hatches to the flooded NSA spaces had been
dogged down, sealing the bodies of the twenty-five Sigint specialists inside.