Blood and Daring (31 page)

Attempting to shore up his numbers, Macdonald moved to pry Galt from the Reform party with the offer of a cabinet seat. Galt agreed on condition that the Cartier-Macdonald administration adopt Confederation as a
goal of the new government. An agreement was struck and Galt became finance minister. He was confident that the idea of Confederation would find traction in Canada and the Maritimes, where local politicians and business people would see the economic advantage of a broader union.
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In 1857, Nova Scotia’s legislature had passed a resolution to investigate such a union. Further, Galt knew that the notion of a more independent British North America was growing popular in London among those in politics and civil society known as Little Englanders, or the Manchester School, who were of the opinion that the cost of governing and defending colonies no longer matched the benefit.
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While not a Little Englander himself, the Duke of Newcastle, British secretary of state for the colonies, saw the writing on the wall and at least twice in the late 1850s had urged his Canadian governor general to see what could be done to support talk of constitutional change among colonial politicians and his Maritime lieutenant-governors.
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Both Cartier and Macdonald were lukewarm to the Confederation idea, but good to their word, and so they allowed Galt to introduce a proposal to broach the subject with Britain. The resolution was so vaguely worded as to appear harmless and so it passed. Shortly afterward, just before the House was about to end its session, Governor General Head surprised many by announcing: “I propose in the course of the recess to communicate with Her Majesty’s Government, and with the Governments of the sister Colonies, on another matter of very great importance. I am desirous of inviting them to discuss with us the principles on which a bond of a federal character, uniting the Provinces of British North America, may perhaps hereafter be practicable.”
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Head’s brief statement was like a clanging bell announcing the need for a fundamental change in the political makeup of British North America, and seemed to offer Galt’s proposal the support of the Crown.

Two months later, Galt, Cartier and John Ross, president of the Executive Council, packed their high hopes and left for London. The cool autumn air was as chilly as their welcome. Henry Labouchère was Palmerston’s secretary of state and, like the Duke of Newcastle, had encouraged Head to support Canadian efforts at uniting the North
American colonies.
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However, within weeks of Head’s statement, the Palmerston government had fallen. There was confusion in the Colonial Office as new colonial secretary, Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, no friend of the Little Englanders, was either unaware of, or perhaps unwilling to acknowledge, previous colonial directives.
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A minor scandal erupted over whether Head had been directed to make his pro-Confederation remarks. Lytton seemed to misunderstand the complexity of the Canadian situation and the storm gathering in the United States. He was worried that Confederation was a half-baked scheme meant mostly to extricate the current Canadian government from a political mess and, further, that if Confederation talks moved forward too quickly, his office would lose control of the process and outcome. He expressed these concerns to Galt and the others in a circular dispatch written in November, and then in another to Head in December.
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Lytton ordered that moves toward a wider federation should be delayed to allow time to build a consensus in Canada and the other colonies.
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With the Galt initiative effectively shelved, George Brown entered the fray. Brown, another Scot, had been a force in Canadian politics and civil society since shortly after arriving in Toronto from New York intent upon using his knowledge of the newspaper business to start a new paper in Canada West. Founded in 1844, the
Globe
was by the late 1850s a powerhouse. It boasted British North America’s largest subscription list, the newest and most efficient printing technology and distribution system, and correspondents connected by telegraph who presented the latest daily news and opinion to a broad urban and rural readership. Brown poured profits back into the paper while investing in real estate and land development. In 1851, he won a seat in Kent County, in the remote southwest of Canada West, as a member of the Reform party.

Canadian political parties in the 1850s were shifting coalitions of independently minded men that were slowly coalescing into two major groups. The Tories or Liberal-Conservatives (or simply Conservatives) were led by Cartier and Macdonald, who did their best to hold together what they called “loose fish.” The Reformers were precursors to the
Liberal Party, who increasingly recognized Brown as their leading voice. Brown spoke for those who opposed the current constitutional system, which gave Canada East and West equal votes in the legislature, resulting in the need for a double majority for anything to happen: that is, party support and French/English support. He advocated a new system of representation by population to reflect the fact that the population of predominantly English-Protestant Canada West had outdistanced that of French-Catholic Canada East, and yet the Constitution still guaranteed each an equal number of seats. Brown’s calls for “Rep by Pop” were interpreted by opponents as either a bigoted attack on French Catholics or a desperate attempt to change the rules of a game his Reform party seemed unable to win. Brown did little to help himself or his cause, by his too frequent mentions of his disdain for “Popism” or a desire to end the power of the Catholic church, and his personal attacks on opponents, which betrayed anger and impatience.

In January 1858, Brown had written a long letter to a political ally, saying that he believed the future lay in forging a federal union between Canada and the Maritime colonies. It would, he reasoned, solve the political and economic problems plaguing them all, and end the ethnic and religious bickering that had no place in the public sphere. And it would allow a strong base for expansion to the west. “No honest man,” he wrote, “can desire that we should remain as we are.… A federal union, it appears to me, cannot be entertained for Canada alone but when agitated must include all British America.”
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Shortly afterward, following the embarrassment of his two-day ministry, he stood apart from many in his party and spoke in favour of Galt’s Confederation motion. When Galt’s mission to London ended in a disappointing failure, Brown dropped the idea—but only for a while. Six months later, beginning on May 10, 1859, the
Globe
ran a three-month series of articles outlining the problems with the current political structure and reviving arguments for a new federal union.

Brown worked assiduously to convince Reform members of the need for a convention to adopt Confederation as party policy. On November 9, in Toronto’s cavernous but ornate St. Lawrence Hall, 570 skeptical and
scrappy party members were gavelled to order. For two days motions came to the floor advocating a number of ideas, including inviting the Maritimes to join a British North American government, altering only the present Canadian political structure, and even dissolving Canada to create separate French and English governments. A compromise was finally approved whereby the party would support the creation of a new general government under what they called “some joint authority,” with details to be worked out later.

Everyone waited for Brown’s response. And he let them wait. Finally, with sunlight fading from the large windows, and gaslights creating golden shadows on the carved gods and gargoyles that glared down from massive crown mouldings, Brown rose to speak. The hot, crowded room fell silent.

He began slowly with innocuous remarks, and then, as his volume and pace increased, there were cheers as he announced support for the convention’s Confederation motion. He then played the note that resonated with so many Reformers and Canadians in general—anti-Americanism. He held up Confederation as a way to create a new Canadian system of government that would be loyal to Britain while avoiding what he called the fundamental errors at the heart of the American system. Those mistakes, he argued, had been played out over the past decade in the increasingly rancorous debates that were splitting the United States apart and had been seen particularly in Kansas, where Americans were killing each other over an inability to compromise. He said Canadians wanted a strong and British-style government and no part of the failing republic. “I have no fear,” he said, “that the people of Upper Canada would ever desire to become the fag end of the neighbour republic.”
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He concluded with a grand vision: “I do look forward with high hopes to the day when these northern countries shall stand out among the nations of the world as one great confederation!”
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The thunderous applause marked Reform Party unity and a hard-won triumph for Brown.

The Cartier-Macdonald administration had allowed the idea of Confederation to wither, but Brown had resuscitated it. Two months later, Conservative finance minister Alexander Galt returned to London to
repeat his request for Britain’s support to begin Confederation negotiations. Lytton again said no. However, after discussions with his cabinet colleagues, Lytton told Galt that the official position of the British government had moved slightly, in that it would not promote Confederation but would no longer oppose it if there was an overwhelming desire on the part of Canadians to bring it about.
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In February 1860, George Brown took the train to Quebec City, ready to kick-start the Confederation debate. Governor General Head read a rather flaccid speech from the throne that ignored the issue altogether. The Conservative government had little to offer as it struggled to hold the confidence of the House in the face of a belligerent opposition and divisive forces within its own caucus.
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As the first opposition speaker responding to the speech from the throne, Brown announced his intention to move two resolutions based on the Reform party’s November convention agreements. His short speech was met by partisan laughter and hoots of derision from government benches, which included Premier Cartier, Galt and Macdonald.

On April 30, in a four-hour speech, Brown was finally able to present his resolutions to the House. The debate lasted several days. On May 7, 1860, a motion expressing the legislature’s desire to end the Canada East–Canada West union was defeated 66 to 27. A second motion, promoting the idea of a new federation, lost 74 to 32. With many of its members supporting the government on both resolutions, Brown’s party crumbled around him.

Confederation had lost again. The previous two years had seen Brown humiliated by what Macdonald repeatedly called his two-day “ephemeral government,” and then by the scuttling of Confederation and the splintering of his party. His personal life mirrored his political difficulties for, while the
Globe
remained strong, he had seen his many other business ventures suffer in the devastating 1857–59 recession. On top of everything, his health began to falter.

Brown was bedridden over the winter of 1860 and missed the entire 1861 session. In the June 1861 election, he lost his seat and with it the
Reform party leadership. He turned his focus to the
Globe
and other business interests, with special attention to his growing Lambton County landholdings near Sarnia. Like the government and his party, Brown abandoned Confederation as an impossible ideal. He offered his still-influential public voice in opposition to Macdonald and his Conservatives and the power of railway interests. He also upheld Northern views in the arguments that were leading to war in America. His health continued to suffer as his days of public service seemed behind him. Brown did not realize in the fall of 1861 that events south of the border were already beginning to do for Confederation what he and Galt could not.

The Civil War began in April 1861. By December’s
Trent
crisis, even sceptical Canadians and Maritimers realized that the war involved and threatened them. Their political leaders, however, recognized their inability to act quickly or decisively in the face of those threats. Palmerston had become Britain’s prime minister again in 1859, and this time with Little Englanders such as William Gladstone at his cabinet table.

In May 1862, in reaction to American threats and British encouragement, the Cartier-Macdonald government introduced the Militia Bill. It was intended to raise fifty thousand men and augment Canadian defence capability with fortifications and arms. The Reform opposition had attacked its enormous expense. The bill, after all, represented about 10 percent of the government’s annual budget. The government could not say if the shocking cost would necessitate increased taxation. In fact, it could not even be specific about how the money would be spent. Many who represented French ridings shouted the bill down for its plan to conscript recruits if there were insufficient volunteers. The government’s faltering efforts to pass the bill were not helped by the fact that Macdonald chose the middle of the debate to fall into a week-long drinking binge.

The Militia Bill was defeated with a vote of 61 to 54. Fifteen Conservative members had defected, and with them gone, the
Cartier-Macdonald coalition had dissolved. The party that had held power since 1854 by managing shifting loyalties and clever political manoeuvring was forced to resign. Sandfield Macdonald, who had assumed the leadership of the Reform party after Brown’s defeat in 1861, formed a government with his Canada East lieutenant, Louis-Victor Sicotte. Sandfield Macdonald was opposed to Confederation. Far from a visionary leader, he was a manager and technocrat of average skill who filled his cabinet with equally uninspired and uninspiring men. Governor General Monck recognized the limitations of the new administration and in a dispatch to London called it “a wretched lot … incapable of rising above the level of a parish politician.”
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