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Authors: Jeremy Scahill
Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army (46 page)
BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
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Before Helvenston, Teague, Zovko, and Batalona were sent into Fallujah, the omission of the word “armored” was brought to the attention of Blackwater management by Helvenston’s friend John Potter, who was supervising the ESS contract, according to the lawsuit. Potter “insisted that the sub-contract include armored vehicles, not only to comply with the primary contract, but more importantly to protect the security contractors who would be working in the area. However, obtaining armored vehicles would not only be an expense to Blackwater, but would also cause a delay in commencing operations. Thus, on March 24, 2004, Blackwater fired Potter as Program Manager and replaced him with another Blackwater employee, Justin McQuown,”
76
the man Scott Helvenston identified as “Shrek,” with whom he had allegedly clashed in both North Carolina and Kuwait.
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the man Scott Helvenston identified as “Shrek,” with whom he had allegedly clashed in both North Carolina and Kuwait.
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The suit alleged that there were six guards available for the Fallujah mission but that Blackwater managers ordered only the four to be sent “in direct violation of all of Blackwater’s policies and agreements.”
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The other two contractors were allegedly kept behind at Blackwater’s Baghdad facility to perform clerical duties.
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A Blackwater official later boasted that the company saved two lives by not sending all six men, the suit alleged .
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The other two contractors were allegedly kept behind at Blackwater’s Baghdad facility to perform clerical duties.
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A Blackwater official later boasted that the company saved two lives by not sending all six men, the suit alleged .
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Blackwater’s Andrew Howell later said, “The vehicle that they went out in that day was believed appropriate based on the mission by everyone involved or . . . I don’t believe that [the mission] would have been carried out at that point.” Regarding the allegation that there should have been six men on the mission instead of four, Howell said, “The mission they were on that day, at that point in time, given the threat as it was known on the ground in Iraq, the norm was not to have the third person.”
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But a Regency official later told Congressional investigators that “although these vehicles included an armor plate behind the back seat, that level of protection was below the armor protection kit called for by the contract” between the companies.
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But a Regency official later told Congressional investigators that “although these vehicles included an armor plate behind the back seat, that level of protection was below the armor protection kit called for by the contract” between the companies.
On March 30, 2004, the day before the Fallujah ambush, Tom Powell, Blackwater’s Baghdad operations manager, sent an e-mail to Blackwater management with the subject line “Ground Truth.” Powell wrote: “I need new vehicles. I need new COMs, I need ammo, I need Glocks and M4s. All the client body armor you got, guys are in the field with borrowed stuff and in harm’s way. I’ve requested hard cars [armored vehicles] from the beginning and, from my understanding, an order is still pending.”
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The e-mail concluded, “Ground truth is appalling.”
Another Blackwater team sent out that day faced a similar situation to that of Helvenston and his comrades—short-staffed, under-armed, and lacking adequate preparation time—and that group likewise protested these conditions to company managers. After allegedly being threatened by Blackwater officials with dismissal, the men went on their mission and managed to survive.
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One of those men later said: “Why did we all want to kill [the Blackwater operations manager]? He had sent us on this f**ked mission and over our protest. We weren’t sighted in, we had no maps, we had not enough sleep, he was taking 2 of our guys cutting off ou[r] field of fire. As we went over these things we [k]new that the other team had the same complaints. They too had their people cut. . . . Why were they sent into the hottest zone in Iraq in unarmored, under powered vehicles to protect a truck? They had no way to protect their flanks because they only had four guys.”
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One of those men later said: “Why did we all want to kill [the Blackwater operations manager]? He had sent us on this f**ked mission and over our protest. We weren’t sighted in, we had no maps, we had not enough sleep, he was taking 2 of our guys cutting off ou[r] field of fire. As we went over these things we [k]new that the other team had the same complaints. They too had their people cut. . . . Why were they sent into the hottest zone in Iraq in unarmored, under powered vehicles to protect a truck? They had no way to protect their flanks because they only had four guys.”
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The lawsuit also alleged that the men were not provided with a detailed map of the Fallujah area. A Blackwater official told Helvenston “it was too late for maps and to just do his job with what he had,” the suit alleged. “The team had no knowledge of where they were going, no maps to review, and had nothing to guide them to their destination.”
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According to Callahan, there was a safer alternative route that went around the city, which the men were unaware of because of Blackwater’s alleged failure to conduct a “risk assessment” before the trip, as mandated by the contract. The suit alleged that the four men should have had a chance to gather intelligence and familiarize themselves with the dangerous routes they would be traveling. Blackwater’s internal report, which Waxman was finally able to obtain, acknowledged that the Fallujah team had “no time to perform proper mission planning” and was sent out “without proper maps of the city.”
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This was not done, attorney Miles alleged, “so as to pad Blackwater’s bottom line” and to impress ESS with Blackwater’s efficiency in order to win more contracts.
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The suit also charged that Blackwater “intentionally refused to allow the Blackwater security contractors to conduct” ride-alongs with the teams they were replacing from Control Risks Group. In the CRG report on the incident, the company’s project manager wrote that Blackwater “did not use the opportunity to learn from the experience gained by CRG on this operation, this leading to inadequate preparation for taking on this task, unfortunately the outcome was the loss of four lives. . . . I believe that this incident could have been avoided or at least the risk minimised
[sic]
.”
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The suit contended that Blackwater “fabricated critical documents” and “created” a pre-trip risk assessment “after this deadly ambush occurred” to “cover-up this incident.”
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The day after the ambush, Erik Prince had directed his Baghdad managers “to perform an immediate internal audit and to keep the information close.”
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When that report finally made it to Waxman, it revealed that some Blackwater employees described the company’s Baghdad office as “flat out a sloppy . . . operation” and a “ship about to sink.” One Blackwater operative said, “Some of these lazy f**ks care about one thing, money.”
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85
According to Callahan, there was a safer alternative route that went around the city, which the men were unaware of because of Blackwater’s alleged failure to conduct a “risk assessment” before the trip, as mandated by the contract. The suit alleged that the four men should have had a chance to gather intelligence and familiarize themselves with the dangerous routes they would be traveling. Blackwater’s internal report, which Waxman was finally able to obtain, acknowledged that the Fallujah team had “no time to perform proper mission planning” and was sent out “without proper maps of the city.”
86
This was not done, attorney Miles alleged, “so as to pad Blackwater’s bottom line” and to impress ESS with Blackwater’s efficiency in order to win more contracts.
87
The suit also charged that Blackwater “intentionally refused to allow the Blackwater security contractors to conduct” ride-alongs with the teams they were replacing from Control Risks Group. In the CRG report on the incident, the company’s project manager wrote that Blackwater “did not use the opportunity to learn from the experience gained by CRG on this operation, this leading to inadequate preparation for taking on this task, unfortunately the outcome was the loss of four lives. . . . I believe that this incident could have been avoided or at least the risk minimised
[sic]
.”
88
The suit contended that Blackwater “fabricated critical documents” and “created” a pre-trip risk assessment “after this deadly ambush occurred” to “cover-up this incident.”
89
The day after the ambush, Erik Prince had directed his Baghdad managers “to perform an immediate internal audit and to keep the information close.”
90
When that report finally made it to Waxman, it revealed that some Blackwater employees described the company’s Baghdad office as “flat out a sloppy . . . operation” and a “ship about to sink.” One Blackwater operative said, “Some of these lazy f**ks care about one thing, money.”
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After these and other statements were revealed by Waxman’s committee, Blackwater issued its own report. “Stronger weapons, armored vehicles, ammunition, or maps would not have saved these Americans’ lives,” Blackwater declared. “[T]his event was a tragedy—for which only the terrorists are to blame.”
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The report repeated the discredited allegations about Iraqi police involvement in the ambush, said the four men had made the decision to proceed on the mission that day, and asserted, “Even if Blackwater had placed six men on the mission, the result would likely have been the same.”
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The report repeated the discredited allegations about Iraqi police involvement in the ambush, said the four men had made the decision to proceed on the mission that day, and asserted, “Even if Blackwater had placed six men on the mission, the result would likely have been the same.”
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Attorney Dan Callahan said that if Blackwater had done in the United States what it is alleged to have done in Iraq, “There would be criminal charges against them.” Blackwater refused to comment on the case, but company vice president Chris Taylor said in July 2006, “We don’t cut corners. We try to prepare our people the best we can for the environment in which they’re going to find themselves.”
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Justin McQuown’s lawyer, William Crenshaw, alleged that there are “numerous serious factual errors” in the lawsuit, asserting that McQuown lacked “involvement in the planning or implementation of that mission.” In an e-mail, Crenshaw wrote: “Let there be no mistake that the murders of the Blackwater team members in Fallujah were tragic. On behalf of Mr. McQuown, we extend our sincerest sympathies to the families of the deceased. It is regrettable and inaccurate to suggest that Mr. McQuown contributed in any way to this terrible tragedy.”
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Justin McQuown’s lawyer, William Crenshaw, alleged that there are “numerous serious factual errors” in the lawsuit, asserting that McQuown lacked “involvement in the planning or implementation of that mission.” In an e-mail, Crenshaw wrote: “Let there be no mistake that the murders of the Blackwater team members in Fallujah were tragic. On behalf of Mr. McQuown, we extend our sincerest sympathies to the families of the deceased. It is regrettable and inaccurate to suggest that Mr. McQuown contributed in any way to this terrible tragedy.”
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In one of its few public statements on the suit, Blackwater spokesperson Chris Bertelli said, “Our thoughts and prayers were with them and their families then and are with them now. . . . Blackwater hopes that the honor and dignity of our fallen comrades are not diminished by the use of the legal process.”
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Katy Helvenston-Wettengel called that “total BS in my opinion,” and said that the families decided to sue only after being stonewalled, misled, and lied to by the company. “Blackwater seems to understand money. That’s the only thing they understand,” she said. “They have no values, they have no morals. They’re whores. They’re the whores of war.”
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Katy Helvenston-Wettengel called that “total BS in my opinion,” and said that the families decided to sue only after being stonewalled, misled, and lied to by the company. “Blackwater seems to understand money. That’s the only thing they understand,” she said. “They have no values, they have no morals. They’re whores. They’re the whores of war.”
After its filing in January 2005, the case moved slowly through the legal system and sparked various battles over jurisdiction. From the start, Blackwater was represented by some of the most influential and well-connected lawyers and firms in the United States. Its original lawyer on the Fallujah case was Fred Fielding, President Reagan’s former counsel (among Fielding’s assistants in that post was future Chief Justice John Roberts). Fielding had also served as a top lawyer under President Nixon and was a member of the 9/11 Commission. In an indication of how deep Fielding’s connections ran, in early 2007 President Bush named him as his White House counsel, replacing Harriet Miers. Blackwater has also been represented in the case by Greenberg Traurig, the influential D.C. law firm that once employed disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff. The lawyers for the families charged that after the suit was filed, Blackwater attempted to stonewall the process.
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While some of that may have been legitimate defense tactics, the lawyers alleged that Blackwater prevented court-ordered depositions from taking place, including taking steps to prevent a key witness from testifying: John Potter, the man who allegedly blew the whistle on the removal of the word “armored” from the subcontract, whom the suit alleged was subsequently removed from his position.
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While some of that may have been legitimate defense tactics, the lawyers alleged that Blackwater prevented court-ordered depositions from taking place, including taking steps to prevent a key witness from testifying: John Potter, the man who allegedly blew the whistle on the removal of the word “armored” from the subcontract, whom the suit alleged was subsequently removed from his position.
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Attorney Marc Miles said that shortly after the suit was filed, he asked the court in North Carolina for an expedited order to depose John Potter. The deposition was set for January 28, 2005, and Miles was to fly to Alaska, where he said the Potters were living. But three days before the deposition, Miles alleged, “Blackwater hired Potter up, flew him to Washington, where it’s my understanding he met with Blackwater representatives and their lawyers. [Blackwater] then flew him to Jordan for ultimate deployment in the Middle East.” Miles charged that Blackwater “concealed a material witness by hiring him and sending him out of the country.” Miles said Blackwater subsequently attempted to have Potter’s deposition order dissolved, but a federal court said no. In testimony before Congress in June 2006, Blackwater’s Chris Taylor said, “I don’t believe John Potter is in our employ right now.”
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The Potter saga took another twist in November 2006 when Miles discovered Potter was back in the United States. After reaching Potter on the phone in his hometown in Alaska, Miles filed papers with the court seeking once again to depose him, sparking a rapid and forceful response from Blackwater. In its filing opposing the deposition, Blackwater argued that the “case involves issues of national security and classified information involving the United States military operations in Iraq” and that “any testimony [Potter] would give would necessarily involve the disclosure of classified information.”
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Miles and his colleagues responded that Blackwater’s filing “reads like a good spy novel” with “claims of ‘classified’ information, state secrets and threats to national security.”
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In reality, they argued, the “Blackwater contractors were not acting as covert operatives for the CIA, but instead were working under a contract with a foreign hotel company to guard kitchen equipment.” National security and espionage, they asserted, “have nothing to do with this case.” In an indication of the significance of the lawsuit and, more significant, Blackwater’s pull with the government, the U.S. Attorney General’s office filed an opposition to the deposition of Potter, asking that—at a minimum—it be delayed so the government could review Potter’s alleged possession of classified information or documents. The U.S. attorney cited a need to “protect the National Security interests of the United States.”
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The U.S. Army’s chief litigator also filed a sworn declaration to “protect from improper disclosure any sensitive and properly classified information to which Mr. Potter may have been given access as a Government contractor.”
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What was remarkable was how quickly Blackwater was able to mobilize the government and military to go to bat for it—the day after Christmas—and help stop, at least for the moment, the deposition of a potentially crucial witness from going ahead.
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Miles and his colleagues responded that Blackwater’s filing “reads like a good spy novel” with “claims of ‘classified’ information, state secrets and threats to national security.”
101
In reality, they argued, the “Blackwater contractors were not acting as covert operatives for the CIA, but instead were working under a contract with a foreign hotel company to guard kitchen equipment.” National security and espionage, they asserted, “have nothing to do with this case.” In an indication of the significance of the lawsuit and, more significant, Blackwater’s pull with the government, the U.S. Attorney General’s office filed an opposition to the deposition of Potter, asking that—at a minimum—it be delayed so the government could review Potter’s alleged possession of classified information or documents. The U.S. attorney cited a need to “protect the National Security interests of the United States.”
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The U.S. Army’s chief litigator also filed a sworn declaration to “protect from improper disclosure any sensitive and properly classified information to which Mr. Potter may have been given access as a Government contractor.”
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What was remarkable was how quickly Blackwater was able to mobilize the government and military to go to bat for it—the day after Christmas—and help stop, at least for the moment, the deposition of a potentially crucial witness from going ahead.
The families have all maintained that their interest in suing Blackwater was not money but accountability. “There’s not enough money in the world that can pay for my Jerry. There’s not enough money that anyone can give me,” said Danica Zovko. “If they made some rules and if they were obligated and if they treated those lives of those people the same way that I have to treat metal on the cars when I work for the city of Cleveland. It seems that there’s more laws and rules made about how to fix a car than there is about a life. There’s no amount of money that can do anything. It doesn’t exist to pay for the death of my son. They’re very, very foolish if they think that’s an answer.”
In the months after the suit was filed, Blackwater did not offer a rebuttal to the specific allegations made by the families, though the company denied in general that they were valid. Instead, Blackwater has argued that what is at stake in this case is nothing less than the ability of the President of the United States to conduct foreign policy as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The company’s lawyers argued that Blackwater’s private soldiers have been recognized by the Pentagon as an essential part of the U.S. “Total Force,” constituting the nation’s “warfighting capability and capacity . . . in thousands of locations around the world, performing a vast array of duties to accomplish critical missions”
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—and allowing Blackwater to be sued for deaths in the war zone would be to attack the sovereignty of the Commander in Chief. “[T]he constitutional separation of powers . . . preclude[s] judicial intrusion into the manner in which the contractor component of the American military deployment in Iraq is trained, armed, and, deployed” by the President, Blackwater argued in one of its court filings.
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This argument, if successful, could have the added benefit of preemptively immunizing Blackwater from any liability when deploying its forces in U.S. war zones.
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—and allowing Blackwater to be sued for deaths in the war zone would be to attack the sovereignty of the Commander in Chief. “[T]he constitutional separation of powers . . . preclude[s] judicial intrusion into the manner in which the contractor component of the American military deployment in Iraq is trained, armed, and, deployed” by the President, Blackwater argued in one of its court filings.
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This argument, if successful, could have the added benefit of preemptively immunizing Blackwater from any liability when deploying its forces in U.S. war zones.
BOOK: Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army
7.22Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
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