Black May (30 page)

The better fit as
Pink’s
target is U-358 (Manke), the slayer of
Bristol City
and
Wentworth.
Analysis of the KTBs of the participating boats shows that U-358 was in the approximate same position as
Pink
, astern of ONS.5 (U-358 at 1000: 54°52'N, 43°3o’
W;
Pink
at 0954: 54°56'N, 43°44'W), and that over a period of one hour and a half she experienced a prolonged pounding from “69 well-placed depth charges.”
Pink,
in fact, dropped forty-three D/Cs and twenty-four Hedgehog rockets; the latter may have sounded like D/Cs when they exploded on contact with the surface, but they would have gone off with near simultaneity. In his description of the event, Manke was not certain about the number of escorts present or about the category of his pursuer, mistaking
Pink
for a destroyer, but he correctly cited a separate “small convoy”:

Afterwards, Manke surveyed the damage: diving cells Nos. 1 and 5 were out of service; the tower hatch leaked badly; there were numerous electrical breakdowns; four battery cells were cracked; there was leakage in the cooling jacket of the outer exhaust cutout; torpedo Tube 5 was inoperable for underwater launches; the stern hydroplanes could not be moved beyond 10 degrees; and the boat produced loud noises throughout the interior. After he surfaced to make what repairs he could, Manke discovered that his diesels could not produce more than 10 knots speed. He signaled a report on his condition to BdU, and at 1731 the next day he received a response:
RETURN DIRECTLY TO BASE WITHOUT REPLENISHING.
²⁸

It was not a kill. But it was as good as a kill. In judging U-358 to have been the U-boat involved, it is useful to note both that no other B7 or Support Group escort made a sustained attack during the time period when
Pink
was attacking, and that no other U-boat reported being attacked during the one hour and thirty minutes when U-358 was absorbing her punishment.
²⁹

For Atkinson, elation quickly turned to ashes: “At 1453, my worst fears materialized.” About three miles astern of his small convoy, augmented since noon by the arrival of a fifth straggler, S.S.
Yearby,
the corvette Captain saw a “huge column of smoke” rising from the port wing ship,
West Madaket,
which immediately began to settle by the stern. Only one ship was sunk, but it was misfortune enough. The “another U-boat” in Atkinson’s conundrum was U
—584,
commanded by Kptlt. Joachim Deecke. This Type VIIC boat was a veteran of several North Atlantic patrols; had sunk a Soviet submarine (M-175) on 10 January 1942; and on 17 June (GST) of the same year had deposited four German saboteurs (all of whom were captured and executed) on the beach at Ponte Vedra, Florida. Now U
-384
was submerged at 1400 on 5 May in qu AJ 5695 (5447'N, 44°12'W):

By this point the reader may have come to suspect that U-boat Commanders, as a species, were uncommonly given to observation errors, if not to self-deception. With claims of two sinkings instead of one, Deecke was the latest in a line that included Junker (U-332), who claimed two hits (that subsequently were credited him by BdU) when he had made none; Hasenschar (U
-628),
who made four claims, including a “vaporized” corvette, but had only one actual hit, plus an artillery coup-de-grace to
Harbury
; and Looks (U—
264),
with three claims and two actuals. Further, as we have seen, there have been reporting errors in ship types, in times required for vessels to sink, and in the quantity of tonnage destroyed.

Endemic to U-boat claims throughout the war were euphoric tonnage figures, as in Manke’s (U-358) claim of 8,000 tons for the 2,864-GRT
Bristol City.
Although Dönitz had urged his Commanders to “estimate cautiously and accurately—we are an honest firm!", they nonetheless sometimes inflated their figures either through mistaken observation, or misinterpretation of an end-of-run detonation for a
Treffer
(hit), or old-fashioned wishful thinking.
³¹
Yet the reader would want to know that all these same defects characterized reporting by U.S. Navy submarine skippers in the Pacific war being conducted at the same time against Japan. A postwar analysis by the U.S. Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) drastically reduced the number of sinkings and tonnage sunk by U.S. submarines from 4,000 enemy ships and 10 million tons claimed to 1,314 ships and 5.3 million tons actually sunk. In one individual example, the leading U.S. submarine
ace of the war, Richard H. O’Kane, had his numbers reduced from thirty-one ships and 227,800 tons claimed to twenty-four ships and 93,824 tons actual.
³²

There was only one ship torpedoed by Deecke on 5 May 1943, and it was
West Madaket.
A sudden jar was felt by those on board the vessel, and the Officer of the Watch and several crew members saw a large geyser of water rise on the port quarter. The torpedo must have penetrated a good distance into the hull, survivors said, because a
5-by-2½-
foot hole was torn in the starboard side. Almost at once the stern sagged. Inspection of the deck, where there was a large crack in the plating amidships, convinced the ship’s Master, Captain H. Schroeder, that the freighter’s back was broken, and he ordered Abandon Ship. The entire crew of sixty-one, including twenty-two D.E.M.S. gunners, who never saw a target, made it into boats safely. In the interim, the other four merchantmen turned to starboard and performed what Atkinson called “some remarkable and spectacular zigzags.”

When
Pink
caught up to
West Madaket
, he carried out an Observant, dropping D/Cs intermittently to keep the U-boat down. These were the “warning charges” heard by
U-584.
The lifeboats were widely scattered and Atkinson endeavored to muster them so that he could make a pickup of survivors while hove-to in the shortest possible time, knowing full well that
Pink
would make an inviting target during the operation. When he approached the boats and found them filled with as much luggage as humanity, he ordered the men out and the luggage left. Then he told the Oerlikon crews to use the boats and luggage for practice fire. Finally, by 1600, without hindrance, he had everyone on board, and could turn his attention to the canted hulk of
West Madaket.

Although her Confidential Books were safely overboard in a metal container, Atkinson decided to assist the broken merchantman to sink, which he accomplished by firing down her side two D/Cs set to 50 feet from his starboard throwers. “The result was devastating,” he stated four days later. “She split as if cleaved by an ax amidships, sinking in two separate pieces and turning turtle as she sank.” (To the writer he said, dryly, “That U-boat didn’t sink
West Madaket.
I sank her.”) Atkinson was surprised that she left no trace of her passing despite the fact that her
bunkers contained 540 tons of oil. Now
Pink
set course to catch up with her remaining four charges while her crew busied themselves making room on the tiny corvette for threescore American passengers.
³³

During the daylight hours of 5 May, two functioning merchantmen,
Dolius
and
West Madaket
, were torpedoed. But in exchange, the Germans took a beating of their own.
Sunflower
sank U-638 (Staudinger), and
Pink
mauled
U-35
8
(Manke), which was compelled to move off for return passage. On the same day, in a reprise of the
U-439/U-639
collision on 4 May, U-600 (Kptlt. Bernhard Zurmühlen) slammed into U
—406
(Kptlt. Horst Dieterichs) at 0905 in qu CG 1746, off the coast of Spain, necessitating the return of both boats, which, like U
-439
and U
-639,
had occupied adjacent stations in Group
Drossel.
The accident took place with the two boats on the surface in good visibility
(gute Sicht),
seas Force 3–4 with medium swell. Unaccountably,
U-600
came into view on U-406's port side and took a collision course toward the latter boat, which frantically flashed a recognition signal
(Erkennungssignal)
and turned hard-a-starboard, both engines emergency full (
äußerste Kraft voraus!).
Without deviating, the bow of U-600 rammed into U-406's hull just forward of the port diving tank. Both boats were compelled by the damages inflicted to make a
Rückmarsch,
U
—600
to La Pallice, U-406 to St.-Nazaire.
³⁴

The first U-boat kill by a surface escort had been posted, and the list of damaged and retreating U-boats was lengthening. So, too, was the list of sunk merchantmen, of course, but the ONS.5 hemorrhaging was about to stop, following one last, and spectacular, U-boat success. Three weeks into her second North Atlantic
Feindfahrt,
the Type VIIC
U-266
launched four torpedoes in rapid succession at 1950 on the 5th. We have no details of her attack because the boat, with her documents, was destroyed later in the month. A KTB reconstructed in Berlin based on F.T.s received cites this signal from boat commander Kptlt. Rolf von Jessen:

Three ships were hit in this action: British steamers
Selvistan
and
Gharinda,
followed by the Norwegian steamer
Bonde,
at 1,750 GRT the smallest ship in the convoy. What Sherwood called “reliable survivors” from the British vessels reported that the torpedoes were seen approaching from port. Since the three victims were positioned toward the starboard side of the convoy, indications were that
U—266
had penetrated inside the columns. That
Bonde
was two columns farther toward the convoy’s center, and that her survivors sighted and engaged a periscope on the starboard beam, persuaded Sherwood that the U-boat torpedoed the British vessels with his bow tubes and the Norwegian with his stern.

First hit was the 5,136-GRT
Selvistan
, owned by the Hindustan Steamship Company of Newcastle, whose First Officer, Mr. C. D. Head, was on the bridge at the time. To port side he sighted something moving near the surface that he took to be a porpoise, since it was “spouting water.” It crossed in front of
Argon’s
bow in the adjoining column and then, halfway to
Selvistan
, it leaped above the surface, revealing itself to be a torpedo. Head described it as “silvery grey,” and thought that because of its slow speed, perhaps 10 to 12 knots, it was nearing the end of its run (G7a torpedoes normally ran at 40 knots, G7es at 30). Though he rang Full Speed Ahead and put the helm hard to port, the ship lacked sufficient speed to swing clear and the torpedo impacted the port side with a dull explosion in No. 5 hold, showing no flash, but sending hatch, beams, and ballast skyward. No more than five seconds later, a second, unseen torpedo punctured the No. 4 hold with exactly the same effects and result.

Quickly, the steamer settled by the stern, and in a matter of only two minutes submerged from view. In that fractional amount of time it was not possible to lower either of the two main lifeboats, but the Master and crew did manage to launch two small bridge boats and the forward starboard raft, on which, or clinging to which, they floated off. Five crewmen were declared missing and one other man, a D.E.M.S. gunner, had a grave head wound from which he would die before rescue. First Officer Head stated later that the Indian firemen, who were the only men to share his boat, “were simply no use at all; they just sat
in the boat, praying to Allah to save them, but not attempting to do anything to save themselves.” Fortunately, after three-quarters of an hour, the forty men who survived were lifted on board the frigate
Tay.
Since
Tay
s asdic was inoperable, Sherwood had assigned his own vessel to the rescue mission while directing
Offa
and
Oribi
to carry out Observant around the sinking position.

Second to be hit by
U-266
was the 5,306-GRT
Gharinda,
owned by the British India Steam Navigation Company of Glasgow. This freighter, with a large crew of ninety-two, including six Navy and four Army gunners, had straggled on 3 May, owing to heavy weather, and had not regained contact with the convoy until 1100 on the 4th. “About two minutes” after
Selvistan
was torpedoed,
Gharinda
s Master, Captain R. Stone, estimated, this second British vessel was struck by a torpedo in No. 1 hold on her port side. There was a flash, a very loud explosion, and a towering column of water that rained down on the bridge, carrying with it the hatches of No. 1 hold. The force of the explosion twisted both derricks and blew them over to starboard. Since the ship began to settle rapidly by the head, Stone threw overboard the Confidential Books and rang Abandon Ship. Five of the six lifeboats were successfully lowered except that, owing to a crewman’s error, one of the five nose-dived into the sea and swamped.