Read Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, The Online
Authors: Bill James
Tags: #SPORTS &, #RECREATION/Baseball/History
How is this possible? How can you lead the league in double plays every year, without a regular shortstop or a regular second baseman? A few points:
1) Stengel did not use control pitchers. Unlike most successful managers, Stengel was perfectly willing to let a pitcher go out there and walk 150 batters a year. The Yankees had more opposition runners on base than one would assume, given the quality of the team.
2) The Yankees had lots of left-handed pitching. Left-handed pitchers force the opposition to use right-handed hitters, which means a few more double plays.
3) Stengel stressed that his middle infielders should cheat toward second in double play situations. I believe, although I can’t prove it, that he probably stressed this more than almost any other manager.
4) He used ground ball pitchers. His pitching coach, Jim Turner, was a ground ball pitcher himself.
While the Yankee defense turned a great many double plays, the Yankee hitters grounded into very few. Yankee hitters were last in the league in grounding into double plays in 1950, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1958, 1959, and 1960. In the twelve years that Stengel managed the Yankees, the Yankees turned 2,233 double plays, while grounding into only 1,342. Even allowing that not all double plays are ground ball double plays, the Yankees in Stengel’s years had an advantage of more than 40 double plays per season over their opponents—despite the fact that the Yankees, of course, always had more men on base than did the opposition.
How did Stengel’s teams
avoid
grounding into double plays? His teams were not slow, to begin with; they didn’t steal bases, but guys like Mantle, Bauer, Andy Carey, and Gil McDougald ran quite well.
He had many left-handed hitters, of course, and left-handed batters ground into double plays about 10% less often than right-handed hitters.
I suspect that the biggest part of this is simply that Stengel was
aware
of the double play, thought about it, and tried to make it work for him. I believe, although I can’t prove it, that Stengel probably used the hit and run more often than any manager of the 1990s, and that he used it most often to avoid the double play.
In his autobiography,
Casey at the Bat
, with Harry Paxton, Stengel wrote about double plays, in passing, many times. Writing about his Boston team, he said that “we had some pitchers that could keep the ball low—Jim Turner, Lou Fette, Danny MacFayden, Milt Shoffner.”
“Some managers have one special way they want double plays to be made,” wrote Stengel (through Paxton). “My system was, make it any way you can. But be sure you find some way to make it, or I can’t play you. I told the infielders that, and had my coaches telling them, and it ended up that we generally had good double-play men on the Yankees, except maybe in 1959.” The 1959 Yankees fell to third in the league in double plays.
“In the middle of your order,” he wrote later, “you should never have two slow-footed, right-handed sluggers batting one after the other, because the double plays will murder you.” Stengel’s
awareness
of the double play, and his ability to get an advantage in this area, was a critical part of the success of his 1950s teams.
How Did He Change the Game?
His largest effect on strategy was his role in resurrecting platooning.
Stengel became such a giant character that you can’t really talk about him in the past. He became an enduring part of the game.
Harry Craft Harry Craft had a slow, languid walk, rolling gently from side to front, that fit perfectly with his mesmerizing Mississippi drawl. He had a habit of swallowing about three times before he said anything, the combination of which tended to reduce the number of questions in a press interview by roughly 80%. He was slow to anger, slow to criticize, careful to say nothing that he might come to regret. Craft played baseball and football at Mississippi College in Jackson. He was a better football player than baseball player, but baseball got the best athletes at that time, and Craft signed with the Cincinnati Reds. Bill McKechnie brought him to the majors in 1938, and as a rookie he was probably the best all-around center fielder in the National League. That was his best season. By 1942 he was a player/ coach for Billy Meyer at Kansas City, the American Association team in the Yankee system. Craft always said that Meyer was the best manager he ever knew. His own chance to manage came at Independence in the Kansas-Oklahoma-Missouri League in 1949, still in the Yankee system. He had a seventeen-year-old Oklahoma kid named Mantle on his roster that summer, beginning his own minor league career, which made Craft’s assignment easier. He moved up to Joplin the next year, and took Mickey with him. Mickey hit .383 and drove in 136 runs. This got Mantle to the majors quicker than it did Craft, but Craft arrived in 1957, in Kansas City. Craft managed Kansas City from 1957–1959, and Houston from 1962 to 1964. His record is interesting because, on a simple level, it looks so awful—360 wins, 485 losses, a .426 winning percentage. His best full season was 1958, when he went 73–81 with the A’s. But compared to the expectations of his teams, Craft’s record is actually quite good, scoring at +12. The A’s had lost 102 games in 1956, and were headed for another 100-loss season in August 1957, when Craft was hired. They played .460 ball the rest of that season, averting 100 losses, and then outperformed expectations by 10 games in 1958; the A’s 73–81 record that season was by far their best in their thirteen seasons in Kansas City. His other assignment was with an expansion team. |
HANDLING THE PITCHING STAFF
Did He Like Power Pitchers, or Did He Prefer to Go with the People Who Put the Ball in Play?
Power pitchers. None of Casey Stengel’s teams ever led the league in fewest walks.
Did He Stay with His Starters, or Go to the Bullpen Quickly?
The bullpen. He was the quickest hook in baseball.
Did He Use a Four-Man Rotation?
Never.
Did He Use the Entire Staff, or Did He Try to Get Five or Six People to Do Most of the Work?
You couldn’t even find the top five pitchers on Stengel’s staff. He’d use his number-seven starter to start a World Series game.
How Long Would He Stay with a Starting Pitcher Who Was Struggling?
Only one Stengel team, the 1938 Braves, led the league in complete games. Nine of Stengel’s teams led the league in saves.
Was There Anything Unique About His Handling of His Pitchers?
Again, everything about it is unique. To cite just four things:
1) He had nothing resembling a regular rotation.
2) He would get the starting pitcher out lightning quick if he showed any signs of faltering, unless that pitcher was one of his key men like Vic Raschi or Whitey Ford.
3) He would dump a pitcher who was successful for him last year if he lost confidence in him.
4) He was unusually patient with pitchers who had poor control.
What Was His Strongest Point As a Manager?
In five words, what Stengel did differently from any other manager of his time was:
He used his entire roster
. Casey Stengel did for major league baseball what Dean Smith did for college basketball. This is an overstatement, but Casey Stengel changed baseball in this respect: that before Stengel, the good teams were simply those teams which had the best players. Everybody tended to put their eight best players on the field 150 games a year. That’s not quite true, because there were always injuries, catchers needed a day off, people lost their jobs in midseason, and there was always the odd manager who platooned his left fielders or something. But the idea of giving
good
players one or two days off a week, platooning
good
players, star-quality players, platooning them with other good players, up and down the lineup—that was new with Stengel.
If There Was No Professional Baseball, What Would He Probably Have Done with His Life?
He’d have gone into vaudeville. He’d have been Jimmy Durante.
Luke Appling Luke Appling was a Hall of Fame shortstop and a successful minor league manager, whose failure to get a decent opportunity to manage in the majors is somewhat inexplicable. When Appling retired as a player in 1950, he almost got the job as the White Sox manager, the job that went to Paul Richards. The general manager told him he preferred someone with managerial experience, so Appling went to the minors and was quite good as a minor league manager. He won pennants at Memphis in 1952 and 1953, and in 1952 was named the Minor League manager of the Year by Appling was outspoken about his desire to manage in the majors. He was well liked in baseball, and he was extremely famous. For some reason, the chance never came. He may have been regarded as too nice to manage, plus he was a chatterbox, a personality which may have been seen as unsuitable to the managerial seat. He finally did get to manage the Kansas City As in late 1967, after Alvin Dark was fired, but managing a terrible team for 40 games when you’re sixty years old is not a real opportunity. |
C
ASEY
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TENGEL
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All-Star Team
A
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OPEZ
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All-Star Team
P
AUL
R
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S
All-Star Team
It has been casually asserted by many baseball writers that Casey Stengel’s greatest value to his teams was in attendance, or in publicity which could result in attendance.
Unfortunately for Topping and Weiss, Casey would surface again, with the neophyte New York Mets, and proceed to attract more fans to the ball park than all the stars he left behind.
—Peter Golenbock,
Dynasty
The new Mets could not compete with (the Yankees) for the ticket dollar in New York with talent. They needed an attraction. There was only one attraction, only one man who could handle the press and win the public, Casey Stengel.
—Maury Allen,
You Could Look It Up
How many fans a year was Casey Stengel worth? Let’s say that a team was going to draw a million fans a year without Casey Stengel. How many would they draw with him?
There’s no way of knowing
exactly
, but I thought maybe it wouldn’t hurt to look. The obvious way to look at the issue is to compare the attendance of Stengel’s teams in the years Stengel was the manager with the attendance of the same teams in the years just before and just after Stengel was the manager.
Casey’s first major league team was the Brooklyn Dodgers, whom he managed from 1934 to 1936. In the three years that Stengel was the manager, the Dodgers drew an average of 464,774 fans—in fact, they were near that figure all three years. This figure was 5% above the National League average for the time:
NL Avg | |||
---|---|---|---|
Brooklyn, 1934-1936 | 464,744 | 443,487 | +5% |
Both of these figures were markedly higher in the period just before Stengel was hired, the three years 1931–1933:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
Brooklyn, 1931-1933 | 653,925 | 482,374 | +36% |
Brooklyn, 1934-1936 | 464,744 | 443,487 | +5% |
After Stengel was let go, Dodger attendance went back up:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
Brooklyn, 1931-1933 | 653,925 | 482,374 | +36% |
Under Stengel | 464,744 | 443,487 | +5% |
Brooklyn, 1937-1939 | 700,412 | 567,078 | +24% |
Charts such as this leave out many details, of course, so let’s fill in a little bit. The Dodgers from 1914 to 1931 were managed by Wilbert Robinson, and their attendance was generally very good. In 1930, with a contending team, they drew a million-plus fans. From 1931 to 1933 the depression was settling in, and baseball attendance was declining everywhere. The Dodgers remained a pretty good team in 1931–1932, over .500 both seasons, but fell near to the basement in 1933, the year before they hired Stengel. Their attendance was in a sharp decline before Stengel was hired, and it hit rock-bottom under Stengel. Thus, such comparisons may be unfair to Casey.
By 1938 the depression was easing. In 1939 Leo Durocher took over, the team improved dramatically, and attendance jumped back near the million level. Again, this is not necessarily a fair basis for comparison to Stengel.
Stengel’s second major league job was in Boston, where he managed the Braves for six seasons, 1938–1943. In the three seasons prior to Stengel’s arrival (1935–1937), the Braves averaged 319,559 fans per seasons, which was 35% below the league norm:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
Boston, 1935-1937 | 319,559 | 490,828 | -35% |
This period includes the 1935 season, when the Braves won only 38 games in a full season.
Stengel was hired in 1938. The Braves’ attendance declined by 44,000 in 1938, despite the fact that the performance of the team was essentially the same as in 1937, and despite gains in attendance throughout most of the baseball world. It continued down from there—down another 55,000 in 1939, down another 44,000 in 1940. For the six years that Stengel was in Boston, the Braves averaged 281,510 fans per season:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
Boston, 1935-1937 | 319,559 | 490,828 | -35% |
Boston, 1938-1943 | 281,510 | 550,823 | -49% |
Boston attendance dropped even lower in 1944, the first year post-Stengel, but recovered strongly in 1945 and 1946:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
Boston, 1935-1937 | 319,559 | 490,828 | -35% |
The Stengel Years | 281,510 | 550,823 | -49% |
Boston, 1944-1946 | 517, 514 | 834,487 | -38% |
Of course, there was a tremendous boom in baseball attendance after the war, so it is hardly fair to compare 1946 attendance figures to those from 1942. But on the other hand, that’s why we look at both figures—the team’s attendance, and their attendance compared to league norms. In 1946, Billy Southworth’s first year in Boston, the Braves attendance was 87% of the league norm. In Stengel’s years, it was consistently near 50% of the league norm.
In 1949, of course, Stengel was hired to manage the Yankees. By now the attendance boom had passed its peak, which was 1948.
In the last three years pre-Stengel, the Yankees drew an average of 2,272,783 fans—81% above the league norm:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
New York, 1946-1948 | 2,272,783 | 1,256,933 | +81% |
In 1949 their raw attendance figure was almost exactly the same—2,281,676. This was 70% above the league norm.
In the following years, attendance both for the Yankees and for the American League went into a sharp decline. This decline is usually blamed on television, which came to dominate the nation’s attention for a few years. For the twelve years that Stengel managed the Yankees, the team averaged 1,670,223 fans per season:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
New York, 1946-1948 | 2,272,783 | 1,256,933 | +81% |
New York 1949-1960 | 1,670,223 | 1,069,097 | +56% |
Attendance in New York declined somewhat more rapidly than throughout the rest of baseball. This continued to be true, however, after Stengel left the team:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
New York, 1946-1948 | 2,272,783 | 1,256,933 | +81% |
New York 1949-1960 | 1,670,223 | 1,069,097 | +56% |
New York, 1961-1963 | 1,516,743 | 978,486 | +55% |
The famous ’61 Yankees drew 1.75 million fans, 72% above the American League average, but the team drew poorly in ’62 and ’63, when they were competing for attendance with the new New York Mets.
Which brings us to the final Casey Stengel experience, the Mets from 1962 through 1965, actually the first half of 1965. The Mets attendance started slowly, but exploded into a kind of phenomenon in 1964, when 1.7 million fans turned out to watch the lovable losers. There is, of course, no “before” data in this case:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
New York, 1962-1965 | 1,375,861 | 1,222,617 | +13% |
Attendance continued to increase after Stengel had departed:
Team | Avg Attendance | League Norm | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
New York, 1962-1965 | 1,375,861 | 1,222,617 | +13% |
New York, 1966-1968 | 1,759,947 | 1,316,919 | +34% |
As I’ve said, there are innumerable factors which explain movements in attendance, and we should be cautious in rushing to any conclusions. I’m sure there are other ways you could arrange the data, which might create very different results.
In the case of the Yankees, for example … the relationship between the Yankees attendance and the league norms has flattened out constantly since about 1920. In the early 1920s the Yankees drew twice as many fans as the average American League team; now, they’re about average. Each era, judged by the standards of the previous era, might tend to look flat.
Nonetheless, the data
is
curious. Just looking at the numbers, one would swear that Casey Stengel was working twenty-four hours a day to scare away the customers:
After drawing 922,530 persons to the Polo Grounds the first year, the Mets vaulted over the million mark in attendance, toward two million, and stayed there.
As Branch Rickey diagnosed the situation, the “perfect link” between the ball club and the public was Stengel.
—Joseph Durso,
Casey
It is, in retrospect, not at all apparent that the Mets attendance in 1962 was especially good. The Mets drew 922,350 fans in their first season—fewer than the Seattle Mariners (1.3 million), the Toronto Blue Jays (1.7 million), or the Montreal Expos (1.2 million). They drew fewer than their expansion mates, the Houston Astros (924,456).
Those cities, of course, were new to baseball, and were excited to have a team. The Mets, on the other hand, came into a city accustomed to major league baseball. Like the Kansas City Royals, who drew 902,414 in their first season. In Kansas City.
The Mets attendance edged over the million mark in 1963 (1.08 million), and exploded toward two million in 1964, when
a) Shea Stadium opened, and
b) there was a World’s Fair going on across the street.
At the time, New York sportswriters
thought
that the Mets were drawing huge crowds, and that Casey Stengel was the cause of this. Neither of these perceptions is self-evidently accurate. The crowds
weren’t
all that large, and Casey Stengel probably wasn’t responsible for their being as large as they were. Taking the whole package, the New York Mets in their first four seasons drew fewer fans than the Blue Jays in their first four seasons (1977–1980), and fewer than the Braves in their first four years in Milwaukee (1953–1956)
or
their first four years in Atlanta (1966–1969). Is 5.5 million fans in four seasons a good total, for a New York City expansion team with a new park, or a bad total? I don’t know the answer, but it is at best a debatable proposition.
Could
Casey Stengel in fact have had a negative impact on attendance, as the data seems to demonstrate? Let me throw out an argument, strictly on a for-what-it’s-worth basis. Nobody goes to a ballpark to watch the manager. What does the manager do? He hides in the dugout. Hell, you can’t even see him most of the time. Even when you can see him, you’re not
watching
him. You’re there to watch the players.
It wasn’t the
fans
who loved Casey Stengel, it was the
writers
. The writers loved him because him because he was the greatest day-in, day-out baseball story since Babe Ruth. There was
always
something to say about him.
But if you focus on the slightly bigger picture, how does this change the publicity of the team? Does it result in more newspaper coverage? Is the sports editor going to say, “Oh, Casey Stengel’s in town; we’d better add another reporter to cover the team.” Is the publisher going to say, “Oh, we’ve got Casey Stengel to write about; we’d better add two pages to the sports section.”
Of course not; that’s not the way the world works. What happens is, Casey Stengel gets written about,
rather than the players
.
From the standpoint of the player, this may be a good thing. Many teams, and in particular many New York teams, have allowed the newspaper coverage to become an obstacle to the success of the team. The pressure for immediate success which can be generated by the New York media is enormous and has led directly to midcareer crises for many athletes. Stengel brought all that pressure upon himself.
But from the standpoint of selling tickets, it might not be a good thing, at all. If one buys the proposition that the fans pay to watch the players, not the manager, then it isn’t a long reach to argue that any publicity which flows away from the players and toward the manager will be counterproductive in terms of attendance. The fact is, in any case, that all of Stengel’s teams did poorly at the box office, with the arguable exception of the New York Mets.