Beyond Belief (20 page)

Gallup polls from the period indicate that Americans regarded maintaining neutrality as the “most important” problem facing them.
¹⁰⁸
A politically conservative Congress had been elected, and Roosevelt knew that his policies, foreign and domestic, faced opposition. In light of his political situation, Roosevelt's recall of Wilson was balanced. It went slightly beyond the public's—but not the press's—desire for an emphatic response but did not appear to draw the country into the ever intensifying crisis. The recall struck out at the perpetrators but virtually ignored the victims, and it was precisely because of its restrained and limited
nature that it won press approval. Had Roosevelt chosen to offer concrete aid to the victims, that would have been opposed.

The combined voices of those papers and journals supporting some liberalization of immigration—however limited and strictly policed—could not counter the overwhelming weight of public and press opinion that adamantly opposed any relaxation of quotas. This was to remain a virtual constant in press opinion except for one brief period in the following spring when the ones to be rescued were children.

Since Wilson's recall was considered a sufficient American response and the quota system was treated as virtually immutable, press interest was sparked by proposals for resettlement of Jews in other areas. Frequently mentioned alternatives included British Guiana, Tanganyika, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, and “someplace” in the vast territorial expanse of the British Empire.
Time
let Walter Lippmann, whom it described as America's “most statesmanly Jewish pundit,” speak for it. Lippmann's strong influence on the press of the nation was reflected in the fact that various papers approvingly echoed his views and cited him as their authority.
Time
cited his argument that nothing could be done for the persecuted Jews, except possibly to find them refuge in Africa.
Time's
implication was clear: if Lippmann, the Jew, believed America should not liberalize its quota system, then could
Time
or anyone else, Jew or non-Jew, be faulted for thinking likewise? (After a five-year silence regarding the persecution of the Jews, Lippmann devoted two of his syndicated columns to Europe's “over-population” problem. Without specifically referring to Jews, he contended that Europe had to be “relieved” of a million people each year. It was the surplus population which was the cause of European upheavals.)
¹⁰⁹

The discussion of where refugees should be allowed to settle after
Kristallnacht
prompted interesting role reversals on the part of prominent Americans. Herbert Hoover, the overseer of refugee rescue and aid during World War I, argued that “America cannot open its doors in the face of our own unemployment and suffering. Sanctuary must be found elsewhere.” In striking contrast, Henry Ford, the industrial magnate whose newspaper, the
Dearborn Independent
,
had published the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion
, called for the immediate entry of Jewish refugees into America.
¹¹⁰
Ultimately it was Hoover, not Ford, who correctly reflected public sentiments, sentiments the press consistently reinforced.

Most of the press recognized that the willingness of some European countries to accept a few refugees would “scarcely make a dent in the evacuation program.” Relatively unpopulated areas of the world were cited as offering the most feasible alternative. By suggesting that “colonial” areas be found, the press was able to avoid the question of whether America should admit these souls. The
Springfield Republican
argued that “since the best parts of our globe are already pre-empted, it would be necessary, in the main, to fall back upon ‘marginal' lands, which are available precisely because they are not very desirable.” Although some recognized that trying to settle a highly educated urban population in an area populated primarily by cacti, jungles, and wild animals was an impractical solution, they contended that the situation was so desperate that measures that “heretofore may have seemed visionary” now had to be discussed seriously.
¹¹¹
In general, however, most of the press shied away from discussing the merits of specific areas and simply stressed the need to provide refuge somewhere—other than here. The most frequent suggestion was that Britain, anxious to win support for its rearmament program and foreign policy and responsible for
Kristallnacht
because of its timidity at Munich, should find an isle of refuge in its vast empire.
¹¹²

* * *

The events of 1938 hardened America's feelings about Germany and its program of persecution. As Ambassador Dieckhoff noted shortly before returning to Germany, even those who had been “restrained” were now “violent and bitter.” But no sooner had editorial boards passionately condemned Germany and voiced their horror than they also urged caution and restraint.

Reporters on the scene now were cautioning more strongly than ever against dismissing as rhetoric any Nazi threat against the Jews no matter how extreme. Otto Tolischus warned readers in a front-page
New York Times
story against ignoring the “seriousness” of “lurid” Nazi predictions such as those contained in the official Gestapo paper,
Das Schwarze Korps
, that if the Jews were not evacuated from Germany at once, they would be “starved
into crime” and “exterminate[d] with ‘fire and sword.' ”
¹¹³
Although Tolischus was not predicting the Final Solution, he, along with a few others, did recognize that organized Jewish life in Germany was at an end. Though the editorial boards and policy makers now recognized more than they had before the seriousness of Nazi threats, they did not recommend dramatic changes in American policy. In fact they cautioned against them because the most efficacious and speedy solution would have necessitated ignoring two prevailing American sentiments: the necessity to maintain strict neutrality and even stricter bars to increased immigration.

The press's attitude fit squarely within the political climate of this country. It is best described by the phrase used to characterize the mood at Evian: “yes but.” Yes, the American press was outraged at Germany's behavior, but nonetheless it was convinced that it must remain out of European affairs. Yes, the refugees' situation was distressing, but there was little America could do. It certainly could not throw open the gates of this land. The American press extended its heart but not its hands.

5

The one significant break in American editorial opposition to alteration of existing refugee legislation occurred in 1939, when Senator Robert Wagner of New York and Representative Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts introduced a bipartisan bill to permit the entry of 20,000 German children under fourteen years of age. The children, who would enter over two years time, would be admitted in addition to the German quota.

This was not the first immigration bill introduced in 1939. Senator Robert Reynolds of North Carolina and Representative Joe Starnes of Alabama proposed a cluster of bills which would have limited immigrants to 10 percent of the quota and halted immigration for a decade or until unemployment fell to 3 million. At the other, more liberal end of the spectrum was a resolution introduced by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York proposing that those who were refugees “because of race or religious beliefs, or liable on that account to criminal persecution, summary or arbitrary treatment, social or economic discrimination,” be admitted outside the quota.
¹
All these proposals died in committee.

When Wagner and Rogers introduced their proposal to admit the children, they won immediate overwhelming editorial support. More than eighty-five newspapers from thirty-six states supported it, among them twenty-six from the south, a region that ardently favored immigration restriction. The bill's sponsors placed over ninety editorials in favor of the measure in the
Congressional Record
.
²
There was no question but that the suffering of little children touched the hearts of editors and publishers in a manner that their parents' suffering had not. However, widespread editorial support of the bill was not a sign of a weakening of America's resolutely anti-immigration stance. If anything, it reflected the inflexibility of that resolve. Supporters of the bill generally agreed that the United States could not and should not “be asked to succor all the victims of race prejudice . . . . But the children are a special case.”
³

It is impossible to offer sanctuary in this country to all refugees, however urgent their need. It would dishonor our traditions of humanity and freedom, however, to refuse the small measure of help contemplated by the Wagner resolution.
⁴

The wisdom of existing policy was not questioned; the bill was perceived of by the press as a one-time exception to the rule. Readers were assured that Wagner-Rogers was not a “precedent for breaking down the immigration laws.”
⁵
As was the case each time this topic came up, the economic repercussions of immigration were debated. Many editorials stressed that while there were legitimate economic grounds to bar refugees, the children would not enter the job market for a number of years and only a small number would enter in any one year.

We can no longer offer refuge to the oppressed of all nations and all ages . . . . But the objections to letting down the bars to men and women of working age do not apply to children.
⁶

The
Miami Herald
adopted a unique and revealingly honest position. An opponent of “too much” immigration, it dismissed the economic objections to immigration as “extraordinary foolishness,” noting that immigrants did not take jobs but, because they were consumers, created them and therefore were an economic asset, not a burden. The
Herald
admitted that the real roots of anti-immigration sentiment were “social and political.”

America is right in admitting no more immigrants than can be adjusted to their new environment and
to our ways of thinking and carrying on
.

Despite these objections, the
Herald
supported the bill because the children were “young enough, given the right chance, to be ‘Americanized' with quickness and ease.” Although this particular editorial did not explicitly cite
Jewish
immigrants as incapable of adjusting to the new environment, its position was noticeably parallel to that of
The Christian Century
which had reverted to its practice of blaming Jews when it argued after
Kristallnacht
that admitting Jewish immigrants would only “exacerbate America's Jewish problem.”
⁷

Although few papers or magazines were as explicit as
The Christian Century
in explaining their objections to increased immigration, the fact that Jewish children would be the ones admitted proved to be a significant obstacle. Though most opponents of the bill did not rely on overtly antisemitic arguments,
The Nation
observed that “a subtle and effective argument is the
sotto voce
contention that this is a Jewish bill.” Despite Wagner's and Rogers's assurances to the contrary, the opponents claimed that all the children who were to be admitted were Jewish. The press was obviously aware of this charge, and numerous editorials justified their support of the measure by assuring readers that the children would include Jews
and
“Aryans.”
⁸