Belisarius: The Last Roman General (42 page)

Procopius now claims that all of the troops, who had been scared and outnumbered, as well as the citizens of the east, praised Belisarius for repelling an invasion without fighting a battle. Belisarius was now summoned to Constantinople to be sent back to Italy, where in his absence the situation had become desperate (Proc,
Wars,
II.xxi.1–34). Such is the story given by Procopius in order to win renown for his patron Belisarius. It does not, however, contain all of the information needed to form a true picture of events.

The Plague and Justinian

In 541 disease had broken out in Egypt. Procopius gives us a clear description of the illness, which allows us to clearly identify it. It was bubonic plague. The description in Procopius almost precisely matches the descriptions of the disease from the Middle Ages – including the use of the term
bonbon
(
Wars
, II.xxii.17). It rapidly spread and was already in the vicinity when Khusrow invaded Euphratensis and Belisarius arrived at Europum. Their urgency to avoid the disease is adequate explanation for the desire of both Belisarius and Khusrow to end the campaign quickly and leave the area.

Yet Belisarius’ ploy of showing strong and fit troops to Abandanes needs explanation. It is likely that Belisarius was demonstrating clearly to Khusrow that not only were his troops fit and free from disease, they were also unworried about catching the disease, instead preparing for a hunt. In effect, this display of strength and bravado increased the pressure on Khusrow. He now realised that he was faced by an army unaffected by the disease and so capable of strong resistance, not weakened by the ravages of plague and so easily defeated or outmanoeuvred. Furthermore, the display of nonchalance contrasted sharply with Khusrow’s desire to leave the area as quickly as possible.

Although Belisarius had given the initiative to Khusrow, he was secure in the knowledge that Khusrow did not want to fight a battle, as the ensuing delays would increase his chances of contracting the plague. Belisarius probably surmised that Khusrow’s next move would almost certainly be to retreat to Persia. He was correct in his assumption.

Yet his overconfidence nearly proved his undoing. Once the Persians were retreating, Belisarius moved north to Edessa, so relieving the Persians of the threat of attack. It would have done little to maintain the majesty and terror of the Persian ruler if, in a major campaign, his only success was the capture of Candidus and the gaining of a previously-agreed ransom. The sack of Callinicum would have enabled Khusrow to claim a victory, since even though threatened by disease and a Byzantine army under one of its greatest generals, he had still accomplished a major feat.

Due to this, Procopius alleges that Belisarius had to face accusations of cowardice for allowing Khusrow to retire unmolested after his attack at Callinicum
(Anekdota,
3. 30–1). Although in some ways understandable, such claims were never to receive a general airing or to be brought in front of a court: it would appear that the majority of people recognised the gravity of the situation and applauded Belisarius for his decision not to risk battle with a possibly infected army.

As Belisarius retired to his headquarters, events in Constantinople changed the whole complexion of both his campaign and his career. In 542 the plague had reached Constantinople. According to Procopius the first recorded outbreak was at Pelusium in Egypt
(Wars,
II.xxii.6). From there it had travelled throughout the whole of Egypt, including Alexandria, and along the coast northwards towards Palestine. Possibly being transmitted by the fleas of the black rat, as in the Middle Ages, the disease was carried by ship around the eastern Mediterranean; Procopius noted that it ‘always took its start from the coast’
(Wars,
II.xxii.9). The first outbreak occurred in Constantinople in the middle of spring, when Belisarius and Procopius were still in residence before their departure to the east to face Khusrow
(Wars,
xxii.10).

Procopius states that the disease lasted for four months in Constantinople, at first making little impact on the number of recorded deaths. Yet, before long it was claiming 5,000 deaths per day and, at its height, 10,000 per day (
Wars,
xxiii.1–4). Overall, the disease is estimated to have taken 300,000 lives in the capital alone (Norwich,
Byzantium,
p.233). Yet by itself the virulence of the disease in Constantinople is unlikely to have affected Belisarius’ career. Circumstances were to change. At some point during the summer (no dates are given by Procopius) Justinian caught the plague.

Belisarius’ fall from favour

Obviously there was a time lapse between Justinian contracting the disease and the news reaching the commanders in the east. By the time the news arrived, the whole of the Middle East was suffering from the plague, so the commanders of the armies naturally assumed that, given their experience of the disease, Justinian would die and may already have done so. At a meeting it was agreed that the army commanders would not endorse any replacement chosen to be emperor in their absence from Constantinople.

The decision was to have grave consequences. Theodora’s only source of power was her marriage to Justinian. If Justinian died, she would have to quickly search for an imperial replacement, presumably marrying the man in the process of making him emperor. This was the only way in which she would be able to maintain her hold on power if Justinian died. When news reached her of the meeting in the east she interpreted it as a personal attack, since it would be unlikely that the generals would approve of her choice of emperor. The individual would be ousted and her grip on power lost. The throne would then pass to one of the generals, most likely Belisarius, since he had the most popularity with the people.

With her fate resting upon the health of Justinian, she watched and waited for Justinian’s recovery. Fortunately for her, he survived. As soon as his survival was assured, Theodora struck. The two generals who were thought to have instigated the fateful meeting – namely Buzes and Belisarius – were recalled to Constantinople. Belisarius was never to return to the eastern frontier. Unaware of events in the capital, the generals arrived in Constantinople.

Taken by surprise, Buzes was thrown into the dungeons, charged with treason
(Anekdota,
4.6–12). He was to remain there for twenty-eight months, until Theodora relented and he was released. However, by some chance Belisarius had not attended the meeting in person. Without that evidence, it was difficult to lay the same charges against him. However, he was charged instead with reserving for himself money taken in the Vandal and Gothic campaigns that should have been delivered to the emperor. He was stripped of the rank of
magister militum per Orientem,
with the title being bestowed upon Martinus. The empress also confiscated all of his wealth and forbade his friends and associates from communicating with him. Finally, his
comitatus
was disbanded, with the officers and palace eunuchs casting lots for the individual units (Proc,
Anekdota,
4.13–16).

Belisarius as commander in the East

In the east, Belisarius only served in two out of the three years of campaigning before his final recall to Constantinople. In both of these Procopius raised doubts about his competence. The question remains as to whether these claims were merely malicious or whether they had a basis in fact.

In his first year on campaign, the second year of the war, Belisarius only advanced a short distance into Persian territory. Procopius ascribed this to his desire to confront Antonina concerning her affair with Theodosius (
Anekdota,
2.19–20). However a close reading of the text reveals that Procopius thought that this had only reinforced his resolve to retire (‘This information, however, led him much more quickly to the decision’ -
Anekdota,
2. 20). The analysis shows that, whatever he thought of Belisarius’ private life, Procopius – even in the vindictive
Anekdota –
grudgingly concedes that Belisarius had acted properly in deciding to withdraw.

The factors that affected this decision readily support the hypothesis. Firstly, Khusrow was reported as being engaged against the Huns, yet, with an army that could be composed entirely of cavalry, it was possible that he could arrive unexpectedly and so take the Byzantines by surprise, possibly with disastrous consequences. Secondly, although Belisarius’ strategy had effectively pinned Nobades in Nisibis, the city still had a large garrison. The arrival of Khusrow with a large force of Persians would free the garrison and so enlarge the forces under Khusrow’s immediate command. In such circumstances, discretion was required, not an ill-informed advance deep into Persian territory. When Procopius claims in the
Anekdota
that Belisarius could easily have taken the Persian capital of Ctesiphon, he did so in hindsight, knowing that the Persians could not have interfered with the action (
Anekdota,
2. 25).

In Belisarius’ final year of campaigning, both Belisarius and Khusrow were constrained in their actions by fear of the plague. Although Belisarius could have forced a battle, it could easily have been lost due to the large numbers of the invading army. Furthermore, even if he had won, remaining in the area could have led to his troops contracting the disease, which would have decimated his forces and so left the east vulnerable to attack. As it was, with disease possibly already present in the Persian army, a withdrawal was the wisest move, since it protected his own troops whilst likely leaving the Persians decimated by the disease and consequently vulnerable. Belisarius would not have known that the plague was destined to devastate both empires, leaving them both weaker than they had been originally.

Therefore, although it is possible to castigate Belisarius over his lack of aggression, an analysis of the possible reasons for his decisions allows us to understand the motives behind his decisions. It is possible that a decision to make a decisive strike at the Persians in either of the two campaigns could have resulted in Khusrow suffering a major defeat, yet on balance Belisarius made the only decision that was open to him. Throughout his campaigns he rarely threw away the lives of his men without strong strategic or tactical reasons. In the east, he decided that the risks outweighed the potential gains and the casualties he would suffer. The continuing care Belisarius took with the lives of his men no doubt contributed to his lasting popularity with the troops.

Finally, although it is possible to claim that Belisarius made a grave mistake in gaining the animosity of Theodora by refusing to accept her nomination for the throne in the event of Justinian’s death, his actions are understandable. As a close friend of Justinian and as a powerful figure in Constantinople, Belisarius
could not have stood by and allowed a rival to become the ruler of the empire. It is unlikely that any new emperor would allow the continued existence of such a powerful competitor as Belisarius. Consequently, Belisarius was in a nowin situation as he would be seen as either the supporter of an extinct line or a threat to the existing one. Yet in one respect his decision making was to be very fortunate. He refused – or was unable – to take part in the meeting that decided not to accept any candidate proposed by Theodora. It is possible that Belisarius assumed that, if he took no active part, he would be more readily acceptable as a candidate for emperor from among the military leaders. Almost by accident, the decision not to attend instead saved his own life.

Chapter 12

Italy again

Italy after Belisarius

In 540 Justinian had sent Alexander to reorganise the new territory upon the imperial model for taxation. The choice would prove to be a mistake. He was nicknamed ‘Snips’ after a set of curved cutters that he used to trim the edge off coins whilst still allowing them to appear round. In this way he was able to build up a store of the metal and so increase his personal wealth. Upon his arrival in Ravenna Alexander announced an investigation into the taxes paid by the Italians to the Goths since they had arrived in Italy with Theoderic nearly a century before. He found that the natives had underpaid the Goths and declared that the underpayment was now due to the emperor. He also stopped the corn ration that was given to the poor at St Peter’s in Rome. Obviously, these actions immediately began to alienate the Italians to the imperial cause (Proc,
Wars,
VII.i.31–33).

Alexander also launched an inquiry into the financial condition of the troops, charging many of them with fraud and of costing the state money, putting many of them on trial and then fining them large sums of money. Whilst some of the money was forwarded to Constantinople, much was retained by Alexander. Finally, he reduced the expenditure on the army. Although his actions increased the cash in the empire’s coffers, as well as enlarging his personal wealth, they began to undermine the loyalty of the troops, many of whom became increasingly unwilling to fight. His actions would later be highlighted by Gothic rulers as the negative aspects of imperial rule.

Alexander’s actions were to some extent mirrored by the actions of the Byzantine commanders Justinian had left in Italy. Ignoring Belisarius’ earlier guidelines, they began to treat the natives badly, taking what they wanted whenever they desired from whoever owned it. The troops followed their example, possibly being spurred on by the knowledge that Alexander’s decisions were depriving them of what they believed were their rewards for their victory.