Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953 (49 page)

Panics, Peace, and Pacifism 1945–53
151

names. One complained that, ‘it will be very shameful to me when my
12 year old son reproaches me because I did not sign this document, painful, very painful.’
^{116
These unsolicited ‘letters of acclamation’ are}
relatively unusual within the Soviet archives.
^{117
They reveal the discur-}
sive power of the Soviet state to structure the attitudes and behaviour of at least some of its population.

Soviet officials’ claims about popular enthusiasm are reinforced by
evidence from a number of other sources. An October 1950
svodka
from L’vov, cited N. P. Miskidzhian commenting about the forthcoming Revolutionary Day march that,

Although I am already sick of being on duty, and celebratory days . . . it will be
pleasant to march in the ranks of the demonstration carrying the slogans ‘Peace in All the World’ and especially to see the military parade as a witness not only to our words about peace but also the mighty military force ready to stand up for peace and to restrain the American aggressors.
¹¹⁸

Several of my interview respondents, when asked if they remembered
the ‘Struggle for Peace’, drew this same distinction between the enthu- siasm they generated and the apathy that greeted many other political movements. Nadezhna Pavlovna remembered that unlike most cam- paigns, ‘Everyone was for it . . . everyone was for peace.’
^{119
Other re-}
spondents, who described themselves as increasingly alienated from the Soviet regime at this time, spoke of the tensions the ‘Struggle for Peace’ generated for them. One interviewee, whose father had been arrested in the 1930s, explained how she felt she had to participate because ‘every war is a crime’.
^{120
A Jewish interviewee, whose family and friends}
suffered persecution in the late-Stalin years, explained, ‘It was very difficult, because on the one hand I was for peace always and every- where . . . On the other hand when they began these manifestoes it was understood that it was some kind of awful Soviet game.’
¹²¹

It is, of course, impossible to quantify the popular enthusiasm for the
‘Struggle for Peace’. However, the evidence from a variety of different

^{116
Let. RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 291, l. 77.}

^{117
They do not fit neatly within any of Fitzpatrick’s letter categories: S. Fitzpatrick,}
‘Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s’,
Slavic Review,
55.1 (1996), 78–105.

^{118
Sv. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 24, d. 15, l. 15.}

^{119
Int. Nadezhda Pavlovna, Arkhangel’sk, August 2004.}

^{120
Int. Al’dona Vladimirovna, Moscow, April 2004.}

^{121
Int. Natalia Leonidovna, Moscow, June 2004. Also: Andrei Ivanovich, Moscow,}
May 2004.

152
Being Soviet

sources suggests that it was an unusually successful political campaign.
The participants signed their names, donated money and worked harder with distinctive enthusiasm. Like rumours, or wartime jazz music, this enthusiasm provides an example of successful behaviour that sheds light on how Soviet citizens engaged with official rhetoric and also how they imagined the world around them.

The power of official rhetoric

The success of the Peace Campaigns was due, in part, to the blanket
coverage they received within the official press. The language and values of the campaigns seem to have resonated with a large number of Soviet citizens. There were some individuals who expressed concern that the USSR’s posture as a patron state would be a drain on the Soviet Union, leaving the population at home over-worked and under-supplied. K.Sh. complained in 1952 that the USSR would sell a hundredweight of grain overseas for five roubles but that ordinary Soviet citizens had to pay hundreds of roubles for it.
^{122
However, the rhetoric of patronage seems}
to have gained more adherents than opponents. Naimark claims that the ‘school-masterish, dismissive, and impatient’ behaviour of Soviet ad- ministrators in East Germany reflected their sense of cultural superiority in relation to local residents.
^{123
For his part, Il’ia Ehrenburg glowed}
with pride as he viewed the Vah Valley in Slovakia, ‘brilliant with electric lights’ in 1950. He ‘did not feel any regrets for the past’ that had been replaced by Soviet-style modernity.
¹²⁴

Enthusiasm for the language of Official Soviet Identity was also
evident in the unsolicited and highly enthusiastic ‘letters of acclama- tion’ from Soviet citizens to Molotov following the Berlin and Geneva Conferences in 1954, where peace was agreed in Korea and Indo- China. The emphases the authors placed on different parts of the official rhetoric demonstrate which aspects of the language of Official Soviet Identity were more accessible and perhaps meaningful to the ‘Strugglers for Peace’: 42 per cent of the letter writers drew on the idea of the USSR as a morally upright ‘patron state’ winning peace on

^{122
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 34999, l. 8; d. 36332, l. 1.}

^123
Naimark,
The Russians In Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945–1949 (Cambridge Mass., 1995), 60–4.

^{124
Mem. I. Ehrenburg, trans., T. Shebunina,}
Post-War Years: 1945–1954
, vol. vi:

Men, Years, Life
(London, 1966), 153.

Panics, Peace, and Pacifism 1945–53
153

behalf of the peoples of the world.
^{125
As one writer explained, ‘I think}
that my voice of thanks is sounding not only from me but also thousands and thousands of peace-loving people from the most far flung corners of the world, experiencing the same feelings of joy for our successes as I do.’ Another wrote of how, ‘You read the paper and there are shivers in your spine and in your throat there are involuntary tears of joy, pride and recognition that it is my—our—government that is leading this ceaseless struggle for justice and truth, for freedom, and sovereignty of all the peoples.’
^{126
The importance of the political}
authority and status of the USSR was emphasized by 29 per cent of the letter writers, who described the agreements as ‘a victory of the Soviet Union’, or commented that they ‘raise the authority of the Soviet Union even higher’.
^{127
The rhetoric of Soviet might, as either}
the cause of the ‘victory’ or the precondition of further success, was much less commonly referred to; only 5 per cent of the letter writers mentioned it.
¹²⁸

This pride in the moral and diplomatic authority of the USSR is also
demonstrated in a number of other letters sent to Soviet leaders in this era. Comrade Begisheva, a war invalid, wrote to
Izvestiia
following one of the USSR’s annual price reductions to say that, ‘Surely the people of the whole world must look with envy at a country which is turning itself into a genuine Motherland for the workers!’
^{129
Others worried that}
events such as the release of the Jewish Doctors, who had been accused of poisoning the Kremlin leadership in March 1953, had humiliated the USSR ‘before the whole world’.
^{130
The ‘educationally uncultured’ repre-}
sentation of Soviet leaders in the film
The Fall of Berlin
also produced concern. One author worried that, ‘Doubtless the film will be shown overseas and create an incorrect impression amongst viewers.’
¹³¹

^{125
Let. RGASPI f. 82, op. 2, d. 1446, l. 1. From a sample of 38 letters. Unfortu-}
nately, since it was first consulted, this collection has been closed and I was not able to expand the size of the sample.

^{126
Let. Ibid., ll. 46, 32.}

^{127
Let. Ibid., ll. 40, 48.}

^{128
Let. Ibid., d. 1470, ll. 32–48. Molotov’s personal strength and resolve was praised}
by nearly everyone (84%). It is possible that he functioned as a symbol of wider Soviet might, or that this demonstrates the extent to which thanking and praising Soviet leaders had become an everyday act.

^{129
Let. RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 114, l. 25.}

^{130
Let. RGASPI f. 82, op. 1, d. 1466, ll. 52, 57, 58.}

^{131
Let. RGASPI f. 17, op. 132, d. 427, ll. 20–1.}

154
Being Soviet

These letters demonstrate that when they wrote to their leaders, late-
Stalinist citizens found the rhetoric of Soviet greatness, though not necessarily physical might, an accessible and valuable medium via which to articulate their concerns. The rhetoric of the USSR as an authoritative, moral, patron state that stood up for peace seems to have resonated within the imagination of many Soviet citizens in this period.

Reappropriation: ‘peace’ into ‘pacifism’

However, the enthusiasm generated by the ‘Struggle for Peace’ was not
simply a product of the campaigns’ rhetorical power. It also reflected the ongoing anxiety about war. There is significantly less evidence for war rumours after the summer of 1947. This may well reflect a decline in recording. The Stalin-era state recorded more ‘negative’ comments when it felt insecure: many fewer
svodki
were collected in this period. It probably also reflects the fact that Britain and America’s seeming indifference to Soviet control in the borderlands or the existence of collective farms undermined the idea that they were on the verge of invasion.

Nonetheless, war anxiety did not evaporate overnight and war
rumours remained a feature of the word-of-mouth network. Various
svodki
from Ukraine cited Soviet citizens interpreting official price or quota changes as a sign that war was imminent in 1948–53.
^132
Several

individuals also wrote to the
vozhd’
in this era advising the government to prepare more thoroughly for the inevitable forthcoming attack.
^{133
This period also saw a significant number of prosecutions for spreading}

rumours such as ‘a war with America is inevitable and America will
win’.
^{134
War anxiety was particularly acute after the outbreak of the}
Korean War. There were still cases of panic buying in the late 1950, particularly in areas close to the conflict, such as Vladivostock. Howev- er, rumours and panics also spread across the rest of the USSR. A wave of war rumours in Voroshilovgrad
oblast’
resulted in the sale of 400 tubs

^{132
Sv. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 5379, ll. 6–7, 48; op. 24, d. 1575, ll. 11–14.}

^{133
Let. RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, d. 875, l. 10; d. 877, l. 54.}

^{134
Proc. GARF f. R8131, op. 31a, d. 36750. l. 14; d. 36346, ll. 30–1.}