Being Soviet: Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life Under Stalin 1939-1953 (24 page)

^17
Ogon¨ek
, 07.09.1941: 28, pp. 8–9.

^{18
RGASPI M-f. 1, op. 32, d. 1, ll. 1–17.}

^19
Pravda
, 23.02.42, p. 1.

^20
Pravda
, 01.04.4, p. 4; 22.05.42, p. 4; and 08.06.42, p. 4. April is also the point at which Soviet press reportage of Allied military actions fell by about 50% and remained low until November.

^{21
A. Korneichuk, ‘Guerrillas of the Ukrainian Steppes’, in,}
Four Soviet War Plays

(London, 1944), 184.

^{22
M. A. Stoler, ‘The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and}
Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943’,
Contributions in Military History,
12, (1977), 43.

^23
Ogon¨ek
, 14.06.1942: 23–4, p. 3;
Pravda
, 12.06.42, p. 1.

Perfidious Allies? 1941–45
51

August to November 1942 was the high point of Soviet coverage of
the Second Front issue, as the Germans drove into the Soviet southern flank and the battle of Stalingrad drew near.
^{24
Krasnaia Zvezda}
and
Ogon¨ek
lamented the fact that the Allies’ inactivity had allowed the Germans to ‘direct all of its forces and the forces of its vassals against the Soviet Union’.
^{25
This imbalance made it easy for the Allies to advance}
on the ‘secondary level’ front in Africa but left the USSR carrying the vast majority of the military burden.
^{26
In October 1942}
Pravda
ran a cartoon depicting the British generals as ‘blimps’ failing to act even at the eleventh hour.
^{27
As a draft thesis for}
kolkhoz
chairmen in November 1942 stated baldly, ‘Until the present time, the participation of England and America in the war has not been active enough.’
^{28
The message was}
clear: England and America could open the Second Front and ensure German defeat; the question remained whether they would.

The Second Front remained the decisive issue within the Anglo-
Soviet-American Alliance until the Tehran Conference in November 1943. Allied advances in North Africa and bombing raids were some- times afforded a high profile.
^{29
However, these reports were always}
associated with demands for more action.
^{30
As Stalin explained, the}
North African offensive, ‘Creates the conditions necessary for the orga- nisation of the Second Front in Europe . . . that will have decisive significance.’
^{31
The Anglo-American landing in Italy did not constitute}
a Second Front. In November 1942, however, Stalin hinted at a shift in the official narrative concerning the invasion of Europe. He stated that the Second Front would be opened, ‘. . . sooner or later. And it will not only be because we need it, but above all because our Allies need it no less than us.’
^{32
During 1943, with the Germans defeated at Stalingrad,}
the Second Front was increasingly treated as a mechanism for shortening the war, rather than a precondition of victory. It would

^24
Pravda
averaged around a third of a column (0.06 pages) every day for this story— the same space as it devoted to Allied military actions.

^{25
Krasnaia Zvezda}
, 27.09.1942, p. 4;
Ogon¨ek
, 02.08.1942: 31, pp. 8–9.

^26
Ogon¨ek
, 18.10.1942: 42, pp. 8–9.

^27
Pravda
, 06.10.42, p. 4.

^{28
RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 82, l. 55.}

^{29
Krasnaia Zvezda}
, 18.12.1942, p. 4;
Pravda
, 03.06.42, p. 4; 11.11.42, p. 4. Coverage peaked at half a page per day in November 1942 and May 1943; the average was around one fifth of a page a day.

^30
Ogon¨ek
, 20.12.1942: 51, p. 8;
Pravda
, 01.06.42, p. 4; 11.06.43, p. 4.

^31
Pravda
, 14.11.42, p. 1. He reiterated this claim in May: 08.05.43, p. 4.

^32
Pravda
, 07.11.42, p. 1.

52
Being Soviet

decide ‘Whether the war will be drawn out longer and whether new
colossal sacrifices will be necessary.’
^{33
The first anniversary of the Soviet-}
American Agreement was greeted with admiration for the great modern army of the United States, but also a warning that, ‘The matter of war is decided by people, who are able to put military technology into prac- tice . . . bravely looking in the face of danger.’
^{34
Whether it was militar-}
ily essential or not, the Second Front remained, until Tehran, the benchmark by which the authenticity of the Allies’ intents was to be judged. It represented the consummation of the union of progressive states and the Allies’ failure to act cast doubt on the entire enterprise of the shared battle against fascism.

What is striking about this constant focus on the absent Second Front
is that the Soviet press provided very little explanation as to why the Allies were failing to fulfil their responsibilities. Stalin devoted a whole section of his November 1942 speech to the thorny question of the Second Front. He argued that the German ‘successes on our front this year’ had been a result of the ‘absence of the Second Front in Europe’ which allowed them to concentrate their forces in the East. In the light of this Anglo-American failure to carry out their most pressing task, Stalin even felt the need to assure the Soviet people that the progressive alliance was still a reality. What the Supreme Commander did not provide was a clear explanation for the failure of that alliance to fulfil its central function.
³⁵

This failure to clearly account for the absence of the Second Front
was typical of the Soviet press in the pre-Tehran era. Agitational material occasionally made dark hints about reactionary groups opposed to the invasion within the allied states.
^{36
In America they were}
isolationists; in Britain they were reactionary ‘Munichites’ who favoured rapprochement with Germany over military action.
^{37
The aggressive}
new journal
War and the Working Class
attacked American isolationists for ‘throwing sticks and stones’ at the government, or industrialists who had a vested interest in a long war.
^{38
Occasionally the Soviet press}
suggested that Anglo-American passivity might be a result of their fear

^33
Pravda
, 06.08.43, p. 2. See also: 31.08.43, p. 4.

^34
Pravda
, 11.06.43, p. 1.

^35
Pravda
, 07.11.42, p. 1. See also:
Krasnaia Zvezda
, 18.12.1942, p. 3.

^{36
RGASPI f 17, op 125, d, 82, l. 25.}

^37
Britain:
Ogon¨ek
, 17.08.1943: 32, p. 15;
Pravda
, 08.09.43, p. 4; RGASPI f. 17, op.

125, d. 43, l. 57. America:
Pravda
, 13.10.42, p. 4.

^38
Pravda
, 04.07.43, p. 2; 06.08.43, p. 2.

Perfidious Allies? 1941–45
53

of engagement: ‘War is not won by people whose thoughts are fully
occupied with the cost of war.’
^{39
But these explanations for inaction}
were not presented systematically. The Soviet press focused the vast majority of its attention on what the Allies were not doing, rather than on why they were not doing it.

As well as demanding that the Allies do more, the Soviet press
also began to emphasize the centrality of the Soviet contribution to the overall victory. Soviet newspapers might be expected to prioritize the Eastern Front. However, their reportage increasingly made clear that the other fronts were mere appendages to the action in the East. As
Pravda
explained in 1942, ‘The victory of the English in Egypt would have been impossible without the advance of the Guards of General Rodishev, and the successes of the Americans in Algeria are closely connected with the losses of the German–Italian army in Russia.’
^40
A
gathering of Party activists in Arkhangel’sk, in December 1942, was informed that the Red Army’s courage and victories had ‘secured for the Allies success in their military operations’.
^{41
An August 1943 cartoon}
depicted a Russian soldier thumping Hitler ‘We strike the blow in Russia’.
^{42
In the picture below Mussolini was blown out of a chimney}
‘The response is seen in Italy’. The Red Army was credited for allied successes on all fronts.

This focus on the primacy of the Red Army was a key element of
Official Soviet Identity in relation to the Allies in the pre-Tehran era. The Soviet press carried almost no stories of individual heroism within the Anglo-American forces.
^{43
There was no space for non-domestic}
heroes within Soviet popular culture. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, they were more likely to appear as ambivalent, or even antagonistic characters. In sharp contrast, the heroes of the Red Army were showered in a tumult of praise. A draft thesis for gatherings of
kolkhoz
chairmen in November 1942 stated that, ‘The people of the mighty USA and the rest of the world see in the USSR the nation with the might to rescue the world from the fascist hordes.’
^{44
A 1943 VOKS exhibition entitled}
‘Soviet Culture Overseas in the Great Fatherland War’ opened with General Macarthur’s statement that, ‘The hopes of civilisation rest on

^39
Pravda
, 05.08.42, p. 4, quoting the British
Sunday Express
.

^40
Pravda
, 12.11.42, p. 3.

^{41
Inf. GAOPDiFAO f. 296, op. 1, d. 1183, l. 5.}

^42
Ogon¨ek
, 10.08.1943: 31, p. 16.

^{43
The only exceptions I found were:}
Pravda
, 01.05.42, p. 4, and 22.04.43 p. 4.

^{44
RGASPI f. 17, op. 125, d. 82, l. 43.}