Barbarossa (63 page)

Hitler:
Only 120 trains?

Zeitzler:
Yes.

Hitler:
Now, now, Zeitzler.

Zeitzler:
It might even be 130 trains.

Hitler:
I'm afraid it will be 150.

Zeitzler:
It doesn't make much difference if there are tea
or fifteen more or less.

Hitler:
What are they leaving behind? Are they going to
leave the Mark IV's here or are they going to take them along?

Zeitzler:
Last night the order came through to leave them
behind, because they would get new ones. I counted on that—but
we should put pressure on the
Leibstandarte
to leave them
there. As far as I know Sepp, he'll take them along unless we send
someone down there to make sure. The best thing is for them to leave
them.

[Sepp Dietrich, SS Oberstgruppenführer, commander of the SS
Panzer Division
Leibstandarte
, later of the 5th and 6th Panzer
armies.]

Hitler:
The two divisions that remain behind are weak
anyway. It would be better to give them additional tanks, and one
must see whether one can't give the Tigers to one of them. He is
going to get two Tiger companies anyway.

[Evidently Dietrich.]

Zeitzler:
I agree that they shouldn't.

Hitler:
That will be enough for the
Leibstandarte
.
How many Tigers is that—two companies?

Zeitzler:
He is going to get two more companies—twenty-two
Tigers.

Hitler:
On top of that he's going to get a hundred
Panthers, his whole battalion. And then he must get replacements for
his Mark IV's in the rear.

Zeitzler:
What should have gone there as replacements I'll
hold back, and he can have them, too.

Hitler:
Maybe assault guns, too, so that he can leave his
behind. That would strengthen the two remaining divisions. Then the
next one to leave would be the
Reich
. The
Reich
can
also leave part of its equipment to these or other units, and can get
its hundred Panthers replaced in transit.

Zeitzler:
That way we are saving a lot of equipment.

Hitler:
We are saving a lot of equipment, and the units out
here are getting stronger. And then Manstein has to get some more
supplies for his divisions. For instance, the 16th
Panzergrenadier
Division must also get something.

Zeitzler:
When the other Panzer divisions arrive, they can
take over some of it—

Kluge:
Well, my Führer, then we are confronted by a
new situation.

Zeitzler:
Perhaps the army group can work out a plan for
what is the earliest possibility, and what the risks involved would
be.

Kluge:
We'll sit right down. I brought my G-3 along. We
will go over it once more. But everything still depends on the
construction of the Hagen Line. I don't want to slide back into a
position that is practically nonexistent.

Hitler:
This is how I really feel about it: If there
weren't this pressing danger down here, I would have committed the
two divisions you are getting right away, instead of the 113th.

Kluge:
Yes, my Führer. Now there will be no forward
commitment of these two divisions. There will be no attacks at all
here; that would be useless; that would be senseless. That was all
planned under the condition—

Hitler:
Just secure the rail line so that it can be used.

Kluge:
According to the original plan, we would have had
plenty of time to do this.

Hitler:
Wouldn't it be possible to detach some units for
the purpose of building up the position?

Kluge:
You mean take them away from Model? Though the
others follow up every day—and we with the miserable remains of
the 11th, 212th, 108th, with the 209th—

Zeitzler:
Those are the ones that were smashed up.

Hitler:
All right then, draw out the broken divisions, fill
them up, and build with
them
.

Kluge:
All right then, I'll have to free some units
somehow. Unfortunately, I also need troops to secure the roads along
which these caravans are moving, or else they'll all be knocked off
behind the forest of Bryansk, because everything is swarming with
guerillas who have been reorganised.

Hitler:
I, too, have to make difficult decisions, very
difficult decisions.

Kluge:
I can well believe that.

Hitler:
But there is nothing else to do.

Kluge:
But I absolutely cannot spare any units until this
operation has been finished. We'll see how we can manage things
afterward.

Hitler:
You must see to it that you finish it as soon as
possible. I can tell you this much:
Gross Deutschland
will be
taken away in the near future, and secondly, you will have to give up
a few units for that position down there. You will have to give up a
few Panzer—and a few infantry divisions—

Kluge:
Not Panzer! I have—

Hitler:
Yes, we'll pull them out and they'll be refitted in
the West.

Kluge:
But I can't do anything without Panzer divisions!

Hitler:
But certainly you don't care about that "junk."
you can easily spare that.

Kluge:
What junk?

Hitler:
You yourself said, "That's just junk."

Kluge:
I did not say that!

Hitler:
Yes, it slipped out. That's why we're going to take
them away from you.

Kluge:
No, my Führer, I didn't mean that. I have so
little left, just a little bit. What I wanted to indicate was that
the situation is hardly tenable any more.

Hitler:
Yes, you have no Panzers. That is why I say they
can be taken away and refitted in the West. We can always get them
back again. Meanwhile they can be filled up. And finally, the men
have deserved it. It would be all wrong to do it the other way. I can
have these divisions reorganized in the West, and the Western units
can be moved up here. The most important thing is to get the 9th and
10th SS divisions ready quickly.

[SS Divisions 9 and 10 were organised in France during the winter
of 1942-43.]

Today I got an opinion how the "Goering Division" stands
up in combat. The English write that the very youngest, the
sixteen-year-olds, just out of the Hitler Youth, have fought
fanatically to the last man. The English couldn't take any prisoners.
Therefore I am convinced that these few divisions composed of boys,
which are already trained, will fight fantastically well, because
they have a splendid idealistic spirit. I am completely convinced
that they will fight fantastically well.

Zeitzler:
Well, the Field Marshal and I will sit down to it
later.

Kluge:
I'll have to think it over once more, my Führer.
Now that I know what the overall purpose is, I will act accordingly.

Hitler:
As I said, the most important thing is that I get
the SS corps out. Manstein needs something down there as replacement.
I don't know yet what I'm going to give him. Perhaps the 7th Panzer
Division, which could be pulled down here if he could close this up
over here. But he has to have replacements or else he won't be able
to hold any of this business. And he needs a couple of infantry
divisions. He can't hold this mess here. Of course, if the worst
comes to the worst, we can't do anything except shorten the lines
down here, too. But we have to realise that that would be a desperate
situation. It's certainly not pleasant. These are very difficult
decisions, decisions that bring us to a critical point. But I'm
considering all the alternatives. Difficult to do anything up there
at Leningrad because of the Finns. I also considered whether we could
give up this down there—

Zeitzler:
If we decide on something up there, we have to do
something down there, too.

Hitler:
There wouldn't be much profit in this.

Zeitzler:
Yes, we would gain something. The enemy isn't
doing anything big now.

Hitler:
If the worst comes to the worst, we may even have
to give
that
up.

Zeitzler:
That's easier to do than this—

Hitler:
How many do you think we can get out of here? We
have to be strong here or else they will start landing operations at
Novorossisk again. First, everybody says give it up, but then I hear
Kleist, or whoever else is down there, yelling, "That's
impossible."

[Generalfeldmarschall von Kleist commanded Army Group A, which,
after retreating from the Caucasus, held the southernmost part of the
German Eastern front. Novorossisk, a port on the eastern side of the
Kerch Strait, was still in German hands at this time.]

With such limited forces in this position, it is impossible to
counteract and the enemy will only start attacking in this area. If
that happens, we won't be able to bring any more ships in. We are
still getting our ships through, but that would finish it. What is
already committed is all right, but I can't bring any more in.

Zeitzler:
We could try to form a small bridgehead. Then we
could hold on there for a while.

Hitler:
I'm afraid we can't hold it, but we can try. We'll
have to think about that.

Kluge:
On our extreme northern wing we can fall back on our
prepared positions at Velikiye Luki, as I suggested. We can
strengthen the line there, too.

Zeitzler:
That's been planned, sir, but that won't free any
of your troops.

Kluge:
No, that wouldn't free any troops. We can't give up
anything else, except that salient. Then we'll have to swallow Kirov
and leave everything else the way it is, although I would have liked
to improve things here a little, but unfortunately, it isn't
possible.

Hitler:
We can retreat here, too.

Kluge:
Perhaps we could free a division here, but that is a
complicated story because the position there is already—

Zeitzler:
The positions there are particularly good.

Kluge:
The positions are good. They were built with
terrific effort.

Hitler:
But you'd rather have Kirov?

Kluge:
Yes, I would like to retake that. That is always a
base for the enemy.

Zeitzler:
That would be more costly.

Kluge:
Under the present circumstances it is completely
impossible—

Zeitzler:
You can free something up there only after you
have withdrawn here.

Hitler:
Will I see you again?

Kluge:
No, I intend to return immediately. Heil, my Führer.

[Field Marshal von Kluge withdraws.]

Hitler:
If only the SS corps were out of there already.

Zeitzler:
The
Leibstandarte
leaves tomorrow at the
earliest, at the rate of twelve trains per day.

Hitler:
The SS corps equals twenty Italian divisions.

Zeitzler:
He must get
Gross Deutschland
and the 7th
Panzer down there. [Manstein.] If Kluge stays on this line for a week
and moves half of the freed divisions over there, it ought to work.
If a division can dig itself in for six days in a sector, it has got
something. He is still mentally adjusted to slow movements, and can't
get away from this idea. Perhaps it will come to him. In my opinion,
everything would be all right then.

On 8th August, Zeitzler flew out to see Manstein at Army Group
South headquarters. The Field Marshal "told him quite plainly
that from now on we could no longer confine ourselves to such
isolated problems as whether such and such a division could be
spared, or whether the Kuban bridgehead should be evacuated or not."
There were only two possibilities, Manstein went on. Either the
entire Donetz region was evacuated immediately, or he was drafted a
further ten divisions from the other sectors of the Eastern front.

(This would have brought Manstein's army group to a strength
equivalent to the total of all the other German forces engaged in
Russia.)

Naturally, Zeitzler did not commit himself, and after he had left
repeated enquiries to OKH produced nothing more than formal
acknowledgements. In the course of the following week the Russian
pressure against Kharkov intensified to such an extent that Manstein
was faced with the alternative of "locking up" Army Group
Kempf in the city to play the role of a minor Paulus or abandoning
the town altogether.

Hitler sent him a special message, ordering that the town be held
at all costs and pointing out that its fall would produce "an
unfavourable effect" on the attitudes of Bulgaria and Turkey.
"However true that might be," was Manstein's acid comment,
". . . the Army Group had no intention of sacrificing an army
for Kharkov." The town was evacuated on 22nd August. But the
unfortunate General Kempf was sacrificed. His command was
redesignated "8th Army," and he was succeeded by General
Wöhler. Manstein's own part in this affair is equivocal, to say
the least. "Although I had got on well with General Kempf, I did
not oppose the change," and the man appointed in Kempf's place
had been Manstein's Chief of Staff of the 11th Army. It seems likely
that both Manstein and Hitler concurred, if tacitly, in this choice
of a scapegoat.

By now Himmler was not the only leading Nazi to have taken alarm
at the way events were developing. Henriette von Schirach (who always
claimed that Hitler tried to kiss her when she was twelve years old)
has left an account of a contrived meeting between her husband and
Goering. The meeting began in an innocent atmosphere of
Gemütlichkeit
in a "secluded, velvet-lined room" of a well-known Vienna
restaurant. (Baldur von Schirach, founder of the
Hitlerjugend
,
was at this time the Gauleiter of Vienna.)