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On 20 December 2008, Jubelin prepared an updated plan for Tuno. He considered whether developments since the original plan—essentially the arrest of Christiansen and what he hoped was the imminence of Martin signing a statement—should change their approach. There were three options. The first was to talk to Christiansen and Urriola about the disappearance of Elliott, but he was reluctant to do this yet. They might exercise
their right to silence and he would have gained nothing and tipped his hand.

The second option was to pull in all the targets immediately, but Tuno still did not have sufficient evidence to charge them all, so if no one rolled, some would walk free. This meant going with option three: continuing as they were for the moment, trying to gather more evidence.

Nevertheless, it was likely they would have to make the arrests soon, if they detected the targets about to commit a crime. So Jubelin began to plan how they would do this. What he wanted was to create the impression Tuno knew even more than it did about their activities. So, when the time came, Tuno would arrest all its targets at once, and confront them with everything it had, in the hope of creating a sense of panic in at least some of them. He decided the questioning of Christiansen and Urriola about Elliott's murder would be more effective if conducted as part of this bigger operation, which would be the police equivalent of a major military assault. The idea was to rattle the targets so badly that one or more would turn on their associates.

The need to act came very soon. Colleen Perish returned to Sydney for Christmas and was still there in January, when Tuno learned of a coded communication between Anthony and Curtis that appeared to refer to her. There was also intelligence suggesting Colleen believed Anthony wanted her dead. As her life might now be in danger, Jubelin decided the time had come to arrest Anthony Perish and Brad Curtis.

Tony Martin's affairs had been put in order and he signed his statement not long after the New Year. It was an irrevocable step for him and those close to him, because even if he later
refused to give evidence in court, the statement's existence would become publicly known and his life would be in danger. The next step was for him to move. He disappeared and has built a new life somewhere away from Sydney.

There was one other piece of unfinished business. After many months, Glen Browne had still not received confirmation from the DPP that Tuno had enough evidence to charge Anthony Perish and Brad Curtis, and to be confident they'd be refused bail. This was important, because if the men were released they would have the opportunity to intimidate or even kill witnesses and their families, and after what had happened to Terry Falconer and to David Taylor's family, police had little doubt this would occur. Senior police put pressure on the DPP to provide what was now urgently needed advice.

He smote them hip and thigh
.

Gary Jubelin had two plans for the arrests of Anthony Perish and Brad Curtis, a personal one and a work one. The personal one involved exercise, training hard so he would go into what he knew would be a stretch of twenty-hour days as fit as possible. He did a lot of running and some boxing and qi gong, a form of eastern meditation he'd practised for twenty years.

Then there was the work plan for what would be an enormous operation involving officers from many different sections, with the arrests of Perish and Curtis to be followed a day later by the arrests or interviewing of twenty more people, which itself would be followed by the announcement of large rewards for information about certain of the murders Tuno was investigating. The whole thing would be a bit like a creeping artillery barrage, designed progressively to strike fear into the hearts of Sydney's criminals and their associates
and families, and encourage some to roll over or otherwise give information to the police. It was clever stuff, but the coordination was going to be a big job. Apart from anything else, all the planning had to be done over the New Year holiday period.

The team came through, as always, working long hours, weekends and public holidays. Other organisations had to be prompted to greater efforts. Finally Nicholas Cowdery, the Director of Public Prosecutions, signed off on the opinion that there was enough evidence to arrest Anthony Perish and Brad Curtis, and to prevent them getting bail.

The detectives now turned their minds to just how to make the arrests. As they had no idea where Perish was, they would have to wait until Curtis—who was under physical surveillance—met up with him, in order to take them together. They were violent men, so Tactical Operations officers from the State Protection Group (SPG) would be needed, with their high-powered guns and body armour. All up, with the SPG and the surveillance crew and the Tuno detectives, a hundred officers would be involved and they would have to be ready to assemble at short notice at any time of the day or night.

The job would be even more complex because of Jubelin's plan to interview almost twenty family members and associates of the targets the day after the two key figures were arrested. The purpose of this was to put psychological pressure on the pair, and also on Christiansen and Urriola, hopefully overwhelming them by showing just how determined the police were and how much they knew about their lives. Presumably the arrests would come as complete surprises, and Jubelin wanted Perish and Curtis to be fully aware their worlds had
just collapsed. Maybe Perish would cope with this, but Curtis might panic when he learned just how much police knew about his activities, and that his home was being searched and his wife and mother interrogated. Being put inside a cell for the first time can have a powerful effect on a man.

A media plan was part of the strategy. Jubelin was after maximum publicity, and intended to release photographs of the arrests and give a stand-up interview to get word of what had happened out to the general public and associates of the targets. Crooks read the papers and watch television just like the rest of us (as do their families and lawyers), and if they thought Anthony Perish's power had been undermined, they might be more prepared to come forward with information, especially when they heard about the rewards. In any case, a publicity blitz would be bad for the morale of the arrested men.

Jubelin drew up a set of operational orders, a document always prepared in advance of any significant police operation. It was a bit like a plan of battle, and set out the actions to occur before, during and after the arrests, and just who was to do each of them. The plan would form the basis for the briefing before the operation, and be a reference point for everyone involved, including the bosses.

Jubelin had learnt the importance of such orders back in his Hornsby days. Not long after he had returned there from the Armed Hold Up Squad, he was contacted by a woman who knew of him from a third party. She had information about a relative responsible for a recent armed hold-up. Jubelin and a junior detective went and met her, and she asked if they could arrest the person without harming him. Jubelin assured her the job would be done carefully, and she told him
where the offender could be found. He applied for a search warrant, arranged for surveillance, and called the Armed Hold Up Squad for back-up. Then he prepared a detailed set of operational orders, although at the time he had no idea how important the wording would become.

He arranged a ‘form up point' near the suspect's home in a block of units at Dundas and conducted a briefing with all the police involved. While waiting to execute the search warrant, the junior detective spoke about how exciting it was doing real police work. Jubelin said he'd only get excited when the suspect was in custody; things can always go wrong when arresting armed offenders. At the designated time all police were in position and the operation commenced. Surveillance officers were covering the rear of the flats. The plan was for Jubelin and his partner to go to the front door, where they would knock and gain entry.

From the moment Jubelin knocked on the door, he knew it was not going to be a simple operation. The suspect on the other side of the door reacted aggressively and began abusing him. Jubelin attempted to negotiate his way into the unit, and was talking to the suspect when the man started to yell. Then came the unmistakable sound of a gunshot, followed by screams from a woman. Jubelin and his partner kicked the door off its hinges and entered the unit, where they found a man on the floor, bleeding from a wound in his chest, and a surveillance officer standing over him with his gun drawn. There was a woman crouching on the floor next to the man, crying. Jubelin and his partner tried to revive the man, but he was dead.

The surveillance officer had heard the yelling coming from the front of the unit and made a split second decision to enter
through the back door to see if he could assist. The offender saw him and came at him with a knife, so the officer had shot him in self-defence.

It was a tragedy, but also a useful experience. In the subsequent coroner's inquest, Jubelin was thankful he had prepared comprehensive operational orders, which showed he'd acted in a professional and well-planned manner. He called the dead man's relative later on, and she just screamed and screamed at him. That night he had a few drinks with colleagues and went home and thought about quitting the cops.

The plan for the arrest of Anthony Perish and the others noted that the operation ‘would be conducted over a wide range of suburbs throughout the Sydney region and regional areas. The later phases of the operation will be conducted at various police stations and the NSW Crime Commission.' In other words, it was huge. There were twenty-one teams, each of which would interview a different suspect or person of interest, in most cases a suspect's wife or girlfriend. A ringbinder full of information was prepared for each interview, giving the person's background and the purpose of questioning. Officers were matched carefully with suspects according to experience, temperament and familiarity with the target. Other teams would search six known locations and one unknown one—if an address for Anthony Perish could be found. The known locations were the homes of the other targets, plus the shed at Mudgee.

The strike force of twenty people had to race to prepare to put the plan into action. It needed to work though a January weekend but overtime was denied. Nearly every one worked the weekend anyway. The plan was to be ready to go from
21 January, but at 11 pm three days before that, surveillance revealed Curtis was to meet Perish somewhere the next day. Obviously it was time to move. Some officers stayed up all night to bring the operation forward.

On the morning of 19 January 2009, a Tuesday, surveillance cars followed Curtis as he left his home in Newcastle in his yellow Mercedes and headed south. As he drove down the expressway, the SPG sought permission from the highest levels of the police force for their part in the operation, which might involve running into a public place with powerful weapons. By this time Jubelin was at Chatswood, guessing that the meeting would be somewhere on the North Shore, and learned permission had not yet been given. He decided that Tuno detectives would have to make the arrest themselves, but approval did come through for the SPG at the last minute.

The surveillance vehicles saw Curtis stop in Crows Nest and get out of his car, and meet Anthony Perish. The men were together for only a moment, and returned to their vehicles and drove off. Jubelin was alarmed—there'd been no time to make the arrests, so if that was the meeting, they'd lost their chance. But Curtis did not turn around to go back to Newcastle. The men drove south and then turned off the Pacific Highway at McMahons Point, where they parked and went into their favourite café, Lavender Blue, on Blues Point Road. Jubelin, his spirits restored, stayed at Chatswood in a room with the coordinators from the SPG and the surveillance teams, each of them in constant radio contact with their commander in the field.

At McMahons Point the SPG parked an unmarked van out the front of the building. A few officers dressed as tradesmen
entered the café, where they took seats and ordered coffee. Perish and Curtis were sitting at a table next to a big open window. With everyone in position around 11 am, Jubelin told the SPG boss it was now in his hands. The back doors of the van opened and men in body armour raced down the path towards the café, while the undercover officers already inside drew their weapons. Perish and Curtis, completely surprised, were hauled out through the window and pushed onto the ground, where their hands were secured with cable ties.

Jubelin left the Chatswood command post and drove down to McMahons Point to take delivery of the prisoners, who were still lying facedown on the ground. Police found a pistol in the glove box of Curtis' Mercedes. The first stage of the operation had occurred successfully and, to cap things off, a television crew who'd been attending a fire at the end of the road captured the aftermath of the arrests on camera. Jubelin swears he did not light that fire.

Glen Browne and Glen Morfoot took charge of Anthony Perish, who was completely cool following the arrest. After the senior SPG officer handed him over, Browne put him in the back of a police car and they drove to North Sydney Police Station, where he was charged with Terry Falconer's murder. Asked if he would participate in an interview he said words to the effect of, ‘I don't know. What do you think?' There was no interview.

Later the police searched Curtis' home in Newcastle and in two locked double garages under the house found everything a well-equipped hitman might need. In the first were two large, padlocked toolboxes, which they opened with bolt-cutters. The top one contained several rifles, the other one an extendable
baton and a bulletproof vest. In the other garage there were three more toolboxes containing pistols, a machine pistol, another vest, a silencer, various police identification patches for uniforms, many police badges, wigs, face masks and balaclavas. Three thousand rounds of ammunition were also discovered.