B00BY4HXME EBOK
Authors: Andrei Lankov
The Real North Korea
Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia
ANDREI LANKOV
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© 2013 Andrei Lankov
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Lankov, A. N. (Andrei Nikolaevich)
The real North Korea : life and politics in the failed Stalinist utopia / Andrei Lankov.
pages; cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-996429-1 (hardback : alk. paper)
1. Korea (North)—Politics and government—1994–
2. Korea (North)—Foreign relations. I. Title.
DS935.774.L36 2013
951.9304—dc23 2012046992
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
CHAPTER 1 The Society Kim Il Sung Built and How He Did It
Between Moscow and Beijing: The Foreign Policy of Kim Il Sung’s North Korea
The World According to Kim Il Sung
The Silver Lining in a Social Disaster
The Birth of Juche, the Rise of the Son, and the Slow-Motion Demise of a Hyper-Stalinist Economy
CHAPTER 2 Two Decades of Crisis
Taking the Exit Option: Not an Exodus Yet, But …
Arrival in Paradise, aka Capitalist Hell
CHAPTER 3 The Logic of Survival (Domestically)
Reform as Collective Political Suicide
Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: (Not-So-Successful) Crackdowns on Market Activity
A Disaster That Almost Happened: The Currency Reform of 2009
The Belated Rise of a “New Star General”
The Sudden Beginning of a New Era
Meanwhile, in South Korea … (the Rise of 386ers and Its Consequences)
INTERLUDE The Contours of a Future: What Might Happen to North Korea in the Next Two Decades
Why North Korea Is Likely to Continue for a While (But Not Forever)
Stability Will Return, but How?
CHAPTER 5 What to Do about the North?
Why the Sticks Are Not Big Enough
Why the Carrots Are Not Sweet Enough (and Why “Strategic Patience” Is Not a Great Idea, Either)
The Hidden Benefits of Engagement
Why They Matter: Working with the Refugees in South Korea
CHAPTER 6 Being Ready for What We Wish For
A Provisional Confederation as the Least Unacceptable Solution
The present book would have been impossible without the support and encouragement of many individuals with whom I have discussed the numerous issues dealt with in the book. Among many others, I would like to mention Rüdiger Frank, Scott Snyder, John Park, Stephen Haggard, Nicolas Eberstadt, Marcus Noland, Fyodor Tertitsky, Tatiana Gabroussenko, Kim Y
ŏ
ng-Il, Kim S
ŏ
k-hyang, Yu Ho-y
ŏ
l, Nam Song-uk, Yu Kil-chae, Kim By
ŏ
ng-y
ŏ
n, and Zhu Feng.
I am especially grateful to Peter Ward, who typed most of the manuscript while correcting my less than perfect English and also providing me with advice on both style and subject matter, as well as with valuable critiques of my ideas and arguments.
When it deals with the issues of the recent social and economic developments, the book draws on the result of the research that was supported by a grant from the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2010-330-B00187). I also would like to express my deep gratitude to “Moravius” who allowed me to use some photos from his extensive collection.
What does the average Westerner think when North Korea is mentioned? In all probability a number of oft-repeated phrases straight from the media will spring to mind. “A mad country,” “the world’s last Stalinist regime,” “nuclear brinkmanship,” and other similar clichés dominate popular understanding of North Korea. Above all, North Korea is said to be “irrational.” This is, allegedly, a country whose actions are unpredictable, defying common sense and perhaps even the laws of physics.
But there is one problem with these clichés: they are largely wrong. North Korea is not irrational, and nothing shows this better than its continuing survival against all odds. North Korea is essentially a political living fossil, a relic of an era long gone. Similar regimes either changed out of recognition or disappeared long ago and are now remembered with disdain, if at all. Meanwhile, the regime in Pyongyang still remains in full control of its country. This is a remarkable feat, especially if we take into consideration that it has to operate in a highly—and increasingly—unfavorable environment.
North Korea is a small country with few resources and a moribund economy. In spite of all this, however, it has managed to survive and successfully manipulate larger players, including an impressive number of the great powers. You simply cannot achieve this by being irrational. North Korea’s alleged penchant for irrational and erratic behavior is illusionary: the North Korean leaders actually know perfectly well what they are doing. They are neither madmen nor ideological zealots, but
rather remarkably efficient and cold-minded calculators, perhaps the best practitioners of Machiavellian politics that can be found in the modern world.
And what of other descriptions: Is North Korea really “driven by an insane ideological zeal”? Is it “unpredictably aggressive”? Indeed, the grotesquely bellicose and often nonsensical rhetoric of the North Korean official media and the country’s occasional armed provocations and nuclear weapons program might seem like a confirmation of its alleged aggressiveness. However, a deeper look into Pyongyang’s decision making should make us skeptical of such claims. Pyongyang’s brinkmanship indeed appears risky at times, but so far North Korea’s leaders have known where to stop, how not to cross the red line, and how not to provoke an escalation of tensions into a full-scale war. They have employed saber rattling for decades as part of a shrewd (and highly rational) manipulative strategy that has succeeded—in most cases, at least.
This book is, first of all, about the inner logic of North Korean behavior. This logic is defined by the peculiarities of North Korean society, which in turn are the results of long-term developments. I have written this book in order to explain how North Korea has come to be an international problem, and I also attempt to explain why North Korea’s leadership has had no option but to try to remain a pariah.
The book starts with a sketch of North Korean history, which is important since familiarity with the history of the North is vital for anybody who wants to understand the current predicament facing the North Korean leadership. The Kim family regime began as a bold experiment in social engineering. This experiment was led by the elite, whose efforts were much encouraged—and often directly controlled—by Stalin’s Russia, but they also enjoyed considerable support from below.
However, the initial rosy expectations and popular enthusiasm were sadly misplaced and soon North Korean society found itself saddled with an increasingly inefficient and unsustainable economic model that had become dependent on the constant infusion of foreign aid. Matters were made worse by the nature of the North Korean elite, which had become hereditary and almost impossible to challenge or change. As time passed
and with no apparent way out of the predicament, the economic and political position of North Korea changed from acceptable to difficult before becoming disastrous.
Sadly and strangely, the major problems faced by North Korea’s decision makers were created by the staggering economic success of North Korea’s twin state—the Republic of Korea. Even though it was impossible to know in 1945, South Korea chose a path that, at the end of the day, proved to be far more efficient and promising than the choices made by (or partially forced on) North Korea’s decision makers. However, the existence of the highly successful South Korean state has created continuous and nearly insurmountable problems for the North Korean elite.
Thus, when things moved from bad to worse around 1990 after Soviet aid suddenly dried up, the North Korean elite and the Kim family decided that they should avoid reform, keep the situation under control as best as possible, and use diplomacy (backed, when necessary, by a bit of nuclear blackmail) to extract foreign aid, which remained vital for the survival of their economy. This decision led to a massive famine, not to mention countless deaths in prison camps, but it has worked so far: unlike other Communist regimes, the North Korean state has survived against seemingly impossible odds.
