Read Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution Online
Authors: Laurent Dubois
Le Cap had been preserved from the insurgents, but much of the property
in the northern plain had been destroyed. Sugar production, the lifeblood
of the region, was at a standstill. And for many planters the government of
France, prey to a powerful revolutionary movement, was almost as danger-
ous and unpredictable as the slave insurgents themselves. For some, exile
was the only choice. One man announced his departure for New England
with a poem that began “Adieu France.” A woman “recently arrived from
France” had soon seen enough, and offered her services as a chambermaid
to anyone headed back across the Atlantic.6
Others stayed, hoping to resolve the situation, or at least to survive it.
Administrators sought aid from nearby Jamaica, whose governor sent sev-
eral ships with provisions and ammunition, though no troops. The planter
Bryan Edwards, who joined the convoy, described how as the ships arrived
in Le Cap townspeople “assembled on the beach” and “with uplifted hands
and streaming eyes, gave welcome to their deliverers (for such they con-
sidered us).” The white population, he claimed, was unanimous in its “out-
cry against the National Assembly, to whose proceedings were imputed all
their disasters.” Indeed many were ready to “renounce their allegiance to
the mother country,” and “without scruple or restraint” declared that they
wished the British would “conquer the island, or rather receive its volun-
tary surrender from the inhabitants.” One prominent planter sent a letter
to British prime minister William Pitt requesting an English occupation
of the colony, which he saw as the only way to preserve the institution of
slavery.7
But in the end the aid provided by the British was, as one embit-
tered colonist wrote, “limited to sterile wishes and useless demonstra-
tions.” Pitt apparently responded to the news of the insurrection by com-
menting dryly: “It seems the French will be drinking their coffee with
caramel.” Whatever sympathies the white slave owners of the Caribbean
might have for one another, the competition between empires was ulti-
mately more important to the British, and when they finally did come to
Saint-Domingue, it would be as invaders seeking internal allies in a war of
conquest rather than as friends providing aid.8
Without troops from the British, and with months to wait before any
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troops could arrive from France, the governors of Saint-Domingue faced a
serious problem. How could the fight against the insurgents be sustained?
The available soldiers had been sent into the field, along with many civil-
ians recruited into this desperate war. But by early November the two most
important officers leading the campaign were convinced that this would
not be enough. The only way to assure a victory, they argued, was to enlist
the support of the free-coloreds. “What is the white population compared
to the multitude of rebel slaves?” asked Rouvray in a speech to the assem-
bly in Le Cap. “Isn’t this enemy enough, without continuing to provoke
the free-coloreds?” Invoking the “authority of history”—and drawing on
his experience as a commander of free-colored troops during the American
Revolution—he reminded his audience that these troops were superior to
soldiers arriving from Europe, who were always decimated by disease.
Tousard seconded Rouvray, pointing out that the only way to win the war
against the insurgents was to harass and pursue them continually. Where
were the soldiers—men “used to the climate”—who could carry out such a
war? “Do you have any other than the mulattoes? No.” Why, then, did the
assembly persist in refusing their help, pushing them into the camp of the
enemy rather than welcoming them as allies?9
Since many of them had served in the militia and in the pursuit of ma-
roons in the
maréchaussée,
the free-coloreds indeed seemed the ideal soldiers for fighting the insurgents. Although there were some among the in-
surgent camps, many free-coloreds had already shown their willingness
to combat the insurrection. In the first days of the uprising a group of free-coloreds in Le Cap had formed a troop to fight the rebels. During the
attack on the Gallifet plantation, the first to enter the camp were “the free mulattoes and negroes, chiefly mounted.” Nevertheless, the assembly rejected the interventions of the veteran officers, deferring any discussion
of the status of the free-coloreds until after the insurrection was de-
feated. Having successfully held the free-coloreds at bay through violence
in Saint-Domingue and lobbying in Paris, they were unwilling to relent,
even in the dramatic situation that surrounded them. “One day,” Rouvray
warned them, “the pitying laughs with which you greet the important
truths I share with you will turn to tears of blood.”10
Not all whites in the colony were as intransigent. Some saw that the
threat of sharing political power with a small group of free-coloreds was
nothing in comparison to the threat of losing everything. During Septem-
ber and October several local administrators signed a remarkable series of
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treaties with groups of free-coloreds. This happened not in the Northern
Province, but rather in the west (and subsequently in the south), where
free-coloreds were armed and well organized, and where the slaves were
relatively contained even after August 1791. While the slave insurrection
was the major force shaping events in the Northern Province, then, the
vexed relationship between free-coloreds and whites took center stage in
other regions of the colony.
Early in August 1791 free-coloreds organized a mass political assembly
in the town of Mirabalais. A well-respected, French-educated man named
Pierre Pinchinat was elected president, and forty delegates were chosen to
address demands for political rights to the National Assembly, as well as to
local assemblies and the colony’s governor. Just as the revolt began in the
Northern Province, however, the governor responded by ordering them to
dissolve their “illegal” assembly. The angry free-colored assembly soon de-
cided to take up arms. Among their leaders was André Rigaud, a goldsmith
who had been educated in Bordeaux and had a long military career that,
according to many accounts, stretched back to the siege at Savannah dur-
ing the American Revolution. He was at the beginning of an illustrious po-
litical career that would ultimately lead him into a brutal conflict with
Toussaint Louverture. But all that was still far in the future.11
The free-coloreds of the Western Province, expecting open warfare with
their white enemies, were eager for military allies. They found them in a
several groups of rebellious slaves who were active in the region. The free-
coloreds promised these slaves—who became known as the Swiss (a refer-
ence to the Swiss mercenaries who served the French king)—that they
would receive freedom in return for their service. The “Confederates,” as
the alliance of the free-coloreds and the Swiss called themselves, quickly
proved to be a daunting military force. In early September a troop of
whites from Port-au-Prince attacked them near Croix-des-Bouquets. The
Confederates pushed many of their white opponents into the nearby cane
fields. It was not a good place to take refuge; as they should have known by
then, sugarcane burns all too easily. The Confederates set fire to the cane
fields, and the whites trapped in them were burned to death.12
In the wake of this victory, a wealthy planter from the town named
Hanus de Jumecourt stepped forward with an audacious plan. At odds with
the radical whites of Port-au-Prince, many of whom came from the class of
“petits blancs,” and intent on preventing slave rebellion from breaking out
in the region, he decided to make peace with the free-coloreds. He led the
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administrators of Croix-des-Bouquets and Mirabalais in signing an agree-
ment with the Confederates, promising to abide by the decrees of the
French National Assembly, including that of May 15, 1791, which had
given political rights to some free-coloreds. This first agreement became
the template for another signed soon afterward between representatives
from Port-au-Prince and the “citizens of color,” as the Confederates point-
edly named themselves. It began with a history lesson. The “citizens of
color” declared that the provisions “passed in their favor” in the 1685 Code
Noir had been “violated by the progress of a ridiculous form of prejudice,”
which had continued when the assemblies in the colony denied them the
vote, and they had therefore been compelled to take up arms to defend
their “violated and misunderstood rights.” Having set the record straight
on their own actions, they noted (undoubtedly with considerable satisfac-
tion) that it was good to see the “return of the white citizens to the true
principles of reason, justice, humanity, and healthy policies.”13
The “citizens of color” presented themselves as defenders of the Na-
tional Assembly, and the whites as rebels against its authority. They de-
manded the “literal execution of all the points and articles of the decrees
and instructions of the National Assembly,” insisting, as Ogé had the year
before, that these had granted them political rights. Since they had been il-
legally excluded from voting, furthermore, they declared that all the as-
semblies then in existence were illegitimate and must be replaced through
new, racially integrated elections. Whites in the region had been furiously
resisting any grant of political rights to free-coloreds for years, but with
slave revolt looming to the north, times had changed. The Port-au-Prince
delegates accepted all the free-coloreds’ demands. Another “Concordat”
signed in October 1791 added more provisions, ordering the integration of
local militia units and abolishing the use of racial distinctions in public discourse. All free men would simply be “citizens.”14
A procession and a mass were organized in Port-au-Prince to celebrate
the agreement. Alongside the victorious free-coloreds were the Swiss—
several hundred rebel slaves turned victorious soldiers—whose presence
thrilled slaves in the town and galled many whites. They walked, wrote one
observer, “with the assurance of free men,” and reportedly told urban
slaves: “If you had done like us, the country would be ours!” There had
been no mention of the Swiss in the numerous agreements signed during
the previous month, but there had been a debate among the free-coloreds
about what to do with them. Many free-coloreds supported a proposal by
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which the Swiss would be freed but forced to serve eight years in the
maréchaussée.
But the white patriots in Port-au-Prince were against any such action, convinced that rewarding rebellious slaves with freedom was
a bad precedent. Although a number of free-coloreds, including André
Rigaud, spoke out in defense of the Swiss, the free-colored leadership, led
by their more conservative leaders such as Pierre Pinchinat, acquiesced in
the decision of the administrators of Port-au-Prince: the Swiss were to be
deported. “I knew all along that the blacks would get screwed,” one dis-
gusted slave in Port-au-Prince exclaimed. He was right: the Swiss were to
be sent to the Mosquito Coast of Central America, a place where, as one
planter wrote, “even the devil couldn’t survive.” In fact, though, they suf-
fered a worse fate. The captain who was supposed to bring them to the
Mosquito Coast tried, and failed, to sell them in Belize, then dumped them
along the shore of Jamaica. The British, alarmed at the prospect of having
such slaves in their colony, shipped them back to Saint-Domingue. There,
imprisoned in a boat in a remote harbor under the watch of French sol-
diers, sixty were executed, and most of the rest died of sickness and starva-
tion. It was a tragic betrayal that would not be forgotten, and a taste of the internal conflicts among different groups of African descent in the colony
that were to come.15
Meanwhile the brief period of cooperation and peace between the free-
coloreds and whites ended in a new outbreak of violence. On the day the
municipality was scheduled to ratify the Concordat, a black Confederate
soldier named Scapin was insulted in the street by a white soldier. They be-
gan to fight, and when the police arrived they arrested Scapin. News of the
incident spread, and an angry white crowd pushed the police aside and
lynched him. Enraged free-coloreds responded by shooting down a white
“patriot.” A battle broke out in the streets of Port-au-Prince. The outnum-
bered free-colored soldiers retreated from the town, but whites killed free-
colored civilians in the streets and murdered them in their homes. As the
killing progressed, a devastating fire broke out in the city. Eight hundred
houses were burnt to their foundations, and the city reduced to a “mound
of ashes.”16