Atlantis and Other Places (13 page)

“What happened to you?”

“We got torpedoed. Broad daylight. [Bleep] sub attacked on the surface. We never had a chance. We started going down fast. Next thing I knew, I was in the drink. That’s how I got this [bleep] oil all over me.”

“Did you lose any shipmates?”

“Better believe it, buddy.”

“I’m sorry. I—”

At that point, we had to withdraw, because naval officers were coming up. They would have confiscated this film if they’d been able to get their hands on it. They have confiscated other film, and blocked newspaper reporting, too. The
Rochester
is the seventeenth ship known to be attacked in Atlantic waters since the war began. How many had you heard about? How many more will there be?

And how many U-boats has the Navy sunk? Any at all?

February 9, 1942—
The New Yorker

The Mark XIV torpedo is the U.S. Navy’s answer to Jane Russell: an expensive bust. Too often, it doesn’t go where our submariners aim it. When it does, it doesn’t sink what they aim it at. Why not? The answer breaks into three parts—poor design, poor testing, and poor production.

Some Mark XIVs dive down to the bottom of the sea shortly after launch. Some run wild. A few have even reversed course and attacked the subs that turned them loose. Despite this, on the record Navy Department officials continue to insist that there is no problem. Off the record—but only off the record—they are trying to figure out what all is wrong and how to fix it.

The magnetic exploder is an idea whose time may not have come. It was considered and rejected by the German U-boat service, which has more experience with submarine warfare than anyone else on earth. Still, in its infinite wisdom, FDR’s Navy Department chose to use this unproved system.

And, in its infinite wisdom, FDR’s Navy Department conducted no live-firing tests before the war broke out. None. Officials were sure the magnetic exploder would perform as advertised. If you’re sure, why bother to test?

Combat experience has shown why. Our Mark XIVs run silent and run deep. More often than not, they run
too
deep: under the keels of the ships at which they’re aimed and on their merry way. Or, sometimes, the magnetic exploder—which is a fragile and highly temperamental gadget—will blow up before the torpedo gets to its target. Manufacturing quality is not where it ought to be—not even close.

Despite this, Navy Department brass is making submariners scrimp with their “fish.” They are strongly urged to shoot only one or two torpedoes at each ship, not a large spread. The brass is sure one hit from a torpedo with a magnetic exploder will sink anything afloat. Getting the hit seems to be the sticking point.

Japan builds torpedoes that work even when dropped from airplanes. Why don’t we? The answer looks obvious. We want to save money. Japan wants to win the war. When fighting a foe who shows such fanatical determination, how can we hope to prevail?

February 13, 1942—
Washington Post

President Roosevelt used the excuse of Lincoln’s Birthday to allege that the United States and its coalition partners might still win the war despite the swelling tide of opposition to his ill-planned adventure.

In a national radio address, Roosevelt said, “Those who point out our weaknesses and emphasize our disagreements only aid the enemy. We were taken by surprise on December 7. We need time to get rolling. But we
can
do the job.”

The President seemed ill at ease—almost desperate—as he went on, “These leaks that torment us have got to stop. They help no one but the foes of freedom. It is much harder to go forward if Germany and Japan know what we are going to do before we do it.”

In the Congressional response to his speech, a ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee said, “The President’s speech highlights the bankruptcy of his policies. After promising to keep us out of war, he got us into one we are not ready to fight. Our weapons don’t work, and we can’t begin to keep our shipping safe. We don’t have enough men to do half of what the President and the Secretary of War are trying to do. And even if we did, what they want to do doesn’t look like a good idea anyhow.”

Peaceful pickets outside the White House demanded that the President bring our troops back to the United States and keep them out of harm’s way. The presence of photographers and reporters helped ensure that White House police did not rough up the demonstrators.

February 23, 1942—
Washington Post

In an embarrassing defeat for the administration, the House of Representatives voted 241-183 to reject a bill that would have rationed fuel, food, and materials deemed “essential to wartime industries.”

“Why should the American people have to suffer for Roosevelt’s mistakes?” demanded a Congressman who opposed the bill. “If we rationed these commodities, you could just wait and see. Gas would jump past thirty cents a gallon, and there wouldn’t be enough of it even at that price.”

A War Department official, speaking off the record, called the House’s action “deplorable.” The only public comment from the executive branch was that it was “studying the situation.” Had it done that in 1940 and 1941 . . .

March 17, 1942—
San Francisco Chronicle

General Douglas MacArthur fled the Philippines one jump ahead of the Japanese. PT boats and a B-17 brought him to Darwin, Australia. (Incidentally, Japanese bombers leveled Darwin last month and forced its abandonment.)

“I shall return,” pledged MacArthur. But the promise rings hollow for the men he left behind. Trapped on the Bataan Peninsula in a war they do not understand, they soldier on as best they can. Since Japanese forces surround them, the only question is how long they can hold out.

Roosevelt hopes MacArthur can lead counterattacks later in the war. Given the disasters thus far, this seems only another sample of his blind and foolish optimism. . . .

March 23, 1942—
The New Yorker

German U-boats are taking a disastrous toll on military goods bound for England. In the first three months of the war, subs sank ships carrying 400 tanks, 60 8-inch howitzers, 880 25-pounder guns, 400 2-pounder guns, 240 armored cars, 500 machine-gun carriers, 52,100 tons of ammo, 6,000 rifles, 4,280 tons of tank supplies, 20,000 tons of miscellaneous supplies, and 10,000 tanks of gasoline. A secret War Department estimate calls this the equivalent of 30,000 bombing runs.

And the administration cannot stop the bleeding. Blackout orders are routinely ignored. Ships silhouetted at night against illuminated East Coast cities make easy targets. Businessmen say dimming their lights at night would hurt their bottom line.

Although the Navy Department claims to have sunk several U-boats and damaged more, there is no hard evidence it has harmed even one German sailor.

Britain urges the United States to begin convoying, as she has done. U.S. Navy big shots continue to believe this is unnecessary. How they can maintain this in the face of losses so staggering is strange and troubling, but they do.

The issue is causing a rift between the United States and one of her two most important allies. Last Wednesday, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill, “My Navy has definitely been slack in preparing for this submarine war off our coast. . . . By May 1 I expect to get a pretty good coastal patrol working.”

Churchill fears May 1 will be much too late.

“Those of us who are directly concerned with combatting the Atlantic submarine menace are not at all sure that the British are applying sufficient effort to bombing German submarine bases,” said U.S. Admiral Ernest J. King.

As the allies bicker, innocent sailors lose their lives for no good purpose.