Ancient Chinese Warfare (65 page)

When sieges commenced in the Spring and Autumn period, aggressive actions against fortified towns sometimes had to be abandoned because the attackers had exhausted their food supplies. Thus, in later periods the problem of sustaining a prolonged siege was sometimes partially solved by assigning a portion of the troops to undertake localized farming efforts, a sort of precursor to deliberately having longemplaced garrisons simultaneously farm and perform defensive functions along the border from the Han onward. Warring States writers were acutely aware of how intertwined war and agriculture had become,
no doubt accounting for Shang Yang’s views and the state of Ch’in awarding rank only for achievements in war and agriculture.
²⁴

Early in the Spring and Autumn period, Ch’in therefore tried to undermine Chin by refusing any aid when the latter was suffering from famine, despite having previously benefited from their largess. Even more perniciously, at the end of the period Yüeh reportedly sought to debilitate its nemesis Wu through an unorthodox biological attack effected by offering them high-yielding but secretly damaged seed for the next year’s crop, thereby enticing them into consuming their reserves.

Because victory invariably depends on securing adequate materials and provisions, severing the enemy’s supply routes could compel them to segment their forces or dispatch disorganized raiding parties that might then be assaulted in detail, thereby winnowing down their forces while reducing them to a starving, ineffective rabble. Under the unrelenting pressure of severe deficiencies, commanders tended to mount hasty actions that often turned out to be premature or ill-conceived. In addition, people trapped in fortified cities under extended siege not infrequently resorted to cannibalism to survive.

Acquiring accurate knowledge of the enemy’s condition, particularly how long they might endure before hunger would totally dispirit or starvation kill them, could prove critical in formulating effective tactics. As early as the
Art of War
Sun-tzu noted that “those who stand about leaning on their weapons are hungry” while “if those who draw water drink first, they are thirsty.”
²⁵
The status of the enemy’s provisions—“whether the army is well prepared or suffers from inadequacies, whether there is a surplus or shortage of foodstuffs”—accordingly came to be viewed as a key factor in assessing enemy vulnerability.
²⁶
The late Warring States, Taoist-oriented
Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung
somewhat expansively advised:
²⁷

Commanders therefore sought to deny this information through increased security, wide buffer zones, outright deception, and other means. For example, General Ho of the Northern Chou created phony grain mounds by heaping grain on top of piles of sand, causing the local people who had been stealthily observing the camp to report the existence of ample supplies to the enemy.
²⁸

In terms of logistical practices, it must be conceded that the Chinese Neolithic remains unknowable. However, most clashes were localized affairs, basically raids and brief encounters conducted by a few dozen men within a day’s march, and the combatants probably carried sufficient provisions to sustain them for a day or two. However, as regional powers such as the Hsia, San Miao, and proto-Shang arose and conflict escalated to involve hundreds, then thousands, of men, some administrative and organizational measures must have been initiated.

Archaeological discoveries provide evidence that the adoption of agriculture and then its rapid expansion in the Lungshan period meant that edible stores ranging from millet to seeds had come into existence, would be found at every village, and could easily be seized by forces in the field. In addition, pigs and other mobile animals that were raised in large numbers greatly increased the potential food supply, but could also entangle the troops in slaying and cooking them, making them vulnerable to the sort of surprise attacks that would be advocated and exploited in later centuries.
²⁹

Insofar as hunting and the gathering of fruits and other edibles still played a vital role in the Neolithic and even the Shang, small bands of
a few hundred could probably find adequate sustenance in the generally uninhabited countryside about them. Large-scale hunts in which several hundred animals might be captured or slain prior to a campaign would also provide significant provisions. Furthermore, since almost all the settlements and villages, the era’s most likely targets, were located near rivers and lakes, fishing and trapping offered another, though somewhat more time-consuming, possibility. Some animals such as the sheep found buried with the Shang chariot formation could have been herded along in viable numbers if the armies, proceeding on foot, did not advance too far or too quickly, thereby lessening the protein burdens of hunting.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of cattle and horses apart, the fundamental problem of providing fodder was simply one of weight and bulk. However, the limited forces fielded prior to the Shang were probably not accompanied by animals, and even Shang armies had few chariots and wagons, so their requirements would have been low and probably satisfied simply by letting the horses and any cattle employed as motive power for so-called
ta ch’e
or large vehicles graze in the immediate area. Reconstructed campaigns indicate that Shang armies on campaign rarely remained encamped for any lengthy period and were thus able to avoid exhausting the locally available fodder and provisions or suffering the many other logistical and health problems posed by stalemates and prolonged sieges.
³⁰

In the Eastern Chou and later periods winter was generally thought to be the proper season for the military activities of punishing and slaying, in accord with the ascendancy of
yin
and the natural characteristics of the correlated elemental phases of metal (autumn) and water (winter). Thus the officials charged with administering punishments appear among those correlated with autumn in the
Chou Li
, and several weapons makers are subsumed under winter. In addition, military activities undertaken at this time could take advantage of the lull in agricultural obligations and live off recently harvested crops. However, the oracular inscriptions show that the Shang initiated military campaigns in response to external stimuli and perceived threats throughout the year. Even though the effects of cold weather had to be endured, autumn and winter campaigns were no doubt facilitated by the maturation of fruits and
nuts and the enhanced availability of agricultural reserves, but clearly were not constrained by their existence.

Warehouses and granaries were maintained in the core area from which the initial supplies for military campaigns could be allocated. In addition, the Shang constantly opened new fields on the periphery and converted conquered areas into farmland, particularly to the west. Armies necessarily passing through these areas could take advantage of locally harvested and stored provisions, and it appears that some of the subjugated states also retained foodstuffs and animals for such use rather than forwarding them to the Shang as tribute, thereby reducing not only any initial amount that might have to be allotted, but also the cost and effort of transport.
³¹
However, large numbers of animals—up to several hundred oxen on at least one occasion—were also received by the Shang, and though many were consumed and used for sacrificial purposes (prior to also being consumed), some would certainly have been available to supply military requirements.

Under Wu Ting the Shang further reduced its military expenses by dispatching subservient states and coercing allies who were responsible for sustaining themselves in the field. They also seem to have provided supplies when necessary. For example, one inscription preserves a query as to whether the proto-state of Yüeh will supply the needs of the
lü
(regiments) on the march.
³²
The value of such contributions should not be underestimated. As the
Art of War
notes, “The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off. When provisions are transported far off, the hundred surnames are impoverished. One who excels in employing the military does not transport provisions a third time.”
³³

Even though many Shang campaigns probably required only a few weeks, weapons questions would have still loomed large. Apart from the piercing and crushing weapons carried from the outset, a huge number of arrows had to be supplied as the campaign progressed. For a single engagement the total of twenty arrows carried in each archer’s two quivers might have sufficed, but even at a very slow rate of fire of perhaps five shots per minute, a daylong standoff or intense pre-clash archery duel would easily consume a few hundred per man. No archer could have carried that many, as suggested by the large number of
bundles often recovered from Shang tombs, so there must have been some system of supply and resupply.

Opinion differs about whether the Hsia’s rudimentary administrative structure included officials responsible for weapons or they were simply provided by the individuals themselves or the various Hsia clans.
³⁴
However, as previously noted, it is generally thought that the Shang monopolized the manufacture and bulk storage of weapons, even though a wide variety of dagger-axes, dirks, axes, and bows must have been in the possession of the Shang warrior elite. Conversely, it has been asserted that the early Chou dynasty military proclamation known as the “Fei Shih,” included in the
Shang Shu
but probably dating to the early Spring and Autumn, provides evidence that the troops furnished their own weapons in the early Chou and thus, by projection backward, in the Shang.

However, the highly laconic “Fei Shih” is a very indeterminate collection of statements promulgated by an unknown commander prior to a campaign against the Yi located around the Huai River. Even though they are instructed to prepare their armor and weapons by repairing, sharpening, and generally putting everything in order, there is no information on the origin of these weapons. (The troops are also ordered to prepare cooked rations of grain, but whether the materials were supplied by the government is unknown.) Even the official in charge of weapons noted in the
Chou Li
, who clearly provides them to the users (including those about to learn archery), cannot be realistically envisioned as having existed in the Shang.

Different clans seem to have specialized, whether deliberately or through historical accident, in certain types of productive activities. If so, they could be tasked with responsibility for furnishing or otherwise overseeing various categories of essential military goods ranging from weapons through provisions. Various peoples with expertise in horses, oxen, and grazing animals, such as the Chiang, and the specialized officers for dogs and perhaps livestock would also have provided a ready core of competent officials for sustained military operations and probably served on an ad hoc basis throughout the Shang. In particular, responsibility for providing meat in the field seems to have fallen to the
Tuo Ch’üan
or Chief Canine Officer.
³⁵
Standing border forces under these
officials and the
shu
also seem to have undertaken local farming for sustenance purposes.
³⁶

Finally, the nature and degree of road development in the Hsia and Shang would have considerably impacted the transportation of goods and materials, as well as facilitated (or hindered) the army’s movement. Although well-tamped roads have been found in many early sites, including Erh-li-t’ou and Yen-shih, all the discoveries to date have been confined to early cities and towns, the natural focus of excavations. Whether the Hsia or, more likely, the Shang had administrative officials entrusted with the task of road improvement and early bridge building is unknown, though the forwarding of tribute and passage of troops would seem to have stimulated the dispatch of work crews responsible for clearing trees and the simple upgrading of well-traveled paths.
³⁷
No doubt there was a reciprocal relationship between the opening of transport routes as a result of trade and administrative necessity, including the passage of large numbers of troops, and the facilitation of commerce and military activities.

25.

DESPITE THE ANALYSES PROFFERED by a growing number of books on primitive or early warfare, the point at which societies shift from being peaceful and rustic to being dominated by martial values in order to survive remains opaque.
¹
Whether an idyllic age of tranquility ever existed apart from later imagination and the projections of theorists who embrace the dogma of matriarchal equality might equally be questioned.
²
However, in China many of the classic Warring States writings already envisioned a sudden devolvement from an era of virtue and tranquility, of simplicity and harmony (whether natural or enforced), through a stage when the members concerned themselves with warfare only when threatened, to the final advent of segregation and conflict.