Ancient Chinese Warfare (75 page)

42
For example, see the extensive discussion in
The Cambridge History of Ancient China
, 124ff., for a comprehensive reflection of the revised view of Chinese history and culture that has
evolved over the past few decades, displacing the former belief that so-called high civilizations define the benchmarks and comparatively determine progress toward some extrapolated ideal.

43
Jui Kuo-yao and Shen Yüeh-ming, KK 1992:11, 1039-1044.

44
For an example of a subordinate state that sent in tribute, could be deputed on warfare tasks, and whose rulers may have been related to the king’s clan by marriage, see Wang Yungp’o, HCCHS 1992:4, 31-40. Many clans and proto-state names are known only from emblems and characters on bronze vessels. (For a concise enumeration of the latter, see Liu Chao-ying and P’ei Shu-lan, STWMYC, 365-372.)

45
For the origins of the plastrons employed in Shang divination, see Sung Chen-hao, STWMYC, 392-398.

46
Yang Sheng-nan, CKSYC 1991:4, 47-59, believes that the king had ultimate control over land allotments and rescissions and that grants were even made to other clans and proto-states outside Shang bounds (constituting a sort of de facto recognition for the purpose of symbolic integration).

47
Wang Kuan-ying, LSYC 1984:5, 80-99. It appears that the Shang was not a centralized state that systematically awarded fiefs but instead the most powerful group among a number of entities characterized by varying degrees of strength and independence. (For example, see Li Sheng,
Chung-kuo Pien-chiang Shih-ti Yen-chiu
2006:9, 1-8; for a recent overview see Li Hsüeh-shan, HCCHS 2005:1, 29-34, who concludes that some thirty-six states concentrated in central Henan, southern central Shanxi, and around the capital had a close relationship with the Shang without ever being formally enfeoffed, and that they formed a defensive bulwark late in the dynasty that effectively blunted encroachments from the northwest.)

48
The core domain was apparently more heterogeneous than traditionally believed; evidence of non-clan names and even foreign peoples, including Chiang, Chi, Yün, Jen, and Ch’ang, has been uncovered. (See Ch’en Chieh, HCCHS 2003:2, 15-22. Evidence for the Ch’ang clan is seen in an opulent tomb; see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tso-tui, KK 2004:1, 7-19.)

49
For recent overviews see Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40; T’ang Chi-ken, KKHP 1999:4, 393-420; and Pei-ching Ta-hsüeh K’ao-ku-hsi, KK 2005:6, 17-31.

50
See Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40, and Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC, 1991:1, 53-63.

51
Lei Kuang-shan, KKWW 2000:2, 28-34; Chang T’ien-en, KK 2001:9, 13-21; and Li Hai-jung, KKWW 2000:2, 35-47. As Li’s analysis shows, Kuan-chung was an extremely complex area that integrated multiple influences from the Shang, Shu, and northern steppes with numerous local factors. (For example, Cheng-chia-pao had better metallurgy and eventually absorbed the nearby Liu-chia before their amalgamated indigenous culture displaced the Shang during the fourth phase of Yin-hsü.)

52
Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC 1991:1, 53-63. For example, a dagger-axe with the name of a powerful group apparently closely related to the royal clan, noted in oracular inscriptions such as HJ33002 as having been dispatched in a military command capacity and also found on bronze vessels, has been recovered at an apparent Shaanxi outpost (Chang Mao-jung, KKWW 1997:4, 38-41, 49).

53
Chang T’ien-en, KK 2001:9, 13-21.

54
T’ang Chi-ken, KKHP 1999:4, 393-420; Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40.

55
Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC, 1991:1, 53-63; Liu Shih-o and Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS 1991:10, 15-19. A strongly fortified Shang citadel, it also had smelting and pottery production facilities. (There is some disagreement as to the date of its loss to the Shang, with Liu and Yüeh arguing that it was the stronghold of the state of Sui, a staunch Shang supporter known to have been vanquished by the Chou prior to their conquest of the Shang.)

56
Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40.

57
For an explication of the site’s martial aspects and their implications (which are generally followed here), see Wang Jui, KK 1998:8, 81-91. Additional analysis may be found in Ts’ao Ping-wu,
KK 1997:12, 85-89, and Wang Yüeh-ch’ien and T’ung Wei-hua, KK 2005:11, 3-17. Radiocarbon dates for the initial site of as early as 2000 BCE, clearly pre-Shang, have been reported. In addition to being a military bastion, it appears to have been the center of the later state of Yüan (Tsou Heng, HSCLWC, undated, 204-218).

58
See Wang Jui, KK 1998:8, 90.

59
See Wang Jui, KK 1998:8, 89-90, and Ts’ao Ping-wu, WW 1997: 12, 85-88. Although ancient copper mines have been discovered in the general region, the site lacks any evidence of a direct relationship, and during the period of Shang fluorescence the most important deposits were located in the south. (See Wang Jui, 90, and Wang Yüeh-ch’ien, KK 2005:11, 16.) However, salt was crucial to every dynasty, and the Yün-ch’eng basin around Yüan-ch’ü was one of the chief sources in antiquity, the salt recovered from the nearby salt lakes being shipped down to Cheng-chou. (It has been suggested that Yüan-ch’ü was T’ang’s early capital of Po, even though radiocarbon dating precludes this possibility, and that it was the center of the enemy state known as Yüan in Wu Ting’s time and thereafter. However, though geographically possible, the recovered artifacts predate Wu Ting’s reign and indicate that it was a purely Shang enclave, uncontaminated by the intrusion of other cultural elements.)

60
Ch’en Hsüeh-hsiang and Chin Han-p’o, KK 2007:5, 84-85.

61
Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS, 1993:10, 29-40. (Dates cited for late T’ai-hsi center on 1300 BCE or a century before Wu Ting’s reign, but some artifacts corresponding to early Yin-hsü manifestations have also been recovered.)

62
Ho-pei-sheng WWYCS, KK 2007:11, 26-35.

63
Sung Hsin-ch’ao CKSYC 1991:1, 55.

64
Sung Hsin-ch’ao, 55. As attested by the character “
ya
” on the various grave goods, tomb number 1 clearly belonged to a Shang commander, probably a member of the royal clan (Ch’en Hsüeh-hsiang and Chin Han-p’o, KK 2007:5, 87).

65
Chiang Kang, KKWW 2008:1, 35-46, but especially 44-45. Initial site reports indicate that Wang-chia-shan consisted of a three-tiered, triangular earthen platform with dimensions of 80 by 180 meters.

66
Sung Hsin-ch’ao, CKSYC, 1991:1, 53-63.

67
The site reportedly shows the extent of Shang power over distant cultures. (A useful early report is Hu-pei-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 1976:2, 5-15, and Chiang Kang has examined some of the military aspects in KKWW 2008:1, 35-46, but the most comprehensive evaluation to date is the extensively illustrated
P’an-lung-ch’eng Ch’ing-t’ung Wen-hua
. Brief evaluations are also found in
Cambridge History of Ancient China
, 168-171, and
State Formation in Early China
, 75-78. Li Chien-min [KK 2001:5, 60-69] believes that Pan-lung-ch’eng was the capital of the Shang enfeoffed southern state of Ching-Ch’u [64], though this seems unlikely in view of the absence of feudal enfeoffments and subsequent Shang campaigns to the south.)

68
In contrast to the bronzes, the strong indigenous character of the ceramics has been interpreted as indicating the relatively sudden imposition of an external cultural type. (Ceramics are generally held to express local factors, bronze stylistic influences imposed by—or copied from—occupying powers. Although the 159 bronze objects consisting of ritual cauldrons, weapons, and a few tools were locally produced rather than imported [Nan P’u-heng et al., WW 2008:8, 77-82] and include a few distinctive types, they are virtually identical to lower Erh-li-kang Cheng-chou artifacts.) However, contrary to recent interpretations that emphasize resource acquisition, Chiang Kang, 2008:1, 46-48, doesn’t believe P’an-lung-ch’eng was engaged in mineral activities prior to the Shang.

69
For a reconstruction of ancient transport routes, the distribution of natural resources in the P’an-lung-ch’eng area, and a discussion of the importance of tribute and redistribution in the Shang’s ritually based monopolization of authority, see
State Formation in Early China
.
(Apparently there were three water routes and one land road for forwarding minerals to the capital, all controllable from P’an-lung-ch’eng. See Chiang Kang, KKWW 2008:1, 44.)

70
Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS 1993:10, 34-37, argues for it having been a Shang enclave.

71
Important reports include T’ang Lan, WW 1975:7, 72-76; Chiang-hsi-sheng Po-wu-kuan, WW 7 (1975): 51-71; and Chan K’ai-sun, KK 1 (1995): 36, 63-74. It is also briefly discussed in K. C. Chang’s
The Archaeology of Ancient China
, 389-394, and by Robert Bagley in the
Cambridge History of Ancient China
, 171-175.

72
K. C. Chang,
The Archaeology of Ancient China
, 389.

73
“Sun-tzu Wu Ch’i Lieh-chuan,”
Shih Chi.
As T’ang Lan points out (1975:7, 73), a slightly expanded, possibly original version is found in “Wei Ts’e” in the
Chan Kuo-ts’e
, which states that “relying on the terrain’s difficulty, they did not practice good government.”

74
For site reports see SHYCS, KKHP 1983:1, 55-92, and Tung-hsia-feng K’ao-ku-tui, KK 1980:2, 97-107.

1
T’ang Chi-ken, KKHP 1999:4, 410-413. Although cut off from direct contact with the Shang, rather than displacing Shang material culture the local resurgence was based on it.

2
See Yüeh Lien-chien, HCCHS 1993:10, 29-40.

3
It has also been suggested that the Hsia populace had been fully integrated, even assimilated, making the citadel’s abandonment possible. See Ts’ao Ping-wu, KK 1997:12, 86-87.

4
Other sequences substitute Pi and Po. Significant discrepancies in Warring States accounts have long prompted rather futile attempts to match them to likely sites. (For convenient summaries see Wang Li-chih, KKWW 2003:4, 41-42, or Wang Chen-chung, KKWW 2006:1, 44-49.)

5
According to the
Ku-pen Bamboo Annals.

6
For reports and discussion see Ch’en Hsü’s five HSLWC articles, 137-144, 145-154, 155- 158, 159-162, and 163-170; Ch’en’s KKWW 1 (2000): 33-38; and Fang Yu-sheng, KKWW 2000:1, 39-41.

7
Ch’en Hsü, KKWW 2000:1 36-37. Tsou Heng, KKWW 1998:4, 24-27, believes that Hsiaoshuang-ch’iao was the site of Chung Ting’s capital of Ao, Cheng-chou having been abandoned, whereas Fang Yu-sheng, HCCHS 1998:1, 58-63, KKWW 2000:1, 39-41, and KK 2002:8, 81-86, has repeatedly argued that Cheng-chou continued to flourish in the Pai-chia-chuang phase as the capital known as Ao and dismisses Hsiao-shuang-ch’iao as a secondary ritual center.

8
Tsou Heng, KKWW 1998:4, 26; Ch’en Hsü, HSWHLC, 161-162, and KKWW 2000:1, 36-37.

9
Ch’en Hsü, HSWHLC, 163-170, and KKWW 2000:1, 36-37.

10
For an overview of their relationship during the Yen-shih/Cheng-chou period, see Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 104-110. Considerably earlier than most archaeologists, Ch’en discerns a shift from a strong intermixing of Yüeh-shih elements prior to Cheng-chou to their virtual elimination post-Cheng-chou, not just in central China, but also in Shangdong, coincident with the Pai-chia-chuang phase of Shang culture.

11
Chia Chin-piao et al., KK 2005:2, 71-78; Chin Wen-sheng, STWMYC, 133-136; and Tsou Heng, STWMYC, 42-44. All the cultural elements clearly postdate ELK Pai-chia-chuang but are equally pre-Yin-hsü.

12
For a site report, see Tung-hsien-hsien K’ao-ku-tui, KK 2003:11, 27-40.

13
For a site report and analysis, see Ho Kuang-yüeh, CKKTS, 1995:5, 32-36.

14
For example, based on a comparative reading of the
Bamboo Annals
,
Shih Chi
, and other early writings, Ch’ao Fu-lin concluded that the clause indicating that “the Shang did not move their capital thereafter” is erroneous and that the
Shih Chi
is correct in stating that in P’an Keng’s
time their capital was north of the river and that he crossed to the south and again dwelt in “Ch’eng T’ang’s old dwelling,” in other words the old Po capital at Cheng-chou. He further believes some collateral activity occurred at Yin-hsü prior to Wu Ting’s ascension. (See CKSYC 1989:1, 57-67, and for further discussion Yen Yi-p’ing, 1989, Vol. 2, 157-173.)

15
Even this claim does not go unchallenged. Apart from the question of whether the storage pits simply haven’t been discovered, the reclassification of certain diviner group inscriptions has resulted in a few being attributed to the three reigns immediately preceding Wu Ting. (See Yang Pao-ch’eng, KK 2000:4, 74-80, and Ts’ao Ting-yün, HCCHS 2007:5, 21-29.)

16
For a basic site report, see SHYCS An-yang Kung-tsuo-tui, KK 2003:5, 3-16.

17
For example, Chu Kuang-hua, KKWW 2006:2, 31-35.

18
Wang Chen-chung, KKWW 2006:1, 48.

19
As suggested by Chu Kuang-hua, KKWW 2006:2, 31-35. (An alternative explanation—that Huan-pei may have been Yen and P’an Keng then simply moved across the river—seems not to have arisen.) Various dates have been suggested for the move to Anyang, such as Hsü Po-hung’s rather early 1350 BCE. (See HCCHS 1998:4, 29-36. Note that Hsü dates the Chou conquest to about 1075 BCE.) However, the Xia Shang Zhou Chronology Project has proposed a date of 1298 BCE, with Wu Ting’s ascension then occurring in 1251 BCE. The question is not independent of Cheng-chou’s abandonment.

20
Li Chi has recounted the myriad problems that beset early excavation work at Anyang in his classic
Anyang
. Apart from the numerous site reports and the fundamental information contained in
Cambridge History of Ancient China
, Chang Kwang-chih’s discussion in
Shang Civilization
, 69-135, and An Chin-huai’s “The Shang City at Cheng-chou and Related Problems” retain value. Chu Yen-min (1999) provides an extensive survey and analysis, but see also Shih Chang-ju, KKHP 2 (1947): 1-81.