Ancient Chinese Warfare (23 page)

As might be expected from its location in the midst of a highly fertile, well-watered alluvial basin bordered by mountains on three sides and the Yellow River to the south, the site was continuously occupied from the Neolithic period. Cultural layers ranging from the Yangshao (when the town was protected with ditches) through Lungshan and Erh-li-t’ou are all visible beneath suddenly intrusive Erh-li-kang artifacts deposited when the walls were erected by utilizing earlier ditches to
create the foundations and the town was turned into a fortress. The artifacts and various layers so far uncovered have stimulated the usual divergent conclusions on the site’s likely date and exact political nature, but without doubt it was constructed shortly after Cheng-chou itself. Moreover, the sharp transition from Erh-li-t’ou to Erh-li-kang culture conclusively shows that this was a deliberate Shang effort that coincided with its westward expansion into Chi-nan and Yü-hsi. Whether it was focused on controlling the former Hsia populace, securing local mineral deposits, warding off threats and incursions from more distant peoples, or some combination of these remains uncertain.
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Eastward, what may be interpreted as Shang colonization and pacification efforts that probably commenced in the Cheng-chou era during Chung Ting’s reign proceeded along the T’ai-hang mountain range out into Shandong and Hebei and the plains area. Hsing-t’ai, Han-tan, and Shih-chia-chuang are thus among the numerous Shang sites marked by heavy upper Erh-li-kang cultural manifestations. Artifacts recovered from Ta-hsin-chuang near Chi-nan City also indicate it was directly controlled by the Shang and probably had become a Shang city through the sudden displacement of Yüeh-shih (Tung Yi) cultural elements, though the latter retain prominence and were apparently well integrated.
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The well-known site of T’ai-hsi at Kao-ch’eng in Hebei also shows the sudden intrusion of Erh-li-kang culture into what had previously been intermixed Lungshan and early Shang strata with pronounced northern cultural (semipastoral) characteristics.
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Situated in the corridor between the T’ai-hang foothills and the Yellow River, the fortified town occupied a crucial location from which movement in all directions, including access down into the Anyang area, could be controlled, explaining its evolution into a powerful regional center by the early Anyang phase.
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The discovery of various symbols of power, including great axes, shows that these were fundamentally Shang military regions under the control of a commander or
ya
. For example, a large bronze
yüeh
with an iron blade (!) and another bronze
yüeh
decorated with an animal motif have been recovered at T’ai-hsi.
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Inscribed
yüeh
recovered from Su-pu-t’un, a site that has been tentatively identified with the former state of P’u-ku made famous by the Shang conquest, indicate that a
“commander Ch’ou” (Ya Ch’ou) governed as ruler of P’u-ku.
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Small bastions or strongpoints have also been found scattered around the southern and western periphery of Shang power, such as near Mt. Wang-chia in Yün-meng, T’ung-ku-shan in the Pa area in the upper Yangtze River, and Ching-nan-ssu, also in the ancient Pa area. Although marked by fewer decidedly Shang characteristics, they must have functioned as military emplacements that ensured the security of trade and transportation routes.
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Down in the Chiang-nan plains region, a complex area marked by strife between Lungshan and local cultures from the late Neolithic onward,
⁶⁶
lies the heavily fortified town of P’an-lung-ch’eng. Evidently constructed about 1500 BCE in the heart of the territory that would subsequently be known as Ching, it seems to have been completely abandoned during the interval between Kings P’an Keng and Wu Ting coincident with the rise of Wu-ch’eng as a major power center, evidence of ongoing Shang retrenchment after the initial period at Cheng-chou.
⁶⁷
Situated some 350 miles south of the latter in the middle Yangtze river valley close to modern Wu-han at the highest point on the Han River, this bastion essentially replicated Cheng-chou both physically and culturally but on a considerably smaller scale. Although the greater site exceeds a million square meters, the actual walls total a mere 1,000 meters, in comparison with Cheng-chou’s 7,100, with the basic fortified enclosure being just 290 meters north to south and 260 meters east to west. Having been constrained by the terrain’s contour—the entire fortification lies on one of several contiguous fingers that project out into Lake P’an-lung—the walls outline a slightly distorted rectangle and encompass about 75,000 square meters.

The stamped earth techniques used for the foundation and walls are virtually identical to those employed at Cheng-chou, clear evidence not only of their erection slightly after the latter, but also that
hang-t’u
fortification methods had become highly systematized. The uniform layers average 8 to 10 centimeters in thickness, while the excavated walls retain a remnant height of 1 to 3 meters despite erosion having claimed at least a meter or two. However, their widths vary dramatically, ranging from 21 to 38 meters on the north and 18 to 45 on the west, the two sides with comparatively greater threat exposure, to between 21 and 28 meters on the south.

A 10- to 12-meter-wide exterior moat with a depth ranging between 3.9 and 4.6 meters that exploited a preexisting ditch and achieved its deepest point in the north further augmented the defenses. In addition, the lake effectively isolated and thus protected P’an-lung-ch’eng on three of its four sides, while the numerous rivers and lakes in the immediate region would have further impeded ill-prepared aggressors.

Without doubt P’an-lung-ch’eng was constructed in an inherently hostile area. The transition from Erh-li-t’ou to Erh-li-kang artifacts indicates the forcible imposition of externally based authority on a local community that had previously been engaged in acquiring and forwarding mineral resources to the Hsia capital.
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Located at a transportation crossroads that allowed access to virtually every corner of China, including via the Yangtze up into Sichuan and down to the sea, and at the gateway to the vital copper and other mineral resources located in the middle and lower Yangtze that were being increasingly consumed by burgeoning Shang ritual culture, P’an-lung-ch’eng constituted a standalone, fortified city in the southern hinterland.
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The richness of the grave goods indicates the city certainly served as the headquarters of a local ruler, perhaps someone awarded ducal status within the Shang complex of dependent and annexed states. Although it has been argued he was a strong local chieftain who enjoyed generous Shang recognition, he may well have been a Shang clan member and the enclave a highly militarized Shang community.
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The unusually large percentage of weapons found among the excavated grave goods offers further confirmation of the settlement’s martial character. Apart from a unique, great symbolic axe of power, other weapons recovered from the ruler’s tomb include three axes, five halberds, two spearheads, seven knives, and eighteen arrowheads. Whatever the commander’s identity and status, P’an-lung-ch’eng proves that the Shang was capable of projecting power and consolidating control in a remote area, as well as levying the labor component necessary to construct a major fortified town.

The Chiang-nan plains region also saw the establishment of Wuch’eng in Jiangxi, another fortified city heavily imbued with Shang characteristics.
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Far from the center of Shang civilization, Wu-ch’eng is located well south of the Yangtze at approximately the same latitude as Ch’ang-sha in the west and Wen-chou in the east. Situated on a low
ridge, it rises above the Hsiao River, which flows from west to east just above it. Additional streams and bodies of water are found among the hillocks to the north and another stream runs along the south, all no doubt potentially effective in retarding enemy incursions, particularly because the Hsiao’s sixty-meter-wide sand bed indicates it had a much greater flow in antiquity. Numerous Shang sites are scattered about the surrounding terrain, no doubt because of the area’s fertility.

The walls enclose a relatively spacious 610,000 square meters, sufficient for a population of about 20,000. Three cultural layers roughly contemporaneous with Cheng-chou, early Anyang, and late Anyang or early Western Chou phases overlie the late Neolithic foundations. A few of the more than 500 items excavated bear primitive characters, some judged to be earlier forms of Shang oracle bone script, others deemed highly localized. Bronze artifacts include a few weapons such as a short knife with a protruding handle from the first period, a halberd and an axe from the second, and arrowheads from the third.

The stone and ceramic items are dominated by tools employed in handicraft industries and daily life, cooking utensils, and wine vessels, some of which were also cast in bronze. A number of stone molds designed to produce items in the style of artifacts from P’an-lung-ch’eng and the early Anyang phase have also been recovered. Many were created to produce arrowheads and similar small weapons, others allowed the casting of larger pieces such as axes, and a few even have inscribed characters. A small foundry has been discovered, but it would not have been capable of producing the full range of recovered items by itself.

Critical questions have arisen about the city’s significance and interpretation because the ceramics and bronzes display a markedly indigenous character despite their basic similarity to Shang styles dating to Cheng-chou and thereafter. Some analysts have suggested Wu-ch’eng is a derivative culture from P’an-lung-ch’eng rather than a direct Shang enclave, but none have ventured any bolder evaluation than that the culture “was the product of an indigenous Geometric environment” that early on developed extensive metallurgical industries.
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However, it is located at a strategic point that could have repelled threats from the south, west, and east and controlled the trade passing through from highly disparate regions. Even Wu Ch’i referred to this area when attempting
to enlighten his ruler about the error of relying on advantageous locations when he said, “Formerly the Three Miao had Tungt’ing Lake on the left and P’eng-li Lake on the right, but they didn’t cultivate Virtue and righteousness and Yü obliterated them.”
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The sudden appearance of Shang-style ceramics and artifacts (despite strong local characteristics) in an area of strategic significance suggests that the city or its associated proto-state had been abruptly integrated into the Shang hierarchy. The ruler might have been a submissive local lord, but given the site’s pronounced military character, localized weapons production, presence of stone weapons in some graves, and the repeated appearance of the character for dagger-axe, it seems more likely that a Shang clan force must have temporarily occupied the area. In addition to immediately erecting fortifications, just as at P’an-lungch’eng they would have brought ceramic and bronze designs, accounting for their similarity to Cheng-chou even though necessarily overlaying indigenous styles.

The changes visible at Tung-hsia-feng in the west and P’an-lungch’eng down in the Chiang-han plains provide clear evidence of the Shang’s formidable power and their determination to secure peripheral areas previously controlled by the Hsia, including by utilizing Hsia fortresses that dominated access to crucial mineral resources. At Tung-hsia-feng the Shang incorporated the Hsia defensive ditches within a much larger, irregular, but presumably rectangular-shaped, early Shang-fortified town that was protected by 8-meter-wide walls. Constructed from tamped earth layers some 10 centimeters thick, the 1.8-meter-high walls are said to have been comparable to P’an-lung-ch’eng and no doubt served the dedicated purpose of projecting power and controlling essential routes from the Shang heartland out to vital mineral deposits.
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8.

A
LTHOUGH DISAGREEMENTS ABOUND over the causes and extent, without doubt the middle Shang—which may be defined as post-Cheng-chou but pre-Anyang and therefore the reigns of Chung Ting to Hsiao Yi or perhaps P’an Keng—was a period of contraction. As indicated by the absence of Shang artifacts, resurgence of indigenous styles, and ascension of new groups such as the Chou, numerous settlements in Shanxi and the western fortresses of Tung-hsia-feng and Yüan-ch’ü were abandoned to local populations.
¹
In addition, a number of “foreign states” or
fang-kuo
that would prove troublesome during the latter part of Wu Ting’s reign, including Ch’ien, Sui, and Ching, were evolving in Shaanxi about this time.
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Yüan-ch’ü’s abandonment despite persistent threats from the western quarter suggests that exposed fortresses lacked the tactical power necessary to function as control points in relative isolation.
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The Shang may have withdrawn its forces as part of a revised strategic approach or simply decided that the bastion had become an indefensible logistical burden because of its inability to rely on locally produced foodstuffs. Nearby relatively mobile steppe peoples such as the Kung and T’u-fang may have already been exerting enormous pressure, but the bastion’s disuse could equally be evidence of imperial weakness or debauchery. However, even after vanquishing the local aggressors, King Wu Ting apparently chose not to reoccupy it or station a permanent garrison there, a decision that suggests the ad hoc nature of Shang military efforts, the difficulty of exerting control at a distance, an overall contraction of
Shang military power, and perhaps a general disinclination to maintain standing border forces despite having erected numerous strongpoints on the perimeter.

Clan disorder and conflict over kingship have been proposed as the impetus for the Shang’s preoccupation with internal affairs as well as the decision to shift the capital, abandoning the well-developed, fortified city of Cheng-chou. Whatever the cause, the massive fiscal and manpower expenditures required to construct an entirely new city, including expansive palaces and substantial fortifications, must have diverted vital resources from power projection, if not military affairs in general. However, the development of highly productive mineral resources in the east and southeast probably diminished Tung-hsia-feng’s formerly vital role in controlling the nearby mountains.