Afghanistan (47 page)

Organization has been a weakness of the US, coalition, and Kabul efforts to counter Afghanistan’s conflicts from the outset. Unity of command and unity of effort have been difficult to achieve, both on a purely military basis and between military and non-military efforts. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in 2002 in an attempt to facilitate UN and NGO participation in Afghan security, as these groups did not want to interact with the US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) headquarters that had led the initial 2001–02 invasion and overthrew the Taliban.
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UN Security Council Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001 authorized the establishment of ISAF. The different origins of the two headquarters, ISAF under Europeans and intended to keep the peace and OEF under Americans (although with coalition participation) and intended to capture terrorists, has made it hard for them to pull together. When it became apparent that the US was not going to put in place a single headquarters that would be able to handle security throughout Afghanistan, ISAF expanded its headquarters’ reach starting in 2003–04, again authorized by the UN Security Council, bringing in higher ranking generals and more capable staffs to manage their operations. The US headquarters in Afghanistan were correspondingly increased, but by then the effective and unified operations of 2001–02 were gone and the US and ISAF were on the paths to separate strategies. US special operations under SOCOM operational command were not integrated with other elements of the overall strategy or with the government of Afghanistan.
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Development was more divided and divorced from the efforts to hold back the insurgent activities that could potentially negate any gains or benefit to the Afghan people realized from humanitarian efforts. When NATO took over responsibility for ISAF in August 2003, it could then access US personnel and support; by the end of 2008 about a quarter of ISAF’s 52,000 personnel were US military and civilians, removing some of the gaps between the US and ISAF efforts. Throughout this period, there was no unitary command plan, let alone strategy, for both US and ISAF forces. Each organization had differing priorities, rules of engagements, and operational methods. Terrorists,
insurgents, and narcotics traffickers alike were perceptive enough to identify the gaps between the two and exploit them: for example, often operating in close proximity to ISAF forces that were considered unlikely to attack them to reduce vulnerability to US airstrikes.

Progress in addressing these problems was made in 2008–10. GEN David Petraeus said: “We need a comprehensive whole-of-government counter-insurgency approach. The legitimacy of government is the key ingredient in any counter-insurgency.”
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This approach was announced by NATO in 2008 and stressed that military operations needed to be carried out in coordination with developing Afghan institutions and capabilities while enabling reconstruction and development.
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2008 saw the previously distinct US and ISAF/NATO chains of command inside Afghanistan brought together under US GEN David McKiernan, which made the parallel chains of higher-level command that continued, running separately to the two coalition commands from Brussels (NATO) and Florida (CENTCOM HQ), more palatable. McKiernan also ordered the drafting of the 2008 ISAF Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) that clearly stated objectives and approaches that would be shared throughout the coalition effort. Although McKiernan was sacked in May 2009
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as too much of a conventional coalition warrior, out of touch with the new command structure, and replaced by US GEN Stanley McChrystal, the unified command arrangement was retained. McChrystal wears two hats and works as both a US and NATO commander. However, NATO still retains its Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) position in Kabul, outside of ISAF, a position held since July 2008 by Italian Ambassador Fernando Gentilni. This means that there is still no single “NATO voice” in interactions with the US and the Afghan government. In January 2010, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called for such a capability.
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In mid-2009 McChrystal was using his dual command authority to implement unity by revising the tactics, techniques, and procedures of both US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. This included a tactical driving directive to reduce accidents and needless casualties that have so often turned Afghans against their foreign guests. A revised ISAF tactical directive has been, according to Petraeus, “All about taking lessons
learned with a very nuanced and granular appreciation of the situation on the ground. It emphasized the imperative of avoiding civilian casualties and the numbers have been reduced by rigorous implementation.”
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ISAF Joint Command (IJC), an intermediate US/ISAF headquarters for Afghanistan, was created using assets from the Germany-based US V Corps headquarters under US LTG David Rodriguez. Operational in November 2009, IJC provided a joint level of command responsible for the full range of daily tactical operations and providing the interface between the high level commands of US Forces-Afghanistan and ISAF and the five contiguous regional commands (RC) (Regional-Commands, East, West, South, North and Center) that have the primary responsibility for operations.
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US and ISAF forces are integrated under these five regional commands. In late 2009, RC-Center was under French Command, RC-East was under US command, RC-West was under Italian command, RC-South command rotated between Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands, and RC-North was under German command. US Special Operations Command is a supporting rather than supported command in these operations, thus working under CENTCOM and not functioning as an independent command, although it can operate as such for operations such as high-priority raids where operational security is especially important.
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CENTCOM continues to operate special operations forces and has a counter-terrorism special operational task force under its command in the region as well.

Afghanistan already has a complex set of internal divisions, but the coalition military effort has added a new set of competing tribes: the military forces of ISAF’s 71,000 personnel from 43-plus countries, each with their own way of operating and each with unique national goals and objectives.
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The impacts on the multiple intertwined conflicts have been dire. GEN Bantz Craddock said that “Political leadership in NATO is AWOL.”
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Tactical interoperability among NATO members reflects a high level of professionalism. But the operational effect of this is undercut by the explicit national caveats, issued by each nation’s government, that restrict the orders that OEF or ISAF may give to their troops.
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National caveats can include prohibitions on night operations, proactive patrolling, or in
taking part in the disarmament of Afghan groups and counter-narcotics operations. Germany’s large coalition troop presence in Afghanistan has had its actions limited by restrictive national caveats and rules of engagement. German troops can use deadly force only in self-defense and have their ability to move or operate at night limited.
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German training and advisory teams cannot conduct combined offensive operations with ANA units. The highly capable German special operations forces were effectively confined to their forward operating base. Other coalition members have taken other limited-liability approaches to their Afghanistan commitments, rendering the coalition militarily weaker than it should be, given the breadth of international participation. France has restricted the number of troops deployed, although its combat units have few restrictive caveats limiting their operations. Norway, Sweden, Italy, and Spain have made widespread use of national caveats and have restricted the areas in Afghanistan where their troops can deploy and operate, while Denmark, with fewer limitations, has allowed its troops to operate integrated with the UK contingent. In some cases, countries have committed only forces suitable for non-combat tasks, such as operating the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that provide much of the coalition’s development work in rural Afghanistan. Other countries that have deployed combat units continue to make force protection, rather than the effective low-level tactics normally associated with successful counter-insurgency warfare, their priority.

The US has pushed its coalition partners to reduce the impact of national caveats, and several countries have removed or reduced them. NATO has moved toward interoperability and shared operational capabilities in more conventional operations and learned the nuances of international peace operations the hard way in the Balkans, but it had no framework at all with regards to counter-insurgency warfare. Some NATO members still do not officially recognize the term. Many of the coalition armed forces committed to Afghanistan are neither trained nor equipped to take part in the full range of military operations required and have lacked the resources or capability to adapt.

But the overall NATO effort may be undercut by the withdrawal of two of the alliance’s most effective members, Canada and the
Netherlands, from ground combat operations (although not necessarily training and development) that is scheduled to take place in 2010–11. Other coalition members have the potential to find that their commitment may become even more politically unpopular at home if they suffer more than minimal casualties.
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Collateral Damage

The unwillingness by many coalition members to commit large numbers of troops and to allow them to take part in effective counter-insurgency operations has actually contributed to collateral damage. When there are too few troops on the ground, they have to redress their lack of numbers by calling in indirect fire or airstrikes, which are especially frequent in southern Afghanistan where there are relatively few troops and insurgents can come together quickly. Many coalition troops remain in their protective positions due to lack of numbers, with force protection being seen as a higher priority than offensive action. Yet moving in rural Afghanistan with large forces is what will strengthen the appearance of an army of occupation that is not comfortable with the Afghan people.

This underlines the fundamental tension collateral damage concerns are placing on coalition operations. More troops are needed to reduce the need for collateral damage, which creates resentment for the coalition and sympathy for the insurgents. While more troops will, in turn, have the potential of appearing as an army of occupation and also creating such resentment, they also have the potential to provide enhanced security for the Afghans that can enable reconstruction and win over support. These contradictory requirements have given additional importance to the use of smaller, special operations forces that will strike using accurate and timely intelligence targeting. But here again, when they are perceived to target the wrong Afghans, regardless of the underlying reality, their actions can undercut overall coalition strategy.

With regards to collateral damage issue, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen said that “I believe each time we do that [kill civilians] puts our strategy in jeopardy. . . . We cannot succeed in Afghanistan—or anywhere else, but let’s talk specifically about Afghanistan—by killing Afghan civilians. The center of gravity in Afghanistan
is the people of Afghanistan.”
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A poll published in 2009 shows that 77 percent of Afghans considered such collateral damage unacceptable.
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By 2007, President Karzai was acting as a spokesman for these concerns.
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In 2008, Rahim Wardak, Afghanistan’s defense minister, said “Civilian casualties and collateral damage hurts the support of the people for the government and the international presence. Better intelligence, integrated planning, cohesion, the use of Afghan forces for house searches, avoiding the use of air forces or indirect fires in populated areas can be achieved by use of ground forces and ensure that reaction is proportionate to the target.”
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The importance of the issue was emphasized by the 22 August 2008 incident where an airstrike killed 95 Afghan civilians in the village of Azizabad in Herat province, which led to strong concerns being voiced by Karzai and UN authorities.
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But collateral damage remains a potential cost inherent in the number of troops required for security against the insurgency, requiring effective mitigation and limitation approaches to be put in place.
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In 2009 polling, among Afghans that report bombing or shelling by US or NATO/ISAF forces in their area, support for the presence of US forces in Afghanistan drops to 46 percent, as opposed to 70 percent among those that report no such activity.
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In 2009, collateral damage continued to increase, with estimates that coalition firepower was creating 20–25 percent of Afghan casualties.
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The impact of civilian casualties has been increased by the Afghan’s expectation as to the precision of US military action. The highly responsive capabilities of US military firepower were clear to the Afghans from the battles of 2001–02. A precise target could be destroyed in just minutes. House searches, non-precision tactics potentially affecting any rural Afghans, special forces raids which take people away in the middle of the night, and road accidents caused by foreign forces, were among the coalition tactics that created not necessarily a mass movement, but large numbers of individual Afghans with grievances that their culture told them could not be easily ignored or explained away without a blow to their self-image.
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The widespread searching of houses by coalition forces after 2001 presented a challenge to traditional Afghan values. As with collateral damage, there is no avoiding the fact that house searches are required in
effective counter-insurgency operations although they create resentment. The increased use of Afghan forces, especially the Afghan National Police (ANP), is part of the required mitigation, but this will require reform and better training of this force. The Afghans will need to see for themselves that the searches help result in the increased security they desire.