A World at Arms (21 page)

The other area of immediate concern to the administration in Washington was the situation in Central and South America. There was worry about the large German element in several Latin American countries, about German ships–and their crews–stranded by the outbreak of war in Latin American ports, and about the attitude of several of the governments in the area toward Germany and the Western Allies. In Central and South America there was a reciprocal concern. All preferred to stay out of the war, some were also worried about German activities at home, and a few either had or hoped to have better relations, especially trade relations, with Germany. A conference held in Panama beginning on September 23, 1939,
¹⁶⁰
affirmed the neutrality of the hemisphere. The most spectacular action of the conference was its unanimous endorsement of a neutral war zone reaching far out into the Atlantic, but perhaps of greater substantive significance was the extent to which the nations of the area were prepared to work together under United States leadership. This novel development was, to some extent, a result of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy toward those countries–vigorously implemented by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles
¹⁶¹
–combined with fears of Germany, particularly in countries with substantial minorities of German settlers.
¹⁶²
Insofar as Germany had established some significant positions for herself in the economic life of several Latin American countries, the beginning of war in 1939 created a new situation: the Latin Americans could neither market their products in Germany nor draw on German industry for imports. In this regard, much would depend upon the length and outcome of the war; in the meantime, the South American countries had to look elsewhere for markets and supplies.
¹⁶³

An important issue on which Roosevelt himself changed tactics during the first month of World War II was that of the possibility of a peace settlement between the Western Powers and Germany
after the initial defeat of Poland. Convinced that any such settlement on the heels of a German military triumph could only lead to even greater dangers later, Roosevelt refrained from giving any encouragement to such steps in the fall of 1939.
¹⁶⁴
He did not directly discourage several Americans who made private efforts in this direction, but he used those efforts–as he had often done with private persons in the past–to inform himself about the situation in Germany
¹⁶⁵
The British government, in any case, was advised to pay no attention to these busybodies.
¹⁶⁶
The President himself was primarily worried that during the period of peace soundings, which are reviewed below, the defeatist views of his ambassador in London, Joseph P. Kennedy, might be mistaken for his own, when in fact he thought of the ambassador as a “pain in the neck.”
¹⁶⁷

Early in 1940, the increasingly close cooperation of Germany and the Soviet Union led him to be concerned that the Germans might launch an offensive in the West before France and Great Britain were adequately prepared to resist it and that Germany and the Soviet Union could then be joined by Italy. It was under these circumstances that he authorized Under Secretary of State Welles to make his famous tour of European capitals, a tour which revealed that the positions of the belligerents were irreconcilable, but in no way delayed the German offensive which by that time, as will be discussed, had been postponed for entirely different reasons. This tactical shift on Roosevelt’s part, however, marked no change in his basic views or in American policy; and as the brief review of the peace soundings of the winter 1939–40 will show, there were in reality no prospects of peace anyway.
¹⁶⁸

PEACE SOUNDINGS

Since Hitler had wanted to clear his eastern border preparatory to launching the great German offensive in the West, which he saw as the necessary prerequisite for a vast but easy seizure of living space in the East, he would have been quite happy to have Britain and France acquiesce in the conquest of Poland peacefully and await their turn to be attacked. The Commander-in-Chief of the German air force, Hermann Göring, was also in charge of large segments of the German economy. He wanted more time for economic preparations he considered important and was similarly interested in a respite in open hostilities. In view of these perceptions and aims, Hitler and Göring launched some peace feelers, Hitler in public, Göring in private. Hitler in speeches pointed to the fate of Poland and explained there was now nothing to fight over.
¹⁶⁹
Göring sent out feelers through Birger Dahlerus, the Swedish
intermediary he had used before, and through other channels as well.
¹⁷⁰

Hitler was most doubtful that peace would be restored, and because he had no intention of making the slightest concessions to obtain it, he was simultaneously ordering preparations for a major offensive in the West to be launched a few weeks after the end of fighting in Poland, most likely in early or mid-November.
¹⁷¹
Many of the key figures in the German military thought this a highly risky venture likely to produce either a defeat or a bitter stalemate of the sort all of them had seen at first hand in World War I; some of them recoiled at the plan to invade the neutral Low Countries; and a small number had doubts about the National Socialist regime as a whole. Supported by and in some contact with a few officials of the German foreign ministry, they too launched a series of peace soundings as did some foreign ministry officials on their own. Though under way in the same months as the ones of Hitler and Göring, these were, of course, not sanctioned by the Führer. Most in fact assumed his displacement. For this reason they will be examined separately at the end of this discussion.
¹⁷²

Other countries were also interested in having formal hostilities ended. During von Ribbentrop’s second visit to Moscow, the German and Soviet governments had agreed that now that Poland had disappeared peace was in order. In support of German policy and in accord with Stalin’s perception of Soviet interests, the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties around the world now launched a vocal campaign for peace.
¹⁷³
Stalin had made clear his belief that the disappearance of Poland and Czechoslovakia from the map of Europe was entirely appropriate; a peace which ratified the existing situation in Eastern Europe would imply Western recognition of Soviet as well as German gains. If the war continued, that meant from his point of view that the capitalist powers would tear each other up to the benefit of the Soviet Union.

The Italians for a while also thought peace could be to their advantage. Since they wanted additional time to prepare for war with Britain and France, a restoration of peace would both provide that time and mitigate Mussolini’s embarrassment at not having been able to join Hitler in the war immediately. The Italians, however, recognized from the start that only major and real German concessions offered the slightest hope of having any peace proposal taken seriously by the Western Powers. They quickly learned that there was no prospect of such concessions and therefore equally quickly gave up their attempts.
¹⁷⁴
The Hungarians for a short time also tried their hand at getting contacts for peace negotiations,
¹⁷⁵
the Belgian and Dutch rulers appealed for peace when a German invasion looked likely,
¹⁷⁶
and individuals from other neutral
countries, like the Norwegian Bishop Eivind Berggrav, made personal attempts at diplomacy.
¹⁷⁷
Because the German government was not about to take any steps backward from their prior advances–which had been designed to be the bases for subsequent further advances–nothing could come from such efforts.

Central to any possible peace under the circumstances of the time was the policy of France and Great Britain. There is some evidence that French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet might have been willing to consider negotiations, but he was in any case soon removed from office by Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, who took over that portfolio himself on September 13. While the latter supported a variety of schemes designed to divert hostilities to other portions of Europe, preferably at a distance from France herself, he was a determined man who was not going to negotiate a peace with Hitler’s Germany on the basis of accepting Germany’s conquests. The detailed record is not entirely clear as yet, but insofar as it is, it shows a complete unwillingness to negotiate with Germany unless that country evacuated Poland, restored Czechoslovakia, and withdrew from Austria. Whether or not British belief that the French would this time insist on a dismemberment of Germany was correct, there was certainly no chance that the French government would give serious consideration to terms other than ones which the Germans were certain to reject.
¹⁷⁸

The British Cabinet began to worry about the impact on public opinion in England and elsewhere of any German peace offensive as early as September 9. Their first concern was that all be reassured that Britain would fight on. Far from exhibiting any interest in negotiations with the German government of the day, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain asserted that “it was clear that the essential preliminary to any settlement of European problems was the destruction of Hitlerism.”
¹⁷⁹
The complete loss of any possible trust in the Hitler regime as a result of the violation of the Munich agreement by the latter had manifested itself in the summer of 1939 in British insistence that Germany take a step backward, that is, restore independence to Czechoslovakia, before there could be any new Anglo-German agreement.
¹⁸⁰
Now that Germany had attacked Poland, the British government would insist not only on the evacuation of Poland and a restored Czechoslovakia but an entirely different government in Germany. Experience had taught the British that agreements with Hitler were not worth the paper on which they were written. In view of these perceptions, any agreement with the existing government in Berlin would be seen in London as counter-productive, or likely to strengthen the Hitler regime instead of displacing it as the British thought essential.

The discussion in London, as well as the consultations of London with Paris in the following weeks, accordingly revolved around making these points clear and explicit while simultaneously trying to reassure the Germans that, if they displaced the Nazi regime and restored the independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia, they might look forward to a satisfactory existence in a peaceful Europe. In a series of discussions within the government, these points were clarified.
¹⁸¹
Poland had to be evacuated by the Germans; although the question of what to do about the portions of Poland occupied by the Soviet Union was left open, the fact that the redrawing of the boundary at the second von Ribbentrop-Stalin meeting had left most of the ethnic Poles on the German side of the line was recognized.
¹⁸²
While the British government was not pre... pared to commit itself on the details of the borders and internal structure of Czechoslovakia, there was no argument over the central issue: the Germans would be required to agree to the restoration of that country’s full independence. Unlike the Soviet Union, Britain and France had never recognized the de jure disappearance of Czechoslovakia; they continued to recognize the ambassadors of the Prague government.
¹⁸³

On these points there was no disagreement between London and Paris.
¹⁸⁴
The Austrian question, however, was not so easily disposed of. From the available evidence it appears that the French government was insistent on a fully independent Austria under any circumstances. The British, on the other hand, took the position that a genuine plebiscite should be held there, thereby implying a willingness to accept either possible verdict of the Austrian voters.
¹⁸⁵
This was an issue in no need of great debate at the time; it would be faced long after the fall of France and by a different anti-German coalition.
¹⁸⁶

In the discussions in London, it was understood that this line of calling for a return to earlier borders and replacing the Hitler regime would make Britain Hitler’s key enemy, to be pounded by air and all other possible means, and that the German government would do its best or worst–to crush England from the occupied Low Countries before turning East.
¹⁸⁷
But there appeared to be few alternatives. When first approached by individuals purporting to represent opposition elements in Germany, the British government authorized contacts by its agents in the Netherlands, only to have the project blow up in their faces. The Germans arranged the kidnapping of the British intelligence officers by the SS, which had engineered the whole scheme. This affair is generally referred to as the Venlo Incident after the Dutch town where the kidnapping, and the murder of a Dutch officer, took place on November 9, 1939. It put a shadow over all subsequent contacts between the British and those Germans claiming to be opposed to the Hitler regime; but,
as will be discussed below, the London government still tried that route much of the winter.
¹⁸⁸

The fundamental issue, however, remained the same from the beginning to the end. In commenting on one of the earliest of the approaches from Dahlerus, British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had stated on September 19: “I can conceive of no peace offer which the German government are likely in present circumstances to make that could be considered by H. M. Government or the French Government.”
¹⁸⁹
As the Cabinet contemplated a possible German offer on October 7 and 9, there was agreement that the chief war aim was the elimination of Hitler plus the restoration of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and disarmament, and that no reliance could be placed on the word of the present German government.
¹⁹⁰
The public position presented in Chamberlain’s speech of October 12 had been worked out with great care; the Dominions and the French had been consulted; and the participation of Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, would leave Chamberlain’s successor pleased with the result and considering it appropriate for his own government.
¹⁹¹
In full public view Chamberlain explained that Hitler’s proposal that Britain and France accept what Germany had done was impossible for Britain to agree to. For Britain, there was no alternative to fighting on until the European countries which had lost their independence had had it returned to them, the Hitler regime had been removed, and such restrictions had been imposed on Germany as would prevent her from attempting to conquer Europe and dominate the world a third time.
¹⁹²